



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



H 108.77

HARVARD COLLEGE
LIBRARY



FROM THE FUND OF
CHARLES MINOT

CLASS OF 1828

GREAT CAMPAIGNS

GREAT CAMPAIGNS

A SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY
OPERATIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE
IN EUROPE FROM 1796 TO 1870

EDITED FROM THE
LECTURES AND WRITINGS OF THE LATE

Charles
MAJOR C. ADAMS

PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY AT THE ROYAL
MILITARY AND STAFF COLLEGES

BY
Charles
CAPTAIN C. COOPER KING

R.M. ARTILLERY; INSTRUCTOR OF TACTICS
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE

c WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXVII

~~#, 30~~ ~~#778.77~~

H108.77

18th, March 11.
Minot fund.

840
42.226
9

P R E F A C E

THE subject-matter of the following pages has been compiled from a long series of printed and manuscript notes left by the late Major Charles Adams.

I have endeavoured to preserve in as unaltered a form as possible those abstracts of the great campaigns of history, on which his lectures, delivered at the Royal Military and Staff Colleges, during a period of many years, were mainly based. As far as it lay in my power, I have retained most of the lectures in their entirety, only making additions to them in places where distinct gaps occurred in the narrative, owing to the loss or obliteration of the original notes. But in some cases I have been compelled to extend those memoranda which were so brief as merely to indicate the points on which the author purposed dwelling, and in other instances I have compiled from several accounts a history which should contain the most important points of each.

In doing this I have been actuated by the sole desire of preserving intact Major Adams's style, expressions, and opinions; and I have attempted, from a large

quantity of material, to select the most useful of his writings. The different campaigns have been connected together by a short summary of the principal events which occurred between them, so as to make the military history of the last eighty years somewhat continuous; for it seemed to me that the necessarily brief accounts of the events recorded would possess more vital interest, and be less disconnected or isolated, if linked together by even so slight a chain. In this case, as in all others, when I have been compelled to introduce new matter necessary for continuity, smaller print has been employed.

It will be observed, from the Table of Contents, that the operations examined are, with one exception, those in which the great Continental Powers only were engaged. But the author very strongly held that subjects for illustrative teaching should be selected on their own merits as examples of military art, and protested against the doctrine that "the school which advocates such a selection should be termed 'Continental' because the wars which they have examined and studied happen to have been fought out by the natives of France or Germany. Earnest students of war are as indifferent to the locality which favours their examination as the surgeon is to the nationality of the body presented for dissection; and the modest reply of King William of Prussia to Napoleon's compliments on the extraordinary efficiency of the German army on the day after Sedan shares the same view: 'Sire, my endeavour has been, during our long period of peace, to assimilate the experience of other more fortunate armies.'"

Major Adams strongly held the opinion that theoretical training is of especial value to all soldiers, from the subaltern to the leader, as imparting additional interest and value to the share each must have in conducting the great operations of war to a successful issue.

In an article on the necessity in modern times for professional training, he said :—

“ I fully share the views held by the Marquis de Feuquières on this question, as long ago as 1736. These were, that ‘a young man, during his first two or three campaigns, either from want of application or deficiency in penetration, is at a loss to understand the motive by which the movements of the generals under whom he serves are dictated. For this reason it has always been my opinion that he who understands the theory of war would be better qualified for reducing the theory to practice than he who is deficient in such preliminary knowledge.’ I can, from my own experience, fully support this. I have been myself, for weeks together, in face of the enemy, on ground the topography of which I was utterly ignorant of, and, what is worse, unqualified, for want of preliminary training, to select the best means of mastering it. I have been for weeks employed with a single regiment, as a junior subaltern, in guarding the sole communications of an army, without recognising in the slightest degree the purpose of the employment. How much more zeal would have been enlisted in my own individual action had the military position been intelligible to me; and, presuming my own case to belong to the rule, and by no means exceptional, how much more would the public service have benefited by accumulation of individual intelligence as opposed to that of individual ignorance?”

Occupying, as the late Major Adams did, the responsible and important position of Professor of Mili-

tary History at the Staff College, it is hoped that his analysis of the great campaigns of the century will be of value to those who care to study, in the history of former wars, those great principles on which a true appreciation of the requirements of military art can alone be securely founded.

C. COOPER KING.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE,
June 1877:

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
1796. CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—MONTENOTTE. France v. Austria and Sardinia.	} . . 1
1800. CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—MARENGO. France v. Austria.	} . . 13
1805. CAMPAIGN IN S. GERMANY—ULM. France v. Austria.	} . . 79
1805. CAMPAIGN IN S. GERMANY—AUSTERLITZ. France v. Austria.	} . . 99
1806. CAMPAIGN IN N. GERMANY—JENA. France v. Prussia.	} . . 120
1807. CAMPAIGN IN POLAND—FRIEDLAND. France v. Prussia and Russia.	} . . 139
1813. CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY—DRESDEN. France v. Allies.	} . . 156
1814. CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE—MONTMIRAIL. France v. Allies.	} . . 171
1815. CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM—WATERLOO. France v. Allies.	} . . 202
1849. CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—NOVARA. Austria v. Sardinia.	} . . 228
1859. CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—MAGENTA. Austria v. France and Sardinia.	} . . 271

1866. CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA—KÖNIGGRATZ.	}	.	.	341
Austria v. Prussia.				
1866. CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—CUSTOZZA.	}	.	.	477
Austria v. Italy.				
1870. CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE—GRAVELOTTE.	}	.	.	508
Germany v. France.				

LIST OF MAPS.

VALLEY OF THE PO.

VALLEY OF THE DANUBE.

NORTHERN EUROPE.

NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.

CENTRAL FRANCE.

GREAT CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. FIRST PERIOD.

Introduction.—On the 7th March 1792, Leopold II., Emperor of Germany, died. He was succeeded by his son Francis II., who, on assuming the reins of government, expressed his determination to carry out his father's policy against France; and the French Government, equally determined on hostilities, forced the King, Louis XVI., to declare war against the German empire.

From this declaration sprang the long series of campaigns and battles which this book illustrates. The bitter feelings engendered by the desperate struggles of the period under review have borne fruit even to the last great war. It will be necessary, therefore, to summarise in the briefest possible way the events that led up to the first campaign examined, that of 1796.

In the spring of the year 1792, the French armies of the North, the Lauter, the Rhine, and the Alps, took the initiative, and the first mentioned invaded Belgium, then an appanage of the Imperial power. Prussia, a member of the German Confederation, united with Austria in publishing a haughty declaration espousing the cause of the French King against his people; and the Duke of Brunswick crossed the Rhine as generalissimo of the united armies. The advance into the Netherlands was therefore checked; but the 20th September saw the dawn of the great successes that were henceforth to shed a lustre on the French arms, in the victory of Valmy, on the Verdun-Chalons road, which, insignificant in itself, produced a wonderful effect on the minds of the French people, and the immediate result of which was the withdrawal of the Allied armies behind the Meuse.

At the same time some minor operations took place between a Sardinian force occupying Savoy, and the Army of the Alps, under Montes-

quien, further assisted by the "Army of Italy," which was despatched to Nice in the French fleet.

The victory of Jemappes, near Mons, on the 6th November 1792, was followed by a further retreat of the Allies, a reoccupation of the Austrian Netherlands, and the advance of the southern theatre of war into the Rhine provinces.

The first event of the year 1793—an event, too, pregnant with important consequences, inasmuch as it brought England on the scene—was the death of Louis XVI.; and this was followed by a declaration of war against Holland and Great Britain on the part of the new French Republic.

The action taken by Charles VI. of Spain in protesting against the trial and condemnation of the King, was followed by the open assertion that the policy of France was "pour exterminer tous les rois de l'Europe," and finally by a declaration of war against Spain on the 7th March.

Thus through the whole of this and the following year the armies of the Republic had to contend with enemies on every side. Every avenue of approach to France was guarded by a hostile army, but the tide of battle surged most violently on the plains of the Low Countries and in the valley of the Rhine, with, on the whole, indecisive results. Still the general improvement in the character of the French armies, the persistency with which they contended against enormous odds and not unfrequent reverses, the tenacity of purpose with which they unitedly followed out their aim as compared with the indecision, want of unity, and lack of energy of the Coalition, led to striking results. The British troops were withdrawn to England on the 12th March 1795. Prussia in the same month was the first to recognise the growing power of France by signing with her a treaty of peace; and the Imperialists fell back on the defensive to Luxemburg and the Rhine.

The French Republic had taken its place among the nations.

The year 1795 closed with an offensive campaign on the part of the French leaders, which was so far ineffective that though the Austrians were somewhat successful, they proposed an armistice, which was gladly accepted by Generals Jourdain and Pichegru; and the belligerents came to terms on the 1st January 1796, remaining inactive till the 1st June of the same year.

During the autumn of 1795 the Army of Italy had also gained its slight successes. In November it had won after a hard contest the battle of Loano, and with it the possession of the valleys leading on Turin marked by the Orba, Bormida, and Tanaro; while the Alpine ridges and the Corniche Pass were also in the possession of the armies of the Republic.

The year 1796 opened with a display of renewed activity on the part of the French Directory. To General Moreau was intrusted the Army of the Rhine, destined to invade Germany. Jourdain was still left in command of that of the Sambre and Meuse; Kellerman commanded the Army of the Alps; while to the Army of Italy was appointed the young general Buonaparte.

The Allied forces there were composed of Sardinians and Austrians,

under the supreme direction of General Beaulieu. Under him when the campaign opened were Colli, covering Ceva and Coni, and the Prince de Carignano the approaches from Savoy.

Opposed to them was an army deficient of the commonest necessities. The French troops were miserably provided with food and clothes, and the military chest was empty. In tents and camp equipage, magazines and hospitals, it was notoriously deficient. The cavalry were weak in numbers, and badly equipped and mounted. And yet it was this force that was, from its brilliant successes, to be the means of raising its young leader to imperial power, and by the spirit it infused into the French people, enable him to form those mightier armies which, for a time at least, changed politically the very face of Europe.

The campaign of 1795 left the French in possession of the Riviera di Genoa, and of the Apennine crests.

The French army consisted of seven divisions.

La Harpe . . .	8000	} = 43,000 men, with 60 guns.
Massena . . .	9000	
Augereau . . .	8000	
Serrurier . . .	7000	
Macquard . . .	3700	
Garnier . . .	3300	
Cervoni . . .	4000	

The three first divisions at the commencement of the operations to be described were in the Riviera di Savona, extending as far as Loano, the 1st brigade being at Voltri.

The mountain-crests between the sources of the Bormida were occupied, and the most important points were intrenched.

Serrurier guarded the sources of the Tanaro with the cavalry in the Riviera, while Macquard and Garnier were posted in the valleys leading to the Cols di Tenda and Cerise to keep up communication with the Army of the Alps, which numbered about 20,000 men under the command of Kellerman.

A further detachment of 20,000 men occupied Provence and guarded the coasts.

The Allied forces consisted of the main army under Beaulieu, 32,000 strong, and that of Colli, composed of the Sardinian and Austrian contingents, 20,000 and 35,000 strong respectively, numbering therefore 87,000 men with 84 guns. The Austrians were further subdivided into a right and left wing under Argenteau and Sebottendorf.

Owing to sickness, however, the Allied strength was really reduced to 46,000—viz.: Colli, 20,000; Argenteau, 12,000; Sebottendorf, 14,000.

In the beginning of the year Colli formed the advanced-guard on the northern Apennine spurs, the Austrians being in cantonments along the Po and Adda until March. But early in April Argenteau was pushed forward into the valleys, thus replacing Colli, who contracted his line to the right, taking up a position at Ceva, Millesimo, and Marialdio, with outposts towards Garesio and flanking detachments towards Mondovi. Argenteau, in the valley of the Orba from Ovada to Cairo, occupied a line in which he could not concentrate to either flank in less than ten to fifteen hours, half of his command only being with him when hostilities began, the rest still remaining on the Po. He stood across the ridges and valleys with his headquarters and three battalions at Tassello, the other fractions of his force being broken up into companies and detachments.

Of the left wing at Pozzolo Formigaro, four battalions were pushed forward to Bochetta and two to Campo Freddo, and a larger portion of the corps was still moving up from Lombardy.

The relative position of the belligerents may be summed up as follows:—

The French in the Riviera held the crests of the hill-range, in itself a bad position. Beaulieu, desirous of preventing undue extension of his force northward, watched the mountain line, with Colli supporting him by half Argenteau's division, the rest of the army remaining in Lombardy.

Thus one half of his entire forces was posted in an extended line, the other half marching for concentration.

Beaulieu had himself remained since the 27th March in Alessandria. The position he had selected was not in itself faulty if proper means of concentration were provided, or if arrangements had been made in case of attack for the advanced line to fall back on a selected position in rear. But this design was never contemplated, and, on the contrary, a determination was evidenced to defend each locality that had been thus weakly occupied.

Such was the state of affairs when hostilities opened. The offensive was taken by both armies. By the French, because they were unable to remain in the desperate position in which they were placed. Closed in between the mountains and the sea, their rear resting on the Mediterranean which was commanded by the British fleet, with a single road for advance and thus a single line of communication, while their connection with their only base of supply lay on the left flank of the position held, immediate offensive action was imperative. Nor were the Allies much better off, for they occupied a line of seventy miles in length, with a series of detached posts along it, all equally endangered in case of brusque attack.

But Buonaparte was thoroughly acquainted with the Apennines; his experience in 1794—experience most valuable in mountain warfare of so difficult a character—was of the highest importance; while Beaulieu, whose previous campaigns had been in vastly different regions, was totally unacquainted with this form of war.

The danger that menaced the new Army of Italy was evident, and Napoleon left no stone unturned to enlist on his side every element of success. "Soldiers," said he, "*voici les champs de la fertile Italie; l'abondance est devant vous, sachez la conquérir: sachez vaincre et la victoire vous fournira demain tout ce qui vous manque aujourd'hui.*"

It will be well to compare the plans of operations of the respective leaders before entering into the details of the success that followed the combinations of the French general.

Beaulieu's intention was—

To drive the French out of the Riviera, to seize the Maritime Alps, to shorten his line of defence, and by gaining the sea-coast to communicate with the British, and eventually to harass the French in Provence.

It is evident from this that the principles of sound strategy were not understood by Napoleon's adversary. He followed the sensuous view of affairs, and endeavoured to expel the enemy by the road by which he had arrived, for he recollected that, at this period especially, the Austrian generals were really dependent on the Aulic Council.

Buonaparte had been ordered by the Directory, and felt himself equally inclined, to take the initiative and attack the enemy in order to relieve himself from his difficulty. Viewing the Allied army as stronger by one-third (which it was not), he saw that it could not be so quickly concentrated in the mountain district as to resist a sudden attack, owing to the absence of good lateral communication. Such would always be the case when the absolute passive defence of a mountain line is undertaken. Moreover, an allied army with divergent lines of communication has equally divergent lines of retreat. To his prescience early success promised repeated victory.

The political purpose of the Directory went hand in hand with the military objective. Their aims were—

The separation of Sardinia from Austria, and

An alliance with the former as a stepping-stone to future action in Italy.

The military instructions to Buonaparte, therefore, were to fall on the Austrians and merely observe Colli at Ceva. Their theory was, after separation, to strike still at the largest fraction of the enemy. But it had to be modified by geographical considerations; and as Clausewitz clearly points out, a truer appreciation of the military situation was due to the genius of Napoleon when he elected to follow out his own more brilliant scheme rather than that of the Directory.

On the 9th April, Buonaparte with the headquarters reached Savona from Nice by the Corniche road, and determined at once to assume the offensive. He determined with the 3d division (between Savona and Loano) to cross the mountains lying between the sources of the Bormida.

Here the Apennines join the Alps, the form or rather shapes of the mountains determining the limits of each range. He proposed with 25,000 men to strike at the joint which united the Allies, whilst the two detachments of Serrurier and Cervoni carried out flanking or containing duties at Voltri and Garessio in the valley of the Tanaro.

At the very moment when this manœuvre was about to commence, Beaulieu anticipated it, before even he had concentrated his forces.

Though Colli's experience of warfare in this part of Italy lent weight to his opinion—for he had been fighting there for two or three years—his plan of combined operation was rejected as too dangerous. He proposed with the main body of the Allied army, 38,000 men, to start in two columns from Ceva and Cairo against Loano, the centre of the French line, and break it there. The plan was good and safe; but paltry considerations for Genoa, the desire to effect a union with Admiral Jarvis, and a reluctance to commence so decisive a manœuvre, weighed more with the Austrian general than the correct opinion of his lieutenant. He feared to boldly assume the initiative before holding all his forces well in hand; and this weakness was apparently due partly to the faulty information received from Genoa as to the condition of his opponents, and partly to the careless system of strategy then pursued by the Austrian leaders.

On the 10th April, Beaulieu fought his first action at Voltri, and on the 15th and 16th his troops were still arriving at Acqui from Lombardy. His object was to attack Cervoni, while isolated, with ten battalions and four squadrons, and to roll up the French right with 8000 men.

One column, Petton's, marching through Bochetta with some cavalry, advanced to Cornegliano; the other, that of Sebottendorf, was detached against Cervoni's left by Campo Freddo, forcing him to retire during the night with some loss to the vicinity of Savona, where he joined La Harpe.

Beaulieu in Voltri established communication with the English.

On the 9th, Argenteau received orders to advance to Montenotte and drive in the French pickets, with a view to bring the Austrian centre into more intimate connection with the left. He therefore concentrated six battalions or about 3400 men on the 10th, and moved at 3 A.M. the following day on Montenotte. The French outposts were driven in and they retired to Monte Legino, where they had thrown up some slight works; and these, occupied by Rampon with two battalions, successfully opposed the Austrian advance during the day.

But between 11 and 12 o'clock at night,
 Buonaparte advanced on Montenotte;
 La Harpe on Monte Legino;
 Massena up the Altare;
 Augereau on Cairo (as a flanking detachment).

La Harpe in front, assisted by Massena, who gained the Austrian flank unperceived, successfully attacked Argenteau, who, with a loss of 2000 men, with difficulty saving even 700, retreated by Acqui on Spigno, thus separating himself from the reserves at Sassello and Dego. Augereau took no part in the action, and thus Massena and La Harpe alone brought 14,000 men to bear on the 3000 Austrians opposed to them. Beaulieu had meanwhile detached Wukassowich to the Monte Pajoli on the 11th, so as to reinforce Argenteau while he returned to Acqui; but the force did not even reach Sassello until the 13th.

On this date the position of the Austrian army was as follows:—

7	battalions	at Sassello.	} = 15 battalions.
4	"	Dego.	
2	"	Moglia.	
1	"	Paretto.	
1	"	Molvigino.	

The other seven battalions of the left wing were either in the Riviera or retreating to Acqui; three battalions were moving from Acqui on Spigno, and at the former place ten battalions were still concentrating. On the evening of the combat at Montenotte, the French were occupying the following positions:—

La Harpe towards Sassello.
 Massena " Cairo.
 Buonaparte " Carcare.
 Augereau " Millesimo.
 Serrurier in the valley of the Tanaro.

Colli had taken no part in the actions of the 11th and 12th, and had been merely ordered to demonstrate. Provera had therefore, on the 12th, started from Salicetto to Cossaria, an old castle situated on the ridge which separates the arms of the Bormida, and had taken up a position there with 1800

men. Buonaparte decided on attacking Dego with the united forces of Massena and La Harpe on the 13th, while he himself turned towards Millesimo. But La Harpe was not yet sufficiently near Massena for combined action, and the latter merely reconnoitred the enemy on that day. On the other hand, Buonaparte dislodged Colli's left wing at Cencio, but Augereau's attack on Provera failed.

Argenteau had retreated after his defeat to Paretto, where he received an earnest appeal for assistance from Roccavino at Dego; but, feeling his own inability to render the required aid, he reported the matter to Acqui, whence he received orders from Beaulieu to strain every nerve to hold Dego some days longer, the detachment there having been reinforced by three battalions in order to cover the roads leading to Acqui. Colli at the same time was directed to operate against the enemy's left flank.

Argenteau therefore ordered Wukassowich to march during the night of the 13th-14th from Sassello on Dego with five battalions. Such was the state of affairs at Dego on the 14th when Buonaparte turned against it. He had left Augereau at Cossaria, where he had, on the 14th, repulsed another attempt of Colli's to relieve Provera, who accordingly surrendered owing to want of provisions.

This was the last result of the action at Millesimo, which had now cost the Allies nearly 3000 men.

On the same day, the 14th, Buonaparte assaulted Dego. The defence was weak owing to the late arrival of the Austrian reinforcements; and the intrenchments were carried, many guns captured, and the garrison made prisoners of war.

Argenteau, with the reinforcements, retired by Spigno to Acqui.

Wukassowich, owing to his having mistaken the date, did not start for Dego until late on the 14th, when receiving a second order he marched, reaching Dego early on the 15th. Though hearing that he was opposed by 20,000 French, he attacked them, taking the intrenchments and capturing nineteen guns. But in his estimate of the numbers in his front he had made an error. Not 20,000 but 6000 soldiers were opposed to him, for Napoleon had already directed La

Harpe and Augereau with Victor's reserve brigade to march against Colli.

Massena reported his defeat, and made a vain effort to regain his position, so that Buonaparte, who was then in Carcare, recalled La Harpe and Victor to his assistance, and retook Dego late on the 15th.

During these battles of the 14th and 15th at Dego, 20,000 French were, in all, brought to bear against 4000 Austrians.

Having secured this part of the field of operations, the Commander-in-Chief turned again against Colli. Wukassowich retreated to Spigno and Acqui.

The Austrian loss in the above encounters had, according to Jomini and Clausewitz, amounted to nearly 10,000 men. This was doubtless an important result to gain; but the latter author views it, on the whole, as but partially satisfactory, and by no means so decisive as one great victory, owing to the small effect these isolated defeats had on the *morale* of the Austrian army.

On the other hand, the successes which the French had attained had been more easily gained than would have been the case had one great action been fought; for whenever they assailed the Austrians, the latter had from the beginning but little chance of victory, owing to their numerical inferiority.

This had simply been the result of superior strategy. Beaulieu commenced hostilities with 33,000 men, disposed in the following manner :—

8000 against the French right.

4000 " " centre.

6000 in detached parts on the Apennine ridges.

15,000 concentrating at Acqui.

It is clear that such a disposition was only safe if the enemy remained passive. Determined offence on his part had not been considered in the Austrian plan of operations, and this miscalculation was consequently fatal.

When disasters, the natural consequence of the false appreciation of the military situation, rapidly and speedily followed in the early days of the campaign, Beaulieu's first necessity was immediate concentration; and this could only be effected at Acqui. He should have started for Dego rather than Acqui

on the 11th, in order to initiate the retreat of his front line, and at the same time sent similar orders to Colli, to concentrate at Ceva and retire upon Mondovi, with a view to a general junction of the Allied forces in Piedmont.

Buonaparte now turned to personally superintend the operations against Colli. Massena was ordered with the three divisions of Serrurier, Augereau, and his own, to move on Ceva, while La Harpe covered the movement on the side of Acqui.

Augereau had continued to press Colli's left after Provera's surrender, and thus arrived on the 16th before Ceva, where he was joined by Serrurier, who had advanced to meet him from the sources of the Tanaro.

Colli stood with 15,000 men along the line Ceva-Mondovi, the French headquarters being on the 18th at Salicetto, with Victor at Cairo.

On the 19th, Ceva was attacked and Colli's position turned ; but he retreated in time and in good order behind the Cassaglia, where Buonaparte advanced against him on the following day, but in a somewhat hasty manner, and was accordingly repulsed with great loss.

Five days had now elapsed since the last attack on Dego. Some decisive action on Beaulieu's part was naturally to be expected, and the French forces were somewhat dispirited both from exhaustion and repulse.

The crisis in Buonaparte's scheme had arrived. Retreat was even more dangerous than advance, and a council of war held at Lesegno on the 21st determined on a renewed attack of the enemy's position on the 22d.

But Colli feared to await the blow. Though he still had about 12,000 men in line, he probably considered his enemy to be twice or thrice his strength, and he could hardly hope, if his estimate were true, to renew his success against such great superiority. Neither did he wish in his present position to fight an action decisive of the campaign. His purpose, rather, was to gain time until concentration with Beaulieu could be effected. He determined, therefore, not to await attack, but to fall back on Mondovi, where he hoped to gain a few days for reorganisation, and, united afterwards with the Austrians, meet the enemy with greater chances of success.

But he had mistaken the energy of his opponent. The French, overjoyed at finding no resistance, crossed the Casaglia and descended into the plains of the Ellero.

Colli's rear-guard was overtaken and routed at Viro, and the French, pushing vigorously on, forced the position he had intended taking up, but which was not yet fully occupied, at all points, and the Sardinian general retired upon Fossano with a loss of 1000 men and 8 guns. The main object of Buonaparte's operations had been fully gained. The Allies had been decisively separated, and Colli's line of retreat was divergent from that of Beaulieu. Overtures of peace from the Sardinian Government ensued, and, while Napoleon still continued to advance, the negotiations from Turin resulted in the withdrawal of Sardinia from the alliance; and a separate peace was concluded with her, by which the three fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria were given up to the French as a material guarantee.

The armistice terminated on the 28th; and the result so far of the campaign had been to detach 40,000 men from the Coalition, and release Kellerman and the Army of the Alps from all immediate danger of attack.

The Austrians under these circumstances retired behind the Po.

CHAPTER II.

MARENGO, 1800.

Introduction.—The early part of the Italian campaign of 1796 has been described in the previous chapter, where the narrative terminates with the conclusion of the negotiations resulting in the separation of Sardinia from the alliance, and the retreat of the Austrians across the Po. The sequence of events in the Italian theatre of war up to the campaign of 1800 is briefly as follows :

1796. *May 7th.*—Beaulieu in position along the Sesia and Ticino.

8th.—Napoleon, having echeloned his forces along the Po, passed the river at Valenza and Piacenza. Skirmishes followed at Fombio and Codogno.

10th.—The passage of the Adda at Lodi forced, and the Austrians retired behind the Mincio.

30th.—The river crossed despite opposition. Beaulieu retreated into the Tyrol, and Mantua was besieged.

June.—The early part occupied in securing the neutrality of Naples, Tuscany, and Papal States, and on the 29th the citadel of Milan surrendered.

July.—Beaulieu superseded by Wurmser, who put the reinforced Austrian army in movement on the 29th, and divided it into two fractions under Quasdanovitch and himself, separated by Lake Garda. Napoleon recognised the opportunity afforded by the subdivision, raised the siege of Mantua, and defeated Quasdanovitch at Lonato on the 31st. Wurmser entered Mantua the same day.

Aug. 2d.—Wurmser advanced to Castiglione.

4th and 5th.—French victories at Lonato and Castiglione followed by retreat of the Austrians into the Tyrol. The Aulic Council sent General Lauer as chief of staff to the Austrian army, and by his advice a strong force was left in the mountains at the head of Lake Garda, and the main army was moved by the valley of the Brenta on Bassano for Legnago and Mantua.

Sept. 2d.—Napoleon defeated the covering force at Rovaredo and Calliano.

5th.—Occupied Trento, and thence followed Wurmser down the valley

of the Brenta, defeated him in a series of combats, drove him into Mantua, and re-established the blockade.

The Austrian army, again reinforced, was now placed under General Alvinzi. The force in the mountain-passes of the Avisio and Upper Adige under Davidovitch was confronted by Vaubois; the main army advancing from Gorizia in Friuli, by Napoleon. The Austrians advanced on 29th October.

Nov. 4th.—Alvinzi on the Brenta. Meanwhile Vaubois was checked at San Michele and Calliano, and retired finally on 8th and 9th to La Corona and Rivoli.

6th.—Severe fighting on the Brenta. French retreated to Verona, but advanced again on the 11th.

12th.—Indecisive battle at Caldiero, and retreat again to Verona.

Position of the French was now very critical, and the army on the Adige was reinforced at the expense of that before Mantua. Napoleon determined to cut the communication of Alvinzi with the Tagliamento.

14th.—Divisions of Augereau and Massena crossed the Adige.

15th.—Recrossed the river at Ronco.

Then ensued the three days' battle at Porcil and Arcola, when, after each battle on the 15th and 16th, Napoleon retired behind the Adige. But on the 17th—Alvinzi defeated, fell back, reaching Montebello on 18th, and thence retired behind the Brenta.

Meanwhile Vaubois had been forced back to Peschiera, but Napoleon, leaving cavalry to pursue Alvinzi, drove the Austrian force into the Tyrol.

1797.—The siege of Mantua was vigorously pressed until the end of the preceding year. The reorganised Austrian army advanced on the 7th January, sending a force under Provera to Padua and Legnago, while the remainder moved from Bassano and the valleys between Lake Garda and the mountains.

Jan. 14th.—Battle of Rivoli, defeat of the Austrians, and retreat beyond the Drave.

16th.—Provera defeated near Mantua, and a sortie from the garrison repulsed.

Feb. 2d.—Mantua capitulated.

During the early part of this month the Archduke Charles of Austria took command of the disorganised Army of Italy. The Tyrolese population was roused to action, and the advanced posts of the army advanced to the Piavé. On the French side, Joubert watched the Tyrol, and was directed to clear it of hostile forces, and join Napoleon by the valley of the Drave.

March 10th.—The French advanced, and after a series of combats, a decisive result was gained on the 16th-21st, in the battles near the Tagliamento.

28th.—French army (except Joubert, &c.) concentrated on the Drave.

April 9th.—The preliminaries of the treaty of Campo Formio agreed on at Leoben.

During the remainder of this year, and during the whole of 1798, no military events of importance took place in Italy, except an unimportant war between the Neapolitan troops under Mack and the French general Championnet, which resulted in the capture of Naples early in the following year ; but the close of 1798 saw the formation of the second Coalition, when Russia and Turkey made common cause with England and the German Empire against France.

1799.—The Republic making the passage of Russian troops into the empire a *casus belli*, declared war on the 12th March.

Melas, commanding the Austrians, was between the Tagliamento and Adige ; opposed by the French general Scherer.

March 26th.—Fighting along the Adige resulting in French defeat.

April 4th.—Battle at Magnano, followed by retreat behind the Mincio and Adda.

15th.—Suwarrow arrived with a large Russian reinforcement, and assumed command.

26th.—Battle of Cassano, French retreated, and Moreau appointed general of the army.

May 11th and 16th.—Skirmishes at Mugarone and Marengo. The army of Naples, now under Macdonald, moved by Bologna and Piacenza, to unite with Moreau, which it did on the 14th June.

June 18th.—Macdonald uniting with Victor's division (of Moreau's force) checked on the Trebbia, was defeated on the 19th, and retreated into Tuscan, Victor's division moving up the valley of the Taro.

20th.—Moreau attacked a detachment at San Giuliano under Bellegarde, but was finally obliged to retreat to the Genoa coast near Loano, where he was joined by the relics of Macdonald's army on the 17th July.

18th.—Moreau appointed to the command of the Army of the Rhine, and Joubert to the Army of Italy.

Aug. 9th.—The battle of Novi was fought and Joubert killed. Moreau reconducted the army to the mountain-passes over Genoa, and then departed for the Rhine. Championnet was finally appointed to the command of the Armies of the Alps and Italy.

On Nov. 4th was fought the action of Genola in which he was defeated. Some unimportant skirmishes occurred in addition, and Corri was captured on the 4th December, thus leaving Italy and the French armies there in much the same position as when Napoleon was first appointed to their command.

The history of the other campaigns in this important era of military history need be but briefly told, inasmuch as they do not materially affect the campaigns in Italy of 1796-1800, which the preceding notes are designed to link together ; but they will be briefly summarised.

1796.—The armistice between the French and Imperialists on the Rhine terminated on the 30th May. On this date hostilities recommenced. The battles of Altenkirchen, Wetzlar, and Ukerath in June, resulted in the withdrawal of Jourdain's and Kleber's armies, for Pichegru had been dismissed across the river.

The army of the Upper Rhine under Moreau, to counteract the effect of this retreat, crossed on the 23d June. The affairs of Reuchen, Rastadt, Etlingen, Haslach, and Neresheim were, on the whole, favourable to the French, as the Archduke withdrew behind the Danube.

In July Jourdain and Kleber resumed the offensive. Frankfort was captured, and the combat of Forcheim induced the Austrian to retreat behind the Naab on the 20th August.

The Archduke Charles thereupon took command of this northern force at Amberg and Wurzburg in August and September, inflicted defeats which obliged Jourdain to recross the frontier.

Meanwhile, Moreau won a battle at Friedberg on 24th August, but then retreated, fighting the battles of Biberach, Emmendingen, and Sliezen, recrossing the Rhine on 26th October; and the Archduke laid siege to Kehl and Hunningen.

1797.—The month of January saw the capture of these fortresses. Hoche (having superseded Jourdain) and Moreau crossed the Rhine on April, but the preliminaries of the treaty of Campo Formio, which had been signed at Leoben, put a stop to hostilities.

1798 witnessed the French occupation of Egypt, and in 1799 war was again declared by France against the Empire; the armies on the Swiss boundaries, Upper, Middle, and Lower Rhine being respectively commanded by Massena, Jourdain, Bernadotte, and Brune. Jourdain advanced on the 1st March, and after the battles of Ostrach and Stockach (21st and 25th) retired behind the Rhine on 6th April, followed in turn by Bernadotte, who had invaded Germany at the same time.

In the same month Massena entered Switzerland, where many minor skirmishes occurred, and on Jourdain's failure, obtained command of his force also. The actions at Frauenfeld, Winterthur, Zurichberg, were without much result, and the armies remained stationary until the 14th August, when the French took the offensive successfully; and the left wing of the army under Massena crossed the Rhine at Mannheim on the 25th, but retired again on the 14th September.

By this time the successes of the Allies in Italy had apparently secured their occupation of the country. Suwarrow, with the Russian contingent of the army there, entered Switzerland by the St Gothard Pass on the 23d August. But on the 25th September, Massena crossed the Limat and defeated Hotze and Korsakow at Zurich, forcing them to retire behind the Rhine. Turning on Suwarrow on the 26th September a series of combats occurred, after which the Russians retreated; and on the 30th October Suwarrow withdrew the armies under Korsakow and himself from Switzerland and returned to Russia.

While Massena thus held Switzerland, Lecourbe, appointed to the Lower Rhine Army, crossed the river on the 11th October; but his operations were without value, and he recrossed at Mannheim.

Thus at the end of 1799 the position of the belligerents was, generally, as follows:—

The Army of the Rhine and Danube (Switzerland) under Moreau, recalled from Italy, confronted by the Austrian general Kray.

Army of the Alps and Italy under Massena, thus replacing Championnet, opposed by the Austrian general Mélas.

Peace reigned between Russia, Prussia, and France ; but Napoleon, who had returned from Italy and been appointed First Consul, had failed in his negotiations for peace with the British Government, which had by liberal subsidies to the Austrian Government induced that power to continue hostilities against the Republic. The British Envoy at Munich had further obtained the adherence of Bavaria and Würtemberg to the new Confederation, and these powers had furnished contingents to the German army under Kray, while the army under Melas threatened Genoa, the sea-approaches to which were watched by a British fleet.

Although the first campaigns of the war of the second Coalition had terminated decidedly in favour of the Allies, this success was considerably qualified by the results of the battle of Zurich, which secured to the French uncontested possession of Switzerland, and by the withdrawal of the Russian army from further share in the war. Buonaparte's unexpected return from Egypt, and the successful daring with which he had seized the reins of government at Paris, were also circumstances well deserving serious consideration, for the military resources of France, though much exhausted by the long-continued wars, were by no means as yet in a desperate state. Indeed, to a man of administrative ability, uniting in himself the genius of strategic combinations and a rare spirit of enterprise, the military situation of France at the commencement of the year 1800 could not have appeared devoid of promise. That such qualities were peculiar to the First Consul, was already known to politicians who had scrutinised the occurrences of the last four years, though the ominous warnings of the Archduke Charles were resented with asperity by the Austrian Court.

Nevertheless there was much in appearances to justify the sanguine views which the leaders of the Coalition entertained. Upon the internal state of France, much of her future military efforts must naturally depend ; it was no secret that in many districts discontent was deep and general—that, in the Vendée especially, armed resistance to Republican authority was still maintained with some success—that the recently-created Triumvirate was exposed to the attack of hostile factions and rival aspirants for power—that the finances were in utter

confusion—that the armies of the Republic, partially demoralised by defeat, unpaid, miserably subsisted and clothed, were in a chronic state of insubordination, and daily wasting from desertion—that her veteran battalions and most promising officers were still in Egypt without prospect of return—that her vessels of war had been swept from the ocean, that her ports were closed, her coasts blockaded, by reason of our own maritime supremacy. Doubtless, such considerations influenced the policy of the Coalition Cabinets in declining the overtures of peace proffered with questionable sincerity by the First Consul on his assumption of office. It appeared dangerous, indeed, to allow the Republic sufficient breathing-time for the further development, at a later period, of her discordant principles. The recovery of territory was not the sole object of past sacrifices; restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, and entire discomfiture of the revolutionary party in France, were the only means of definitely concluding a war of political principle.

A ready weapon was thus furnished to the warrior Consul. In a stirring proclamation he published to Frenchmen the aims of the Coalition, the menacing attitude of its armies, and the rejection of its own pacific propositions. His course once chosen, the whole of his prodigious energy was centred upon the creation and organisation of military resources. Uniting the Helvetian army with that of the Rhine, he intrusted its command to Moreau, who had already displayed marked abilities in this self-same theatre, where his qualities were now again to be severely tested. Massena, victorious recently in the midst of disaster, was ordered from Switzerland to replace, as chief of the Army of Italy, Championnet, who had succumbed to the fatigues of the recent campaigns. All the example and influence of this stern soldier were required to restore order and discipline to the ranks of these suffering men. To Moreau the available reinforcements and material were at once despatched, with a view to enable that general to take the field as early as possible. Massena received nothing but money with which to pay up the arrears of his troops, and good advice—sufficient evidence that Buonaparte had early determined in his own

mind that the war must be decided in the valley of the Danube.

Before serious steps could be taken for the commencement of hostilities, it was indispensably necessary that the Vendée should be pacified. Not only did the civil strife there raging absorb a large portion of the army, but a tempting opportunity was thus offered for English invasion from the west. A very important military diversion might so be effected by the Allies, calculated seriously to embarrass operations on the eastern frontier. This old sore, which had defied the healing efforts of previous governments, was now treated with admirable skill and success by the First Consul. Towards the end of February, the last insurrectionary sparks were extinguished by a mixture of firmness and conciliation well suited to the occasion. The troops thus released were marched at once to the French capital, and thence distributed to the Rhine, and to Dijon, where they formed the nucleus of the future Army of Reserve.

The idea of organising this third army had early culminated in the mind of the First Consul. The strategic advantages to be derived from the possession of Switzerland, provided a sufficient force could be improvised for the purpose, were too obvious to be overlooked. With this object in view he had appealed to the legislative body for 100,000 conscripts, which were readily sanctioned. Though some months must elapse before these were ready for service, older soldiers were thus released from the depots and placed at his disposal.

Whilst these measures were in course of execution the Allies had not been idle. The Coalition—now represented by Great Britain and Austria—had two armies in the field.

On the departure of Suwarrow for Switzerland in the preceding campaign, Baron Mélas had assumed the conduct of operations in Italy. Having completed the successes obtained at Novi and the Trebbia, he had placed his army in winter quarters in the plains of Piedmont and Lombardy, at the foot of the northern slopes of the Apennines—his advanced posts pushed forward into the mountain valleys. Here he confronted Massena, who, with the wasted remains of the once

formidable Army of Italy, held the mountain crests and passes, based upon Genoa and Nice.

In Germany, Kray had succeeded the Archduke Charles in command of the army of the Danube. With a view to guard the passages of the Rhine, he had posted himself obliquely across the Black Forest, his right stretching towards Strasbourg and Alsace, his left appuyed upon the Lake of Constance and the Vorarlberg. Here he occupied the base of a triangle, of which Moreau held the two sides formed by the course of the Rhine, which river separated the two armies. In order to fill the chasm caused by the secession of Russia, endeavours had been successfully made to swell Kray's numbers by enlisting the services of contingents, supplied by the minor States of Germany, subsidised by England. In the Mediterranean a British expedition was also in course of organisation, destined with a body of French emigrants, by aid of the fleet, to co-operate with Mélas in Liguria. No doubt the absence of the Archduke Charles was keenly felt by those who had appreciated his unusual military abilities. Nevertheless, it was impossible to take exception to the appointed commanders of the Austrian forces. Both were men of decided ability, possessed of great experience in war. Thanks to the gold of England, and the splendidly fertile districts they occupied, their soldiers were rapidly recovering from recent fatigues. The Army of Italy especially, elated by victory, and trained to the system of close fighting practised by Suwarrow, eagerly anticipated the forward movement which was to complete its triumph over a hated and inferior adversary.

By consulting the map of Central Europe, however, the defective character of the Austrian positions may easily be recognised.

The upper valley of the Danube (which river rises in the Black Forest) is separated from the sources of the Po by the intervening mountainous territory of Switzerland—ordinarily neutral, but now occupied by the French. This interruption entirely destroyed direct communication between Mélas and Kray. That, under ordinary circumstances, such communication is indispensable, will be obvious to all who consider that an enemy holding the mountains would, by

means of the various passes, be able to act upon the flank, and ultimately upon the communications of armies moving in the external valleys. Sound operations would therefore have required that a frontal attack should have been made upon Switzerland from the side of Tyrol, with a view to wrest that country from the enemy's grasp before other offensive operations were attempted. The Aulic Council at Vienna was fully alive to this necessity, but the circumstances were altogether exceptional. The attempt upon Switzerland in the preceding year had miserably failed; bitter experience had sufficiently illustrated the arduous and indecisive nature of mountain warfare, as well as the extreme difficulty of subsisting large armies where no supplies were to be found. It was quite possible to turn this formidable position, unassailable in front—a course which appeared the more advisable, inasmuch as it was all important to avoid delay. The forces of the Republic available for instant warfare had been estimated with tolerable accuracy by the Austrian staff; and it was well known that Kray's menacing attitude would force Moreau to concentrate upon the Rhine, freeing Mélas from all danger of interruption in Piedmont. It was further intended to commence operations on the southern theatre, favoured by the milder climate, at the earliest possible date, when the Alpine passes were altogether impracticable for the passage of troops with artillery.

This neglect of Switzerland in the Allied plan of operations has been severely censured by competent critics. We must, however, bear in mind that it was not accidental, or the result of ignorance; it was really considered less dangerous to neglect Switzerland under existing circumstances than to attack it.

It is evident that, in refusing to listen to negotiations for peace, the Coalition Cabinets considered their position such as to offer fair promise of continued success. With these, therefore, rested the initiative in the approaching campaign—that is to say, their plan of operations should be offensive in its general tendency. In a war of such extreme character, true interests would have led them to strike at the heart of the Republic—to march by the shortest line upon the French

capital; but Kray, to whom this operation must have been intrusted, was already pushed too far forward for his own safety, considering the French occupation of Switzerland; one more step in advance would have placed his communications at the mercy of an adversary almost his equal in numbers and superior in every other respect. If we consider that in all these wars the valley of the Danube, as the direct line to the Austrian capital, has necessarily formed the decisive theatre, it will be easily understood that, in the earliest stage of the campaign, at any rate, invasion of French territory from that quarter was entirely out of the question. So long as the French remained in Switzerland, it is clear that Kray's attitude must be essentially defensive; to arrest Moreau's possible advance, and to bar the road to Vienna, his first object.

Various circumstances pointed at this period to the valley of the Po as the readiest base for offensive operations. There the Austrian position was one of undisputed superiority. To all appearances no task could be more desperate than that assigned to Massena, of successfully defending Genoa and the Riviéra stretching westwards to the Var. One vigorous effort with vastly superior forces must sever his extended line, destroy his communication with the French frontier, and force him to seek refuge behind the works of Genoa, where his speedy surrender might be anticipated. Here, too, direct communication would be established with the British fleet—since the battle of the Nile, proud mistress of the Mediterranean. The importance of this co-operation could not be over-estimated. Upon it hinged the entire success of the plan of campaign. An admirable proposition, emanating from Sir Charles Stuart, for landing a British force on the coast of Provence, between Toulon and the mouth of the Var, had been approved by the English Minister of War. By this means the line of that river—sufficiently formidable in itself—would be taken in reverse, the standard of insurrection would be raised, and the scene of war transferred to French territory. It was calculated that this diversion would force the First Consul to concentrate his attention towards the south. Not only would the reinforcements assembling at Dijon be necessarily turned

to stem this tide of invasion, but Moreau's action on the Rhine would thus be paralysed, and Kray, emerging from his defensive attitude, would cross that river, entering Switzerland or France as circumstances might direct.

Such was the plan of the Coalition: calculated neglect of Switzerland, strictly defensive operations in Germany, early and vigorous offensive in Liguria with a view to the ultimate invasion of south-eastern France, thus to effect the favourable reaction upon Switzerland and the Rhine already alluded to.

No one will deny to this scheme certain merits of combination; it remains to be seen in how far it was calculated to bear the test of execution, without which all military plans must naturally be valueless. What account had it taken of *time* and *distance*, upon a just calculation of which the whole secret of successful strategy rests? When could operations with certainty be commenced? What period would suffice for Massena's destruction in Liguria? In how far could dependence be placed upon British punctuality and co-operation? Lastly, how might the time which must necessarily elapse before France could be invaded, be turned to account by an active enemy? Leaving subsequent events to answer these pertinent questions, let us return to the First Consul.

I have already noticed the pacification of the western departments, the union of the Rhine and Helvetian armies—a most important measure—the appeal to national patriotism, and the early concentration of the principal military forces of the Republic, under Moreau's command, upon the Rhine. Far from intending to remain upon the defensive, there is ample evidence to show that Buonaparte's first thoughts were directed upon offensive action. With possession of Switzerland this might be carried out either in Germany or Italy. There is reason to believe that the original destination of the army of reserve was for the former theatre, as that of primary importance. Operations in the valley of the Danube necessarily react upon the Italian theatre, but the converse is not the case from the side of the Po. Moreau's advance upon the Inn—supposing Kray defeated—would have compelled Mélas to retire upon the corresponding line of the Adige if he wished to consult his own safety; but no success of Mélas in

Liguria would have equally affected the French operations in the valley of the Danube. It is simply a matter of distance, the Danube forming the inner, the Po the exterior line between Paris and Vienna as objective points. For this reason the Italian theatre must ever be of secondary importance, and one great defect in the Austrian plan was, that it was there selected for primary operations. In addition to this, Kray had taken up his position in Suabia, as though Switzerland were neutral territory; his left flank was dangerously exposed, so that bold action on the part of his adversary would probably envelop him in signal disaster. Instructions had been forwarded to Moreau to act in this sense. By concentrating secretly behind the Rhine, opposite to Schaffhausen, he might throw his army across that river upon Kray's flank and rear, and then, by rapid movement, sever him from his base. This manœuvre would have been supported upon the right, through Switzerland, by the army of reserve. But Moreau, able general as he was, shrank from the risk of uncertain execution, or, what is more probable, made this his excuse for declining to be tutored by a man whom he personally disliked. Circumstances forced the First Consul to give way, and Moreau was left to operate in the general sense of the campaign after his own inclination, provided he assumed the offensive without delay. Disappointed thus in finding an early solution of his difficulties in Germany, the keen eye of Buonaparte glanced to the southern theatre, which his genius had hitherto rejected as of inferior value. The result was a plan of campaign by which the three armies of the Republic were to act more or less in concert with each other. It is evident that the leading thought throughout in Buonaparte's mind was to utilise his interior position in Switzerland. Frustrated in his wishes on the side of the Danube, alive to the extreme value of time, he boldly determined to brave the dangers of the Alps, to carry the army of reserve in person into the plains of Northern Italy, and to inflict upon Mélas, by a similar manœuvre, the punishment originally designed for Kray. In order to do this, three things were necessary: time, impenetrable secrecy of design, and absolute freedom of action in Switzerland. Towards this end

Massena and Moreau were called upon to co-operate by very different action. The former was required to defend the Apennines with desperate tenacity, to engage fully the attention of the Austrian commander, to demand the utmost devotion from his troops, and, if need be, to shut himself up in Genoa, and there hold out to the last extremity. The latter was to cross the Rhine and assail Kray's position in such manner as to drive him back upon Ulm, on the Danube, away from all communication with Switzerland; having effected this, to detach to the army of reserve a sufficient number of men to render the action of the First Consul in Italy decisive. To sum up—offensive action in Southern Germany, defensive in Liguria, with a view to decisive intervention, by means of the army of reserve from the side of Switzerland, in the valley of the Po.

These preliminary remarks are necessary in order to offer a tolerable insight of one of the most remarkable combinations in modern warfare. *This could not be obtained if the movements of the Army of Reserve, which formed but one item in the general conception, were alone considered. Again, the action of the Allies would have been incomprehensible, had it not been based upon the conviction of the utter exhaustion of the resources of the Republic after seven years of warfare. This was no hasty conclusion on their part; and though in this instance it involved the crushing disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, such results were attributable to the exceptional impulse imparted by extraordinary genius, which defied calculations based upon the ordinary standard.

All military manœuvres must depend, more or less, upon the character of the ground upon which they are to be executed. It will therefore be necessary to make the theatre of the operations about to be studied a subject of careful consideration. The upper valley of the Po, semicircular in form, is enclosed on three sides by some of the highest mountains in Europe: in the north by the southern slopes of the Pennine Alps, in the west by the eastern slopes of the Graian and Cottian Alps, in the south by the northern slopes of the Maritime Alps and of the northern Apennines. These mountain-ranges separate Lombardy and Piedmont respectively from

Switzerland, France, and the territory then belonging to the Genoese Republic, known by the ancient name of Liguria. Eastwards, the valley, which varies from 30 to 70 miles in breadth, is open, stretching away to the Adriatic. The continuous heights are drained by numerous streams, which flow more or less in a rectangular direction from the north and south into the main river, which conducts their waters to the above-named sea. The principal of these are: the Dora Baltea, Sesia, Ticinus, Lambro, Adda, Oglio, and Mincio from the north; the Tanaro with its affluent the Bormida, Scrivia, Staffora, and Trebbia from the south. The beds of some of these short rivers, wide and gravelly, are frequently dry in summer; but when sudden thaws in the mountains, or heavy rains set in, the accumulated waters rush with great violence into the plains below, and render military operations connected with the main river and its tributaries somewhat precarious. The plain itself is nearly flat, resembling a vast garden. Owing to its exceeding fertility, it has, from the earliest times, been very closely cultivated; there are no forests, neither are the fields enclosed, but numberless parallel rows of mulberry-trees, often interlaced with vines, impede the view, and restrict the movements of ordered bodies of men to the many excellent roads. Soil so much exposed to the reflected influence of a powerful sun naturally requires constant irrigation, which is readily procured from the principal mountain rivers by means of artificial canals and water-courses. This system, connected with the peculiar cultivation alluded to, renders Northern Italy one of the most intersected countries in Europe. There, chief command in the field is no sinecure; incessant vigilance, accurate knowledge of country, and constant employment of light troops for reconnoitring purposes is indispensable in order to retain the *touch* of an adversary. The spots where cavalry can be employed in large bodies for purposes of battle are few, and the action of artillery is frequently confined to the main communications. The qualities of light infantry, on the other hand, are here displayed to great advantage—the judicious employment of this arm having often decided the issue of a war.

The special value of the territory thus briefly sketched,

its Mediterranean aspect, and early historic associations, have constantly subjected it to hostile invasion. For many past centuries it has formed the battle-field of Europe. The experience of each succeeding war has determined certain points which, under given circumstances, may prove of decisive strategic importance. To many of such the aid of science had already in 1800 been invoked, and numerous fortified cities had thus been called into existence. Some of these considerably influenced the operations of this campaign, and deserve attention.

Genoa, at the head of the gulf to which it gives its name, was the last stronghold by which the French still clung to Italian soil. Its vast fortifications constituted an intrenched camp, into which an army might retire and defy attack so long as its provisions lasted. Its defence by Massena during this campaign may be justly considered one of the finest exploits of that eventful period.

Alessandria—situated in the angle of confluence of the Bormida-Tanaro, formed the immediate base of the Austrian forces about to operate in Liguria. Under its shelter they subsequently rallied, in order to fight the action which determined their fate. Its importance in opposite interests, whether to cover the concentration of an army of invasion from the west, or to protect its retreat in case of disaster, had early attracted the penetrating observation of Buonaparte.

Casale and Valenza—both on the Po, on either side of the mouth of the Sesia—secure the passage of the main river at convenient points, within easy reach of the last-named fortress.

Pavia, on the Ticinus, commands the lower course of that river, adding to its general defensive strength. In the present campaign it was admirably adapted for an intermediate Austrian base between the Mincio and Alessandria. Its influence has been asserted in almost every war conducted upon this theatre.

Piacenza, on the Po, at the foot of the valley of the Trebbia, equally commands that and the important defile of Stradella. The larger towns of Northern Italy which were not fortified possessed citadels, where an isolated garrison could find

shelter and security ; and the principal passes leading across the mountains from the north, west, and south were closed at the period of which I am speaking by forts. Such were Novi, Gavi, Ceva, Coni, Exilles, Finistrelles, Susa, Bard, Arona, which, it is sufficient to say, have never proved efficacious in preventing invasion.

Now, a French army wishing to invade Lombardy or Piedmont from the north or west—*i.e.*, from Switzerland or France—has various roads at its disposal. It may cross the St Gothard from Hospital to Airolo debouching upon Milan, or the Simplon from Brieg to Domo d'Ossola, or the Great St Bernard from Martigny to Aosta, or the little St Bernard from Moutiers to Aosta, or Mont Cenis from St Jean de Maurienne to Susa, or lastly, Mont Genevre from Besançon to Susa, the four last debouching upon Turin. In 1800, however, the magnificent roads since constructed by Napoleon I. did not exist ; and though at earlier periods of history armies had crossed the Alps by one or other of these passes on several occasions, the difficulty of transporting artillery, with its attendant encumbrances, had hitherto been generally considered insuperable. Suwarrow's marvellous passage of the St Gothard in the preceding year tended rather to confirm the rashness of such an operation than to encourage imitation.

Again, an Austrian army posted at Alessandria-Turin, about to enter Liguria with a view subsequently to invade France by crossing the Var, has four principal passages by which it may cross the Apennines and Maritime Alps. These are the Monte Bruno pass, at the head of the Trebbia valley, and the Bochetta, both debouching upon Genoa from Piacenza and Alessandria respectively ; the Col di Cadibona, leading from Acqui to Savona ; and the Col di Tenda, issuing from Turin and Coni upon Nice. Genoa again communicates with Savona, Nice, and, west of the Var, with the Provence by the Corniche road, which skirts the Mediterranean coast and receives on its course the before-mentioned tributaries. The country here is exceedingly difficult ; from the character of the mountains, which trend perpendicularly to the sea, no communication can exist between columns advancing into the Riviera by the above-named passes. Thus it was that Buona-

parte, with very inferior forces, defeated Beaulieu on this same ground in 1796. Though similar success could hardly now be expected from Massena under circumstances of increased disadvantage, the First Consul had not failed to impress upon his lieutenant the secret of his earlier victories: "Keep your forces concentrated in hand in the vicinity of Genoa, and fall upon the enemy's columns as they issue singly from the mountains."

Further, an Austrian commander operating from Alessandria, in the sense of the plan of campaign, might communicate with his proper base upon the Mincio by two great thoroughfares on either bank of the Po. The shortest, on the southern bank, touching Tortona, Voghera, and Montebello, enters the defile of Stradella, at the end of which it finds Piacenza; thence, two main roads conduct to Mantua—north of the Po by Pizzighitone and Cremona, or by Parma and Borgoforte on its southern bank.

The longer line would cross the main river at Casale or Valenza, proceeding by Novara or Mortara, Milan, and Brescia to Peschiera. Upon these communications much of the interest of the subsequent operations of the campaign hinges, so that it will be well to bear them in mind.

The French army of Liguria, already alluded to, numbered about 36,000 men, of which 30,000 were available for the defence of Genoa, and of the Riviera generally.

Strength and Organisation of the French Army of Liguria, in April 1800.

Corps.	Divisions.	Strength.
<i>Right—</i>		
Soult	{ Miollis Gazan Gardanne }	. . 18,000
<i>Centre—</i>		
Suchet	{ Clausel Pouget Garnier }	. . 12,000
<i>Left—</i>		
Thurreaud	{ Liébaud Valette }	. . 6,000
(not engaged)		
Total, . . .		36,000

Massena commanding in chief.

On leaving Switzerland for Italy, Massena, in anticipation

of much future difficulty, had invited some of his best officers to accompany him. With these he proceeded to reorganise his command. To Soult he committed the charge of his right wing, formed in three divisions, under Miollis, Gazan, and Gardanne, in all 18,000 strong. In the above order these divisions guarded the Monte Bruno, Bochetta, and Cadibona passes, garrisoning Gavi, Genoa, and Savona. Suchet commanded the centre, composed of three weak divisions led by Clausel, Pouget, and Garnier, amounting altogether to little more than 11,000 men. With them he occupied the line of coast from Savona to Oniglia, as well as the mountain-crests from Cadibona to the Tenda road.

The left wing in two divisions, containing barely 6000 men, under Liébaud and Valette, held the Alpine passes from the sources of the Var to the Swiss frontier. Thurreaud who commanded it had fixed his headquarters at Embrun, and took no part in the early engagements of the campaign.

One glance at these positions will point out their extreme danger. With 30,000 men, the French general occupied a line nearly 80 miles in extent from Tenda to Genoa. This line runs parallel to the sea, which is immediately in its rear, and was then closely watched by the British squadron under Lord Keith. Communication with France must either be effected from the extreme left of the position, or be altogether abandoned. The whole district, sterile and sparsely populated, offered absolutely no means of subsistence; and Genoa, with a large population, was provisioned for a few weeks only. When, in addition, Massena was confronted on the northern slopes of the Apennines by an adversary who might at any moment assume the offensive with forces trebly superior, it will be conceded that his prospects were gloomy indeed. Two distinct and conflicting interests necessitated, to a certain extent, this false position. The First Consul, in his instructions to his lieutenant, laid the greatest stress upon the preservation of Genoa, where alone on Italian soil the Republican principles of France were still represented. It so happened that military as well as political considerations advocated its extreme importance. Massed at Genoa, the army of Liguria effectually protected the French

frontiers, besides being there in a position, under able command, to operate generally at considerable advantage. Here, if anywhere, Massena's difficult problem could be solved. For these reasons Buonaparte, in the French capital, eager at any expense to gain the time indispensable for his ultimate ends, urged his general to concentrate upon that fortress, and, if need be, to neglect his communications altogether.

On the other hand, though anxious to obey to the utmost the First Consul's instructions, Massena, more subject to local influences, yet felt the whole responsibility of his position. Dependent for everything upon France, the loss of his communications—in the absence of sufficient stores in Genoa—must, sooner or later assuredly entail surrender or destruction. Against the former alternative his military pride, against the latter his sense of duty to his soldiers, revolted. On the horns of this dilemma, in the vain hope of meeting both demands at opposite extremities, he extended his feeble line, and was soon called upon to pay the penalty which usually attends half measures. And yet, so strange and unaccountable is the influence of chance in war, that these very dispositions in their results served the First Consul's purposes probably beyond any others that might have been adopted!

The Austrian Army of Italy presented a much more formidable array. At the close of the preceding campaign, Mélas, having reduced the important fortress of Coni, had distributed his soldiers far and wide across the fertile plains of Northern Italy, with a view to their rest, reorganisation, and easier subsistence. Being accurately informed as to the condition of the French forces during the winter, which was unusually severe in the Apennine districts, and therefore free from all apprehension of attack, he foresaw that such a step was further calculated to mask his future designs, and to lull his adversaries into a sense of false security. Rapid and secret concentration in the early spring would enable him to strike where his blow was least expected, and thus to secure the full advantage of a vigorous initiative. Reinforcements which he received during the winter months, had amply compensated for the losses sustained in the late arduous

campaign, so that in January the Austrian army in Northern Italy already amounted to 110,000 men of all arms. Still the whole of this force was not available for active operations.

Strength and Organisation of the Austrian Army of Italy, in April 1800.

Corps.	Divisions.	Strength.
<i>Right—</i>		
Kaim	{ Wukassowich Haddick Kaim }	27,000
	Knesewich	8,000
<i>Centre—</i>		
Mélas (Commanding in chief)	{ Elanitz Morzin Palfy Hohenzollern }	43,000
<i>Left—</i>		
Ott	{ Vogelsang Gottesheim }	15,000
Total,		93,000

20,000 men in Lombardy, Venetia, and Tuscany, not included.

The Italians, though now cowed by the extreme severity with which their French sympathies had recently been suppressed, still clung fondly to the institutions which they had received at the hands of the great Republic. It was necessary to maintain considerable garrisons in Lombardy and in Venetia, both to repress insurrection and to insure communication with the empire. For this purpose some 20,000 men were required, so that in the month of February, when the reopening of hostilities was contemplated in the Allied plan, Mélas could count upon the services of about 90,000 men. This force was divided into three corps, forming the right, centre, and left, commanded by Kaim, Mélas, and Ott respectively. Owing, however, to an unexpected fall of snow in the Apennines, which partially suspended communication, and still more to the absence of information as to the arrival of transports with stores from Livorno, upon which the army would depend for subsistence in the Riviera, operations were actually postponed until the beginning of April. This delay, hardly sufficiently accounted for by the motives alleged, proved fatal to the Allies. In it may be recognised a sense of overweening confidence in future success, barely warranted by circumstances. Their plan, open to severe criticism as

it was, rested entirely upon early action for its results. To neglect this was to cut away the ground from under their own feet.

Towards the end of March the Austrian commander drew in his detachments with great caution upon Acqui, concentrating against the centre of his adversary's line. It has already been argued that the contemplated invasion of French territory could not safely be attempted until Massena's army had been effectually disposed of. The question, therefore, was, how to attain this object in the most speedy and decisive manner. We have seen that Mélas might cross the mountains, in order to enter the Riviera, by four different roads—through the Trebbia valley, by the Bochetta Pass, by Cadibona, and the Col di Tenda. This last, debouching upon Nice, was too far away for present purposes, and could hardly have been adopted by Mélas, as the main line of operations, without risk to his own communications. The extended position of the French army was accurately known at the Austrian headquarters, and, taken in connection with the character of the ground, pointed to the centre as its weaker part. Now the centre of Massena's line—that is to say, Soult's left and Suchet's right—rested upon Savona, to which town the Cadibona road directly conducted. Overwhelming attack directed here would probably sever the two French divisions, forcing Suchet back upon the Var and Soult upon Genoa. Either fraction would thus be subjected to defeat in detail, and the first object of the campaign attained. This, then, was selected by Mélas as his first line of operations. In order, however, to anticipate concentration by Massena, with a view to meet this danger, it was necessary to claim his attention simultaneously at other important points. Of all these, Genoa would naturally be most cherished by the French commander, and upon that fortress both of the other roads, as has been already shown, debouched. In this sense the following dispositions were made :—

Ott, with the Austrian left, 15,000 strong, was ordered to ascend the Trebbia valley, and crossing Monte Bruno to threaten Genoa from the north-east.

Hohenzollern, detached from the centre with 10,000

men, was to force the Bochetta, and subsequently unite with Ott.

The centre, 25,000 strong, under Mélas in person, would march by the Cadibona Pass upon Savona, whilst Knesewich, with 4,000 men, was pushed forward to Coni and the Col di Tenda, in order subsequently to menace Suchet's communications with the Var.

Lastly, the right, under Kaim, was to remain in Piedmont, with the double object of forming the reserve and of guarding the issues from the Alpine passes. With this wing the splendid cavalry attached to Mélas's army—useless in the Apennine gorges—and the greater portion of the artillery remained.

On the 5th of April, this plan very ably conceived by Zach, chief of the Austrian staff, was carried into execution. Massena, ignorant of the combinations by which he was threatened, and consequently ill prepared to meet it, soon found himself out-mancœuvred. Before he could fully realise his adversary's intention the French centre was broken and the purposed separation effected. Of the many officers, however, who during this and subsequent wars so faithfully served the First Consul, few equalled Massena in presence of mind under emergency, or in resolute action. Instantly recovering from the surprise which had caused his reverse, he prepared the necessary measures for re-establishing communication with Suchet. In a series of engagements on successive days, both these generals struggled desperately to re-unite their forces. But the wedge which Mélas had firmly inserted at Savona defied their isolated efforts, and further development of force upon his rear forced Massena to retire definitely behind the works of Genoa. Here, with energy unimpaired by disaster, almost indeed unexampled in history, he commenced on the 20th of April that glorious defence which for ever established his military reputation.

The investment of Genoa by Ott, with 30,000 men, enabled the Austrian commander-in-chief thenceforward to concentrate his attention upon Suchet, who still held his ground in the neighbourhood of Loano. But that officer avoided the fate intended for him by timely retreat, first upon Nice, and ultimately behind the Var, which river he crossed on the 11th of May. Here he established himself in an intrenched

position of commanding strength, and, aided by the happy arrival of reinforcements from the interior, easily repulsed the assaults which Elsnitz had been ordered to deliver.

Thus, at the expiration of one month from the commencement of hostilities, it will be well to pause, in order to realise the military situation and future prospects of the belligerents.

Massena, though shut up in Genoa by sea and land, still commanded 12,000 men, who, under his active command, gave full employment to Ott's blockading force. His troops, however, were suffering from sickness and extreme exertion, and his provisions were rapidly diminishing. Suchet, with 11,000 men in an impregnable position upon the Var, effectually protected the French frontier, with a prospect, indeed, of shortly finding himself in a position to assume the offensive. Moreau, having crossed the Rhine at different points on the 25th of April, had defeated Kray in several important actions, and was now successfully completing the operation which would throw his adversary back upon Ulm. On the 12th of May he despatched the detachment—16,000 men—for which Buona-parte had stipulated, to the Army of Reserve. This last force, nominally under Berthier, already organised and concentrating secretly from all sides upon the Lake of Geneva, 40,000 strong, was about to be joined by the First Consul in person, who had left Paris for that purpose some days before Suchet crossed the Var.

On the other hand, Mélas's successes—equally creditable to himself and his army—had not proved sufficiently decisive for the exigencies of the Allied plan. The capitulation of Genoa, upon which his future action depended, was still a matter of uncertain speculation, and did not actually ensue until another month had expired. Ten thousand of his best soldiers had already found their graves on the Apennine slopes, or had been carried prisoners into his adversary's stronghold. The British expedition, from the co-operation of which so much had been expected, still remained in abeyance, and vain were the entreaties from Austrian headquarters for its instant furtherance from Minorca to the scene of action. The news of Moreau's advance had already penetrated into Italy, accompanied by the discredited announcement of the concentration of fresh

French troops in Switzerland. In a word, the Allies were now virtually deprived of the initiative, soon to be thrust back altogether upon the defensive. Mélas in reality had been fighting against time, genius, and position; it was in the nature of things that he should ultimately succumb to their united influence.

The unwelcome tidings of Mélas's successful advance upon Savona reached the First Consul at Paris on the 22d of April. During the earlier portion of the month his attention had been engrossed with the many details which the formation of the Army of Reserve entailed. Originally no secret was made of the preparation of this force, at Dijon, for active service. Berthier had been publicly appointed to its command, and Marmont, with Gassendi, were there busily employed in furnishing the necessary complement of artillery and ammunition. In addition to men, horses, and material, all of which must be collected with extreme difficulty from distant departments, a vast amount of supplies for the subsistence of the army, whilst marching to its destination in Italy, was indispensable. For the completion of these several objects time was still required, so that the news from Liguria was calculated to cause some anxiety. An ordinary general would perhaps have hurried with the few battalions already assembled at Dijon to the Var, in aid of Suchet, whose retreat in that direction was now inevitable. Such a course—presupposed by the Allied plan—appears never to have suggested itself to the mind of the First Consul. From it no decisive result could accrue, and the inestimable value of a central position in Switzerland would thus have been sacrificed. On the other hand, the well-known tenacity of Massena's character responded for the safety of Genoa during another month, for which period the scanty stores at his disposal would suffice to subsist his men. Three weeks, however, were still required by Berthier to complete his preparations, so that not more than ten days would then remain for the concentration of the Army of Reserve on Italian soil. Even under favouring circumstances, so close a calculation of time and distance—allowing but little scope for accident—would seem to render any similar operation precarious in the extreme. When, however, it is remembered that

Moreau as yet had not stirred, that instant success on the part of that general was necessary to insure the detachment from his force which Buonaparte considered indispensable to decisive intervention in the south, that the passage of the Alps might possibly present difficulties beyond the range of human foresight, that the slightest intimation of his project revealed to the enemy would infallibly render it abortive, and that failure was ruin, it is difficult indeed to realise the vast daring of a conception which depended upon elements apparently so uncertain for success.

And yet not a trace of hesitation is perceptible in the action of the First Consul. A formal order was immediately despatched to Moreau to cross the Rhine and commence operations. Marescot, an engineer officer of experience and ability, was sent to explore and report upon the character of the several passes by which an entry into Italy across the Alps might be effected. Orders were forwarded to Massena to hold out to the last extremity, and to Suchet to aid his commander by every means in his power; and lastly, a bold and very successful course was adopted, with a view henceforward to deceive the hostile Cabinets as to the actual existence of the Army of Reserve.

The early decree for military preparations on a large scale at Dijon had naturally attracted a certain amount of attention. But that town, from its situation, seemed so reasonably selected for the concentration of reinforcements intended for Moreau, and the few ill-clad battalions there assembled so poorly responded to the loud announcements made from Paris, that the agents of the Coalition characterised the measure to their respective Governments as a *ruse* of Buonaparte's to deter Mélas from following up his success. This fact, soon ascertained through the English press, admirably served the First Consul's purpose. Whilst the 'Moniteur' and other publications continued to insist, in exaggerated terms, upon the efficiency of the large force already organised and present at Dijon, the battalions and levies really marching upon that town from all sides were secretly directed to concentrate at Geneva and Lausanne, carefully avoiding their previous destination. Similar precautions being observed in furthering all the stores

and material, the artifice proved fully successful, and unquestionably conduced in a very considerable degree to the ultimate results of the campaign.

Moreau started on the 25th of April, and had soon completed the manœuvre by which Kray's position was turned. In two severe engagements, at Engen and Stockach, he defeated the Austrian general on the 3d of May. This intelligence, awaited with intense anxiety, reached Buonaparte on the 5th. In the same night he left Paris for Dijon, where he reviewed the conscript and volunteer battalions, still purposely left to represent the Army of Reserve. On the 8th of May he reached Geneva, and announced his intention of remaining in that town, in order to watch the events of the war on either theatre. Here he received the report from Marescot which enabled him to make the necessary dispositions for crossing the Alps. The considerations which determined these are very interesting.

Of the four available passes, the Simplon alone was altogether impracticable for the transport of material, so that selection had to be made from the other three.

The St Gothard debouched into Italy precisely where the First Consul wished to arrive, but in order to reach it, the Valais, destitute of all resources, must be traversed to the sources of the Rhone—an operation requiring too much time, and likely to attract notice. Besides, this was the only pass adapted for the use of the detachment expected from Moreau.

Mont Cenis offered, perhaps, fewer difficulties than any of the other roads, but the reasons which militated against its selection are sufficiently obvious. In the first place, it debouched upon the right front, and not upon the rear of the Austrian position, Susa being occupied by a strong detachment from Kaim's wing, which was posted in considerable force at Turin. The intelligence of the French march in the supposed direction could not long remain a secret, and would probably reach Mélas sufficiently early to enable that general to send timely reinforcements into Piedmont. To be executed successfully, this movement should be impenetrably veiled at greater distance from the Austrian headquarters on the Var. From this passage, too, no great strategic advantage could be

derived; the Austrian communications with the Mincio were perfectly guarded, the moral effect of surprise would be forfeited, and Moncey, debouching by the St Gothard with Moreau's soldiers, might find himself dangerously isolated and exposed to defeat. In a word, it would seem almost preferable for the First Consul to have marched with all his forces to join Suchet, in order resolutely to fight his way along the Riviera to Genoa.

The two St Bernard passes, both of which conducted through the long and narrow valley of Aosta to Ivrea, remained for consideration. Of these the road leading across the Great St Bernard was the shortest from the point of concentration—a consideration, under the circumstances, of almost conclusive weight. From Villeneuve, at the eastern extremity of the Lake of Geneva, two ordinary marches along an excellent road would carry the army to St Pierre, where the direct ascent of the mountain commences. From this village the hospice at its summit might be reached in eight hours, by a footpath practicable for men and horses, but not for carriages. The descent thence to St Rémy, where the carriage-road begins again, might be completed in three hours more, so that the actual passage of the mountain could be effected by an ordinary individual in about twelve hours. From the last-named village the valley leads by Etroubles to the town of Aosta, to which the pass of the Little St Bernard likewise conducts. Here, too, the Dora Baltea joins the road, which reaches in succession Chatillon, the little fort of Bard, and Ivrea, where the country opens, and the eye at last rests on the stretching plains of the Po. From this last town the road divides, eastwards to Milan, and in a south-westerly direction to Turin, some thirty miles distant. Thus, an army successfully concentrated at Ivrea—which was open to assault—would already have gained the right rear of the Austrian position, and might operate at discretion upon Turin, Milan, or even upon Genoa, by crossing the Po near the mouth of the Sesia. This point was, moreover, eminently central, considering that Moncey must of necessity descend by the St Gothard, and that Thurreaud already occupied the summits of Mont Cenis, whence he would soon be called upon to force his way into

the plains. To either of these detachments the main column would so be enabled to stretch a helping hand in case of emergency and peril. Nor was there much reason for the First Consul to suppose that this concentration, pregnant with positive advantage, would meet with resistance on the part of the enemy. It was known that the Alpine gorges were somewhat heedlessly watched by several detachments from Kaim's reserve, and that the little fortress of Bard might prove a slight impediment; but in truth little opposition to such superior forces could be expected from either obstacle.

These various considerations of time, distance, and direction prompted the First Consul to question Marescot as to the possibility of using the pathway across the Great St Bernard for the main passage of his men, horses, and material. To that general's reply, that the operation was possible but extremely dangerous and difficult at the time of year, the only answer vouchsafed was the order for immediate preparation and departure.

It is clear that at this period the principal object of Buonaparte's concern was the safe issue of the army from the mountains into the Italian plains after the passage had been effected. Under all circumstances, to debouch from a defile, and to develop force in the presence of an expectant adversary, is an operation of exceeding difficulty. In order to surmount this, it is necessary either to conceal the purpose altogether, or, where such a possibility exists, to demonstrate from several quarters simultaneously, with a view to mask the main operation. Both means were adopted in this instance with singular care. Not only, as has been seen, was the Great St Bernard selected for principal passage, the St Gothard left for Moncey, and Mont Cenis in possession of Thurreaud, but detachments were besides directed from the main army by the Simplon and Little St Bernard, under B  thencourt and Chabran respectively. This served the double purpose of insuring communication between the several columns as they entered Italy, and of compelling the enemy to divide his forces in order to meet each point of invasion.

The plan of operation being determined, the First Consul

descended from the higher considerations of strategy to the minute direction of all details necessary to its execution. In order to transport the artillery from St Pierre to the opposite side of the mountain various ingenious devices were employed. The guns, dismounted and placed on sledges, or encased in the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose, were to be dragged by Swiss peasants hired for the occasion. The carriages taken to pieces, numbered, and loaded upon mules, were afterwards to be put together again at St Rémy. Thus it became necessary to collect a great number of artificers—blacksmiths, carpenters, and saddlers—at St Pierre. Thither, too, biscuit, grain, and stores of all kind were forwarded, transport being greatly facilitated by the presence of the lake.

From the 8th to the 12th of May Buonaparte remained at Geneva, fully occupied with these duties. On the 13th, he, though occupying the high office of Minister of War, had been sent from Paris to Moreau's headquarters personally to superintend the departure of Moncey with 16,000 men for Italy. The welcome announcement by him that this movement had commenced, completed the last link in the chain of Buonaparte's combinations. After personal inspection of each division he immediately placed his army in motion for the foot of the St Bernard.

The Army of Reserve at this moment numbered about 35,000 infantry and artillery, and 5000 cavalry, independent of the several detachments commanded by Moncey, Thurreaud, and Béthencourt. The four corps of which it was composed were severally led by Lannes, Duhesme, Victor, and Murat.

Army of Reserve—Organisation.

Lannes	.	.	{	Division.	.	.	.	Watrin.
				Brigade	.	.	.	Mahler.
				do.	.	.	.	Riveaud.
Duhesme	.	.	{	Division	.	.	.	Loison.
				do.	.	.	.	Boudet.
Victor	.	.	{	Division	.	.	.	Chambarlhac.
				do.	.	.	.	Gardanne.

Cavalry.

(<i>Reserve.</i>)	{	Division	.	.	.	Monnier.
Murat . . .	{	Brigade	.	.	.	Kellerman.
		do.	.	.	.	Champeau.

Total, 35,000 men.

These do not include Chabran 6000, Moncey 15,000, Thurreaud 5000, detached by the Little St Bernard, St Gothard, and Mont Cenis, which would raise the above number to about 61,000.

Echeloned in this order, they moved in succession from Villeneuve to St Pierre, which was reached by Lannes, with the advance-guard, on the 15th of May. Before daybreak, on the following morning, the ascent commenced, so calculated that one corps should cross the mountain with ammunition and provisions every twelve hours. Berthier preceded the march of the army to St Rémy, in order to superintend the arrangements necessary for the reception of the troops. The First Consul remained at Martigny, actively engaged in forwarding the material of the army—a work of great difficulty and labour—and in corresponding with his colleagues at Paris, as well as with Suchet, and with Moncey, who had already entered Switzerland. During four successive days the army filed across the mountain, cheerfully bearing up against fatigues of no ordinary character. Lannes in the meantime had pushed forward with some light guns to Etroubles, and dispersing the Austrian outposts, occupied Aosta on the 17th of May. At Chatillon, on the 18th, he drove in a small body of Croats who opposed his march, and then pushed on to Ivrea, with a view there to secure the mouth of the defile for the debouch of the army.

Some ten miles below Chatillon, the valley, which hitherto gradually increases in development, suddenly contracts again, until it is almost closed by the convergence of the mountains at the little town of Bard. In the narrow space left open between them stands a large, detached, conical rock, which frowns gloomily upon the river and road, for the passage of which on different sides, just sufficient room remains. On its summit a small casemated fort had been constructed, which at this time was well furnished with artillery, and held a

small garrison. From it both road and river were completely enfiladed, so that Lannes's onward march was at once arrested by an obstacle of no ordinary character. Berthier and Marecot hurrying up on receipt of the report, soon appreciated the extreme danger of the emergency. So long as Fort Bard remained in the enemy's possession entry into Piedmont appeared, at the moment, really impossible. For escalade or assault the rock was too steep, and there was no means of establishing batteries in such a position as to render it untenable by its garrison. In the meantime the narrow valley would be choked by the arrival of the rear divisions, whilst the provisions, nicely calculated for the operation, would not admit of any delay. Couriers were at once despatched to Buonaparte, at Martigny, to inform him of the danger by which his army was threatened. The startling intelligence reached him in the night of the 19th May, on which same day he had already received most reassuring news from Suchet. From this it appeared that, on the 14th of May, Mélas was still at Nice, quite unconscious of his imminent danger, and that Genoa still held out in defiance of Ott. Kaim, therefore, alone remained in Piedmont, probably guarding the numerous roads by weak and isolated detachments. The only real peril, that of finding an enemy drawn up at Ivrea in position in order to oppose the head of the French column as it endeavoured to emerge from the defile of Aosta, had thus vanished altogether. The difficulty presented at Bard could not impair the joyful impression which these tidings from the Var had created in the mind of the Republican general. True, it was an inconvenience, but one which must be surmounted by some means or other. Berthier's messengers were therefore sent back with instructions for that officer to reconnoitre carefully the neighbouring mountains. Where sheep, goats, and shepherds were present, paths for communication must also exist, by which the infantry, at any rate, could turn the impediment to its progress. With forced labour from the peasantry such paths might even become practicable for the cavalry, so that, under any circumstances, the army might reach Ivrea, though possibly deprived, for a time, of the services of its artillery. The occasion, however, was suffi-

ently serious to demand the First Consul's presence in person ; accordingly, he crossed the St Bernard on a mule led by a peasant, on the 20th of May, and joined Berthier before Bard early on the day following. In the meantime Lannes had thrown a few companies of grenadiers into the houses of the town, and summoned the commandant of the fort. Captain Bernkopf, who occupied it, fully alive to the importance of the post committed to his care, expressed his intention of defending it to extremity, and at once reported to Turin the magnitude of the operation in course of execution. A path had, however, been discovered which led along the scarped sides of Mount Albaredo to St Donaz, where it rejoined the highroad below the fort. With great exertion this was made practicable for the cavalry, so that Lannes succeeded in passing his division by moving in single file in the evening and during the night of the 21st May.

Although an army, composed of infantry and cavalry only, might operate with possible success against a very inferior adversary in the close and intersected country about Ivrea, manœuvres on a large scale without artillery in the open country were entirely out of the question. It was determined, therefore, with a view to test the staunchness of the Austrian garrison, to attempt the escalade of the outer enclosure of the fort. The effort was made with desperate gallantry under the eyes of the First Consul by Dufour, with 300 grenadiers. It resulted, as Marescot had predicted, in the loss of nearly all concerned, without the slightest impression having been made. There can be no doubt but that Buonaparte was equally aware of the hopelessness of the enterprise, supposing the garrison to do its duty. It is not always, however, that officers in similar emergency are as equal to the occasion as Captain Bernkopf proved himself to be ; the test, expensive in human life as it was, seems justified by circumstances ; its failure redounds to the honour of the Austrian, rather than to the discredit of the French commander.

Force having thus failed, stratagem was resorted to—this time successfully. During the night the road leading through the town was covered with straw, dung, and other soft material ; the wheels of the gun-carriages and ammunition-

waggon were muffled, and the pieces themselves encased in tow, so as to avoid all noise. They were then dragged by volunteer artillerymen through the street under the guns of the fort, which, occasionally fired by the garrison by way of precaution, caused some little loss. The artifice, however, proved fully successful, and the whole of the heavy artillery was thus removed beyond the defile, whilst the horses were led round by Mount Albaredo.

On the 22d of May Lannes carried Ivrea, occupied by Briey's brigade, by a daring *coup de main*, and then took position at the mouth of the valley to cover the advance of the other divisions. Slowly, but without further impediment, they successively arrived during the following days, concentration being fully effected by the 27th of May.

Whilst the main operation was thus successfully completed, the several detachments were struggling towards their destinations.

Chabran, issuing from the Great St Bernard, had reached Aosta, and was immediately charged with the investment of Bard, which could not safely be left in the enemy's hands upon the French line of communications.

Thurreaud, descending from Mont Cenis, had carried Susa after severe fighting, and, covering his front with intrenchments, felt anxiously with his left for communication with Ivrea.

Béthencourt debouching from the Simplon, after a terrible march, had repulsed De Rohan with the aid of Lecci's Italians, and would soon reach Arona, at the southern extremity of the Lago Maggiore.

Moncey, lastly, a little behind time, was now ascending the northern slopes of the St Gothard, and could hardly be counted upon for co-operation for another ten days.

Such is a brief outline of this great operation, the execution of which fixed with startled admiration the public gaze of Europe, and at once raised Buonaparte in general estimation to a level with the greatest captains of past generations. To us, who have carefully studied the means by which such effect was produced, a source of instructive reflection is opened. Breadth and power of comprehension, industry in

detail, enterprise with perseverance, natural resource, and undeviating firmness of purpose, are the qualities required from all who aspire to high military distinction. In them we find the key to the grandest results which are chronicled in the pages of history; we may rest assured that the same rule will hold good for all future times.

Mélas was at Nice, vainly endeavouring to force the passage of the Var, which Suchet defended. As time wore on—for six weeks had now elapsed since the opening of the campaign—he naturally felt anxious concerning the possible use to which any fresh troops the First Consul might now have at his disposal could be turned. Although the notion of a completely organised army, prepared expressly for intervention in Italy, had been ridiculed in London and Vienna, common-sense suggested that Buonaparte was not the man to remain idle whilst the Army of Liguria was exposed to such unequal contest. The rumours which reached Austrian headquarters were, however, exceedingly vague, and it was not before the 19th of May that Mélas received reliable information that a French diversion from the side of the Alps was in course of execution. The intelligence could not have been altogether unexpected; nothing would appear more natural than that an attempt should be made from this quarter, by indirect effort, to relieve Massena. But Kaim having been left with a comparatively small force of infantry in Piedmont, it seemed desirable to reinforce him in this particular arm. Leaving Elsnitz with 18,000 men before Suchet, Mélas therefore determined to hurry in person with two strong brigades to the Sardinian capital, with a view to protect the operations pending in the Riviera from that point. On the 22d of May he reached Coni, and on the 27th—the same day that had witnessed the concentration of the Army of Reserve at Ivrea—he arrived at Turin. On his march, Mélas had heard of Thurreaud's advance upon Susa, and had received the report from the commandant of Fort Bard. He was inclined to attach greater importance to the former movement, as proceeding from that side where entry into Italy might be most readily effected. It seemed so natural for an officer situated as Bernkopf was at Bard, to over-estimate the

number of his foes. The Austrian general felt assured that, under any circumstances, the 10,000 soldiers he had brought with him, and who would raise Kaim's force to about 35,000 well-appointed troops, would amply suffice to keep Berthier at a distance, from whichever side he might appear. So easy is it in war to accept conclusions harmonising with our wishes, rather than those which the voice of prudence but timidly suggests.

Of the three divisions which composed Kaim's wing, Wukassowich had been guarding the Simplon and St Gothard, Haddick the valley of Aosta, and Lamarssaille the defile of Susa. With the exception of the brigade watching the St Gothard, each of these detachments had been driven in from the posts which they had occupied by the advance of the French. On Mélas's arrival, the official reports announcing these events had reached Turin, accompanied with the discredited statement that Buonaparte himself had already been seen at Ivrea. The confirmation of this report by an officer who had known the Republican general during the campaigns of 1796-97, first impressed Mélas with a gloomy presentiment of the trials in store for him. Of Moncey's advance by the St Gothard, however, he was still profoundly ignorant; so that, himself intent upon gaining possession of Genoa, it was natural he should presume that the relief of that fortress, now reduced to extremity, must necessarily form the First Consul's primary object. In this conjecture he was strengthened by later intelligence, which announced that Lannes, advancing from Ivrea on the 26th of May, had beaten Haddick the day following on the Chinsella, and was now making for Chivasso, on the Po. Without a moment's delay he therefore collected the battalions within reach, and placing them in position opposite to Chivasso, determined to dispute the passage of the main river. Simultaneously he forwarded instructions to Wukassowich to retire to the left bank of the Ticinus, in order to defend the line of that river, and thus to cover the Austrian communications in Lombardy. These dispositions have been much criticised, and yet, impartially considered by the light of the information which the veteran commander at that time possessed, they seem perfectly reasonable and sound. It

appeared very improbable that Buonaparte, abandoning Massena, leaving Thurreaud dangerously isolated at Susa, and, above all, neglecting his only communication through the Val d'Aosta with his base, would march from Ivrea by his left upon Milan. Assuredly his purpose must be to seize Turin, and, calling in Thurreaud, to force the line of the Po, in order to redeem the promises so confidently relied upon by Massena in his extreme adversity. Posted as M  las was, he certainly had every prospect of defeating such a design. In case of reverse on the Po, he would fall back upon the Apennines, leaning on his fortresses, and there defend the passages leading to the Riviera. The surrender of Genoa, from Ott's reports daily expected, would then place the investing army at his disposal, and soon enable him to regain the initiative from his formidable adversary. Moncey's march by the St Gothard stultified these conjectures, and rendered futile the consequent dispositions. Merit, as it ever must, paled before genius; for genius alone could have thus justly measured the true value of the detachment which was wrung with so much difficulty from Moreau.

Meanwhile, the task of investing Genoa had proved no sinecure to Ott.

A well-designed attack upon the forts which crown the heights surrounding the town having failed on the 30th of April, the Austrian general thenceforward restricted his efforts to the reduction of the fortress by famine. Quiet submission to a slow process of starvation was not in Massena's character. In several sorties he worsted his antagonist, and on the 11th of May inflicted upon him severe defeat. Two days later, in the hopes of following up his success, he again assaulted Ott's position; but the exertion demanded from his wearied soldiers proved too great for their powers of endurance. Repulsed on all points, they returned dispirited to Genoa, having left Soult, dangerously wounded, a prisoner to the enemy. From this time all thoughts of offence were abandoned, the attention of the French general being now turned to economising the means of subsistence which were left to him.

The account of the straits and suffering to which the inhabitants, as well as the garrison, were exposed during the ensuing

days of trial is heart-rending. In spite of famine, insurrection, and all the miseries attending constant bombardment, Massena throughout successfully asserted the influence which enabled him to fulfil his terrible task. As the last long days of May passed away, he still maintained the heroic bearing which alone constrained the murmurs of his soldiers, and the despair of the populace. It was known to him that the Army of Reserve had already entered Italy; and whilst he daily awaited relief which would terminate his exertions, he fully realised the importance to the First Consul of every hour gained by Ott's detention. To those who, in future days, may find themselves similarly situated, no happier example of intelligence, firmness, and military spirit can be offered than that displayed by Massena during the defence of Genoa. But human endurance has its necessary limits, and the first day of June, if no assistance arrived, must assuredly witness the surrender of the Ligurian stronghold.

Elsnitz in the meantime, repeatedly repulsed by Suchet, had, since Mélas's departure, gradually relapsed to a defensive attitude. Thus, during the last days of May, both he and Mélas were simply covering Ott's operations at Genoa.

Thanks, therefore, to the prolonged defence of that fortress, Buonaparte, upon entering Italy, soon found himself fully master of the situation, free to act in whichever direction he might select. The relief of Genoa being his announced object, it certainly appeared natural that he should march upon Turin in order firmly to establish himself, based upon Susa and Savoy, before he moved directly to Massena's aid. Such, as we have seen, was the opinion entertained at Austrian headquarters: it was a just and reasonable surmise, considering that no report of Moncey's movements had as yet reached Mélas. We may be equally assured that, with the knowledge of the French dispositions which we now possess, the Austrian general would not long have doubted the object of the First Consul's march. In good truth, Buonaparte's plan had long been matured; the relief of Genoa, to him, was but a secondary object; he played for higher stakes—the highest, always, of which circumstances would admit. His earliest fixed resolve, from the first, had

been, if opportunity allowed, to throw himself, with 60,000 soldiers, across Mélas's communications, then to force him to do battle where defeat was destruction. It was quite possible that this manœuvre might serve Massena better than any more direct operation ; for Mélas, once alive to his danger, would surely raise the siege of Genoa in order to hurry back to his base. Otherwise, Genoa must meet her fate, consoled by the reflection that, without her devoted aid, the ends of the campaign could never have been attained.

On the 28th of May Buonaparte joined Lannes at Chivasso, where he witnessed his adversary's preparations for defending the line of the Po. Leaving Lannes here to sustain the delusion, he started with the remaining divisions for the Ticinus, which river he reached without opposition. On the 31st of May, after a sharp engagement with Wukassowich, whose position, owing to Moncey's advance, was already compromised, the passage of that river was forced at Turbigo, and subsequently at Buffalora. Wukassowich then withdrew behind the Adda, and the French were once more led in triumph by the victor of Lodi, on the 2d of June, into the Lombard capital. Lannes, meanwhile, had remained at Chivasso until the 29th of May, demonstrating towards Turin ; then slipping dexterously from his enemy he crossed the Sesia near its mouth, and gaining the lower Ticinus seized Pavia, which fortress, full of stores, ammunition, and artillery, had been left by Mélas altogether powerless for defence.

No sooner was the direction of this flank march revealed to Mélas, than, trusting that Wukassowich would check the French advance upon the Ticinus, he resolved to cross to the north bank of the Po, in order by way of Vercelli to fall upon the rear of the French columns. About to execute this intention on the evening of the 31st of May, he was informed of the circumstances which had rendered the retreat of Wukassowich imperatively necessary. Then, and not till then, did he fully realise the extent of the combination of which he was soon to be the victim. With calm energy the old man resolved at last to abandon the blood-stained prize in the Riviera which had already cost him so dear. Ordering Elsnitz to retire from Nice by way of Coni, Cherasco, and Asti, and directing Ott to

raise the siege of Genoa, he determined to concentrate the whole of his forces about Alessandria. Had this order been punctually executed, Mélas might still have avoided the fate which was in store for him; but the evil genius which of late had thwarted his every resolve, was not yet fully appeased. Before Elsnitz could receive the order, Suchet had attacked him with such vehemence and ability that the Austrian general was forced to retreat. Anxious to cover Genoa at any price, he halted on the Roya, and there received his commander's latest instructions. But Suchet had already seized the Tenda road, and manœuvring boldly by his left, sought to involve Elsnitz in signal disaster. In this he fully succeeded; for when the Austrians at last reached Ceva, at the head of the Bormida valley, on the 7th of June, but 8000 of his men remained with their colours. Ten thousand veteran soldiers had been sacrificed during this short but fatal retreat.

Ott, on the other hand, had received Mélas's despatch, which, unfortunately, did not explain the events which had occurred in Piedmont on the 1st June, twenty-four hours after the first negotiations with Massena for the surrender of the fortress had been opened. How was he, under these circumstances, to act? Should he literally obey his superior's orders, issued in ignorance of the state of affairs at Genoa? Was it not rather advisable, considering the value of Genoa for subsequent operations, to await further instructions after his own report which had crossed Mélas's courier had reached headquarters? In his difficulty he consulted the British admiral, with whom he had hitherto co-operated. Lord Keith's opinion coincided with his own in deciding upon the latter alternative; a resolve which was subsequently approved by Mélas, provided Ott prepared to march in the given direction the moment Massena had evacuated the fortress. On the 4th of June, the French general affixed his signature to the terms which allowed him, unrestricted as to future action, to rejoin Suchet, who, unknown to his chief, had already reached the neighbourhood of Savona. The day following, the garrison of Genoa, reduced to 8000 half-starved soldiers, marched through the Austrian posts accompanied with all the honours of war, and was immediately replaced by sixteen battalions under Hohenzollern.

Then Ott, whose destination had meanwhile been altered to Piacenza, commenced his march by the Bochetta, having previously detached Gottesheim, with some infantry battalions, by the shorter Trebbia valley, to the same point.

It is evident that Mélas could regain the Mincio—now his sole object—from Alessandria by either bank of the Po. The northern bank of that river was occupied, as he knew, by the whole of the Army of Reserve; whilst the road by Tortona and Piacenza, the shortest and most direct, was still open. But this road, which was naturally selected for the above reasons, traversed the narrow defile of Stradella, which it was all important to secure, and which was commanded by Piacenza. From a careless sense of security, that fortress, like Pavia, had been left almost unguarded, and was now actually within easier reach of the French than of the Austrians. The town and citadel, however, were on the southern bank of the river, and contained some two or three hundred soldiers, who watched the magazines. With a view to be first up at this decisive point, O'Reilly was instructed to start with some cavalry squadrons to the support of the garrison, and to endeavour to hold out until Gottesheim and Ott, arriving in succession, could then firmly establish themselves.

While Elsnitz and Kaim were thus marching upon Alessandria, and O'Reilly, Gottesheim, and Ott were straining for Piacenza, the First Consul was at Milan.

Before the decisive operation of the campaign could be commenced, it was necessary to await Moncey's arrival, and to order a system of administration in the capital, by which the army could be regularly provided with supplies. Some days, too, must necessarily elapse before the military dispositions could be completed; so that there is little doubt that Buonaparte, at this time, had already reconciled himself to the temporary loss of Genoa. A decisive victory on the banks of the Po would, however, restore that stronghold, as well as all her old possessions in Italy, to the Republic. To this end, therefore, the whole of his energies were now applied.

Duhesme and Loison were first directed upon Lodi, where they crossed the Adda in pursuit of Wukassowich, who, falling back upon Crema and Brescia, ultimately retreated to Mantua.

Pizzighitone was then invested by Duhesme, who, calling in Loison from Brescia, where Lecchi replaced him, subsequently made himself master of the important post of Cremona. Here Loison at once crossed to the southern bank of the Po, marching for Piacenza, upon which fortress Murat had been simultaneously directed by way of Lodi, from Milan. Lannes, too, from Pavia, was already constructing a bridge across the main river at Belgiojoso, below the mouth of the Ticinus, with a view to cross to the southern bank, and, supported by Victor, to secure the defile, which takes its name from the village of Stradella. Moncey, who had meanwhile brought his three divisions under Lapoype, Lorges, and Gilly into line, was ordered with the first to replace Lannes, at Pavia, whilst the others garrisoned Milan and the adjacent towns. Fort Bard having capitulated on the 1st of June, Chabran was instructed to occupy the line of the Po, carefully watching the progress of that river from Chivasso to the Ticinus, where he would communicate with Lapoype. A garrison was to be left at Bard and Ivrea, which had been hastily fortified, with a view to maintain communication by that line with Switzerland. For the same reason B  thencourt remained at Arona, and Moncey's rear-guard occupied Bellinzona in the Simplon and St Gothard valleys.

The object of these dispositions is sufficiently apparent. Before any important step could be undertaken upon the central Po, it was necessary to guard the French left from interruption on the side of the Mincio; hence the occupation of the line Brescia-Cremona. The avowed purpose of the First Consul being to obstruct M  las's retreat, and bring him to decisive battle, it was necessary to determine that road by which the Austrian general would endeavour to retire. The same reasons which influenced M  las's choice decided the dispositions of the French general; at the same time it would not be prudent to leave the longer road, which cut the French communications on the north bank of the Po, weakly occupied. Thus, whilst Lannes, Victor, Murat, and Loison were moving upon Piacenza, with a view to block the Stradella defile *en masse*, Chabran watched the higher passage of the Po, and Lapoype, appuy   upon Pavia, was prepared to defend the line of the Ticinus. The difficult object was, so to echelon

the French divisions, on both banks of the Po, that in whichever direction Mélas might appear, a sufficiency of force could be concentrated to insure his defeat. Lastly, in case of disaster, the Army of Reserve would retire, as it had advanced, by the various passes which conducted to Switzerland, all of which it still held in possession.

The execution of these movements soon brought the two armies into hostile conflict. Lannes, crossing the main river at Belgiojoso on the 6th of June, had barely effected a lodgment with a small portion of his men on the southern bank, before these were vigorously attacked by a detachment under Prince Taxis, marching from Alessandria to Piacenza. The French were favoured by the ground, and fighting well, under Watrin, repulsed Taxis with severe loss.

On the evening of the same day, Murat, accompanied by his cavalry and Boudet's division, appeared suddenly before the *tête de pont* of Piacenza. Into this the commandant had thrown his small garrison, and arming the works with what guns he could muster, beat back the French assault with such hardy courage, that Murat decided to defer further effort until the following morning. In the night the garrison retired by the bridge, which they partially destroyed, into the citadel, and during the day O'Reilly with his cavalry arrived. But Murat, correctly estimating the value of the place, soon found means to throw the French infantry across the river at Nocello, and then entering the streets of the town, engaged the Austrian cavalry with great advantage. To add to his embarrassment, O'Reilly received intelligence of the defeat of Taxis, whom he had expected, and of the near approach of a large train of Austrian artillery. To rescue this, which was in imminent danger of falling into the hands of the French, he extricated himself from the hopeless contest, and, galloping back upon the Stradella road, succeeded, with daring gallantry, in escorting the artillery, through Lannes's posts, back to Tortona. Hardly had O'Reilly departed when the head of Gottesheim's column appeared before the town from the side of the Trebbia. But the French were already in great force on the southern bank, and charging vigorously, drove the Austrian brigade, utterly routed, back into the mountains. The same fate was

experienced by another regiment which came up from Tuscany by the Parma road; so that, on the 8th of June, Murat remained in undisputed possession of this important point. Twelve additional hours would seem to have been sufficient for the concentration of these several detachments, under O'Reilly's command, an event which might seriously have interfered with the after operations of the French; so great is the value of time in war.

Meanwhile Ott, marching from Genoa, had reached Novi on the 7th of June, and then pushed on to Tortona. But the swollen state of the Scrivia delayed his passage of that river until the following day, on the evening of which he bivouacked with about 16,000 men at Voghera and Casteggio. Here, if he continued his march, he must inevitably come into collision with Lannes, whose light troops, advanced from Broni, had already skirmished with the Austrian riflemen. Intent upon gaining Piacenza, and ignorant of the French masses which interposed between him and his destination, Ott determined to engage.

On the following day, the 9th of June, he fought the battle of Montebello with Lannes and Victor. The probability of such an action had been foreseen by Buonaparte, who had reached Pavia on the 7th, and was closely watching the turn of events. The precautions which he had wisely taken rendered success on Ott's part hopeless; so that, with the loss of 4000, that general retired somewhat discouraged behind the Scrivia. The First Consul had not received the intelligence of the surrender of Genoa until the 8th of June, and was still entirely ignorant of the terms of evacuation. He consequently deemed it prudent, considering the great dissemination of his forces, to remain in position at Stradella after the battle of Montebello. But during three days no signs of hostile approach presented themselves; and then, terribly anxious lest his adversary should escape him, he moved forwards into the plains of the Scrivia.

Mélas was, in fact, now concentrated under the walls of Alessandria, and, weary of the constant ill-fortune which attended his dispositions, was preparing to try the last stern issue of the sword.

It has been stated that the First Consul, tired of waiting in his formidable position at Stradella for the appearance of the Austrian columns—fearful, moreover, lest his adversary should have decided upon some other course than that which he had confidently attributed to him—advanced on the afternoon of the 12th of June, with the whole of the force which had held the defile, towards the Scrivia.

On the 13th he crossed that river, debouching into the broad plain which extends to the Bormida. Towards evening, in the absence of any indication of the enemy's presence, Victor's corps was pushed forward in the direction of Alessandria. In the village of Marengo these troops came into collision with an Austrian detachment belonging to O'Reilly's command, which, with some slight show of resistance, fell back upon the intrenchments which covered the bridges spanning the Bormida. A futile effort was made by Victor to carry these, and eventually his most advanced posts were contented with occupying the little hamlet of Pedrabuona.

Victor's report was little calculated to allay the First Consul's anxiety. Were Mélas really concentrated at Alessandria with a view to force his passage to the Mincio through the French lines, he must obviously first lead his soldiers across the Bormida in order to gain the road which conducts by Tortona and Voghera to Piacenza. To secure this operation from dangerous interruption, the most ordinary forethought would seem to have suggested that the village of Marengo, with the line of the Fontanone, should have been obstinately defended against Victor's advance. As no serious effort had been made to this end, the doubts which already harassed the French general received additional substance. He feared, indeed, that his adversary was about to elude his grasp, thus to rob him of the precious fruits expected from a combination so daring and genial. Intent upon regaining the *touch* of his enemy which he felt momentarily lost, he hurried back to his headquarters at Voghera, leaving Victor with his two divisions at Marengo, and placing Lannes, by way of precaution, echeloned in support of the former general on the plain. But the Scrivia, owing to sudden rain in the mountains, had overflowed its banks, and thus Buonaparte, much to

his annoyance, was forced to spend the night at Torre di Garofoldo. To this circumstance, which admitted of his early presence on the battle-field the following morning, he probably owed his victory. The advices which reached him here from the Ticinus and the Lower Po reported that all was quiet in those parts; and so the unwelcome conjecture forced itself upon him that Mélas, wisely avoiding a conflict in which so many chances were enlisted against him, had retired upon Genoa, now open for his reception.

Judging after the event, every dictate of prudence would seem to have counselled this step on the part of the Austrian commander. It would appear, indeed, as though 40,000 soldiers posted in the Mediterranean fortress, supported and supplied with every want by the British fleet, might have defied attack, and have prolonged the war to an indefinite extent. From Genoa, too, the possibility existed of gaining Tuscany, either by sea or land, there to recommence operations from a fresh base in allied territory, or thence to regain the Adige and the Mincio. The advisability of such a course had presented itself with great force to the mind of the old general, but the sense of his soldiers was against it. The veterans who had conquered on so many fields were reluctant now to turn their backs upon the foe who challenged them so roughly. Besides, experience had shown that not much reliance could be placed on British co-operation, and at Genoa the army must be dependent for its every movement upon the fleet of a closely-allied but foreign Power. For these reasons the idea had already been discarded in the Austrian camp. But Buonaparte, to whom this was of course unknown, determined at any risk to ascertain the truth. During the last few days he had been joined by Desaix, who had recently returned from Egypt—an officer of marked ability, in whom he placed implicit reliance. On arrival, this general had at once been intrusted with the command of the reserve divisions, Monnier and Boudet. With the last of these he was now directed to march for Rivalta and Novi, with a view to learn whether the much-dreaded retrograde movement had really been commenced by the Austrians. Thus the French forces, already scattered over a vast extent of territory on either bank of the

Po, were still further disseminated on the eve of the impending battle.

It will be interesting here to recall to recollection the positions occupied on the night of the 13th of June by the several French divisions.

On the north bank of the Po, Thurreaud was still intrenched at Susa, held in check by the garrison left by the Austrians in the citadel of Turin. Chabran guarded the line of the Po between the Sesia and the Ticinus, and garrisoned Ivrea. Béthencourt remained at Arona. Lapoype held Pavia and the line of the Ticinus; and the other divisions belonging to Moncey's command, under Gilly and Lorges, supported him at Milan and on the Adda. The Italian brigade occupied Brescia; whilst Duhesme, striding across the Po at Cremona, carefully watched the avenues of approach from the Mincio and the Apennines. Not less than 30,000 soldiers were thus absent from the spot where the fate of the campaign was about to be decided.

South of the Po, Victor was at Marengo; Lannes supported him a short distance in rear on the plain; Murat, with the cavalry and Monnier's division, took post on the Scrivia at Ponte Curone and Castel Nuovo; and Desaix bivouacked with Boudet's division in the vicinity of Rivalta. Finally, Suchet had already made his appearance on the northern slopes of the Apennines, in the direction of Acqui, having left Massena with some strong detachments in the vicinity of Savona.

On the other hand, the pressing demands made upon Mélas, together with the terrible losses he had experienced, had reduced his fighting force to 31,000 combatants now assembled at Alessandria. Garrisons at Genoa, Savona, Alessandria, Tonarto, Casale, Turin, Milan, and in numerous other citadels, absorbed fully 25,000 men, whilst Wukassowich, who had retreated behind the Mincio, and the garrisons in Venetia, were paralysed for present purposes of the campaign.

*Strength and Organisation of the French Army at the
Battle of Marengo.*

Infantry.

Lieutenant-General Victor.

Gardanne 3691

Chambarlhac 5287

Lieutenant-General Lannes.

Watrin 5083

Lieutenant-General Desaix.

Monnier 3614

Boudet 5316

Consular Garde 900

————— 23,891

Cavalry.

Lieutenant-General Murat.

Kellerman 1270

Champeaux 998

Rivaud 1060

Consular Garde 360

————— 3,688

Artillery 690

Grand total 28,269

*Strength and Organisation of the Austrian Army at the
Battle of Marengo.*

CORPS.	DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	STRENGTH.	REMARKS.
Right Column	O'Reilly	Rousseau . .	3000	800 Cavalry.
	Advance-guard .	Frimont . .	1800	450 Cavalry.
		Pilati . . .	1400	Cavalry.
	Haddick	Bellegarde .	1500	
		St Julien . .	2200	
		De Briey . .	1650	
Main Body . .	Kaim'	Knesewich . .	2200	
		Lamarsaille .	1100	
	Morzin (Grenadiers)	Lattermann .	2100	
		Weidenfeld .	2200	
		Pioneers . .	400	
	Elanitz (Cavalry)	Nobili . . .	1900	
		Nimptsch . .	2300	Cavalry.
		Gottesheim .	800	250 Cavalry.
Left Column . .	Schellenberg . .	Retz	2000	
	Vogelsang . . .	Sticker . . .	2600	550 Cavalry.
		Ulm	2200	
		Total . . .	30,850	Including 7450 Cavalry.

Nevertheless, actual circumstances singularly favoured the hardy resolution of the Austrian chief. To oppose his march to the Scrivia, Lannes and Victor together could barely muster 18,000 soldiers, nor could these be supported, in case they accepted action, for several hours to come. During the night, however, reports reached the First Consul from his advance posts, which convinced him that his fears had been groundless; and messengers were despatched in hot haste to recall Desaix, as well as to order up Murat and Monnier from the Lower Scrivia.

The plain, which since the battle has borne the name of Marengo, offered further advantages to the Austrians, inasmuch as it favoured the development of their cavalry and artillery, in which arms they were much superior to the French.

The Po here flows at some distance from the Apennines, and the broad open space cultivated throughout, which separated the main river from the mountains, is intersected by the Tanaro, Bormida, Scrivia, and Staffora. The actual battle-field is enclosed between the Scrivia and Bormida, the object of contest being the highroad which leads from Alessandria through Marengo and San Giuliano to Tortona and Piacenza. A second road conducts from the same fortress, through Castel Ceriolo, either to Salé and further to Cambio on the Po, or to Castel Nuovo on the Scrivia, and thence to Voghera, where it rejoins the main thoroughfare.

Two bridges spanned the Bormida close to the fortress, protected by a *tête de pont*; and parallel to this river streamed the deep and marshy Fontanone brook, on the eastern bank of which stood the village of Marengo. The plain is studded with farms and hamlets; and the action of cavalry, though practicable in most parts, was somewhat impeded by the cultivation.

In a stirring order of the day, the Austrian general announced his intention of fighting to his army, reminded it of earlier triumphs, and called upon his soldiers to do their duty in the coming struggle. His plan was, to debouch with the whole of his army by the bridges on the Bormida, at daybreak on the 14th of June, into the plain of Marengo, and then detaching Ott with 8000 men to Castel Ceriolo in order to meet a strong hostile column reported from that direction, to

march himself with the divisions commanded by Haddick, Kaim, Morzin, and Elsnitz, 20,000 strong, by way of Marengo to San Giuliano, regulating his subsequent movements by the amount of resistance encountered. O'Reilly, with 3000 men, would ascend the Bormida towards La Stortigliona, and thus cover the right flank of the army.

This last general, who had bivouacked during the night outside the intrenchments, headed the line of march. He soon found himself engaged with the troops belonging to Gardanne at Pedrabuona, and drove them back in considerable confusion upon Marengo. Had he followed up his success and entered the village with the fugitives, the events of the day might have turned out very differently; but his orders directed him to march upon La Stortigliona, nor could he depend upon the immediate support which he would certainly require. The difficulty of debouching by the single issue from the *tête de pont* was in fact already making itself felt. Before Haddick, who followed O'Reilly, could fully deploy his division, two hours had elapsed, and a third was lost ere Kaim took post in second line according to the order of battle. Then Haddick, covered by his batteries, as O'Reilly moved off by his right, advanced to assault Marengo. It will be recollected that between him and the village was the deep and difficult bed of the Fontanone, offering an admirable line of defence to the French. The configuration of the rivulet at this point is such that troops advancing by the road from Alessandria towards the village must inevitably be exposed to a crushing fire in front and flank, and Victor had made good use of the early hours lost by the Austrians to complete his dispositions for receiving them. Haddick, consequently, found all his efforts to surmount this obstacle vain, and, on the point of abandoning his object, fell mortally wounded. His soldiers giving way were immediately replaced by Kaim, who, after suffering cruel loss, was in turn compelled to retire. Meanwhile Pilati had succeeded in throwing a few squadrons across the brook a short distance above Marengo. He was about to roll up Chambarlhac's infantry, which lined the bank of the stream, when Kellerman, who had been watching his opportunity, charged violently before the Austrian horsemen

had gained sufficient footing, hurling men and horses back into the muddy brook. In the interim, too, Lannes, moving up from Li Poggi, had brought his men into line on Victor's right towards La Barbotta. Making free use of his troops, he prepared here to take Kaim, who was still struggling along the stream, in flank, and was with difficulty contained by the rallied battalions belonging to Haddick. Everywhere, as yet, victory inclined to the French, but Ott had not yet made his appearance at Castel Ceriolo, and Mélas still held the divisions belonging to Elsnitz and Morzin in reserve. The French, on the other hand, had developed the whole of their available force—the line along the Fontanone assuming the following formation: on the left, Kellerman, with his cavalry, covered that flank of the position which was then occupied in the order named by the divisions of Chambarlhac, Gardanne, and Watrin, under Victor and Lannes respectively; the extreme right towards Castel Ceriolo being feebly protected by the remainder of the cavalry under Champeaux.

Bitterly the Austrian general now regretted the oversight which had permitted him to abandon so easily on the preceding evening the key to the plain he was so anxious to gain. To add to his troubles, he at this moment—about 9 A.M.—received intelligence of Suchet's approach from the side of Acqui. In this emergency, the exceeding difficulty of his position appears somewhat to have clouded the otherwise clear judgment of the veteran officer. Under any circumstances, the battle which he was now fighting must be terminated before Suchet could possibly make his appearance. To detach, therefore, from the actual battle-field, was uselessly to deprive himself of the aid of soldiers whose assistance might turn the scale in his favour. But Mélas thought otherwise, and, in a fatal moment, ordered Nimptsch to recross the Bormida with 2000 cavalry, taken from the reserve, in order to observe, and if necessary confront, this new danger.*

Ott's column had closed the line of march from the left bank of the Bormida, and was first able to proceed to its destination, when the other troops had successively filed out of the in-

* Suchet appears only to have reached Acqui, after a forced march, on the night of the 14th of June.

trenchments ; his action, consequently, had been much retarded. Having occupied Castel Ceriolo at last without impediment, and finding no enemy on his front, he turned to his right and bore down heavily upon Lannes's flank. This attack, apparently unexpected, forced Lannes to effect a partial change of front, and Mélas, thus relieved on his left, made his last effort against Victor at Marengo. Preparing his assault with an overwhelming artillery-fire, he brought up Lattermann's grenadiers from the reserve, and, supporting these crack troops with the remnants of Kaim's force, he succeeded at last in lodging one battalion on the opposite bank. A light bridge on trestles was immediately thrown across the fatal ditch, and the supports streaming over, whilst the Austrian guns crossed their fire upon the village, Victor at last gave way, falling back, with both his divisions in considerable disorder, upon Spinetta, as well as on the road leading to San Giuliano. Simultaneously O'Reilly had carried La Stortigliona, and was now marching by way of La Bolla for Frugarolo.

By the retreat of Victor, Lannes, already severely pressed by Ott on his opposite flank, found his left uncovered. With admirable presence of mind and great dexterity, he withdrew Watrin's division from its critical position, defending every inch of ground as he retired. Matters, however, were rapidly approaching to a crisis, and unless support arrived, the ultimate rout of both French divisions seemed inevitable.

At this decisive moment—about 11 A.M.—Buonaparte made his first appearance on the field. With him were two battalions of the Consular Garde, about 900 strong, and a short distance in rear, Monnier's division was hurrying up by the road from Castel Nuova della Scrivia. Desaix had announced his presence with Boudet's division on the battle-field for four o'clock in the afternoon and beyond these named no further reinforcements were available for this day's fighting.

A rapid survey of the battle-field showed the First Consul that little further effort could be expected from Victor's divisions, and that, consequently, the road leading to Tortona must be regarded for the moment as lost. Lannes, on the other hand, in spite of severe losses, had retained more order ;

Monnier, too, was approaching on his right rear ; moreover, it will be remembered that a second road, starting from Castel Ceriolo, was available for the retreat of the French either towards the Po, or by a more circuitous route to Voghera. It seemed important, therefore, to secure this communication without delay ; so, leaving Victor to shift for himself, Buonaparte launched the Consular Garde into the thick of the fray on Lannes's right front, with a view to afford that general relief from Ott's extremely dangerous attacks until Monnier could arrive. The Garde did its duty nobly, sustaining an unequal combat during anxious minutes, which were invaluable to the French general ; but charged at the same time by infantry in front and cavalry in rear, after suffering terribly in square from the enemy's guns, it succumbed at last, and fled in disorder for shelter to Li Poggi.

Flushed with victory, Ott's soldiers pressed on to complete their triumph over Lannes's exhausted troops, when, fortunately for this last officer, Monnier brought his men into action at the very moment when utter rout appeared imminent.

An order from Buonaparte directed Monnier to seize Castel Ceriolo ; so detaching Carra St Cyr, who commanded his right brigade, for that purpose, he held on with his left towards Li Poggi, whither the Consular Garde, as we have already seen, and Lannes, thanks to the efforts made on his behalf, had retired. Victor, too, had formed up in something like order at Spinetta ; so that the French line, shattered indeed, but still retaining formation, extended now from this village on the left by way of Li Poggi towards Villa Nuova. St Cyr had taken and settled in Castel Ceriolo ; and the remainder of the French line, pivoting upon Monnier, who formed its right, continued to fall back slowly upon San Giuliano.

The battle was won by the Austrians, but their general, wounded and faint in his old age from exhaustion, returned to Alessandria, directing Zach and Kaim to complete his victory.

So great was the disorder amongst the French, that a compact body of cavalry thrown into the scale at this moment must inevitably have secured to the Austrians the fruits of their hardly-earned triumph. But no such force remained. Nimptsch had departed for Cantaluppo. Pilati and Frimont's

squadrons had been almost destroyed. What horsemen remained were galloping about the plain in small detachments, harassing the retreating French, but quite insufficient in force to strike the decisive blow. Nobili appears still to have been held in reserve. Certain it is that the golden opportunity was lost; and during the period in which Zach was forming the scattered Austrian divisions in order to pursue his march towards the Scrivia, Desaix arrived at San Giuliano from Rivalta.

His appearance inspired the First Consul with fresh hope. Desaix was eagerly surrounded by the French generals and informed of the occurrences of the day. Although these were unanimous in counselling retreat, considering the state of Lannes's and Victor's divisions, Desaix, it is stated, inclined to opposite views. He held that the action could be renewed, not only without additional risk, but with considerable prospect of success, inasmuch as the French were now firm masters of the road to Tortona, and moreover possessed a reserve of 6000 fresh troops, whilst the Austrian reserves had already been engaged. The very slackness of the enemy's pursuit showed his exhaustion.

If we consider the stake for which Buonaparte was playing, and to how great an extent his future prospects might have been damaged by a retreat, tantamount to the acknowledgment of defeat, we shall readily understand how strenuously he insisted upon the force of Desaix's arguments. With the energy which characterised him, he succeeded in imparting his own ardour to his subordinates, and, halting his divisions on the ground which they occupied, he rode down their front addressing his men in the inspiring language of which he was so great a master. Then he made his dispositions for receiving the Austrians as they advanced.

In advance of San Giuliano, on the right of the road, Desaix's soldiers were formed up in two lines, concealed from the enemy's view by a slight undulation of the ground. A battery of twelve guns—all that remained to the French—under Marmont, covered Desaix's front. On his right stood Lannes, and to Lannes's right, slightly advanced, the Consular Garde and Monnier. St Cyr remained, cut off from the rest of the

army, in Castel Ceriolo. The remnant of Victor's divisions took post on the left of the road in rear of Desaix, in support of whose either flank were ranged, under Kellerman and Champeaux, the few cavalry squadrons of which the First Consul could still dispose.

Meanwhile Zach, little anticipating further resistance, had formed his divisions in order of march along the highroad. His advance-guard, deployed in two lines after passing Cassina Grossa, consisted of the Brigade St Julien, and of Lattermann's Grenadiers, the left flank being covered by the Liechtenstein Dragoons. Half a mile in rear, in column of march on the road, followed in succession the troops commanded by Bellegarde, Knesewich, and Lamarsaille, composing the main body, whilst Weidenfeld's Grenadiers formed the rear-guard. Pilati flanked the infantry on the left of the road; and Frimont extended on the right, in order to seek communication with O'Reilly, marching for Frugarolo.

Ott, finally, had abandoned the Salé road for that leading to La Ghilina, and was now moving, separated by a space of two miles, parallel to the main column.

In this order the Austrians advanced with bands playing upon San Giuliano. As St Julien approached the village, with singular want of care, Marmont's batteries opened upon him, decimating the ranks of his brigade with grape. Before the soldiers had recovered from the effects of this surprise, they were charged by Desaix at the head of his infantry. Then they turned, damaging in their flight the formation of Lattermann's battalions. But the grenadiers stood firm, and, firing a volley in return, Desaix fell. The steadiness of these troops had already checked the eagerness of the French infantry, when Kellerman, who had filed through Desaix's lines, by Buonaparte's order, to support his charge, attacked the squadrons which covered the flank of the Austrian infantry. These broke and fled, and Kellerman, seizing the opportunity before the grenadiers could change their formation, dashed through the ranks, when in a moment all was confusion. Kellermann's action, vigorously supported by Boudet now at the head of Desaix's division, was decisive. Two thousand veteran soldiers, with Zach at their head, surrendered; and the French,

electrified by success so unexpected, appreciating, too, with characteristic sagacity the value of the surprise, pushed on to clench their victory. Again the Austrian cavalry gave way before Kellerman's troopers, in their terror riding down their own battalions, and rendering all attempts at ordered formation hopeless. The rout of Kaim and Haddick was soon completed, the troops rushing blindly for the Bormida bridges; fortunately for them Weidenfeld had found time to deploy at Spinetta, where, soon joined by O'Reilly, who had hurried back from the Frugarolo road, he covered with great firmness the wreck of the main column, giving way towards Marengo. But more time was necessary to save the panic-stricken fugitives of all arms, who choked the bridges on the Bormida; Weidenfeld and O'Reilly therefore redoubled their efforts, with noble devotion, to defend the Fontanone line. The position, however, did not now offer the same advantages which the French had secured in the morning, as the village stood on the eastern bank of the stream. Marengo was carried by assault at seven in the evening, by Lannes and Boudet, the Austrians retiring in tolerable order upon Pedrabuona. Here Weidenfeld, most opportunely, was reinforced by Ott.

When the general advance commenced along the whole Austrian line, Ott, as elsewhere described, turned from the Salé road, where no enemy had shown himself, into that leading to La Ghilina and the Scrivia, ignorant, apparently, that in rear of his line of march St Cyr was still in possession of Castel Ceriolo. Firing in the direction of San Giuliano had already attracted his attention; but the peculiar cultivation of the plain impeded his view, so that he was ignorant alike of Desaix's arrival, and of the fresh position assumed by the French. Some of the troopers, however, whom Kellerman had dispersed, rallied to his column, and informed him of Zach's disaster on the Marengo road. He immediately bore to his right with a view to assist the main body of the army, by taking the French in flank. But the extraordinary rapidity with which the French divisions had followed up Kellerman's first success, soon convinced him of the utter hopelessness of providing a remedy for the general disorder which had ensued. At the same time, the appearance of Rivaud, with a

heavy detachment of French cavalry from the direction of Salé, alarmed him for his own security. He judged it prudent, therefore, in the absence of all directions from his chief, to effect his retreat upon Alessandria. His astonishment was great, after having reversed the direction of his line of march, to find Castel Ceriolo occupied by the enemy. No time was to be lost; so he assaulted the village, clearing himself a passage at the point of the bayonet, arriving ultimately at Pedrabuona in sufficient time to afford Weidenfeld the support of which he now was so much in need. With Ott's assistance, further disasters were avoided, and the last Austrian soldier filed into the Bormida intrenchments at ten o'clock, long after dusk.

The losses sustained by both armies in the battle were unusually severe. One-fourth of the combatants in each army was placed *hors de combat*. On the Austrian side, in addition to 3000 prisoners, 7000 soldiers were killed or wounded; amongst them 300 officers, including many generals. The same loss, exclusive of the prisoners, was experienced by the French, and Desaix (after the First Consul the most promising officer of the Republic) was amongst the dead.

During the night succeeding the battle, efforts were made in the Austrian camp to restore order, but great irresolution on the part of the commander and superior officers prevailed. Zach, upon whose ability Mélas greatly leant, was a prisoner to the French, and no other officer was now found willing to undertake the great responsibility he shared. The usual resort under such circumstances is a council of war, generally a poor substitute for energetic action.

With 20,000 soldiers at his command, superior too in artillery and cavalry, it was, doubtless, still in Mélas's power to make a second effort to burst the bonds with which his adversary had surrounded him. Such, however, could barely tend to the true interests of the State he served. Whether the attempt were renewed on the south or north bank of the Po, success would only carry a sorry remnant of the fine army he had so lately commanded to the banks of the Mincio. The isolated garrisons in the numerous strong places they occupied in Piedmont must inevitably be sacrificed in successive capitulations. Defeat, moreover, must entail, sooner or

later, the loss to the Austrian Empire of the entire army of Italy.

Further hesitation was suspended by the intelligence that Buonaparte, always intent upon gathering the fruits of victory, was preparing at daybreak to assault the intrenchments, and to carry his army across the Bormida. Negotiations therefore commenced; and Zach, accompanied by Berthier, proceeded on the part of the First Consul to Alessandria, to frame the clauses which subsequently constituted the celebrated Convention of Alessandria. On the 15th of June the following terms were acceded to by both contending parties, and the document containing them accordingly executed:—

Suspension of hostilities until the terms of convention were ratified at Vienna.

The Austrians to occupy the line extending from Peschiera, on the Mincio, to the mouth of the Po. Their garrisons in Tuscany would remain there as well as in Ancona.

The French would hold the territory west of the Chiese; the ground between the Chiese and Mincio remaining neutral.

On retiring, the Austrians engaged to evacuate all the fortresses which they occupied within these bounds. The citadels of Tortona, Alessandria, Milan, Arona, and Piacenza, were to be delivered up between the 16th and 20th of June; those of Ceva, Savona, and the fortresses of Coni and Genoa, between the 16th and 24th of the same month.

The Austrian army would retire to the Mincio in three columns by way of Piacenza, as the fortresses were evacuated.

The artillery in the fortresses belonging to the Sardinian foundries was assigned to the French, the Austrian guns restored to the Imperial army. The stores to be divided equally between both armies.

Severe and humiliating as these terms were to an army which for two preceding years had been constantly victorious, they were still the best of which circumstances would admit. Sixty thousand soldiers would thus be preserved to the Empire, and, ranged on the Mincio, might possibly soon be in a position to renew the war. Buonaparte was fully alive to this fact; but his political position, not as yet fully secured in

France, required the instant *prestige* of victory which he was reluctant further to endanger.

COMMENTS.

The strategical manœuvre which commands our attention in the study of this campaign, is that of throwing an army across an enemy's communications. The circumstances in war where such an operation is feasible, are necessarily few. It would seem that, to enlist the chances of successful execution, a commander must start with considerable advantages in his favour. These may consist in numerical superiority, interior position, fighting and manœuvring power, or in the sympathising spirit of the inhabitants of the country about to form the theatre of action. Decisive in case of success, the risk in execution is proportionately hazardous, for the obvious reason, that an army manœuvring with such purpose lays itself open to the possibility of counterstroke on the part of an enterprising adversary. Much, therefore, would also appear to depend upon the character of the enemy with which one has to deal.

In the present instance, the justification of the combination lies in the due appreciation of surrounding circumstances. The secrecy with which the First Consul was able to cloak his preparations, the impenetrable veil to his movements presented by the Alpine frontiers, the difficulties of passage, the occupation of the Austrian army in Liguria, and the restricted powers of its commander, were all considerations containing in the aggregate the elements for successful issue.

Nevertheless, the extreme nicety of the operation is transparent throughout every phase of the campaign, dependent as it principally was upon a just calculation of numbers, time, and distance.

Without the co-operation of Moreau's detachment, Buonaparte justly deemed the Army of Reserve insufficient for the purpose. Therefore it was that he despatched Carnot to that general's headquarters, to urge him to instant action, and to superintend the departure of the reinforcement, without which he felt himself powerless. This once effected, he set his col-

umns in motion; and the actual passage of the mountains constituted, perhaps, the least of the difficulties he would have to encounter. The preoccupation of his adversary at Genoa and on the Var diminished the danger of debouching from the mountain defiles, and the concentration at Ivrea was, consequently, secured almost without opposition. Now, however, his adversary was on the alert, and the flank march from this last town to the Lombard capital was fraught with peril. This, again, was lessened by the fact of Moncey's approach by the St Gothard, which would not only establish his full fighting force, but would enable him to reopen communications with Switzerland by that line were those by St Bernard lost in the interim.

Such communications, however, as these mountain passes presented, would barely suffice for an army dependent upon its base for supplies, though they might well serve for the safe retreat of an army, defeated in the plains, without its material. It was upon the sympathy of the inhabitants, the resources of the country, and the magazines belonging to the Austrians, that the First Consul was enabled to rely for the subsistence of his troops.

Had the acquirement of territory alone constituted the purpose of Buonaparte, that object was gained by his concentration at Milan. The Austrian commander was in no position to encounter him here with anything approaching to equality of force, let alone the embarrassments which must inevitably result from hurried concentration and damaged communications. Had he been permitted, Mélas must consequently at once have fallen back upon the Mincio. Vast as such a result—the possession of Piedmont and Lombardy without firing a shot—would seem, it by no means sufficed for the necessities of the First Consul's position. From the Mincio, again in solid communication with the interior of the empire, the Austrians would inevitably renew the war, and the fruits of a brilliant strategical combination must still be contested on a final battle-field. Better, then, if such must be the case, to force his adversary to action where a false position was certain to entail moral detriment, than to allow him to recover from the effects of surprise and uncertainty.

Furthermore, the opportunity of rapidly terminating the war in one decisive engagement was too tempting to be missed, and the First Consul's confidence in his own powers was unbounded.

Here, then, arose the necessity of intercepting the Austrian army on its retreat. Considering that Moncey had only effected his junction with Buonaparte on the 6th of June, some days later than expected, no time was to be lost. Communications from Alessandria, where Mélas was concentrated, to the Mincio, existed on either bank of the Po. The shortest line carried along the southern bank of the river, through the defile of Stradella, and was restricted to one road. The other, north of the river, commanded several roads on a much larger expanse of territory. Either line was available for the Austrian march; both, therefore, must be guarded in sufficient force to fight with advantage at the point of future collision. Here lies the real difficulty of the problem, and the more extensive the sphere of action, the greater that difficulty becomes. It would seem, therefore, that where communications are similarly intercepted, the offensive army should close at once towards the enemy it wishes to grasp, in order to diminish the chances of disadvantageous action. If this be so, the delay of the First Consul for three days in the position selected at Stradella was an error which nearly cost him dear. It seems the more reprehensible, since Buonaparte was aware of the fall of Genoa on the 8th of June, so that he must have known, after Ott's defeat at Montebello, that a fresh line of retreat was open to the Austrians which they might thus have pursued unmolested. Otherwise, bearing the object of his dispositions in mind, they appeared to have been effected up to this point with masterly care.

Turning to the intercepted army, the first step under such circumstances is necessarily concentration. The promptness with which Mélas issued his orders to this end is laudable, if we consider the sacrifice it entailed. Nevertheless, the measure was not sufficiently thorough for the pressing demands of the moment. The tendency to guard tenaciously numerous posts of passing value, was strong amongst the Austrian com-

manders of that day. The fact that the fate of such posts must in any case depend upon the issue of a decisive general action, was frequently ignored. Ten thousand soldiers, frittered away in citadels and isolated forts in the present instance, would certainly by their presence at Marengo have changed the results of the day. The inopportune surrender of Genoa by Massena, and Ott's consequently motified disobedience of orders, was simply a misfortune. Had that general marched on the 2d of June instead of on the 5th, he would have reached the head of the defile of Stradella on the 6th at latest, and, recollecting that Lannes crossed first at Belgiojoso, on that day, would in all human probability have succeeded in securing the object which both armies were struggling to gain. The surrender of Genoa, by a singular anomaly, was thus actually more conducive to the success of Buonaparte's dispositions, than if its defence had been further protracted. When Ott at last reached the plain of the Scrivia, his effective force was reduced by sixteen battalions, left behind in Liguria, consequently he was defeated at Montebello. Accepting the orders of his chief, and his ignorance of the French numbers on his front, as a sufficient justification for Ott's determination of fighting here, it is difficult to understand the subsequent resolve of the Austrian commander-in-chief to force his way on that bank of the Po, where he now had certain proof that the French were massed in force. The idea of retreating upon Genoa, without fighting, having been abandoned, the possibility of slipping from his adversary by the northern bank of the Po still remained. Holding the passages of the main river at Casale and Valenza, such an operation was perfectly feasible, and presented the further prospect of preparing some embarrassment for his adversary, since the Austrian march must cut the French communications.

Probably the Austrian commander sought on the field of Marengo the advantageous employment of those arms in which he recognised his decided superiority to his adversary. Certain it is that he entered upon his chosen field with every prospect of success, thanks to Buonaparte's latest dispositions. The culpable oversight of the tactical importance of the line

of the Fontanone contributed indirectly to his advantage, by misleading his adversary as to his intentions. The neglect of the previous evening, moreover, might have been repaired on the early morning of the 14th of June, had O'Reilly's first success been vigorously supported by crossing the Fontanone simultaneously with Gardanne's defeated battalions. Instead of this, Haddick's line was slowly and pedantically deployed in strict accordance with the plan drawn up on paper, and the golden opportunity was thus missed. The successive efforts subsequently made to force this obstacle entailed such serious loss that the troops were exhausted when the village of Marengo was at last carried. The inability of the Austrians to complete their early victory must doubtless be attributed to this circumstance. The detachment of a large body of cavalry from the actual field of battle to face Suchet, whose intervention on that day was simply impossible, was a grave error of judgment, which entailed the most serious consequences. When the moment of victory arrived, as it really did, Mélas was powerless to reap its fruits, from the absence of a sufficiency of that very arm upon which he had relied. Probably it was owing to the extreme fatigue of his troops, who had undergone much exertion in the preceding days, that Mélas was unable to follow up his success. His own weariness doubtless deprived him of that energy which is required at a general's hands in moments of emergency. He therefore not only halted his army with a view to restore order, and give it a little breathing-time, but himself returned to Alessandria, leaving Zach to complete what further dispositions were deemed necessary. All military writers are unanimous in condemning this fatal inaction. Irrespective of pedantic formations, the battalions should have been urged forward in the direction of the retreating foe, without allowing him the opportunity of recovering from the shock which had all but shattered his system. "Victory," says Clausewitz, "is useless indeed, unless her fruits are at once carefully gathered into the storeroom." So contented, however, was the Austrian general with the results of the morning, that the army was quietly formed in columns of march on the Tortona road, as though no further possible danger could cross its path. The time lost in

effecting this pedantic order, with battalions scattered over the plain, may be readily imagined, and sufficiently accounts for the recovery of their firmness by the self-same infantry that one more timely blow would have routed. Having commenced his march, Zach would appear to have taken every precaution for the safety of his flanks, none for the security of his front. A few squadrons pushed well in advance of his column of march, would soon have touched Desaix's formation at San Giuliano, and so have saved the advance-guard from the subsequent surprise which terminated in a general panic. Never, perhaps, was an army abandoned by its commander at a moment so singularly inopportune. Not all the vigour of his earlier operations, his constancy under misfortune, or his courage on the battle-field—he was wounded, and had two horses killed under him—have consequently preserved for Mélas, amongst posterity, one shred of that reputation which every soldier holds so dear. The military virtues which he undoubtedly possessed are swamped in his last great failure; for the exigencies of the public service at the hands of its commanders, in all countries, must ever remain relentlessly severe. History has, however, decided that much of the disaster encountered by Mélas may safely be laid at the door of that Aulic Council which sinned so heavily in Austria's earlier wars.

Jomini says, with reference to Buonaparte's conduct of this battle, that he has little to be proud of. Unexpectedly assailed by his adversary, he was saved in this instance, as on a later occasion at Eylau, by the timely arrival of a force detached several leagues from the field of battle.

The justice of this criticism has not been disturbed by subsequent writers. Had the First Consul met his equal in youth and ability on the plain of the Scrivia, he would probably have suffered crushing defeat at his hands. It is the difficulty of first finding, and then closing upon, an intercepted foe, which constitutes the risk of the manœuvre which has been explained. The same difficulty presented itself, in a less degree, five years later at Ulm. From a precisely similar manœuvre, too, Radetzky found himself prematurely engaged at Novara in 1849. It must therefore be considered rash in

the First Consul to have posted Lannes and Victor as he did, on the evening of the 13th of June, unsupported, on ground where he might suddenly be called upon to meet a superior adversary on terms of great disadvantage. Probably his recollections of Austrian generals and Austrian armies in 1796 led him to under-estimate the qualities of his foe. From first to last, in the strategy and tactics he employed, a contemptuous sense of his own and his army's superiority is apparent. His eagerness for action in this instance was consequently carried too far, barely escaping punishment.

Some writers have considered that the echeloned formation of his divisions, in which Buonaparte found himself called upon to accept battle on the ground he held, was the best for the purpose. Jomini disposes of such views in a few words. Echelon, he says in substance, is the best formation for attack, where troops must constantly be fed from the rear, or in retreat where never-failing support will thus be found; but for holding ground occupied with a view to maintain its possession, no worse formation can be conceived, as each division is liable to be separately defeated as it arrives. "Never," he justly adds, "was the proof of this better demonstrated than at Marengo." It was principally to the ability of his subordinates, and to the tenacity of his soldiers, that the First Consul owed this important victory. Had the Emperor, writes Thiers, been served by his subordinates at Waterloo with the same zeal displayed at Marengo, he would have preserved the Empire, and France her preponderant position amongst the nations of Europe. With less justice the same writer attributes to Buonaparte's skill the calculated oblique formation of his line of battle on Desaix's arrival. When a renewal of the battle was then, amidst very conflicting opinions, at last determined upon, the divisions were ordered to halt in the positions they occupied. It was the circumstances of action which had determined these positions. Victor, in utter disorder, was farthest in rear; Lannes, twice rescued from disaster by happy reinforcements, had retreated more deliberately; and Monnier, the last to reach the field in the morning, was still more or less engaged with Ott. That St Cyr was in Castel Ceriolo could scarcely have been known

to the First Consul, for Ott's battalions interposed between that general and Monnier.

That, after Desaix's arrival, and the renewal of the action, positive advantage was derived from the formation is undoubted, but the idea of preconceived purpose has been properly scouted by Jomini, who terms it a romance "*après coup*." "No amount of tactical resource could have saved Buonaparte," he adds, "in his present emergency. Fresh troops, and not manœuvres, could alone re-establish the balance of affairs."

Where the merit of the French commander first really shines, is in the readiness with which he appreciated the altered situation when Desaix reached the field. The natural energy and determination of his character at once exercised its extraordinary influence upon all around him. The kind of ambush which he designed for his careless foe was admirably suited to the moment, and the promptitude with which he availed himself of the first turn in his favour has never been excelled in war. "A few squadrons of cavalry, with half-a-dozen battalions of infantry," says Jomini again, "decided the fate of the Peninsula and changed the face of Europe." Never, perhaps, was cavalry charge more brilliantly executed; and the sagacity with which Kellerman changed his original object, by turning upon infantry unprepared to receive him, stamps him as a cavalry leader of no mean order. Still more credit is due to him, if we consider the severe service which he had already rendered in the morning, and the recognised numerical inferiority of the arm to which he belonged, as compared with that of the enemy.

It has been urged, more especially by M. Thiers, that, had the Austrians conquered at Marengo, they must nevertheless have succumbed still more ingloriously, a day or two later, in the defile of Stradella; that the fresh troops—Desaix and Lapoype—hurrying up from Rivalta and Pavia, would have enabled the First Consul to have re-formed on their rear; whilst Duhesme, with 10,000 soldiers, and in possession of Piacenza, would have barred their egress from the defile. Probably this would in great part depend upon the character of the defeat which the French might have experienced.

Had he routed his foe, there was no necessity for Mûlas to

enter the defile of Stradella, or to continue his retreat. His object must have been to crush in detail the isolated fractions of the Army of Reserve, which the First Consul would then have been unable to concentrate. Contented, however, as he appeared to be, with the partial success which secured, as he thought, the Tortona road for the further march of his army, it seems not improbable that Buonaparte might have found the opportunity of retrieving his first disaster. A similar blow to that which struck Wurmser in the valley of the Brenta, in 1796, might certainly have realised the conjectures of M. Thiers.

The value of this victory to the First Consul was incalculable. Independent of the territory and influence restored to France in the Italian peninsula, it established permanently Buonaparte's influence with his countrymen. Regarded hitherto as a successful general and a man of enterprising talent, he henceforth took his place in men's minds amongst the most prominent characters in history. With one blow the Republic had freed herself from the dangers of the Coalition, and was able to assume a position recognised and respected by her neighbours. Simultaneously the intrigues for political power and factious agitation in the French capital ceased of themselves. All willingly recognised the ascendancy of the man who had conceived and executed a design of such startling magnitude. Thus it came to pass that Frenchmen soon became reconciled to the idea of the Empire; and four short years sufficed to place the imperial mantle on the shoulders of Mélas's victorious antagonist.

CHAPTER III.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1805.

FIRST PERIOD: ULM.

Introduction.—Napoleon, after Marengo, returned to Paris, leaving Massena in command ; but he was soon superseded, at his own request, by Brune. During the operations detailed in the previous pages, the Army of the Rhine had not been idle. On the 25th April Moreau crossed the river, and after gaining the indecisive actions of Engen, Möskirch, and Biberach, obliged his adversary to intrench himself at Ulm. In June, sorties at Kirchberg and Guttenzell were checked, and Kray finally abandoned Ulm ; and, after a series of skirmishes in his retreat, an armistice was signed on the 15th July on the receipt of the news of the conclusion of the Convention of Alessandria. Fruitless negotiations for peace ensued ; but a military convention was agreed on in September at Hohenlinden and Castiglione between the several antagonists, whereby the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, and Kray and De Mélas were disgraced and withdrawn from their commands, their places being taken by the Archduke John and General Bellegarde.

In September the armistice terminated, and in December Hohenlinden witnessed another French victory, the lines of the Inn and Saltzach being successively surrendered. The Archduke Charles next assumed command of the disorganised columns ; and finally, on the 25th December, by the armistice of Steyer, it was agreed that no reinforcements should be sent by the Austrians to Italy until their armies there should also have concluded an agreement with the forces opposed to them. Hostilities had also broken out in Italy. Macdonald crossing the Splügen from the Grisons united with Brune in November, and the battles of Pozzolo and Monzambano were followed by the retreat of the Austrians to Verona.

1801.—The French pursued their advantage by crossing the Adige in January, and, pushing on with unvarying success, finally brought about an armistice, which was followed by the peace of Luneville on the 9th February. War still continued between Great Britain and France in Egypt and on the seas, and the “armed neutrality of the North,”

arranged by the Czar between Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, in a spirit hostile to Great Britain, resulted in the bombardment of Copenhagen by Nelson and the British fleet. But the nations were tired of war, and the peace of Amiens in 1802 was hailed with satisfaction by all the Powers. It was, however, of but short duration. The rupture with England began in 1803; and Napoleon, now declared First Consul for life, invaded and conquered Hanover, while St Cyr occupied Southern Italy. No further steps were taken till 1804, when General Buonaparte, declared Emperor, was crowned by the Pope, and signified his intention of invading England.

For this purpose a vast flotilla was organised in the Channel ports. A powerful army was formed at Boulogne, and extreme care taken in its organisation, discipline, and equipment. But the war of the third Coalition was ready to burst forth. The invasion of England was, thanks to the activity of the British fleet, rendered impossible; and when, in April 1805, a treaty, having for its object the overthrow of the new Empire, was signed between England, Russia, and Austria, Napoleon formed the determination of suddenly and secretly transferring the army at Boulogne to the Rhine, and thence to Germany.

The French army at Boulogne had been actively and intelligently organised for a period of many months. The formation of the corps and staff had been carefully studied, and they were complete in all details, having, further, the advantage of being formed with deliberation and exercised in unison at the great Camp of Exercise, under the supreme command and direction of one general, and that the greatest of his day.

The Austrian army, on the other hand, suffered from divided interests. The real head was the Aulic Council, which drew up the plans of operation and influenced the movements even of the armies in the field. The nominal heads, the commanders of the forces, had their hands tied and schemes fettered by want of independent authority and freedom of action. As if to add to these disadvantages, the reorganisation of the army had only taken place a month before the outbreak of hostilities.

The French army, which, before its final concentration, was on the Channel coast, in Holland, and in Hanover, had been divided into six corps, under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, with the Imperial Guard under Bessières, and reserve cavalry under Murat, and the usual proportion of artillery, staff, &c. It numbered 180,000 men,

with 340 guns, to which may be added a German contingent of 30,000 soldiers. Massena commanded an army in Italy of some 50,000 more. Of the former, the 1st and 2d corps and Bavarians—in all, 60,000 men—were to advance from the Maine, while the remainder crossed the Rhine.

The Austrian field-armies were three in number: 84,000 men, under the Archduke Ferdinand and General Mack, operated in the valley of the Danube; 100,000, under the Archduke Charles, formed the Army of Italy on the Adige; 40,000, under the Archduke John, were assembled in the Tyrol; and a reserve, under the Emperor himself, remained at Vienna. The initiative was taken by the Austrians, who, by the premature invasion of Bavaria, offered at once a *casus belli*. English diplomacy and the promise of exclusive subsidies had forced Austria, the advanced post of the Coalition, to make the first move. It was eminently desirable to master the territory and resources of the Elector of Bavaria, though it was equally necessary for the success of the general plan of operations to effect a junction with the Russians, who were some sixty-four marches in rear. Their first intention had been to remain on the Leck; but they were ultimately to be pushed forward to the Iller, where, watching the Black Forest defiles and covered on their right by Ulm and the Danube, they might await the arrival of their Russian allies. It had been assumed that the French Emperor would require at least sixty-eight days to reach the Leck from Boulogne, but they had miscalculated the skill and prescience of their formidable adversary.

The successful issue of all offensive operations depends on the following considerations:—

1. *Secrecy*.—The means to this end were carefully considered by Napoleon. All communication had been suspended along the Rhine; even the post-offices had been seized. Demonstrations on the Channel coast were still maintained, and diplomatic representations were officially made in Paris to direct public attention away from the real theatre of war; and lastly, Bernadotte's movement on Mayence was reported to be merely for the purpose of relieving the garrison and troops in that district.

2. *Upon celerity of execution*.—The army was to concentrate on the Rhine frontier at Strasbourg, Mannheim, Wurz-

burg (by Göttingen), and at Mayence (by Nymwegen.) The march from Boulogne commenced on the 25th August, and the distance to be traversed, about 350 miles, gave about twenty-four days' march at the rate of 15 miles a-day. Great regularity attended this movement, and stragglers were few. An excellent staff, working as one man under the supreme command of a leader whose mastery of technical details was as great as his grasp of the higher branches of the warlike art, rendered the regular even advance of the several corps possible and complete; and on the 24th September the "Army of Germany" was present near the Rhine.

3. *Upon due exercise of diplomacy.*—For Duroc had been sent to Berlin to insure the neutrality, if not the active co-operation, of Prussia. The line of march of the French left might lead them to violate the territory of this Power, and the prevention of armed opposition, to say the least, was of grave importance. Even Hanover, the Emperor's latest annexation, was offered as a bait to secure the end in view; and though Prussia professed to persist in her complete neutrality, the result of the negotiations tended somewhat to compromise her position with regard to France.

4. *Mastery of the theatre of war.*—And in this few excelled Napoleon in his rapid appreciation of its features, and in the consequent formation of his plans of operation. Murat, as leader of the advanced-guard, was sent into Bavaria, with directions to examine and reconnoitre the country and get maps.

5. *The possession of good reserves;* and of these at least 30,000 old soldiers were at the general's disposal.

The country in which the operations took place deserves careful consideration, and the following points should be studied:—

1. The valleys of the Rhine and Danube, with the tributaries of the latter which cross the line of advance—viz., the Iller, Leck, Isar, and Inn on the south; Wernitz and Altmühl on the northern bank.

2. The defiles of the Black Forest by which access to the valley of the Danube is obtained.

3. The nature of the roads which, on the north bank of the river and west of Donauwerth, lead rather in a direc-

tion from north to south than towards Vienna, while on the south bank the roads leading to the capital are more numerous.

4. The importance of Ulm, Donauwerth, Neuburg, and Ingolstadt as points of passage of the stream.

The Austrian commander-in-chief, anxious to anticipate the enemy's movement, crossed the Bavarian frontier on the 8th September. The ultimatum sent to the Elector Maximilian of Bavaria had been refused; and his army, smarting under the irritation consequent on this unceremonious violation of his territory, withdrew to join the corps commanded by Bernadotte. The precipitate action of the Aulic Council had but strengthened its adversary's hand by about 30,000 men. General Mack moved on Neuburg to cut off this retreating force, crossed the Iller on the 16th to 18th September with the light troops and advanced-guard, and pushing across the remainder five or six days later, reached Ulm on the 18th.

He wished to play a defensive rôle until the Russians had arrived; and meanwhile detachments were pushed forward north of the Danube and towards the Rhine for the purpose of observation. The Aulic Council, with the Emperor, remained at Landsberg. But the means now at the disposal of Austria for the execution of her plan were insufficient. War had commenced six months too early for her, inasmuch as the forces of the Coalition were still far apart, and the fractions, unconcentrated, were but weakly offering their divided units to be broken by the concentrated power of the French.

Thus, on the 24th September the positions of the armies were—

French.

Cavalry	.	.	Murat	}	.	Strassburg.
5th corps	.	.	Lannes			
Guard	.	.	Bezières			
6th corps	.	.	Ney	.	.	Weissenburg.
4th corps	.	.	Soult	.	.	Speyer.
3d corps	.	.	Davoust	.	.	Mannheim.
2d corps	.	.	Marmont	.	.	Mayence.
1st corps	.	.	Bernadotte	.	.	Wurzburg.
Bavarians	.	.	Wrede	.	.	Bamberg.

Austrians.

Advanced-guard	Schwarzenberg	.	Biberach.
	(With cavalry in Black Forest defiles.)		
Right wing	Kollowrat	.	Ulm to Deitmannsreid.
Centre	Auffenburg	.	Kempten and Kaufheuren.
Left	Jellachich	.	Lindau, Mursberg.
Reserve	Werneck	.	Burgau-Landsberg.
Detached	Keinmayer	.	Eichstadt, Ingolstadt, Neuburg.

The Austrian reinforcements were not expected till the second week in October, the Russians not till the third week ; but still the army, lacking both the careful organisation and discipline of that which had been trained for long months at Boulogne, and with divided councils and a leader who was far less known and trusted than Napoleon, had pushed itself forward towards an enemy stronger, more able, and more mobile than itself.

The passage of the Rhine by the French armies was fixed for the 24th September. Issues of ammunition, clothing and shoes, bread, and other supplies, were furnished to the various corps. There were to be no magazines and no camp, for the troops were to be cantoned or bivouacked, and districts were definitely assigned to each corps leader for foraging. Four days' supply was to be carried in waggons, and four days by the men themselves ; for rapidity was essential to success, and the campaign was to be one in which outmarching was one of the great adjuncts to victory. Murat commanded the reconnaissance department of the staff, and all marshals were directed to him for what they wished to know. The French objective was of a twofold nature : to destroy Mack the first—to keep the Russians at bay till this was effected, the second. The Rhine army was to deal with the one, the Maine army with the other ; and demonstrations in the Black Forest were still further to confuse the enemy as to where the blow would fall. The direction of Bernadotte's march, therefore, was to be concealed ; the demonstrations towards the Black Forest and the cavalry force, formed the screen behind which Napoleon designed to make a flank march with his columns through Swabia on Donauwerth, where, crossing the Danube, he would

interpose his army between Mack and the Russians, and find time to deal with each singly.

On the 25th, Murat, crossing the Rhine, occupied the surrounding villages, drove in the Austrian cavalry, and pushed up the defiles of the Black Forest. Lannes, by Kehl, followed to Rendsheim.

On the 26th, Ney, at Knielingen, to Dürlach; Soult, at Spire, to Heilbronn; Davoust, at Mannheim, towards Neckarelz. On the 27th, Ney crossed at Lauterburg; 28th, marched on Stuttgart, reaching that place on the 30th, where he was to take up a position on the Neckar, three marches from Ulm: on the same day a general advance was made up the defiles of the Black Forest. 29th, Lannes, who had neared Rastadt, followed Ney along the Enz to Ludwigsburg. On the 1st October, Murat followed Lannes to the Ems with the bulk of his force, leaving Bourcier to cover and mask his march.

On this date, therefore, the movement of the right wing was completed, and detachments were pushed down all the roads leading to the Danube. Soult had been kept back in order not to betray the strategical plan, but, crossing on the 25th, he had now reached Heilbronn. Davoust was at Ingelfingen, his march having been retarded to allow the left to come round. Bernadotte and Marmont crossed the Maine, while the artillery reserve moved in safety three marches in rear of the centre of the army.

Ney's movement had been the most important up to this time. He had been pushed forward as a screen to the other corps, and to induce Mack to believe he was the extreme left of the French army; for, to carry out the plan of concentrating the Maine and Rhine armies against Mack's right, it was essential that the nature of the operation should not be divined. How to effect it unperceived was the difficult part of the problem; for if it were understood, it was evident that Mack would retreat and avoid the blow, in order to concentrate with the Russians on the Inn. As we have seen, all the measures that prudence could suggest to insure secrecy had been carefully attended to. Next in crossing the Rhine Lannes and Murat had been turned towards the south, had entered the Black Forest defiles, and had pushed in the out-

posts of the enemy all along the line in advancing on Fredericstadt, Rothweil, and Neustadt, in order by this demonstration to lead the Austrians to expect an attack in front. So far it had quite succeeded. Mack hoped and expected it, and the outpost reports from Neustadt to Pforzheim confirmed him in his view. Up to this time, the French supplies had, to avoid danger, been carried down the left bank of the Rhine.

The routes taken by the armies were as follows :—

Rhine Army.

Soult,	Oettingen, Halle, Ellwangen, Nordlingen.
Murat, Lannes, and Guard,	Gemünd, Aalen, Nordlingen.
Davoust,	Crailsheim, Dinkelsbühl, Oettingen.
Ney,	Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, Heidenheim.

Maine Army.

Marmont,	Gelichsheim, Rotenburg, Monheim.
Bernadotte,	Uffenheim, Anspach, Eichstadt.
Bavarians,	Nürnberg, Ingolstadt.

Donauwerth had been the point aimed at, as its possession was strategically decisive.

Reviewing the events of the campaign up to this point, the following particulars must be noticed. There are three kinds of offensive operations which can be undertaken against a hostile force—viz., against one flank, both flanks, or the centre of the enemy's strategic front: all others can be deduced from one of these; and of all of them, that of striking at one flank is preferable, for reasons not now to be argued.

The Austrian front extended from Ulm to Legnago. There was every motive for attacking their right flank in the valley of the Danube, and remaining on the defensive in Italy, for Switzerland was neutral, and the Iller front strong, besides offering in case of success no decisive result. Considering the great superiority of force on the French side, defeat alone was not sufficient—destruction was to be aimed at; and in order to effect this, it was essential not to disturb Mack in his sense of security whilst the necessary movements were being carried out. The army of the Maine, therefore, was retained in position until the last moment, whilst Ney screened the

march of the other columns, already much favoured by the nature of the country.

There were four courses of action still open to the Austrian general :—

1. To direct a retreat towards his own frontier by Munich and Augsburg.

2. To march by his left into the Tyrol.

3. To move down the right bank of the Danube, cross the river and fight a battle at Nordlingen, securing passages for retreat.

4. To cross at Ulm, fall upon the Emperor's communications with the mass of his army, and either endeavour to defeat the enemy's corps singly, or, by some means, effect his retreat into Bohemia.

To meet all these eventualities was for Napoleon difficult and even dangerous. The best thing that could happen was for Mack to remain as long as possible where he was. In order not to disturb him, the right wing was to be used as a pivot until the left reached Ingolstadt. Here it would be available either to intercept the retreat or assist in a battle at Nordlingen. It was necessary to effect the passage with the left wing sufficiently in rear of the Austrians in order to be sure of intercepting them. In the case of Mack's assuming the offensive, he would first strike Ney's corps, which in the mountainous country would hold its own while the others rallied. If he purposed to escape on this side, he would not be able to commence his movement till the Emperor was on the south bank of the Danube. Hence the necessity for leaving a portion of his troops on the north bank.* The French continued their advance, and, on the evening of the 5th October, had reached the following points, with a view of concentrating at Nordlingen on the 6th, to be prepared for a possible battle the following day.

Headquarters and Guard,	Gemünd.
Lannes,	Aalen.
Ney,	Heidenheim.
Murat, towards the Danube.	

* Compare Hamley's Operations of War. Chap. VII.

Soult,	Ellwangen.
Davoust,	Oettingen.
Marmont,	}	Gungenhausen.
Bernadotte,	}	
Bavarian,	Weissenberg.
Bourcier, also rejoined the Maine army.						

The line of communication lay through Nordlingen, Ellwangen, Halle, Oettingen, Heilbronn, and Spire; but a single line has disadvantages in an extended operation like that under consideration, as stores and supplies may arrive at the left wing which are really required by the right. The army hitherto had subsisted on requisitions made on the way, but henceforth different means of supply were advisable. The marshals were directed to complete the full allowance of bread and biscuit which the troops could carry, and, further, to transport other provisions in country carts with them.

Meanwhile Mack, feeling the pressure of Ney's advance, had considered an attack on his right impending, still never anticipating the true nature of the danger to which he was exposed. On 3d October, therefore, he concentrated near Ulm, occupying about 18 miles of front, along the line Ulm-Iller-Archeim. No real intelligence had been furnished him, for he had taken no measures to insure his obtaining it. Keimayer's force had been forgotten, and no communication had been effected with the Russians. The skirmish on the previous day at Göppingen might have indicated clearly enough that the French were moving eastward, and this was recognised by the Archduke Ferdinand, but the Austrian commander-in-chief failed to see its import. Even then two courses were open to him—either to move offensively to the left bank of the Danube, or to abandon the Iller line for that of Donauwerth and Ingolstadt; but Mack, like Gyulai in 1859, treated the appearance of the hostile forces as mere demonstrations. On the 5th, the views of the Archduke at length prevailed, and a change of front was ordered to the Günzburg and Danube line, Reidhausen being occupied to secure the Leipheim and Günzburg passages. On the 6th, Keimayer, retreating as Bernadotte advanced, crossed the

Danube at Neuburg; and leaving a few battalions to guard the passage at Donauwerth, Ingolstadt, and Rain (on the Leck), retired upon Aichach, which he reached on the 7th.

Thus, while the Austrians were contemplating and slowly carrying out a change of front, Napoleon was ready to cross the Danube, and effect the prolongation of the original turning movement against the enemy's right, so as to effect a complete interception of his forces at all points on the 7th October. Before daybreak, Murat at Donauwerth seized the bridge and commenced a bridge-head. Soult's first division under Vandamme reached him first—and this, on being relieved by Legrand, followed Murat to Rain; Lannes moved on Munster; Ney sent detachments to Albeck; Davoust on Neuburg, seizing the bridge there; and Marmont followed him. The Bavarians and Bernadotte were at Eichstadt.

The object of Murat's and Vandamme's movement on the Leck was to separate the Austrian right from the centre, cutting off Mack from Keinmayer; the passages, therefore, on the river were secured, and communication opened with Marmont at Neuburg. The news of the occupation of Donauwerth reached Mack on the afternoon of the 7th, when the Archduke was absent; and he then, mistaking the importance of the movement, issued orders for crushing what he conceived to be but a weak detachment. No accurate reports had been received from Keinmayer, who, directed to Rain, was now retreating upon Munich without the commander-in-chief's knowledge; and Auffenberg was sent to Wertingen to connect the centre with Keinmayer, while the other corps were to follow this movement down the stream. On the Archduke's return on the night of the 7th, he recommended a retreat to the Inn by Augsburg and Munich, and orders were issued accordingly. Keinmayer was to move on Munich, Auffenberg on Zumarshausen, the remainder on Günzburg, where they were to await the calling in of the detachments. But these efforts to oppose the passage of the Danube were made too late. Delay at this juncture was fatal; all available forces should have moved at once for the Upper Leck, sacrificing, if necessary, both Auffenberg and Keinmayer. The actual position of the belligerents on the 8th was:—

Austrians.

Auffenberg, . .	Wertingen.
Werneck, . .	Günzburg.
Reisch, . .	Ulm and Günzburg.
Schwarzenberg, .	Ulm.
Jellachich, . .	Marching on Ulm.
Spangen, . .	Mundelsheim, on Günzburg.
Keinmayer, . .	Schwabhausen.

In all, numbering 66,000 men and 9000 horses.

French.

Bernadotte, . .	Ingolstadt.
Davoust, . .	Neuburg to Aichach.
Marmont, . .	Supporting him.
Murat, . .	Rain to Zumarshausen

(covering the angle of the Leck and Danube to veil the subsequent movements).

Soult,	On Augsburg.
Lannes, . . .	Crossed at Münster

(and henceforth, with Murat, formed the advanced-guard towards Ulm).

Both the latter, thus marching for Wertingen, would necessarily come into collision with Auffenberg, who was resting there. In the action that took place he was routed, and Murat continued to advance on Zumarshausen. The Austrians still delayed with their main force, and did not start from Günzburg till the 9th—though, as only Lannes and Murat were across their line of communication, retreat on this day was still practicable. Ney again received special orders, by which he was to take up a position on the left bank of the Danube at Giengen, and be prepared—

1. To close the retreat into Bohemia.
2. To intercept any movement from Ulm on Gundelfingen, or Ulm on Heidenheim.
3. To invest Ulm on the left bank.
4. To seize the passages on the Danube.

To this end he was reinforced by Gazan's dragoons (5th corps) and Bourcier; and now commanding, therefore, 36,000

men, was ordered to attack wherever possible, in order to appear stronger than he really was. These dispositions were somewhat modified in the evening, owing to information that Napoleon had received to the effect that Mack would move on Augsburg; and Ney was directed to seize the Günzburg bridge, in order the more readily to communicate with the troops on the south bank in case of a general action. 9th October—all the French corps, with the exception of Ney, gained the south bank of the Danube.

East of the Leck, fronting towards the Inn, were Bernadotte and the Bavarians, with Davoust posted centrally on the Leck: west of it were,—Lannes, reinforced by two of Soult's divisions, at Zumarshausen; Murat on the Günz, commanding all the troops on the left bank of the Leck and Danube; headquarters and Guard at Donauwerth; Marmont at Pöttmes; and Soult at Augsburg-Landsberg.

The Russians were now about 180 miles off on the Linz.

The Austrians commenced their march on Augsburg, but only got as far as Burgau; for Mack, alarmed at the aspect of affairs, resolved on retreating by the north bank, and directed the bridge at Günzburg to be restored for this purpose. The first plan of retreat had therefore been already abandoned; and Ney, following out his previous instructions, had started from the Brenz in the morning and gained possession of the bridge by which he intended crossing, inflicting a loss on the Austrians of some 2000 men. In consequence of this fresh disaster, the Austrian retreat was directed upon Ulm, which was reached on the 10th; but the disorder and disorganisation consequent on these repeated alterations in orders, and the resultant countermarches rendered further operations impossible without at least a day's rest. Orders were sent to Spangen to march on Memmingen.

On the 10th, Lannes and Ney communicated at Burgau.

The further development of the French towards the Iller was completed. Napoleon, on the 11th, fronted that river, with a central reserve, under Marmont, at Augsburg on the Leck; and now he began to turn his attention towards the last line of retreat, that by the Tyrol—so that the possession of Memmingen became a matter of importance. Murat's patrols

reached Lannes, stretching from Burgau to Weissenhorn; Ney strode across the Danube at Günzburg; Soult wheeled round from Landsberg towards Mindelheim and Memmingen; Marmont, passing Augsburg, fronted towards the Günz; the headquarters and Guard were at Augsburg; Bernadotte and the Bavarians at Munich; while, as an intermediate link in the chain, Davoust extended between Munich and Augsburg. The head of Kutusoff's columns only reached the Inn on this day, and were even then in weak force.

The events of the 9th led Napoleon to fear that Mack wished to throw himself into the Tyrol. If this were the case, but a small force would be left behind, and Ulm might be captured. Ney was therefore ordered to investigate, from his position on the left bank, what was going on in the fortress, and Dupont was hence directed to advance from Albeck in that direction. This led to the affair of Haslach, where Dupont, though he made a most courageous attack against superior forces, was defeated, and retreated again on Albeck and Langenau. Mack had commenced to retreat to Heidenheim for Bohemia on the 11th, after detaching Jellachich to Memmingen; but the result of the action, in which he claimed an important victory, only confirmed him in his obstinate determination of delaying at Ulm, in spite of loud remonstrances on the part of his subordinate generals—and the orders for retreat were once more countermanded. At the same time, he effected a reorganisation of his army, giving command of the left to Schwarzenberg, the centre to Reisch, and the right to Werneck, Jellachich still remaining detached.

On the 12th, the French were closing around Ulm, and Mack, at length giving way, issued fresh orders for a move, with, however, doubtful sincerity, until the nature of the French turning movement becoming unmistakable, he was obliged to decide on making preparations in earnest for retreat on the 13th, and the instructions to the generals were as follows:—

Werneck, 16,000 strong, to march at daybreak.

Reisch, with 18,000 and the reserve artillery, to follow some hours later.

Schwarzenberg, 18,000, to demonstrate on the right bank

between the Iller and Danube, following to Heidenheim on the 14th.

Jellachich to move up the left bank of the Iller, destroying the bridges, and eventually retreating into the Tyrol.

But even this disposition was destined to be disturbed ; for the Emperor, very indistinctly informed of the Austrian movements, considered that he would retreat entirely into the Tyrol, and therefore proposed to receive him on the right bank of the Danube. Preparing for action either on the 13th or 14th, he concentrated on the Roth, six miles east of Ulm. Ney was ordered to draw in Dupont from Albeck, and, holding Gunzburg, to advance to Leipheim ; Lannes and Murat to advance on the right bank of the river ; Marmont on Nattenhausen from Augsburg ; Soult on Mindelheim ; Guard to Pfaffenhofen.

According to some authorities, Dupont's movement was ordered by Murat, who commanded the troops in the angle of the Danube and Leck, and this was resented by Ney ; but in the end Dupont retired upon Albeck by Brenz, where he arrives on the 13th.

On the 13th, Marmont to Weissenhorn.

Soult to Memmingen, which he invested ; Ney to seize Elchingen.

But Napoleon now obtained accurate information of the Austrian plan ; and it was important to detain Mack still longer at Ulm. A spy was therefore employed, and Mack, believing the false intelligence conveyed by him, again arrested the forward movement, though on this day the road was in reality open, seeing that Dupont did not leave Brenz until the 14th.

Austrian movements :—

Jellachich marched by Gazelingen on Ochsenhausen.

Werneck, on Heidenheim, reached Herbrechtingen the same night, beyond the *rayon* of French investment, with artillery and baggage.

Schwarzenberg demonstrated in Ulm.

Reisch was ordered not to take the road to Heidenheim, but that to Elchingen and Gundelfingen. This further

counter-order was carried out, and he reached Elchingen, but his second division was impeded by the state of the roads.

14th October.—French movements :—

Dupont reached Albeck—(right.)

Ney, moving by both banks, forced the bridge at Elchingen, attacked Reisch, routing him with the loss of his artillery, driving him in disorganised flight to Ulm, and gained Thalfingen—(centre.)

Marmont to Oberkirchberg—(left.)

Lannes pushing on till in sight of the *tête de pont* at Ulm, advanced one division to Capellenberg.

Soult at Memmingen.

Guard and Davoust in support.

Austrian movements :—

Jellachich continuing his previous march nearly reached Memmingen on the 14th, and sent orders to Spangen, who occupied it, to march on Wurzach; but the town was already invested by Soult, and so the general could not comply with the order, and surrendered on the following day.

The Emperor established his headquarters at Abbey Elchingen after the battle which had destroyed Reisch, and thence issued his final orders for the complete investment of Ulm. Lannes was therefore called to the left bank to take position at Unterthalfingen, the bridges used being those of Leihe and Unterthalfingen, which were repaired; Ney, when relieved by him, was to move on Möhringen; Marmont to Capellenberg from Wiblingen; the Guard in second line on the left bank, crossing at Leihe; Soult to cross the Iller, and gain the road to Biberach as rapidly as possible.

Thus on the 14th-15th the French army was rapidly closing in. It was unknown to the Emperor that Werneck's corps was outside his investing force and in rear of his right, but still instructions were given to Rivand to guard the line of communication, and to move the artillery park to the south bank of the Danube. On the morning of the 14th, there were yet some hopes of escape for the Austrian army. Mack might still have struck out for Bohemia by Geislingen

and Aalen, or, crossing the Danube above Ulm at Etingen, seek to gain the Tyrol by Biberach. The opposition to be anticipated from Soult was not fatal to such a measure. He was already engaged at Memmingen, and the force opposed to him had not then surrendered. But Mack obstinately adhered to the extraordinary views he had formed; and then, at last, the Archduke Ferdinand declared his intention of leaving Ulm in order to join Werneck. A violent scene ensued. Amidst bitter altercation Mack produced the Emperor of Austria's secret instructions, and threatened to take the Archduke's life in case of disobedience. But the threat availed him little. His army was demoralised, his generals insubordinate; and Ferdinand, accompanied by Schwarzenberg and 12 squadrons of cavalry, vacated the fortress, marching for Geislingen, which he reached during the night of the 14th-15th October. The campaign of Ulm was practically finished: whatever had been Mack's position early on the day of the 14th, its close saw him in a desperate plight. Deserted by his principal lieutenants, Werneck isolated, Reisch routed, with a diminished force of artillery and all discipline lost, the chances of success were altogether gone. The 15th saw the beginning of the end. At 7 A.M., the dispositions for attacking Ulm were made, and the final positions were taken up in pouring rain.

Ney from Möhringen to Jungingen, with Bourcier on the extreme flank.

Lannes on Ney's left.

Guard at Thalfingen.

Marmont on the right bank, with one division at the bridge-head and one at Capellenberg; the bridges being held by dismounted dragoons. Light cavalry were employed in all directions. On the Austrian side reigned much confusion. The troops which had escaped from Elchingen were too demoralised to take part in the impending action. Mack could only dispose of 30 weak battalions, and 14 squadrons of cavalry. The works on the Michaelsberg were rendered useless by rain. And lastly, since most of the troops belonging to the corps of Schwarzenberg had escaped with the Archduke, there was a want of that unity of command on which

the successful issue of a battle to be fought against such desperate odds could alone be based.

The assault commenced at mid-day: all the heights were carried and the Austrians driven into the fortress, which might have been taken by storm; but the Emperor, now sure of his prey, and unwilling to encounter useless loss of life, broke off the action.

During the day, he heard of a skirmish between a French detachment and superior Austrian forces at Albeck, and thus the French line of communication appeared to be endangered. Murat was therefore detached with a large body of cavalry together with Dupont's division to Nordlingen.

The close of the 15th saw the commencement of negotiations with the Austrians, and the Comte de Segur was sent to explain the true state of affairs. Notwithstanding the hopelessness of his position, Mack demanded a truce of eight days; but to this Napoleon would not consent, offering, however, a six days' armistice, to which his opponent would not agree. His garrison now numbered 23,000 infantry and cavalry, with 59 guns.

On the 16th, the fortress was bombarded and negotiations were resumed.

On the 17th, a personal interview took place between the Austrian and French generals-in-chief; and, finally, the former signed the terms of capitulation, by which the army became prisoners of war, the officers only being allowed to depart on parole. He made but one stipulation, that a clause should be inserted to the effect that if, by midnight on the 25th, the blockade of Ulm should be raised either by Austrian or Russian troops, the garrison was to be permitted to march out unimpeded and unite with the relieving force. To this the Emperor agreed. He required rest for his soldiers after their extraordinary exertions, and time to regulate the system of subsistence for them, while the pursuit of what Austrian troops were not in Ulm had still to be carried out.

Jellachich had remained during the 15th at Lentkirch without attempting anything for Spangen's relief; but hearing of that general's capitulation, he marched on the 16th towards Wangen with a view to draw in his other detachments at Lindau.

Soult had marched on the 16th from Memmingen to Ochsenhausen, and on the 17th to Biberach, maintaining communication with Marmont on the right bank of the Iller with one division.

Meanwhile Werneck and Ferdinand were in full retreat.

The former halted at Herbrechtingen on the 14th, to give his train a further start, and expected to be joined by Reisch, but his defeat had rendered this impossible. Information was soon, however, obtained from stragglers of the disasters that were beginning to be suffered by the rest of the forces; and Werneck thereupon determined to retrace his steps, with a view to their assistance. The movement was planned for the 15th, and the skirmish that ensued with Dupont was that of which the Emperor had received intelligence. As with Mack, there was evidence of bad dispositions and want of resolution. He retired in the evening of the day, but, urged by his generals, prepared to advance again on the 16th. Ferdinand with Schwarzenberg had marched first to Geislingen, and then on Gmünd and Aalen, which they reached on the morning of the 16th, to find there a detachment of Werneck's force. The Archduke sent orders at once to the former to abandon his object and to continue his retreat. But Murat was already on the heels of Werneck's infantry, and harassing the rear of the tired and weary column, obliged a large body of them to lay down their arms at Langenau. The retreat was again continued by the line Herbrechtingen-Unterkochen-Bopfingen-Neresheim-Trochtelfingen-Oettingen, &c., the Archduke moving on Nordlingen; but learning on the march that it was occupied by a strong body of French troops, he turned north to Wallenstein, and cutting his way through the depots reached Oettingen in safety. Werneck was again overtaken by Murat at Neresheim, where he suffered further losses in prisoners, and at midnight reached Trochtelfingen, sending the cavalry to Oettingen. Here, exhausted by retreat and with his train captured on the 17th and 18th, he capitulated to Murat.

The Archduke, joined by the wreck of Werneck's corps, left Oettingen on the 18th, and reached the Altmühl on the 19th, where, again overtaken by Murat, his exhausted infantry

were compelled to surrender. The cavalry continued to retire by Eschenbach, where Murat abandoned the pursuit; and on the 23d, Ferdinand reached the Eger with 1700 horsemen and 560 artillerymen, having retreated, in constant collision with the enemy, 200 miles in eight days.

The last act of the drama had still to be accomplished, the surrender of Ulm into French hands. Mack, seeing at last the hopelessness of his position, hastened the result. He declared himself ready to hand over the fortress on the 20th, instead of the 26th, provided a French corps of equal strength with the garrison were left in the neighbourhood.

The bulk of his army was killed, wounded, or prisoners. Of the latter 2000 were captured at Wertingen, 2000 at Gunzburg, 4000 at Halslach, 3000 at Elchingen, 5000 at Memmingen, 13,000 at Trochtelfingen and in pursuit by Murat, and at Ulm 25,000; while the losses in the different actions amounted to 16,000 men.

Only 19,200 out of a total of more than 89,000 men had escaped. There were the troops under Jellachich 6000, Keimayer 11,000, and the Archduke 2200. This magnificent result had been obtained by Napoleon with a loss of 6000 men. 54,000 prisoners, 200 guns, 80 standards, and 5000 horses were the trophies of the campaign. The first part of the war against the third Coalition had been entirely successful.

COMMENTS.

The line of the Maine with the Rhine offered a rectangular base, the value of which was fully utilised. The direction of the French march was well calculated for Mack's direct retreat to be entirely intercepted by the time he had changed front.

But another avenue was still open, and hence the necessity of a continuation of the turning movement, entailing more danger. The roads leading from the Austrian position to the base were so numerous, that any attempt to cover them all must necessarily attenuate the French line and offer many opportunities to the intercepted. A determined effort in any

direction, except towards the centre of the French line, would probably have been successful.

For this reason, to aim at the rear of an enemy is seldom originally purposed, but is determined by circumstances and the situation. Hamley says the operation of throwing an army across an enemy's lines of retreat is in appearance much more decisive and effectual than that of operating parallel to these lines, but in appearance only. Troops spread over a great space cannot be strong enough at all points to resist a march of the enemy in mass. The front being parallel to the line of communication, a lost battle is as disastrous to them as to the adversary. On the other hand, by retaining a front parallel to the enemy's communications, the assailant covers his own, and therefore preserves a relative advantage in case of battle.

In general, the better course for the assailant, on attaining the point of the enemy's communications aimed at, is to move rapidly along them until close to the opposing army, and then to manœuvre so as to force that army to form front to a flank.

It will thus be compelled to engage at the greatest relative disadvantage; and if it determines to fight, and if it escapes by a line still open, the territory it had occupied will be gained without a blow.

SECOND PERIOD: AUSTERLITZ.

Introduction.—As before stated, the left of the Austrian strategic front was Italy. Here the Archduke Charles was confronted by Massena. Great expectations had been formed by the Aulic Council that success to the armies of the Coalition would have led to the restitution of the Milanese to Austrian rule. But the rapidity of the French successes on the Danube had rendered these hopes for the time fruitless. On the 15th October, 30 battalions had by order of the Imperial Cabinet been hastened into the Tyrol, to assist the army at Ulm. This unexpected weakening of his force deprived the Archduke of any opportunity of offensive action. He remained, therefore, strengthening the position at Caldiero, near Verona, and, while awaiting events in the more important portion of the theatre of war, concluded an armistice with Massena

until the 28th. St Cyr was stationed in the kingdom of Naples, where the Viceroy, Eugène Beauharnais, exerted all his energies in furnishing supplies for the Italian campaign. On the 28th, Massena received news of the capitulation of Ulm, and on the 29th, advanced against his adversary. This led to the hotly-contested but indecisive battles of Caldiero, after which the Archduke, on the 1st November, decided on falling back, feeling that his presence might be required nearer the capital; and sending a strong detachment to Venice, he crossed the Isonzo on the 17th, and reached Laybach without opposition. The pursuit was continued without any events worthy of especial notice, inasmuch as the campaign in Germany was still going in the favour of the French; and by the end of November Massena was in communication with Marmont at Brugg, and thus the French line extended from the Adriatic to the frontiers of Moravia, and the operations of the Army of Italy terminated.

In Germany, Napoleon received news of the advance of Kutusow in force on the Inn, and issued a stirring address to his troops. He had now to separate the Russians from the Archduke Charles in Italy, and also prevent their junction with the Archduke John in the Tyrol. Bernadotte, hitherto the left wing, became the extreme right at Salzburg, and the Emperor advanced to Munich. Ney pushed into the Tyrol against the Archduke John; and the Leck, with Augsburg as a grand depot, was made the intermediate base of operations. The other corps advanced in the valley of the Danube, preceded by Murat with the cavalry and pontoon train and followed by Soult; and Ney was reinforced by Augereau's corps which had arrived from France, Marmont following Bernadotte and strengthening the right wing.

The Inn was passed in three columns on the 28th. Murat came up with Keinnayer's rear-guard and engaged it at Ried on the 29th, and again near Lambach on the 31st October, where the Austrians destroyed the bridge over the Traun. Linz was reached on the 2d November by Lannes, the Bavarians moving by Innsbruck; the Enns passed on the 5th. On the 7th, the French were concentrated for battle opposite the heights from Krems on the Danube to Loeben, by which latter route the Archduke Charles might have advanced from Italy; Bernadotte, Davoust, and Marmont on the right, Soult the centre, Murat and Lannes the left, resting on the Danube, while a new corps was formed and placed under Mortier to act on the left bank of the river, where advance was much impeded by bad roads. An action was fought on this bank at Dürrenstein on the 11th, with a Russian division, which obliged the French marshal to fall back to Spitz, where, however, he was not pursued. On the same date Murat reached Bunkersdorf, and Vienna was entered on the 13th and 14th November. Ney's advance, though opposed, had meanwhile been successful, and on the 15th November he had obliged Jellachich to capitulate at Scharnitz. The Archduke John, however, still retreated in good order before him, and Ney could not prevent his communication with the Archduke Charles on the 20th, when the two generals were at Klagenfurth and Laybach respectively, and they finally retired into Hungary on the capture of Vienna.

But a thunder-cloud was threatening in the north of Germany that occasioned some anxiety to the French Emperor. The violation of Prussian territory at Anspach had begun to bear fruit. On the 3d November, a treaty of friendship was signed between Prussia and Russia, and the King of Sweden had taken the field in Pomerania. But Napoleon confined himself to proclamations, and to the despatch of a small Spanish auxiliary force to the north of Europe. Success against the main armies of the Coalition would inevitably cause the break-up of the forces of the smaller Powers. At Vienna he felt comparatively safe, for he saw that if hostilities were attempted in Hungary, he had Davoust and Marmont to dispose of, while in Moravia he could meet the blow with the corps of Soult, Lannes, Murat, and Bernadotte.

Kutusow, crossing the Danube at Krems, had fallen back towards Brünn and Olmütz on the occupation of Vienna, with a view of uniting with the Austrians from the capital and the Russian reinforcements; and a skirmish occurred between Bagration, one of his lieutenants, and the forces of Murat and Soult.

On the 20th, the French headquarters were at Brünn, and Kutusow had effected a junction with the allied armies, and fallen back on Olmütz. Negotiations ensued without effect on the 25th; and on the 28th, when the Emperors of Austria and Russia met there, all hopes of peace had vanished, and both sides prepared for battle. Skirmishes ensued, resulting in the retreat of the advanced French forces in rear of Austerlitz; and this on the 1st December brought the armies into position for decisive battle.

The following sketch illustrates the main features of the strategy of the "Campaign of Vienna" up to this date:—

1. Deterrent effect of military success upon neutral Powers. (Prussia.)
2. Preparations of the Emperor Napoleon for continuing his operations.
3. Arrival of Kutusow on the Inn, which river he declines to cross.
4. Present objective of Napoleon, to crush Kutusow before the arrival of Buxhöwden with 2d Russian army.
5. Character of the valley of the Danube between Munich and Vienna. Military operations cramped in consequence.
6. Sagacity of Kutusow in rejecting the influence of the Court and Aulic Council at Vienna.
7. He commences his retreat from the Inn, October 26th; refuses to defend the river-lines in Upper Austria, or to cover, directly, the Austrian capital.
8. The Emperor, convinced that Kutusow will stand on the Traseu, effects dispositions for a general action.
9. Kutusow, meanwhile, cleverly shrouding his purpose, carries his army, without impediment, to the north bank of the Danube, at Krems.
10. Peculiar configuration of the river utilised for this purpose.
11. The detached forces of the French army: Ney's advance in Tyrol; Mortier's check at Dürrenstein.
12. Occupation of Vienna by Murat, and seizure of the Tabor bridge.

13. Kutusow's position thus dangerously compromised ; his successful dispositions for regaining his line of retreat.

14. Junction of the Russian armies in the the vicinity of Olmütz.

This brings the narrative up to the period immediately preceding the battle of Austerlitz.

The success of Kutusow in parrying the blows aimed at him by Napoleon, and the subsequent junction of the Russian armies, soon changed the complexion of the military situation. The waste and difficulty attending prolonged offensive operations are seldom better illustrated than in the present campaign. The French Emperor had no sooner occupied Brünn without opposition, than he found it necessary to take a calm survey of his general position. Though he had succeeded, in a marvellously short space of time, in destroying an entire army and in seizing his enemy's capital, the general action upon which the ultimate issue of the campaign must depend had yet to be fought, his actual prospects being by no means reassuring. In Prussia, whilst the startling development of the campaign had increased the weight of arguments adduced in favour of peace by the king's timid councillors, the vehemence of the popular voice had at last roused that monarch to resent the insult offered to the nation by the violation of his territory. Posted in Silesia, as well as in the valley of the Saale, the Prussian armies were in a position to exercise decisive influence upon Napoleon's operations by joining actively the Coalition.

The Archduke Charles, recalled from the Italian theatre where he had hitherto successfully opposed Massena, had already crossed the Julian Alps, and probably, by the middle of December, would join the Russian army in Moravia, with 50,000 additional soldiers.

In Hungary, the reserve forces of the empire, largely increased by patriotic levies, would soon be in a position to take the field.

In Bohemia, the Archduke Ferdinand had succeeded in organising a force of 12,000 men ready to co-operate in the general interests of the campaign.

Finally, the occupation of Vienna, heavy detachments to the Tyrol and Hungarian frontier, then the care of a line of

communications extending 400 miles westwards to the Rhine, had drawn heavily upon the effective resources of the Emperor. The numerical superiority which had enabled him so decisively to crush Mack at Ulm had now altogether vanished. In point of fact, in the impending general action Napoleon would certainly find himself inferior in fighting numbers to his adversary. For this reason it is evident that the limits of his invasive power had already been reached, and deeper advance into his enemy's territory would only serve to weaken further his relative military position. Whilst certain considerations, therefore, urged him with almost irresistible force to hurry on the final crisis of the campaign, his own good judgment rejected the alternative in which every chance of success appeared against him. Nothing seemingly could release the Emperor, at so late a season of the year, from the false position he held at Brünn, but radical error on the part of his antagonist. Although, from his experience of Kutusow's patient sagacity this could barely be assumed or expected, Napoleon recognised that other influences would henceforth direct the movements of the allied army. The Emperor Alexander of Russia was present in the camp of his soldiers; and though Kutusow, as senior general, nominally held the chief command over the now united armies, his future action must necessarily be much embarrassed by the presence of his sovereign. It was more than probable that Alexander, inexperienced, haughty, and eager for military renown, would reject as ignominious for his army the further pursuit of a system of strategy which eventually would surely have brought success. The Czar might consider that the moment for avenging the humiliating retreat of his soldiers from the Inn had at last arrived, and, carried away by impulse and a false sense of chivalry, might himself seek the general action which Napoleon's interests so pressingly demanded. In this case the French Emperor had little fear for the result on a defensive battle-field selected by himself; he well knew that the advantage of numbers would thus be neutralised, and the victory he confidently anticipated would at once terminate his embarrassment, and break up the Coalition. Napoleon therefore halted at Brünn, placing his in-

fantry, about 50,000 strong, in cantonments as far east as Austerlitz; whilst Murat, with the cavalry, received strict directions to watch with unceasing vigilance the enemy's movements. With a view to select the ground for the battle he hoped soon to be called upon to fight, he then carefully studied, in concert with his superior officers, the topography of the country between Austerlitz and Brünn.

The Russians, meanwhile, after effecting their junction, continued their retreat, halting eventually in the strong defensive position of Oltschan, in the vicinity of Olmütz. Altogether Kutusow's army numbered about 85,000 men, including the small Austrian contingent which had retreated with the 1st Russian army from the Danube. With numbers so much superior to any that Napoleon could oppose to them, it is clear that, on the ground they now held, the Russians might accept battle with every chance in their favour. What delay might occur would be profitably utilised in further strengthening this position by artificial means. Owing to considerations which have been already adduced, every day gained here increased the mastery of the military situation which the allies already possessed. The only possible means of forfeiting this, was by relinquishing the defensive attitude which was now beginning to bear its inevitable fruits. Had the advice of Kutusow, and some few other experienced officers present, been followed, the battle of Austerlitz would not have been fought. Unfortunately more powerful influences interfered with the old general's authority. The Court party, which surrounded the Czar, profoundly ignorant of military science, filled his ear with plausible but unsound arguments for offensive action, well knowing that this was in accordance with his inmost wishes. It was urged that at Amstetten, Dürrenstein, and Hollabrunn, the Russian soldier had successfully asserted his claim to be considered equal to the enemy. Viewing the considerable superiority of force available for the allies, victory must therefore be considered certain. The only fear was lest the enemy should recognise this fact and decamp in time. To remain inactive was virtually to tarnish the fame of the Russian army. In support of these views other circumstances of more practical urgency

were adduced, which ultimately served to carry the day. It had not been anticipated by the Austrian Government that so large an army would be placed in position at Olmütz. The magazines required for its prolonged subsistence had not been provided, whilst the resources of the neighbouring district would soon be exhausted. The Russians, moreover, bivouacked in the open air, without any shelter from the inclemency of November nights. The diseases which invariably accompany exposure and want, soon, consequently, made their appearance in the camp. At this juncture, too, General Weirotter, Kutusow's chief of the staff, produced an elaborate plan of offensive battle. Plausible enough in appearance, it contained many essential defects. It sufficed, however, to elicit Alexander's approval, whilst Kutusow, from deference bordering on servility, failed to raise his voice against a course he in his own mind utterly condemned. It was agreed that the execution of the manœuvre proposed by Weirotter should be commenced on the 27th of November, on which day the allies vacated their camp at Oltschan, marching by the imperial road leading to Brünn. This movement was at once reported to Napoleon by Murat. Now the distance from Oltschan to Brünn was about forty-five miles, or three ordinary days' march. Napoleon therefore would have fully forty-eight hours at his disposal to complete his preparations for battle. This brings us to the consideration of the battle-field.

About eleven miles to the east of Brünn, the capital of Moravia, the Posoritzer Post-house marks the point where the highroad forks, leading by Olmütz to Poland, and by Göding to Hungary. That portion of the road between Brünn and the Post-house is divided into equal parts by the course of the river Goldbach, which intersects it at Bellowitz. This stream flows for a distance of six miles in a due southerly direction to the village of Tellnitz, which, with the adjacent lakes, Satschan and Menitz, formed the southern boundary of the battle-field. The banks of the Goldbach were covered with brushwood and marshy, so that the stream could only be crossed by troops at the regular passages—at Schlappanitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, and the castle and village of Sokolnitz,

all lying between Bellowitz and Tellnitz. About a mile and a half to the east of the Goldbach, a second stream, which takes its name from the village of Bosonitz, cuts the Olmütz road, and then, turning gradually towards the south-west, joins the Goldbach at Puntowitz. On its left bank stands the village of Girzikowitz, and in the angle it forms with the Goldbach a ridge of dominant heights overlook the surrounding country. The line of the Bosonitz brook and the lower course of the Goldbach, below Puntowitz, form the western boundary of the actual battle-field. The eastern limit is formed by the river Littawa, which flows from north-east to south-west towards the lake of Satschan, into which it empties itself. Between the Littawa, the Goldbach, the Olmütz road and the lake, is an elevated plateau tolerably defined by the course of the above-named waters. Westward, the face, broken by several ravines—all practicable for the movement of troops—slopes gently down to the Goldbach; eastward and to the south more steeply towards the Littawa and Satschan lake. Towards the Olmütz road the plateau subsides very gradually, presenting a surface highly favourable to the action of cavalry. It is marked by two hills, Stari Winibradi and Pratzen, between which, in the riven flank of the plateau, stands the village of Pratzen. The value of the lower line of the Goldbach, as a defensive obstacle, is considerably enhanced by the lake of Kobelnitz, through which it flows, as also by further considerable deposits of water on its right bank at Ottmarau. Five miles away to the west, washing the walls of the capital, flows the river Schwarza, enclosing with the Goldbach the wooded heights of Turas. Parallel with its course runs the highroad by which Napoleon communicated with Vienna. Although most of his supplies, and all his expected reinforcements, would be forwarded from the Austrian capital, Napoleon was by no means entirely dependent upon this line. With the foresight which characterised his military operations, the Emperor had already detached Bernadotte towards Bohemia, both with a view to observe the Archduke Ferdinand, and to prepare supplies and open up a line of communication through that kingdom to the Danube, in case of disaster. The country north of the Brünn-Olmütz road is rough, mountainous, and

woody. Adjacent to the road, where this is crossed by the Bosonitz brook, close to Dwaroschna, stands an isolated conical hill ordinarily called by the name of the village. This hill—which very much resembled in shape a height used for a similar purpose in Egypt—was fortified, and armed with heavy guns by Napoleon, to protect and secure the left flank of his position, which was somewhat exposed. The French soldiers christened it after its prototype, Santon—(friar, dervish).

It was late on the evening of the 1st December when the allies reached the position from which they purposed to commence their attack upon the French army on the day following. For marching and manœuvring convenience, the Russian army had been divided into five separate columns, each of which on the day stated bivouacked on the ground assigned to it by Weirother's order of battle.

The left wing of the army, in position, consisted of the three first columns and an advanced-guard, the whole commanded by Buxhöwden.

Keinmayer, with the advanced-guard, 6300,* stood slightly to the north of the village of Aujesd.

The 1st column under Doctorow, 15,200, and the 2d under Langeron, 11,100, occupied the southern portion of the plateau of Pratzen, from Aujesd to the village from which it takes its name. They formed line parallel to the Goldbach, about a mile and a half away from its left bank.

The 3d column, led by Przybyszewski, 10,300, rested with its left upon the village of Pratzen, the centre and right being thrown back considerably from the original line.

The centre consisted of the 4th and strongest column under Kollowrat, 16,750; it was formed up behind Pratzen, and in rear of the left of the 3d column.

The right wing comprised the 5th column under Liechtenstein, made up exclusively of cavalry, 6000, and a strong advanced-guard led by Bagration, 11,500—the whole commanded by the former officer. Liechtenstein took ground with the cavalry in rear of the right of the 3d column, some-

* The numbers, which are variously given by different authors, are taken from Rüstow.

what further back than the 4th. Bagration, striding across the *chaussée*, at Holubitz, covered the roads leading to Olmütz and Göding.

Between the right of the 3d column and Bagration's left, a space of over two miles remained unoccupied. To cover this gap, and to act at the same time as a general reserve, the Russian guard, 7400,* under Grand Duke Constantine, was posted on the left bank of the Littawa, between the Post-house and Krzenowitz. During the battle, Kutusow, as commander-in-chief, then the two emperors, Alexander of Russia and Francis of Austria, would be present with the central column.

When the army had settled into the above positions, the commanders of columns were called to Kutusow's headquarters at Krzenowitz in order to be made acquainted with the plan of battle.

The assumption was, that the bulk of the French army stood behind Schlappanitz and Sokolnitz, the left resting on the wooded heights of Lischna, the right being covered by the lakes of Kobelnitz and Ottmarau. In their present position, the allies, therefore, already overlapped with their left the French right. Moreover, the communications of the French with Vienna were maintained by roads parallel to their present front, and in the prolongation of this exposed flank. Weir-ther's purpose was to force the lower passages of the Goldbach and to attack this flank with overwhelming force, severing Napoleon's communication with the Danube and Bohemia, and forcing him to fight the action with inverted front. In case of success, the French would be driven across the Olmütz road into the wild Moravian mountains, where retreat would be difficult. Obviously, in order to complete this manœuvre, the Russian left wing would have to effect a change of front during the battle. Pivoting upon Kobelnitz, the columns, as they successively forced the passages of the Goldbach, must wheel to their right in order to gain the contemplated line parallel to the Olmütz road. With a view to gain the necessary time for the completion of this difficult movement, the right wing was expected to demonstrate against the French front in order to divert attention from the true point

* The entire army thus amounted to 84,550 men.

of attack. So soon as the left wing had effected its change of front on the right bank of the Goldbach, Bagration was to attack earnestly, to carry the upper passages of the Goldbach, and assist in completing the anticipated triumph.

The detailed orders directed the four columns of the left wing to march off by their left punctually at seven o'clock on the morning of the 2d December, each column selecting a separate point of passage across the Goldbach:—

The 1st at Tellnitz.

„ 2d „ Sokolnitz (village).

„ 3d „ do. (castle).

„ 4th „ between Sokolnitz and Kobelnitz.

Little difficulty was anticipated at these points, it being correctly assumed that the mass of the French army stood between Schlappanitz and Bellowitz.

The right wing, Liechtenstein with the cavalry leading, followed by Bagration, would form up at break of day on both sides of the Olmütz road, between Blasowitz and Kruch, and then advance upon Bellowitz, in order to effect the demonstration alluded to above.

During this advance, the right wing would be supported, and covered on its left flank—greatly exposed by the contemplated movement of the other columns—by the Russian Guard, which would move up from the Littawa for that purpose.

Should victory crown the combination, the army would concentrate at Latein, in order to cross the Schwarza without delay. In case of reverse the columns would retreat upon Herspitz and Niemtschan.

The intelligence of the forward movement of the Russians from Oltschan reached the French Emperor at Brünn on the 28th of November. Orders were at once issued to call in the various detachments echeloned on the roads leading to Bohemia and the Austrian capital. Soult, meanwhile, was directed to fall back from Austerlitz, in order to concentrate with the remainder of the army in rear of the Goldbach and the Bosonitz rivulet. By this means the Emperor hoped to gain sufficient time for the arrival of his detached brigades, whilst he enlisted in his favour the advantages of defensive position.

The troops upon the presence of which he could calculate with certainty were, of infantry—

1st Corps,	Bernadotte,	10,300
3d „	Davoust,	12,400
4th „	Soult,	29,100
5th „	Lannes,	5,800
Imperial Guard,		3,300

—in all, about 60,000 soldiers. Bernadotte, coming from Iglau, traversed Brünn on the evening of the 1st December; and during the night, Friant, commanding one of Davoust's brigades, reached the Abbey of Raigern. Including the cavalry, the effective strength of the French army, for the 2d of December, may be estimated at about 73,000 men; a very much larger force than was credited to Napoleon by his adversary. On the morning of the 29th of November, the Emperor joined the bivouac of his army, selecting his post on the high ground between the Goldbach and Bosonitz river, whence he could overlook the surrounding country. The movement of the allies, on the 1st of December, confirmed the anticipations he had formed as to their probable intentions, enabling him at once to effect his counter-dispositions. It was evident that in order to effect the turning movement which was clearly their object, the allies must descend from the Pratzen heights to the Goldbach. In doing this they would offer their right flank to troops massed on the line of the Bosonitz stream, between Puntowitz and Girzikowitz. By pushing a sufficient force across the river so soon as the heights were vacated by the enemy, it would be easy to master these; thereby effecting the double object of inserting a wedge between the hostile wings, and of gaining commanding ground from which to assail with decisive effect the Russian columns, crowded on the low ground of the Goldbach. The nicety of the manœuvre consisted in selecting the true moment for the counter-attack; but so confident was the Emperor of the result of his combination, that, in a stirring order of the day, he explained to his soldiers the manner in which the fault of their enemy would be turned to account.

It was, however, indispensable that the Russian left wing should be checked on the line of the Goldbach, until the French had fully established themselves upon the Pratzen plateau.

Otherwise, Buxhöwden would not only escape the punishment intended for him in the valley, but his forward movement might make itself unpleasantly felt upon the French rear. To counteract this, it was necessary to employ a retarding force on the Lower Goldbach. The character of the river and of the ground adjacent singularly favoured this purpose. Properly distributed, a small force would effectually defend the passages across the stream, and when forced from the river, would find further protection in rear of the Ottmarau and Kobelnitz lakes. The time thus gained would assuredly be turned to profitable account by the offensive centre, the influence of which could scarcely prove otherwise than decisive.

On the other hand, the advance of a heavy central column from the Bosonitz river upon Pratzen would somewhat expose its left flank to the Russian right. It was desirable, therefore, that sufficient troops should be echeloned in rear of this to accompany the forward movement, and as the ground opened, to spread out, fan-like, for its protection—the more so as the northern portion of the plateau was well suited for cavalry action.

In this sense the Emperor made the following dispositions on the evening of the 1st of December :—

Soult received orders to place his corps in position on the left bank of the Bosonitz river, between Puntowitz and Girzikowitz, by 7 A.M. on the 2d of December, ready to execute the manœuvre of the day—an advance in echelon from his right.

Davoust was to relieve the detachments left by Soult to guard the passage on the Lower Goldbach, early on the morning of the 2d, by moving up from the Abbey of Raigern, which he had only reached during the night. He would then undertake the defence of the river-line.

Lannes would form with his two divisions the extreme left of the French line, striding across the Olmütz road, and leaning with his left upon the fortified Santon.

Murat, taking post with the cavalry on the right bank of the Bosonitz river, in rear of Lannes's right, and of Soult's left—near the village of Girzikowitz—would be prepared to support Soult's advance, and co-operate in effecting the complete separation of the enemy's wings.

Bernadotte would place his corps, formed in contiguous columns of battalions, half-way between the Goldbach and the Bosonitz river, south of the road. Here he was well posted to follow the contemplated forward movement of the French centre and left, and, if necessary, to take his place in first line, between them.

As a general reserve, Napoleon placed Oudinot's division, and six battalions of the Guard under Bessières, on the eminence where he had taken his own stand. At this point, too, the attendance of all the French marshals was requested at half-past 7 A.M. on the 2d, to receive their final instructions. It was the Emperor's object to await here the development of the plan which he credited to his enemy. Should his conjecture be realised, dispositions were already effected for the contingency. In case unforeseen circumstances should force him to alter these, with his subalterns around him, and his army concentrated on the smallest possible space, he would be ready to face any difficulty which might present itself.

In rear of the French position, Brünn was armed and occupied, and passages were prepared across the Schwarza, should the army be forced to retreat.

The morning of the battle was characterised by a thick fog, which shrouded the hills as well as the low grounds in impenetrable mist. The movement of the Russian left commenced with Keinmayer's advance upon Tellnitz. Reinforced by Doctorow, after severe fighting, the passage remained at 9 A.M. in the hands of the Russians. Here Buxhöwden, who was present, instead of following up his advantage, halted, waiting for the result of the attack of the 2d column upon the village of Sokolnitz.

At half-past nine this village was carried by Langeron, which forced Davoust to withdraw his right and centre behind the Ottmarau lake, still clinging tenaciously with his left to the river-line at the castle of Sokolnitz, where the passage was, however, soon forced by the 3d Russian column.

Then Przybyzjewski, uniting with Langeron on the right bank, attacked Davoust's left with great vigour. It was of the highest moment that Davoust should retain his hold of

the river, in order to maintain his communication with the remainder of his army, and also to bar the entry of the Russians too soon into the heart of the French position. With the aid of his artillery, well posted on the heights adjacent to the river, he succeeded in regaining possession both of the village and castle of Sokolnitz; but in the face of numbers so superior, was unable to hold them after eleven o'clock, when he definitely retired from the river-line. The result of his efforts, favoured by the ground, was, that with 10,000 men, he had fully employed upwards of 40,000 Russian soldiers for a period of nearly four hours. During this time the decisive manœuvre of the day had been so far and so successfully developed on another part of the field, that little more remained to be done.

The sound of the Russian artillery from the direction of Tellnitz had already confirmed Napoleon's conjecture as to his enemy's purpose, when his marshals joined him on the "Emperor's hill"—as it has since been termed. The fog, however, was still so thick that it was impossible to examine the Russian movements on the plateau so closely as he had desired. About eight o'clock the rising sun dispelled the dense atmosphere from the surrounding hills, laying bare the Pratzen plateau, and disclosing the winding march of the Russian columns. Presently through the mist the church steeple of the village of Pratzen became visible, and it was half-past nine o'clock when Soult's divisions were launched against the heights, which the Emperor had every reason to believe were now unoccupied.

It will have been noticed, however, that in the preceding narrative, whilst the movements of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Russian columns have been accounted for, the 4th or central column has not been named. Owing to the original position of the 3d column, the flank march executed by Przybyszewski, in order to reach the castle of Sokolnitz, had impeded the advance of Kollowrat. But after his front was clear, Kutusow still retained him behind the crest of the Pratzen heights. The truth is that the Russian commander had openly expressed his disapproval of Weirotter's plan. He had urged that the Russian army should be held together, trusting

rather to its hard fighting, than to its manœuvring, qualities. He mistrusted the wide turning movement, in the face of so able and enterprising an adversary, and a categorical order from his Emperor was necessary to induce him to vacate what he recognised as, possibly, the decisive ground of the battle-field. About nine o'clock he set Kollowrat's column in motion for the village of Pratzen, which he must traverse in order to gain his objective point on the Goldbach. The three leading regiments had barely issued from the village when they came into collision with Soult's advance. The French spreading right and left soon seized the hills on either side of the village, whilst Kutusow found difficulty in extricating his battalions, in order to form his fighting line. When this was at last effected, the French had already established themselves in superior numbers upon the commanding ground of the position, and all Kutusow's efforts to dislodge them were futile. Shortly before eleven o'clock he withdrew his shattered regiments behind the Littawa, so disorganised that any further share in the combat was hopeless.

From this time Soult remained in full possession of that portion of the plateau south of the village of Pratzen. His success, however, had cost him dearly, and some short time was spent in reorganising his command.

Meanwhile Lannes and Murat had followed Soult's forward movement, extending as they gained space over the more open and level ground of the plateau. Here they soon came to blows with Bagration, Liechtenstein, and the Grand Duke Constantine, who had found it necessary to enter the general order of battle, in order to cover the flanks of the more forward columns, exposed by the interval previously alluded to. As neither army sought decisive results on this portion of the battle-field the fighting which ensued was more or less of a desultory character, in which the cavalry played a leading part. The defeat of the Russian centre, then the want of connection in the line of battle, and the consequent necessity of using the reserve in the earliest hours of the day, were all causes which told in favour of the French. In spite of Bagration's obstinacy and the gallantry of their Guard, the Russians constantly lost ground, and by half-past eleven

o'clock were in full retreat, first upon Posoritz, and eventually upon Austerlitz, leaving the Olmütz road on which their baggage-waggons were crowded entirely at the mercy of the French cavalry.

By noon the result of the battle was no longer doubtful. Recognising this, Kutusow sent orders to Buxhöwden, at Tellnitz, to retire the Russian left as speedily as possible. But that general fancied himself victorious, and though he had done absolutely nothing to improve his success, hesitated in obeying.

The phases of battle had by this time altogether changed the relative position of the two armies. Owing to the defeat of the Russian right and centre, and the partial refusal of Davoust's corps, the French army had virtually executed a wheeling movement on its centre, pivoting upon Puntowitz. That is to say, whilst Davoust on the extreme French right had been slowly pressed back by the weight of the Russian left, Soult and Lannes, victorious on the French centre and left, had gained ground considerably to their front. The position of the French army may therefore now be assumed, as with the extreme left at Posoritz, the centre at Pratzen, and the right at Ottmarau.

On the other hand the Russian army was hopelessly separated—the one half, shattered and defeated, in rear of the Littawa, the other still engaged on the low grounds of the Goldbach, whilst the commanding heights between the two rivers were entirely in the hands of the enemy.

Under these circumstances it only remained for the French Emperor to deliver his final blow against Buxhöwden's wing, and in this he was much assisted by that general's want of perception. On the French side the reserve, as well as the greater portion of Bernadotte's corps, had not as yet been under fire. These troops, together with Soult and Davoust on either bank of the Goldbach, were now directed against Przybyszewski, Langeron, and Doctorow. The commanding ground which enabled the French artillery to play with terrible effect upon the Russian columns in the valley, then the numerical superiority, now altogether on the side of the French, soon told with decisive effect. Przybyszewski's

column was almost destroyed, whilst Langeron with great difficulty succeeded in extricating a portion of his command, retiring with a view to unite with Doctorow upon Tellnitz. Meanwhile Buxhöwden had at last commenced his retreat upon Aujesd, purposing to cross the Littawa at Reichmansdorf. But the bridge broke under the weight of his soldiers, struggling in disorderly masses to gain the opposite bank. The only possibility of escape now remaining was, by doubling back towards Tellnitz, to endeavour to carry the broken remnants of his force across the narrow neck of land which separates the Satschan from the Menitz lake. To this end a couple of battalions were thrown into Tellnitz to cover the movement, which was at first conducted in tolerable order. But the road was crowded with ammunition-carriages belonging to the Russian artillery, one of which exploded, creating terrible confusion in the retreating column. Henceforth all order was at an end; the regiments, shelled from the neighbouring heights, broke, endeavouring to escape across the lake, which was covered with a thin skin of ice. Here many found their graves, and when darkness put an end to the struggle, but 8000 soldiers were rallied at Neudorf by Buxhöwden, who during the night joined the main army in retreat on the road leading to Hungary.

The total loss of the allied army in killed, wounded, and prisoners has been estimated at 33,000 men, with 186 guns, and the whole of the heavy baggage.

French authors return their own losses at about 7000 killed and wounded, out of 56,000 men actually under fire during the battle.

COMMENTS.

The battle of Austerlitz offers an admirable illustration of the futility of theoretical combination where the faculty of practical execution is wanting.

Apparently, the fundamental idea of Weirotter's plan was sound. Assuming the French army to be little more than 40,000 strong, formed up on a narrow front, parallel to its line

of communications, he proposed to turn the flank connected with these. Independent of the fact that the premises upon which he based his disposition were altogether faulty, the operation selected, as best calculated to lead to decisive success, leaves nothing to be desired. To assail an army in flank is to attack its most sensitive part under all circumstances; but when the flank attacked represents the line from which supplies are drawn, and along which, in case of disaster, retreat must be effected, the danger and embarrassment accruing to the defensive force is largely increased. Nevertheless, provided a commander have confidence in his own skill, as well as in the fighting qualities of his soldiers, tactical success is not thus rendered less probable. On the contrary, the very character of the offensive movement implies a separation of force favourable to a well-aimed counter-stroke. The success of the operation would therefore depend upon nice calculations of time and distance, providing timely support on all portions of the battle-field. It would further depend, in great degree, upon the character of the ground upon which the manœuvre would be executed. These essential considerations were entirely overlooked by Weirother.

According to the proposed plan, hard fighting was not anticipated until the Russian left had fully effected its change of front on the right bank of the Goldbach. In other words, the successful development of Buxhöwden's wing on the line Turas-Kobelnitz was assumed as an accomplished fact; the enemy being credited, during the period necessary for the execution of this, with an attitude purely and passively defensive.

Now the movements of the several columns composing the Russian left were necessarily dependent upon the wheeling flank, represented by Doctorow's 1st column. The distance from Aujesed to Turas—the objective point—was over seven miles, which, taken into account with the character of the roads, and the amount of opposition to be expected on the Goldbach, would consume, under favourable circumstances, fully four hours. The character of the river, moreover, was

such as to offer every opportunity for successful defence by a greatly inferior force. Thus the distance to be traversed, together with the delay easily encountered on the Goldbach, would offer to a skilful adversary, holding his forces well in hand, precisely the opportunity required for effective counter-stroke. For it will be recollected that every step taken by the Russian left and centre towards the Goldbach, increased the interval between these and the Russian right. If, again, we consider the character of the ground—commanding on all sides—exposed by this interval, the effect of its occupation, in sufficient force, upon the separated fractions of the allied army, could not prove otherwise than decisive.

It was not probable that the victor of Lonato and Castiglione, would fail to seize the advantages which central position must here offer. But beyond the genial appreciation of instant opportunity, it is impossible to overlook, in the study of this campaign, the forecaste and sagacity which conduced to its successful termination. The instinctive recognition of the true measure of his offensive means, the distribution of his soldiers on the theatre of war, the careful study of ground where he was prepared to fight, then the vigilance with which his enemy's movements were watched, or his intentions sounded, are striking proofs of the consummate skill which characterised the military operations of Napoleon.

The day had scarcely closed before Prince John of Liechtenstein, the envoy of the Emperor of Austria, arrived to propose a cessation of arms. It was speedily followed by a treaty resulting in the Peace of Presburg. The Emperor of Russia withdrew from the confederation with that Power without compromising his alliance with Prussia. But the victory of Austerlitz carried weight even in the north of Germany. The King of Prussia engaged by treaty on the 15th December to abandon his alliance with the other States, receiving Hanover as the price of his perfidy. Nor was this all. His defection caused the withdrawal of the combined force of British, Swedes, and Russians which, under the command of the King of Sweden, was besieging Hameln, and the return of the allied troops to England, Stralsund, and Mecklenburg; while another expedition of Russians and English under General Stuart, landed in the bay of Naples to assist the Neapolitan Court, which had declared war against France, was therefore withdrawn, the Russians re-embarking and the English retiring to Sicily.

Thus the year closed with complete success to the French armies. The German Empire had ceased to exist. The Emperor of Germany assumed the title of that of Austria, only, in July of the following year ; and Napoleon, constituting himself protector of the minor German States, converted the Electorates of Bavaria and Würtemberg into kingdoms, increasing their territories as a reward for the assistance they had rendered him in the campaign.

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN OF 1806-1807.

FIRST PHASE: JENA AND AUERSTADT.

Introduction.—The first days of January were passed by Napoleon at Munich, and as soon as the Peace of Presburg was carried into effect he returned to Paris on the 26th. The decree issued at Schönbrunn, by which the Neapolitan dynasty was declared to have ceased to reign, followed by the appointment of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne, resulted in the entry of the new King into his kingdom, with an army under St Cyr, Reynier, and Massena. Though the deposed King and Queen had retired to Sicily, an effort was yet made by the Neapolitan Prince Royal to oppose the French forces, but he was defeated and his army dispersed. A descent was also made upon the coast by Admiral Sir Sidney Smith and Sir John Stuart with a force of 4800 men, in the hopes of encouraging the besieged garrison of Gaeta, still held by the Neapolitan troops. This led to the small action of Maida, in which the French under Reynier were defeated; but, notwithstanding this success, Gaeta finally fell, the British troops were withdrawn, and the French remained masters of the peninsula. Disturbances also occurred in Dalmatia, where the Russians had sent an expedition from Corfu; but it was disposed of by Molitor and Lauriston, assisted by Marmont, in September, and Berthier was directed not to withdraw his army beyond the Inn. During the operations Ragusa had been seized; and this being displeasing to the Sultan, Sebastiani was sent to pacify him, and, if possible, destroy the influence that Russia and Great Britain possessed over the Ottoman Porte. July witnessed the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine under French direction, and fruitless negotiations for peace were entered into between the Emperor and England, during which it transpired that he had offered to yield up to the latter the kingdom of Hanover, though he had not long before added it to the Prussian dominions.

The crooked policy of Prussia in the previous year had borne fruit at last. She had acquired Hanover by her

diplomatic non-intervention, but this had involved her in a naval war with Great Britain, and her commerce had been swept from the seas. The national feeling against France was so strong that the Government was obliged to contemplate the resumption of hostilities. Many things had led to this general feeling of irritation. The violation of Prussian territory in 1805, the insolent bearing of the Emperor towards the German States that did not belong to the new Confederation of the Rhine, the very formation of that Confederation, had stung the pride of Prussia to the quick. Still she might even then have refrained from a warlike declaration had it not been for a rumour that France was contemplating the restoration of Hanover to England as the basis of future peace. To preserve Hanover she drew the sword, and Napoleon wrote on the occasion, "Prussia is at this day what she was in 1740, and what she has been at all times, without consistency and without honour."

The time had been ill chosen by her. France was never more powerful, never better prepared. Her officers were experienced and skilful, her soldiers inured to warfare, her organisation and tactics the best in Europe. Prussia, on the other hand, possessed good but untried troops, antiquated generals whose experience was that of former times, finances impoverished, fortresses unprepared and ill provisioned, while divided councils reigned among her leaders.

She contracted alliances, however, with England and Russia—an insufficient measure, seeing that the Emperor was almost at her gates with 200,000 men—and thus was formed the fourth coalition against France, the first campaign of the new war commencing on October 8, 1806.

In a war between France and Germany the theatre is not easily determined. A French army might at that time invade Prussia either from the lower Rhine or from the Maine. The case is different now, owing to the existence of the neutral kingdom of Belgium, and the Prussian territories on the left bank of the Rhine, while the extensive fortifications at the important points of passage are all obstacles to cross; and though the sea remains open, the difficulties of a maritime expedition in sufficient force are simply enormous.

In the centre of Germany is the Forest of Thuringia, form-

ing a watershed between the Elbe and the Rhine. The rivers which flow from it into the Rhine are the Maine and the Lahn. Into the Elbe run the Mulda, Elster, Saale, Ilm, and Unstruth; the Werra and Sulda uniting form the Weser, and flow into the German Ocean. The Elbe, the north-east boundary of the Forest of Thuringia, rises in Bohemia, and, cutting through the Erzgebirge, traverses the country extending from Dresden to Hamburg. On the Elbe are Dresden, Torgau, Wittenburg, and Magdeburg, forming the principal line of defence for Prussia in 1806.

From the Rhine three roads would carry an army to the Elbe above Magdeburg:—

1. The main post-road *vid* Frankfurt, Fulda, Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt.

2. Frankfurt, Schweinfurt, Meiningen, Gotha — but the communications are indifferent.

3. A system of roads which traverse the eastern portion of the Forest of Thuringia near its junction with the Erzgebirge, and which, uniting in the valley of the Saxon Saale, lead to Leipzig.

After 1805, the Grand Army had remained in Southern Germany to watch Austria and the fulfilment of the treaty of Presburg, as well as to await the result of the impending Prussian complications. In its return it had been halted along the line of the Maine, where it subsisted by forced contributions.

In addition to the Grand Army, numbering 140,000 infantry, 45,000 cavalry, and 15,000 artillery, were 26,000 German allies under Lefebvre at Augsburg; Mayence was held by Mortier with 20,000. Several corps were now called into the line of the Maine, and the general position on the 3d October was as follows:—

1. Bernadotte, . . .	23,000	. . .	Lichtenfels.
3. Davoust, . . .	33,000	. . .	Bamberg.
4. Soult, . . .	41,000	. . .	Amberg.
5. Lannes, . . .	22,000	. . .	Schweinfurt.
6. Ney, . . .	33,000	. . .	Nürnberg.
7. Augereau, . . .	19,000	. . .	Würzburg.
Murat (cavalry), . .	20,000	. . .	Both banks of Maine.
Guard, . . .	9,000	. . .	Würzburg.

200,000

In 2d Line the German Allies,	26,000
Mortier,	20,000
Army of Holland,	30,000
Bavarian garrisons,	15,000
	<hr/>
	91,000

The line of the Maine was to be the point of concentration and immediate base of future operations, so that fortified posts were established at Mayence, Würzburg, and Kronach. A second line of communications existed by Forchheim and Strassburg. The Maine was selected as a starting-point for the following reasons.

Three districts presented themselves for concentration and as a base of supply :—

1. River Rhine, Coblenz to Wesel.
2. Maine-Rhine, Würzburg to Lahn.
3. Upper Maine, Würzburg to Bayreuth.

In the first case the country was open; the Elbe reached between Magdeburg and Hamburg *en route* to Berlin; but the objections to it were the long march the army must make to get there, and the formidable character of the rivers to be crossed in face of an enemy. The Weser, Aller, and Elbe might cause unnecessary delay.

In the second case there was a good road, the most direct to Berlin; but it was rejected as being a single line of communication, and because, being most direct, the principal resistance might reasonably be expected to be concentrated on it.

The third case seemed more favourable. The Prussian flank might be turned, and the communications were three in number, namely—

1. Bayreuth to Hof.
2. Kronach to Schleitz.
3. Coburg to Saalfeld.

There were further advantages too. The material obstacles were inconsiderable; direct collision might be avoided if the enemy's flank were turned; and fresh Prussian dispositions would be necessitated. Saxony was ill disposed towards Prussia, and might be separated from her.

The passage of Saale would be avoided, and lastly the Elbe would be reached at a favourable point, where its breadth was less, and the communications of the enemy would be at once endangered.

The Prussian army was of doubtful quality. It had not been at war for eleven years, and had, with young inexperienced soldiers, old officers. Its entire strength was 180,000 men, but of these 58,000 remained in garrison, reducing the field effective to 122,000.

The supreme command was vested in the Duke of Brunswick, seventy-two years old. The first army consisted of five divisions. The first three, those of the Prince of Orange, Wartensleben, and Schmettau (with Rüchel commanding 18,000 Westphalians detached), were under Möllendorf, an octogenarian; the remaining two, those of Künheim and Von Armin, under Kalkreuth: in all, numbering 58,000 men.

Prince Hohenlohe commanded the second army, of 40,000, principally Saxons.

The advanced-guard, 10,000 strong, at Erfurt and Weimar Gotha, had been given to the Duke of Weimar.

The reserve under Eugene of Würtemberg amounted to 14,000 combatants; thus giving as a grand total, 28,500 cavalry, 90,000 infantry, and 3500 artillery, of which Rüchel's Westphalians formed the right, the first army the centre, and the second the left.

Viewing this numerical inferiority of Prussia, the circumstances were such as to impose a defensive attitude on her armies behind the Elbe. Her general line, and the river itself, could only be completely turned through Bohemia. Her Russian allies were yet far distant, and possibly the safest course to pursue would have been to withdraw the armies behind the Oder, leaving strong garrisons in all the fortresses, and thus approaching the advancing columns of the Russians. But the Prussians did not see it in this light, considering themselves superior to the French, and hence offensive operations were determined on, and undertaken. The armies were thus posted:—

Rüchel, at Mühlhausen; Brunswick, at Magdeburg to Wittenburg; Weimar, on the Saale; Hohenlohe, from Torgau to

Dresden, with his advanced-guard at Hof; Würtemberg behind Magdeburg; Blucher in Westphalia. In this position a council of war was held at Erfurt. Meanwhile the Emperor had decided on taking the initiative, and made the following dispositions.

Right.—Soult, with 4th corps from Bayreuth to Hof, followed by Ney with 6th corps at half-a-day's march interval.

Centre.—Murat, with cavalry, from Kronach to Saalburg, and, on emerging from the forest, to extend reconnoitring to the right and left and procuring supplies; Bernadotte, with 1st corps to support Murat, followed by Davoust with 3d corps from Bamberg at the same interval.

In rear of this column marched Napoleon with the Guard.

Left.—Lannes, with 5th corps from Coburg to Saalfeld, followed by Augereau with the 7th corps. The former was ordered to diverge towards Meiningen, and then to counter-march in the original direction.

Napoleon left Paris, 24th September, reaching Würzburg, October 3d.

On the Prussian side there was much diversity of opinion as to the plan to be adopted. Hohenlohe preferred falling on the right of the French at Bayreuth, and rolling them up from right to left; Brunswick reinforcing him through the defiles. Brunswick suggested marching *via* Fulda on the Maine, to sever the line and defeat the fractions of Napoleon's army, similar to the plan of the campaign of 1796 and 1800. A compromise was therefore effected, and a double line agreed to; but this false strategy was disturbed by Napoleon's arrival at Würzburg, and in farther council on the 5th and 6th October, it was agreed to concentrate at the sources of the Ilm, and if advisable to march on Würzburg by Meiningen, the right under Rüchel, the left under Tauenzin. The day fixed for concentration at Meiningen was the 12th October.

Hohenlohe's army was already on the march according to the previous dispositions, and countermarching and confusion followed this change of plan, which was further anticipated by Napoleon's forward movement.

The Prussians received intimation of the French concen-

tration at Bamberg on the 7th, and Weimar reconnoitred towards Neustadt.

On the 1st October, the King's ultimatum had been remitted to the Emperor. By it he was to evacuate Germany, restore Wesel to Prussia, and return an answer to these demands before the 8th, at the royal headquarters.

Napoleon's proclamation quickly followed; a stirring address to his army preceded his advance on the 8th October, before which Brunswick retreated.

Hohenlohe was called to the left bank of the Saale; the centre to Hochdorff; the right to Gotha; the reserve to Halle; and Weimar was directed to cross the Maine as a diversion.

The French advance continued. Soult, on the 9th, reached Hof, which was evacuated by Tauenzien, who had retired to Schleitz and Plauen on the 10th, where, finding his right clear, he bent off to Gera, reaching it on the 12th, by the right bank of the Elster. Ney had previously left Soult's track, marching for Auma, where he arrived on the 12th. The left of the Prussians was thus already turned, and the communications with Berlin interrupted, except by Naumburg.

Murat and Bernadotte left Kronach on the 8th, and passing the forest, reached the Saale at Saalburg, which was found to be occupied by Tauenzien's advanced-guard, which withdrew to Schleitz by night. On the 9th, Bernadotte attacked him, and Tauenzien, outflanked, retired upon Auma with the sacrifice of his rear-guard. The loss of the Prussians was 500 killed and wounded, 30 prisoners, and 2 guns. Marching continuously he rejoined Hohenlohe at Triplitz, on the 10th, still delaying to comply with the Duke of Brunswick's orders.

Bernadotte gained Auma on the 10th; Murat reached Gera on the 11th, capturing 500 carriages, and the pontoon train of Hohenlohe's army, which was marching across his front; Bernadotte followed upon Gera; Davoust obliqued left to Mittal Pölnitz; Napoleon with the Guard was at Auma on the 11th. He recognised the character of the enemy's march, and, presuming he purposed concentrating at Gera, made his dispositions accordingly, feeling his way carefully.

Lannes marched on the 8th for Hildburghausen, his object

being to divert the Prussians' attention to their right, but countermarched after some hours by Coburg and Grafenthal, being thus echeloned behind the centre and right. On the 15th, Lannes emerged from the forest at Saalfeld, at the junction of the Schwarza and Saale, and of the roads from Gera and Jena to Coburg. This point was held by Prince Louis of Prussia with 8000 men, forming the right of Hohenlohe's advance.

Hohenlohe ordered him to stand fast so as to gain time, but the Prince, thus exposed, was defeated and killed, the Prussian loss being 1200 killed and wounded, 1800 prisoners, 4 colours, 33 guns, and a quantity of baggage.

Lannes pushed on to Neustadt, reaching it on the 11th.

Augereau following Lannes to Saalfeld, then obliqued to his left along the Saale.

The French had thus in three days concentrated north of the forest between the Saale and Elster, having gained two important actions.

Brunswick had summoned Hohenlohe peremptorily to the left bank of the Saale, and he obeyed, reaching Jena by Kahla and Roda on the 11th October ; Weimar was recalled ; Rüchel directed to Erfurt ; while Hohenlohe, facing south, was left at Jena.

Anxious lest the fate which had befallen Mack in the previous year might be his also, he waited, however, for Weimar, thus losing an important hour. Rüchel had been left behind to hold out a hand to him, and the retreat commenced, the Prussian line now extending to Halle.

Hohenlohe arrived in great disorder, carrying demoralisation with him ; but order was at length restored, and the camp formed at Capellendorff on the 12th October.

Napoleon found to his surprise the road open. He had lost touch of the enemy,* and knowing the Prussians to be westward, he effected a change of front, pivoting on the centre.

In order to do this rapidly, he transposed the original order. Bernadotte and Davoust had become the right (being in advance of Gera), Soult and Ney the centre, halting for the rest.

* Compare 1800 and 1849.

The orders for the alteration were issued on the 12th. Murat pushed on to Naumburg towards the Leipzig road; Davoust to Naumburg; Bernadotte to Zeitz, on the Leipzig road; Lannes from Neustadt to Jena, to cross and patrol towards Weimar; Augereau to cross the Saale at Kohlen, to patrol on the left bank and communicate with Lannes; headquarters at Gera, where Napoleon was joined by Lefebvre, who having organised the German contingent, now took command of the Guard.

Murat meanwhile reached the gates of Leipzig, and Davoust and Bernadotte Naumburg and Zeitz, without, however, gaining important information; but Lannes, crossing the Saale at Winzerlee and marching down the left bank for Jena, reached Landgrafenburg on the 13th, seized the heights, and from its eminence discovered Hohenlohe's army drawn up in three lines, as well as other forces on the line of march. Recognising the importance of this fact, he sent information, which reached the Emperor at Gera about noon on the 13th, who thereupon started for Jena with Soult and part of the 4th corps, Ney being ordered to Roda, and the Guard to follow to Jena. Davoust and Bernadotte were to concentrate at Naumburg to hold that passage, and possibly to co-operate against the left of the enemy should he line the Saale.

The Emperor reached Landgrafenburg at 4 P.M., and, concluding that the entire Prussian forces were before him, determined to give battle.

The Saale, though fordable in places, runs in a deep gorge below Jena. On the left bank are steep wooded heights, while between Jena and Naumburg are only three bridges—viz., Lobstadt, Dornburg, and Camburg. The Prussians might have held the line of the Saale advantageously. It would have been true strategy to do so, but it was already turned by Lannes and Augereau, and the tactical points were not occupied.

Napoleon utilised his adversary's error. Lannes's position was strengthened during the night of the 13th by all means at his disposal; communications were improved, sappers were at work all night, preparing for the transport of the artillery, and Napoleon bivouacked in the square formed by the Guard.

Separated only from Tauenzein by a slight ridge of ground, in position on a very contracted space, and numbering only 20,000 men, the French on the 13th were in a very precarious position.

On the evening of that day, all the troops had been directed on Jena; Murat was also recalled; Angereau reached the Galgenberg, which commanded the road to Weimar; Lannes and the Guard were at Landgrafenburg; Soult and Ney at Jena and Roda and on the roads to Dornburg; Davoust and Bernadotte near Naumburg; Murat was moving by Zeitz on Dornburg when recalled.

Hohenlohe had been quite unable to fathom the meaning and intention of Napoleon's movements. He still laboured under the impression that he was confronted solely by the corps of Lannes and Angereau, instead of the bulk of the French army. He did not think it necessary to dispossess the French of their commanding position on the Landgrafenburg, and had but slightly reinforced his left, while his main body still faced the point from which he thought the blow would come—that is, along the left bank of the river from Saalfeld.

At Jena, therefore, the Prussians were outnumbered in the proportion of two to one; but on the other hand Davoust, who had been directed both to bar the way to Kosen, and, crossing the Saale there, to move by Apolda on the Prussian rear, was, owing to the false impression of the Emperor that in front of him lay the entire Prussian army, exposed to not inconsiderable danger, for barring his way was the army under Brunswick, which in its turn outnumbered the single corps that was moving towards the field of Jena on this side. It is true that Bernadotte had been directed to march with him if the despatch sent by Napoleon to Davoust ordering the movement reached the two marshals when in communication; but the Prince of Ponte Corvo, obeying the previous order to move on Dornburg, marched thither on the 14th.

The 14th saw the two victories of Jena and Auerstadt won. At the latter, Davoust, in a most brilliant action, defeated Brunswick, who, in retiring on Weimar to effect a junction with Hohenlohe, ignorant of what had occurred at Jena, was met by the corps of Bernadotte at Apolda, and his retreat con-

verted into headlong rout. At Jena, also, the Emperor had gained a complete success; and the night after the battle was spent in directing a vigorous pursuit, which might prevent the shattered columns from rallying, and also result in the possession of the line of the Elbe before such a defence could be organised as might render the passage of that river difficult.

The movements on the 14th and following days were as follows :—

Bernadotte by Halle (where the Prussian reserve under Würtemberg was attacked and then retreated on Dessau), towards Magdeburg, crossing the Elbe at Barby on the 20th; Davoust on Naumburg where he rested till the 17th, as also did the corps of Lannes, the Guard, Angereau, and Ney, near Weimar. Up to this date the pursuit had been conducted by Murat on Erfurt and Weissensee, Soult on Buttstedt with Bernadotte; but on this day, Ney, following Murat, joined Soult at Magdeburg, which was besieged. Lannes and Angereau moved on Merseburg by Naumburg, Davoust by Leipzig on Wittenburg, the bridge at which place was seized on the 20th. Lannes and Angereau crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and thus the line of that river was now in French hands. During these operations the Duke of Weimar's corps had on the 15th, at Erfurt, hearing of the defeat of the main army, retreated by the Brunswick road, crossing the Elbe at Landau on the 20th, when General Winning took over the command, and retiring thence by Kyritz on Mecklenburg, reached Waren on the 30th, where it was joined by Blücher with the relics of Hohenlohe's cavalry. The latter's force, to which Blücher had at first acted as rear-guard, had retreated from Magdeburg on the 21st, making for the Oder, as Hohenlohe despaired of forming a junction with Weimar; and moving by Ratenow, Rupin, Fürstenburg to Prentzlow, he was finally compelled to capitulate to Murat on the 28th. Blücher, who had assumed the command of the force under General Winning, was hotly pursued from Waren to Schwerin, Gadebusch, and Lübeck, where he was again attacked, and then, hemmed in against the Danish frontier at Ratkau, he surrendered to Murat on the 7th November.

The entire Prussian army had been slain or taken prisoners.

The corps of Murat and Lannes had been pursuing Hohenlohe, Soult had followed Weimar, and Bernadotte had followed Blücher; thus the latter had in the end been pressed in rear by Bernadotte, whilst his flanks were constantly threatened by Murat and Soult.

The fortresses were also one by one surrendering. Berlin was entered and Spandau surprised on the 25th October: Stettin capitulated on the 29th; Custrin on the 31st. On the 8th November Magdeburg fell to Ney; Hameln to King Louis of Holland, on the 27th; Nieuburg on the 25th; and the minor places on the Weser soon followed.

The whole of the Prussian fortresses had capitulated to the French.

This campaign is but the prelude to that of 1807, which is next examined. It will be unnecessary further to criticise in detail the general plan of operations and its execution. The comments made by Colonel

Hamley in the 'Operations of War' are of the greatest value, and an examination of the opinions so clearly expressed there will fully explain the salient strategical features of the campaign up to this time.

The first phase, the destruction of the Prussian portion of the allied armies, is complete; but it yet remains to investigate the continuation of this campaign, which involved the defeat of the other and equally important fraction.

SECOND PHASE: PULTUSK, ETC.

Napoleon's successes in Prussia enabled him to extend his operations to the Vistula, and thus deprive the King of Prussia of those resources which, during the winter, he would have drawn from the country between the Oder and that river, and also from Silesia.

The political alliances of Prussia were far from satisfactory. Sweden was insufficient in force to be of much value in the forthcoming operations. Any forces that might be sent by England were not to be expected before the spring. Austria was at present inactive after her recent reverses. Russia's purpose was solely to obtain for Prussia a tolerable peace, she having in the interim engaged in war with Turkey, and entered the Principalities with 80,000 men. Meanwhile Napoleon had entered Berlin in triumph. His occupation of the Prussian capital had been followed by an increased expression of hostility to England. Unable to meet her on the sea, he endeavoured to cripple her commerce on the Continent; and when, by an order in council, the entire coast of France was declared to be in a state of blockade, the conqueror of Jena issued a decree by which all English goods were prohibited to be sold in the countries over which he held sway, and other arbitrary measures were taken with a view of checking the rising prosperity and success of the British nation. He had replied to the paper blockade of England by a Continental blockade, laying an embargo on everything that appertained to her. But the scheme was ineffective. Smuggling prevailed to an enormous extent. And his effort to check the development of her commerce by land was as ineffectual as her attempts to destroy French trade by sea were successful.

In his new war with Russia the political element largely entered. An advance through North Germany into her territories would leave his right flank exposed to the action of enemies only too anxious to turn against him. Thus he contemplated utilising Poland against Russia, making overtures to Kosciusko regarding the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom; but in this he failed. Next, turning to Saxony, he admitted her Elector to the new Rhenish Confederation, converting his electorate into a kingdom. This was at least one obstacle interposed between his late enemy Austria, even now engaged in busily remodelling her army, and his proposed line of advance. But it was not enough. Fruitless efforts were made to gain the Austrian alliance by the offer of the Silesian province in exchange for Galicia; and then, as a last resource, he endeavoured to cultivate the assistance of Turkey by embroiling her with Russia, and was so far successful that, thanks to the injudicious action taken by the latter in interfering with regard to the banished Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sultan, irritated at the arbitrary conduct of his ancient adversary, threw his weight into the French balance. Thus the Emperor Alexander was compelled to weaken his main army by 80,000 men, which, under General Michelson, had crossed the Dniester into Moldavia.

The King of Prussia had retreated to Königsberg after the occupation of his kingdom and the entry of Napoleon into Berlin on the 25th October, and the Emperor demanded as a preliminary to peace the possession of the line of the Vistula and of the Silesian fortresses. The defeat of Russia was essential to his supremacy in Europe, and feeling this, his natural anxiety to secure his lines of communication by Mayence, Würzburg, Erfurt, Wittenburg, and Spandau with France, led him to take the measures before referred to, so as to prevent the danger of interruption to them by a blow from the States that, secretly or openly hostile to him, lay on the right flank of an advance into Russia—that is, towards the south of Europe. There was still Sweden at war with him on his other flank, though her action would be ineffective until the naval powers were fully prepared to co-operate.

But continued success had increased his daring, and he

prepared, therefore, once more to take the initiative, and carry the war into the enemy's territory. Large armies would therefore be required, and the conscription of 1807 was levied. The reserves were assembled on the Rhine, and at Boulogne. The 8th corps, under Mortier, which had been employed in Hanover, was to secure his left flank, and operate against the Swedes on the shores of the Baltic. Detachments were organised and forwarded from the Rhine to the Oder to fill up the gaps occasioned by his previous campaign, and the depots were stocked with material, the great cavalry depot at Potsdam being placed under Bourcier. The great necessity for cavalry on the plains of Poland was evident, and while men were forwarded from Italy, horses to mount them were largely purchased in Germany.

Thus the Grand Army, including reinforcements and auxiliaries, now numbered 300,000 men. Turning to his adversaries, we find that the 1st corps of Russians, 60,000 strong, under Beningsen, crossed the Niemen, advancing to the Vistula on November 1st; the 2d, under Buxhöwden, 38,000 strong, followed; while the reserve remained with General Essen, organising. The Prussian Court was still at Königsberg, and the wreck of the army under L'Estocq, numbering 25,000 men, was on the Vistula, based on Graudenz and Dantzic. The total available forces, therefore, were 120,000 men, under the supreme command of the Russian octogenarian, General Kamenski.

The early French movements were as follows: Davoust, to Custrin and Posen; Augereau, to Custrin and Landsberg on the Netze; Lannes, from Stettin to Stargard and Schneidmühl; Murat returned from Lübeck to Posen; Jerome, with the German auxiliaries, was to reduce the Silesian fortresses, and to occupy Kalisch.

Thus the first line under Murat consisted of 80,000 men. In addition to this, Soult and Bernadotte from Lübeck, Ney from Magdeburg, the Imperial Guard and the reserve cavalry—in all, 80,000 men—were to concentrate at Berlin, and to follow the 1st division to the Vistula.

The character of the country between the Oder and Vistula requires careful examination. Taking its rise in the Sudetes

Alps, the former river has generally a north-westerly direction, running by a wide estuary into the Baltic. The principal points of passage, occupied usually by fortified towns, are Ratisbon, Breslau, Glogau, Frankfurt, Custrin, and Stettin. At Custrin it receives the Wartha, which takes its rise in the northern slopes of the Carpathians, runs north through Kolo, passing near Kalisch, west to Szrem, north again through Posen, beyond which, bending west, it unites with the Netze to join the Oder at Custrin. The Vistula also has its sources in the Carpathians, running generally north through Cracow, Warsaw, Mödlin, Plock, Thorn, and Graudenz, entering the Baltic at Dantzic, which is a fortress of the first class. A short distance above Warsaw it receives on its left bank the Pilica, which rises near the sources of the Wartha, and at Mödlin is joined on the right bank by the Bug, forming the eastern boundary of Poland, an affluent of which is the Narew, which, rising near the sources of the Pregel, runs south into the Bug through Pultusk. The northern district between the Vistula and Oder is Pomerania, bordering on the sea; the central that of Posen; and the southern, Silesia and part of Poland. touching therefore the Austrian frontier.

The area between these river-basins was in its northern part sterile and unfertile, with few good roads except the main arteries of communication between Russia, Poland, and the west. The temper of the Poles was, as might be imagined after the violent and unjustifiable partition of their country by two of the Powers engaging in hostilities on their frontier, far more favourable to the French than to their adversaries. The entry of Murat into Moscow partook of the nature of a triumph, and hopes were even entertained that the independence of the kingdom might be restored, with the Grand Duke of Berg as king. Though this was refused, the ancient nobility of Warsaw received from the Emperor marked attention.

On the 16th Lannes and Augereau were directed to march on Nackel and Bromberg; Davoust on Warsaw by Sempolno, Kutno, Blonie. The Russians occupied Warsaw only with their advance, and had during their occupation destroyed all stores and shipping that might be useful to the enemy. Lannes, leaving Bromberg, filing before Thorn, moved by Inowracław,

Bresesc, and Kowal on Warsaw, followed by Augereau, having vainly endeavoured to obtain possession of Thorn.

Napoleon remained in Berlin until the last days of November, and then started for Posen.

The advance of the second French division at once ensued, and Ney was ordered to Thorn, when, after a skirmish, the passage of the Vistula was effected, notwithstanding the difficulties presented by the volume of water and the bad weather, the river being covered with floating ice. The Russians thereupon abandoned Praga, retiring upon the Narew.

Davoust, crossing the Vistula, pushed on to Jablona, and Lannes replaced him at Warsaw. Augereau established himself opposite Mödlin, while Thorn was seized by Ney; but there is some difference as to these operations between the French and Russian accounts. Napoleon was now master of the Vistula, and of the fortifications on the river, which lay in the line of his advance between the Vistula and Pregel. The latter river rises in the lakes and swamps of east Prussia, running west into the sea at Königsberg, a badly-fortified town; and receiving at Gumbinnen a small tributary, the Alle, draining the wide swampy lakes of Löwentin and Spirding. Between it and the Vistula is a small stream, the Passarge, running into the Frische Haff, a vast lagoon extending from the Vistula to the Pregel parallel to the Baltic coast.

Between these four rivers, the Vistula, Narew, Alle, and Pregel, lies the theatre of war, which, despite the lakes and the tributary streamlets of the Passarge, is sandy, sterile, and infertile. The basin of the latter river is occupied by an industrious population, and is well cultivated by a race of German descent; but the southern area is poor, densely wooded, and thinly populated by people of the Sclavic race. The roads were infamously bad, the climate intensely severe; and thus, while the Russo-Prussian armies abounded with supplies based on Dantzic, Königsberg, and the sea, the French forces were in want, privation, and distress.

In the Russian army at this period, the time of service was twenty-five years for conscripts, and for volunteers fifteen. The men were small and thickset, but a brave and hardy race. The officers inactive, uneducated, and ignorant, were obliged

to avail themselves of the service of foreigners, who were the cream of the service. Thus the staff, engineers, &c., were on bad terms with the native officers. Severe discipline was enforced when on duty; but, off duty, excesses of every kind were common, owing to the indifferent commissariat arrangements of the army.

One of the principal evils was the enormous mass of servants and retainers, 200 per regiment, who accompanied the force. Hospitals were equally bad. The Cossacks, the principal light cavalry of Russia, had little manœuvring power. The tactics of the infantry were exclusively confined to bayonet attacks, and the use of ground was unknown, as also the art of posting troops properly. The organisation was absolutely bad, and the proper proportion of the arms, the one to the other, neglected; and this or that arm was constantly borrowed from several divisions, never to return to them. Seldom, consequently, were the leaders able to avail themselves of the advantages gained by the bravery of their troops. With the French the condition of affairs was very different. There, skill and regularity reigned. Posen was made a grand depot, together with Kalisch, Kowal, and Bromberg. A topographical staff was attached to each corps, to sketch roughly the country and roads on both sides of the line of march, the plans furnished by which were sent in daily to headquarters. Jerome was detached on December 3d with the Bavarians (under Wrede), to Breslau, and Devay to Kalisch.

Beningsen meanwhile ordered L'Estocq to fall back from the Vistula, removing his own headquarters to Pultusk, where the King soon repaired and placed Beningsen definitely in command of the Prussians, L'Estocq having demurred to abandoning the line of Vistula.

Davoust occupied Praga December 2, the passage of his corps being completed on the 8th, while Ney had finished his at Thorn by the 11th.

The Russians were concentrating at the same date at Ostrolenka and Nowogrod. Napoleon being now in complete possession of the line of the Vistula determined to strengthen his left—with the view of separating the Prussians from their allies—and to open up the country as far as Wittenburg and

Pultusk. He despatched Bernadotte and Bessières (in command of the cavalry) to Thorn, to support Ney ; Bernadotte, in command of the left wing, concentrating at Thorn by December 20.

But Beningsen had formed the determination to regain the line of the Vistula, and the Prussians in Strassburg were consequently ordered to retake Thorn ; but Ney was already too strong there, and the attempt was abandoned.

At this juncture the Prussian position was—

Right—Eylau, Bischofswerder, Neumark, Kauernich ;

Centre—Strassburg, Gurzno ;

Left—Lipno, Sierps, Diericke, Soldau ;

their object being to cover Königsberg, and maintain communication with Graudenz and Dantzic on one side, and the Russians on the other. But the line was too extended—the attempt to effect, too much apparent. L'Estocq, with the centre and left, retired to Biezun, expecting to be attacked with superior forces, a flying column being left at Bischofswerder on December 13-14. The Russians reached Pultusk again, December 8, and halted till the 10th in position on the Ukra and Narew, covered by these rivers.

The reasons for the readvance of the Russians assigned by Beningsen were, the importance of his union with Buxhöwden, and the non-pursuit of the French after gaining the Vistula ; but the union was not effected.

The reasons presumed by the Prussians, however, were, that the Russian marshal had not yet arrived, and Beningsen, unwilling to place himself under his senior, Buxhöwden, had advanced in order still to retain command. Buxhöwden crossed the Prussian frontier, December 6, and reached Masiawieckz, on the 9th, 70 miles from Pultusk.

Davoust crossed the Narew at Okwein, December 10, occupying the right bank of the Ukra as far as Pomiechowow, and eventually Mödlin. A *tête de pont* was constructed by the 12th, and the bridge by the 22d December.

The opportunity of attacking the French on the 12th was missed by Beningsen owing to the vacillation and inactivity of the Russians. Thus the fortifications were continued on

the Vistula and Narew by the French unopposed, and Soult was pushed up to the former stream at Wroklawek, crossing at Plock and Dobrzyskow on the 23d. Augereau crossed at Lakroczyou by the 20th December, the bridge being finished on the 23d. Napoleon and the Guard left Posen on December 16, and reached Warsaw, the former the 19th, and the latter the 23d December.

Beningsen had again abandoned offensive movements and decided upon assuming a central position at Pultusk, with a view to defend the line of the Ukra. On the 18th December his troops were disposed along this line from Kolozomb to the confluence of the Ukra with the Narew. Novemiasto and Nasielsk were occupied in second line, and Pultusk in third line, which was to be the general point of assembly for retreat.

Buxhöwden, on the 18th, reached Ostrolenka with three divisions, one being left on the Bug, too far back for support. Kamenski, joining on December 21st, drove Beningsen forward to Novemiasto, ordered up Buxhöwden, and was about to attack the French when they anticipated him. Napoleon's object was simply to obtain undisturbed winter quarters. The Russians were too near for safety, and it was necessary to drive them behind the Omuleff.

The Ukra was therefore reconnoitred; an island at the mouth seized by Davoust, and connected with the right bank by a bridge. Batteries were then established, and preparations for further passage commenced.

Napoleon reached Okunin on December 23, and Osterman prepared to dispute the passage; but it was forced at Czar-nowo, Kolozomb, and Sochozyn, and the Russians retired on Nasielsk and Pultusk.

The further advance of the French brought on the battles of Pultusk and Golymin on the 26th: the former between Lannes with one division (Gudin's) of Davoust, and Beningsen, resulting in the defeat of the Russians; and the latter between Davoust and Augereau, and detachments from the corps of Sacken, Gallitzin, and Doctorow.

Thus the extreme right of the general French line met with some opposition in mastering the line of the Ukra and Narew;

but, in the centre, Soult had reached Ciechanow, and Bernadotte Biezun unopposed—though Bessières, covering the advance with the second cavalry reserve, had captured some Prussian prisoners near the latter place.

On the extreme left Ney had advanced from Strassburg on Soldau (26th), and Mlawa, pushing back the Prussian corps under L'Estocq; and engaging them at Soldau on the 26th, fought an obstinate battle.

Thus Napoleon's plan to drive the enemy back from the Ukra on the Narew, and separate them from the rich countries on the seaboard of Old Prussia, had been successful.

The Russian armies had been commanded by Beningsen, with Osterman, Sacken, Gallitzin, and Sedmaratski as subordinates; and Buxhöwden, with Totschakow, Doctorow, Sacken, and Aurepp.

Meanwhile the Prussians had been at Biezun on the 23d, and Soldau on the 26th, retreating, after the action there, to Neidenberg, reaching Ortelsberg 28th and 29th, Rhemswein 30th, Landsberg 31st, Rastenberg on the 2d January 1807, and Angenberg on the 3d, where they came into communication with the Russians, having succeeded in carrying out their own retreat without becoming entangled in theirs.

After these actions Buxhöwden retired from his command, the Russians withdrew behind the Pregel, and the French went into winter quarters.

Note.—The distances from Warsaw to the most important points in the theatre up to this point are: to Pultusk, 30 miles; Thorn, 80; Ostrolenka, 55; Plock, 40; Dantzic, 120; and Königsberg, 130 miles.

THIRD PHASE: FRIEDLAND, ETC.

The close of 1806 had seen the commencement of a winter of extreme severity. Sudden thaws, in which the wretched roads speedily became so impassable as to render it almost impossible to move the guns except with double and even triple teams, and with mud so deep that the soldiers

sank to their knees in it, had alternated with severe frosts, and had increased the difficulties of campaigning to the utmost. Repose was absolutely necessary for both armies : the French were accordingly placed in cantonments, between the Narew and Ukra ; and Napoleon, returning to Warsaw, kept a brilliant court in the ancient Polish capital.

In the Mediterranean the Russian fleet had harassed the French under Marmont by landing on the coast they held, and Ragusa had been also blockaded ; but these events exercised no influence on the great campaign that was preparing in the north.

The French, in January 1807, occupied the following positions :—

4th corps (Soul't) : the country about the Orezze and Sonna to the Ukra, the front covered by Lasalles's and Milhaud's cavalry, with Golymin as a rallying-point. The grand depots were at Plock ; the minor ones at Sochozyn, Prznoni, and Ciechanowo.

3d corps (Davoust) : on both sides of the Narew to the Bug ; headquarters and depots, Pultusk, covered by cavalry under Recker, from Ostrolenka to Ostrow.

5th corps (Lannes) : suburbs of Warsaw and Praga, and in the triangle between the Austrian frontier, Narew, Bug, and Vistula, at Sierock, Wyszokow, and Brock ; headquarters, Warsaw ; rallying-point, Sierock, where there was an intrenched camp ; depots at Warsaw and Sierock.

7th corps (Augereau) : the district from Wyszogrod to the Ukra, and on the left bank of the Vistula along the Bzurra to Lowicz ; communication by Mödlin ; rallying-point, Plonsk ; depots, Wyszogrod and Lowicz.

1st corps (Bernadotte) : the country between Elbing and Osterode, thus threatening Königsberg, attracting the attention of the Russians, separating Königsberg from Dantzic, and collecting stores for the benefit of the army in the richer provinces of the north ; rallying-point, Osterode ; depots, Marienwerder ; communications by the bridge at Graudenz : covered by his own light cavalry and the Division Lahne.

6th corps (Ney, under Bernadotte) : the country about Neidenburg, Soldau, and Wittenburg ; covered by Grouchy's cavalry : rallying-point, Mlawa ; depots, Bromburg and Thorn ; heavy cavalry in rear of the infantry corps.

Guard at Warsaw.

Grenadiers (Oudinot), at Kalisch.

All unnecessary provocation of the inhabitants of the occupied districts was strictly prohibited.

The line so occupied extended from the Frische Haff along the Passarge and Omuleff, and from Ostrolenka by Ostrow to Brock on the Bug. Mortier blockaded Stralsund. The Bavarian contingent remained in Silesia; and a 10th corps formed under Lefebvre, composed of Germans, Poles, and French, carried out the investment of Colberg and the siege of Dantzic.

The objects to be attained by taking up these positions were—

1. Rest and reorganisation of the army.
2. Covering the blockade and sieges of the Vistula fortresses.
3. Construction of a strong base of operation for the next campaign.
4. Security of territory occupied should the enemy attack.
5. Organisation of the military resources of Poland.

During the whole winter these requirements were kept steadily in view. *Têtes de pont* were formed at every point of passage on the Vistula; convoys of the most extensive kind were organised, and transported stores of all kinds from the Danube and the Rhine. Special attention was also directed to the formation of hospitals and ambulance trains.

Stettin and Custrin, Glogau and Breslau, Brieg and Kosel, successively surrendered, and soon only Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Glatz in Silesia remained in Prussian hands. Vandamme was therefore sent to besiege these fortresses, and Brune watched the mouths of the Elbe and Weser to prevent a descent of the British troops.

Meanwhile Ney had unadvisedly made an attempt on Königsberg. He had without direct orders advanced his headquarters from Neidenberg to Altenstein, and came into collision with the Russian cavalry under Gallitzin. Receiving peremptory orders from the Emperor to withdraw, he fell back to his former position.

The strength of the Russians united at Bialla on the 18th January was—

7 divisions,	66,000
1 division, (Goliorz),	8,000
1 „ (Essen),	18,000
L'Estocq (Prussians),	13,000
					<hr/>
					105,000

The French field force in Poland and Russia amounted to 140,000 men. The force that had checked Ney's advance was the advanced-guard of the Russian army, which had resumed the offensive. Beningsen's plan was this: to march unperceived behind the lakes and surprise the French left, to make himself master of the Lower Vistula, communicate with Dantzic, relieve Graudenz, take up winter quarters in East Prussia, await reinforcements from Russia, then throw L'Estocq into Dantzic, and undertake a diversion on the left bank of the Vistula. The plan was good, provided the surprise and distraction of the left French wing were purposed; while the country was well adapted to conceal such a march. The condition of the army, however, had deteriorated, and was barely fit then for active exertion.

The Russian march was continued from Bialla on the 16th January to Ariss; 17th and 18th to Rhein; and on the 19th, 76,000 Russians and Prussians were concentrated opposite to Ney's scattered forces.

Ney was therefore peremptorily recalled by Napoleon on the 18th; but his imprudence had been in one sense fortunate, for Napoleon was ignorant of the Russian movements, and the undesigned advance of Ney's corps had given him timely information of the march of the Russians, who, on the 21st, occupied the line Bischofsheim-Heilsberg. An action occurred at Heilsberg on the 24th January, and the French retreated on the 25th to Mohrunge.

January 20th.—Russian headquarters at Rössel, and the Prussian at Drengfurth.

22d.—Preparations were made to attack Heilsberg, Badenstein, Schippenbeil.

The direction of Thorn had been abandoned, owing to Ney's accidental but timely retreat. Ney retired in perfect order upon Neidenburg, warning Bernadotte and pointing out the

value of the position of Osterode, and also reporting to the Emperor.

Beningsen halted on the 22d and 23d, and the Prussians reached Landsberg, the 23d; Mehlsack, the 24th, on which day the Russians were at Heilsberg. Bernadotte's retreat terminated in concentration on the 24th at Osterode, Saalfeld, and Preussisch-Holland.

The Russians were at Arensdorff on the 25th. The irresponsible action of the Prussian corps at this time is very noticeable.

Actions occurred at Liebstadt, on the Passarge, on the 24th; and again at Mohrungen on the 25th. Bernadotte retreated to Liebmühl. The Prussians advanced to Saalfeld, and the Russians to Liebmühl and Allenstein on the 27th. The conjectures of Beningsen as to the presence of the whole French army had been incorrect. He had failed to surprise Bernadotte; and after marching 70 miles in ten days, he halted for three more on the 28th, nominally on account of fatigue and want of food.

The result of the manœuvre so far was that the French left had effected a retreat with little loss at a time when the bridge at Thorn had been swept away by ice. The Prussians were now at Freystadt. The Russian right was at Eylau, the left at Allenstein, the centre at Mohrungen, and reserve at Guttstadt.

Bernadotte, ordered to cover Thorn, reached Strassburg on the 1st February.

Napoleon received the first intelligence of the advance of the Russians in East Prussia on the 24th of January, by which time they might have gained great advantages over the French left. Napoleon fancied it was only a response to Ney's raids, but still took wise precautions, and ordered Lefebvre to move on Thorn and occupy the left bank of the Lower Vistula, while at the same time he supplied Sierock and Pultusk, completing the works against Essen, and ordering up reinforcements from Posen and Kalisch. On the 27th, Napoleon saw clearly the enemy's plan, and his cantonments were accordingly raised. The troops were supplied with four days' bread and as much biscuit as could be transported

on carts, while the following dispositions were at once ordered.

Soult to concentrate at Wittenburg; Ney at Neidenburg and Hohenstein; Augereau at Mława; Davoust at Myszyniec; Lannes (Savary) at Brock, on the Bug; Murat's cavalry at Ortelsburg; and Bernadotte was left behind to cover Thorn.

The Emperor quitted Warsaw, January 30th. Thus on the 31st of January French positions were as follows:—

On the extreme left, . . .	Lefebvre,	16,000
On his right,	Savary,	20,000
In the centre,	Bernadotte (at Strassburg),	20,000
Ney,	Gilgenburg,	16,000
Augereau,	Neidenburg,	27,000
Guard,	Chorzelen,	9,000
Cavalry reserve,		8,000
Davoust,	Myszyniec,	19,000
		<hr/>
		Total, 135,000

In four days the army had been thus concentrated towards Wittenburg, with a combatant superiority of 40,000 men for the offensive. Compare this with the indecision of the Russian movements, during which some troops had marched 75 miles. The French dispositions were admirably adapted to the events that had been reported. The rapid march on Wittenburg in superior force would, if concealed, oblige Beningsen to retreat on Königsberg or accept battle, and thus separate him from the Prussians, who would be left to retire on Dantzic. The communication with Warsaw was circuitous and precarious; Thorn, therefore, had to be specially guarded.

The despatch to Bernadotte explaining the nature of the movement was intercepted by the Russians, and importance was unduly attached to it by the French. The Russians concentrated at Jonkowo, and the French line advanced on February 1st and 2d to Passenheim - Allenstein - Guttstadt. Napoleon made dispositions for battle on February 3d, and an action occurred at Bergfried on that date, his advance pushing forward on Jonkowo, February 4th. But the Russians had retreated, ordering L'Estocq to join them at Arens-

dorff; and Napoleon, disappointed in not bringing matters to a crisis, pressed the rear-guard under Bagration on Wolfsdorff and Landsberg.

Ney was detached, February 5th, to intercept the Russians, and, should they stand, to operate towards their right. Davoust was pushed forward on the Alle, and Bernadotte was ordered to join him. The Prussians had left Freystadt for Deutsch-Eylau on the 2d of February, moving on the 3d for Osterode—4th, Mohrungen—and 5th, Passarge. An action followed at Waltersdorf on the 5th. The Russians reached Landsberg on the 6th, fighting rear-guard actions at Hoff and Heilsberg, and arriving at Eylau on the 7th, on which date the battle of Preussisch-Eylau was begun by the stout rear-guard action fought by Bagration on the plateau of the Ziegelhof before the town, and which resulted in his falling back behind it. Meanwhile Ney had been marching on Kreuzburg to keep back the Prussians, and eventually, if necessary, to threaten Königsberg; and Davoust was at Bartenstein on this date: both were therefore urgently pressed to hasten towards the battle-field, in order that on the left and right flank respectively they might strengthen Napoleon's force at Eylau, at that moment numerically weaker than his adversary, and operate against both his flanks.

If Beningsen failed in the amount of success to be expected from his rash measure, he at least derived the negative advantage of avoiding entire defeat; but at Eylau he was brought to bay, and other reasons combined to make battle there a matter of necessity. It was the last point where he could stand to cover Königsberg. The ground was well suited to the Russian troops; and his object was to inflict such a blow on Napoleon as would check his further advance. Eylau was reached, February 7th, in the morning, and the army was formed in three lines between Schladitten and Serpallen.

The terrible combat with Bagration's rear-guard was followed by the occupation of Eylau by the French; but it was retaken by the Russians early on the morning of the 8th, and a half an hour later abandoned—when, according to 'Beningsen's Memoirs,' it was reoccupied by the French. The reasons assigned for thus abandoning the town are,—that retreat was

a decoy to the French, inducing them to push into the more open ground beyond; and the selection of a position in rear offered greater impediments to a correct appreciation of the Russian dispositions than would have been the case had the village been retained.

The Russian army, according to Höffner, numbered 58,000; but Thiers places them at 72,000, exclusive of the Prussians. The accounts as to the strength of the French army are equally confusing. Dumas says 68,000, including Davoust and Ney; Thiers 54,000, exclusive of Ney; and Höffner 80,000, including him; but apparently the chances before Davoust's arrival were equal. The Prussians, meanwhile, had reached Rossitten late on the 7th February, and received orders to move on to Preussisch-Eylau and Althoff, thus bringing about a *rencontre* with Ney, who was marching for Kreuzburg at Wackern. They reached Althoff at 1 P.M. on the 8th of February, 5500 strong—thus making the allied total 63,500 men—and were at once directed on Kutschütten.

The battle had commenced at daybreak, and Napoleon awaited the arrival of his detached corps. Davoust, marching by Molwitten, reached the battle at noon. At half-past 7 he at once seized Althoff and Schladitten, but was ultimately expelled, and at 10 P.M. the battle terminated without decisive result.

But six days' fighting, frequent night-marches in a cold climate, fatigue, and want, had strained the Russian army. On the night of the 9th February the disorder was general. Nevertheless offensive action was contemplated, particularly by Kamenski; but from Beningsen's reports the army now only consisted of 30,000 men under arms.

Under these circumstances, the arrival of Ney, and the fact that Napoleon had not employed his Guard, whilst there was not a Russian battalion but what had been engaged, was decisive; and at midnight the retreat on Königsberg, covered by L'Estocq marching by Domnau and Friedland, was decided on.

The French were not in a much better plight than the Russians, but nevertheless Murat moved in pursuit on the 9th; and on the 10th of February the Russians took up an in-

trenched position before Königsberg, their left resting on the Pregel; while the Prussians were at Altenburg with a detachment in Friedland. The loss at Eylau had been greater in proportion than in any battle of modern times. According to Höffner, the Russians had 18,000 killed and wounded; and the French somewhat more:—

Dumas puts the French loss at 2000 killed, and 15,000 to 16,000 wounded.

Pelet,	"	1800	"	5000	"
Others,	"	1900	"	5700	"
Thiers,	"	3000	"	7000	"

And the Prussians, according to some French accounts, had 30,000 killed and wounded, though Thiers fixes the loss at 26,000 only.

Certainly some of the objects sought by Beningsen in accepting battle had been attained in that of Eylau. The French were unable to pursue with any vigour; and the state of the French army imposed a decided veto on further advance for a while. The extreme severity of the climate, the difficulty of subsistence, and Russian obstinacy, were elements of opposition too strong to be readily overcome. The balance of power, hitherto on Napoleon's side, was beginning to turn in another direction.

The French cavalry were in a bad state; and, under these circumstances, the Emperor remained eight days in the neighbourhood of Eylau, to impress his victory on Europe—and then prepared to re-enter winter quarters. The retrograde march commenced on the 17th February: Murat and Ney, rear-guard; Davoust, right; Soult, centre; Augereau, left; and Bernadotte still on the Frische Haff. The army ascended the Alle, and then changed direction to Thorn, Marienwerder, and Elbing, thus abandoning Warsaw—for the Emperor recognised the difficulty of holding a line so extended with Dantzic in his rear. The care of Warsaw was committed to the 3d corps, comprising the Bavarians and Poles; and the new quarters occupied extended, right to Thorn, centre to Osterode, and left to Elburg.

There was a possibility of fresh strategic combinations from this fresh base, and the troops were thus disposed: Bernadotte,

Braunsberg and Spandau ; Soult, Liebstadt and Molwingen ; Davoust, Allenstein and Hohenstein ; Ney, Guttstadt ; Guard, Oudinot, and headquarters, Osterode ; cavalry in rear from Thorn to Elburg, and Augereau's corps was disembodied. The 5th corps on the Omuleff, and Massena, were also sent for. The general distribution of French forces at this period was as follows :—

Field forces on the Vistula and the Passarge,	80,000 to 90,000
" at Ostrolenka,	24,000
" at Dantzic and Colberg,	22,000
" at Bremen and Stralsund,	28,000
" in Silesia,	15,000
In the fortresses,	30,000
With parks,	8,000
Wounded,	15,000
Sick and marauding,	60,000
Recruits on the march,	30,000
Making a total of 270,000 French, and 60,000 auxiliaries.	

Efforts were made almost immediately after the battle of Eylau to effect a separate peace with Prussia, but the negotiations failed ; and Beningsen, falling back, re-established his army near Königsberg, where he found abundant supplies, and chiefly hospital accommodation, especially necessary in the disorganised and dispirited state of his army after the severities that had attended their retreat. His extreme left was meanwhile again defeated—for Essen, who commanded it, advanced on the 15th of February against Lannes's corps, and collision occurred at Ostrolenka ; followed, on the 16th February, by the defeat of the Russians, with a loss of 1200 men and 7 guns. This secured, for the time, the right of the French army. Beningsen, mortified by his want of success, had requested to be relieved from his command ; but he was urged by the Emperor to remain and act with energy, the army having been reinforced by Sedmaratski and Cossacks, bringing up its strength, counting the Prussians, to 70,000 soldiers.

Beningsen advanced on the 16th February to Friedland and Schippenbeil ; on the 20th to Bartenstein ; his advanced-guard on the 21st to Landsberg, where he halted till the 26th.

At this time the Russian headquarters, according to Beningsen's order to L'Estocq, were on the 23d February at

Kreutzberg; 24th, Landsberg; 25th, Heilsberg; 27th, Guttstadt; 28th, Allenstein.

Beningsen had come to the conclusion that the French would retreat behind the Vistula, but he found Napoleon on the Passarge; and after experiencing some loss, went into winter quarters on both banks of the Alle, where the wretched method of supply of the Russians, removed further from their base at Königsberg, was sensibly felt.

While both armies thus rested in winter quarters, the siege of the fortresses were not forgotten. Schweidnitz had fallen; Neisse was invested and surrendered in June; and on the 1st April Dantzg was finally and effectually invested.

A great impression was made upon the European public by the battle of Eylau and its consequences.

The smallest amount of administrative activity on the part of Prussia would have turned the scale by calling others into the fray; but Talleyrand at Warsaw exercised his diplomatic ability to stave off this possibility. Napoleon, too, exerted all his energies to repair the gaps in his army. The means of subsistence were matters requiring the most anxious thought; the difficulty of transport was immense; the weather execrable. But one by one these difficulties were overcome: the arrival of provisional regiments enabled him to fill up the *cadres* to their proper strength; and with rest, care, and administrative attention, the French *morale* sensibly improved.

Two bridges only were left on the Passarge, those at Braunsberg and Spandau, and these were covered by *têtes de pont*: two others remained over the Vistula at Marienburg and Marienwerder.

But the French were not alone in enduring hardships and privations. The sufferings of the Russians were dreadful, and for military purposes their army was practically impotent.

Early in March, therefore, the military organisation of the transport was undertaken, and the removal of headquarters to Finkenstein carried out. Everywhere was displayed prodigious energy, which in itself was productive of glory—and glory sometimes brings back power.

During March pacific negotiations were carried on with Prussia, but they were fruitless. Viewing the difficulty and

uncertainty of his position, the anxiety of the Emperor regarding Austria was naturally great, and intrigues were carried on on both sides.

Moreover, he wearied of this distant and long-continuing campaign, and to bring matters to a conclusion more men were wanted, so that the conscription of 1808 was enforced, and the cavalry increased to 80,000. He purposed, after the termination of the sieges in which he was still engaged, to increase the active army by two corps under Mortier and Lannes, and to place them between the Vistula and Oder, connecting the field army with the second army, 100,000 strong (60,000 auxiliaries, 40,000 French), which was to remain on the Elbe.

Disturbances occurred in Hesse, and an irruption was attempted by the Swedes at Stralsund in April; but they were settled by Mortier on the 18th, who effected an armistice with the forces opposed to him.

The siege of Dantzic by Marshal Lefebvre continued, the trenches having been opened on the 18th of April, and a feeble attempt to relieve it was made by the allies on the 12th May; but on the 26th of May it capitulated, and thus the enormous resources found in Dantzic were at the disposal of the French. Dispositions were soon made, therefore, for resuming the offensive, and operations commenced on the first days of June. The allied sovereigns were at Bartenstein. The Russian army had been reinforced by 30,000 men, and renewed promises of support had been received from England, so that Beningsen was ordered to advance, and an intrenched camp was formed at Heilsberg. The estimates formed by Thiers of the force at the disposal of the allies is 100,000 combatants, besides 18,000 on the Narew under Tolstoi. L'Estocq and Kamenski were on the right, 20,000 strong. But the resources of the French were vastly superior to those of their adversaries. Brune, with 80,000, was on the Elbe; Lannes and Mortier on the Lower Vistula; in the field were five corps, as well as the Guard and cavalry reserve.

Massena was on the Narew, and was connected by the Poles with the Passarge. Excluding Massena and including Mortier, the Emperor could dispose of 160,000 combatants—(Thiers).

The French positions had been intrenched, and the cantonments were raised in May, as a precautionary measure, the troops being encamped by divisions in well-selected positions as follows:—

Ney, Guttstadt and Deppen; Davoust, Hohenstein; Soult, Lieberstadt; Bernadotte, Braunsberg; headquarters, Finken-stein; in rear, Murat.

Napoleon intended to move on June 10th, his plan being to descend the Alle, separate the Russians from Königsberg, capture that city, and throw the enemy back upon the Niemen.

But the Russians anticipated him. Their doing so was a false step on all accounts now; the positions of the French were too strong, their own numbers too inferior, while all the fortresses were in Napoleon's possession. Their true course was to await action on the Pregel, their right resting on Königsberg, and then defend that line, retiring, if necessary, upon the Niemen, and thus drawing the French further from their resources. But they elected otherwise, and Ney was attacked earnestly, while demonstrations were made against the other marshals. The real attack was on Altkirch, Wolfsdorff, and Guttstadt, by three columns and the Guard. The Hetman Platoff occupying Davoust; Doctorow, Soult at Lomitten; Kamenski, Bernadotte at Spandau; L'Estocq being at Braunsberg.

The attack commenced June 5th, and was unexpected by the French; but there was want of unity among the Russians, and after a splendid action Ney retired upon Deppen. The demonstrations along the Passarge were repulsed, and Napoleon ordered a general concentration upon Saalfeld.

The attack on Ney was renewed on the 6th, and he again retreated uninjured behind the Passarge. On the 7th, Napoleon moved to Deppen. Beningsen remained on this date at Guttstadt in a state of indecision, resulting in a general retreat to Heilsberg. L'Estocq had been detached to cover Königsberg.

The French pushed forward offensively with 130,000 men, Victor, replacing Bernadotte on the Lower Passarge, remaining behind.

The battle of Heilsberg followed, and the French advance was repulsed with loss. Beningsen retreated on the right

bank of the Alle on the 11th, making for Bartenstein. Napoleon hesitated to renew the attack, preferring to turn the strong position by pushing forward Davoust. Leaning towards Königsberg he marched for Domnau, two marches from Königsberg and one from Friedland: thus both objectives were now within reach. Victor was called in by Mehlsack and Eylau, while the Russian army was observed by the light cavalry on the Alle. Indications of their march for Königsberg were reported, so that Soult and Murat were detached to Kreuzburg; Lannes and Mortier to Domnau and Friedland; Ney and Victor, at Eylau, were to follow in either direction.

On the evening of the 13th, Beningsen's march for Friedland was declared. All the corps were therefore pushed forward in that direction. Lannes and Mortier were ordered to seize the bridges at Friedland, but the light troops were repulsed by the enemy.

The army reached Posthenen at 1 A.M. on 14th, and halted. The entire Russian army was now approaching Friedland from Bartenstein and Schippenbeil, and the battle of Friedland accordingly took place on the 14th.

It was again a rash resolve of Beningsen to fight a general action, and it would have been better for him to have continued on the right bank of the Alle to Wehlau. But he had decided on crossing at Friedland and giving battle, so three bridges were consequently thrown over the Alle, one above and two below the town. Opposed to him was simply the corps of Lannes, which was shortly reinforced first by Nansouty, and afterwards by one division of Mortier; but even then it numbered in all only 27,000 men, while the Russians were 75,000 strong.

The combat was prolonged until noon by Lannes and Mortier, when Ney arrived with other reinforcements, and Napoleon himself making the dispositions for continuing the battle, directed him on Friedland. The French force was now computed at 80,000.

Beningsen soon discovered his mistake. Though the attack of the French right wing was checked by the Russian artillery, the latter was soon more or less silenced by the batteries of

Senermont, and under their protection Friedland was carried ; and with it the possession of the bridges, constructed to facilitate the passage of the stream, was obtained. The advance of the left wing completed the defeat—80 cannon, and 25,000 men *hors de combat*, being the Russian loss, as compared with 8000 on the French side.

The Russian army cut in two, retired to Wehlau, destroying the bridges on the Pregel. On the 16th it reached Petersdorff, waiting for Kamenski and L'Estocq, thus abandoning Königsberg, to which place Soult accordingly proceeded. Davoust and Murat had been called to Friedland ; but hearing of the victory, crossed the Pregel at Tapiau.

The Russians retired behind the Niemen on the 19th, and an armistice proposed on that day was signed on the 22d.

COMMENTS.

The campaign has three distinct epochs—viz., Pultusk, Eylau, and Friedland. Höffner considers that in these operations Napoleon displayed more systematic action than in any he had hitherto conducted. His care for communications, the construction of depots, provision of reinforcements, the special attention devoted to the mastery of the lines in rear of his operation, all denote the caution with which he proceeded. Special attention again was paid to Thorn, owing to the configuration of the Vistula, there forming, as it does, a great re-entrant bend. Were this point not gained and guarded, the line of operations from Posen to Warsaw would be evidently unsafe, because exposed to flank attack.

The Prussians in possession of Thorn, and operating from Dantzic and Graudenz on his flank, would be a constant source of anxiety to him.

It is difficult to see, moreover, the object the allies had in assigning a detached sphere of action to the Prussian contingents. The German authors agree that, in spite of constant

defeat, the individual German soldier retained the confident feeling of physical superiority; but the cause may probably be found in a superannuated system, by which the Prussian leaders were first of all punctiliously unwilling to serve other than independently, fearful lest such a course would imply inferiority—and next, showed a reluctance to adopt anything new after a long period of peace.

The Emperor's method of manœuvring with superior force is extremely instructive, the general plan being that of advancing the two wings with a strong centre refused. The same system was applied both strategically and tactically.

The skill with which the Emperor recovered the initiative in the first days of June is again remarkable.

His object was constantly directed to the separation of the Prussians from their allies, with a view to drive Prussia out of the field politically.

Höffner blames him for not continuing the battle of Heilsberg on June the 11th, instead of manœuvring; but his abstention is a proof of his sense of the precarious nature of his position, and he was, moreover, anxious to economise force. Without Beningsen's blunder the Russians would have arrived safe on the Pregel, whilst Napoleon's line, already extended, would have been still further stretched. The point had been reached where the occupation of territory was of no further value, but in this poor district rather the contrary, and a general action was the sole object worth striving for. This object was obtained at Friedland by good fortune, which, according to Beningsen, was owing to his misinformation as to Napoleon's movements on Königsberg. In this case he cannot escape the charge of neglecting to crush Lannes as he had previously failed in beating Ney at Guttstadt, and Soult at Heilsberg. Throughout the campaign there was a want of resolution and enterprise on his part, and the essential element of active defence was distinctly wanting. But there was no lack of resolution on the other side, and Lannes's waiting action at Friedland is presented as a model for similar circumstances. His dispositions were excellent, and were

such as to completely check Beningsen until reinforcements could be brought up.

Napoleon's tactics were equally remarkable, and his rapid *coup d'œil* at the battle, whereby he recognised the value of the narrow peninsula on which Friedland stood and the importance of its possession, is as striking as the result was successful.

CHAPTER V.

DRESDEN, 1813.

Introductory.—The events of the period intervening between the last campaign studied and that of which one of the concluding battles is alone critically examined, are so numerous that they can be but briefly referred to.

The Peace of Tilsit followed the victorious campaign of 1807, one treaty between France and Russia being signed on the 7th July 1807, the other between the same Power and Prussia on the 9th. Russia remained untouched; Prussia resumed her own kingdom; North Germany became the kingdom of Westphalia under Jerome; and Poland, though not independent, was converted into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and Napoleon became the Protector of a new European confederation. Sweden and England alone remained at war with him, and on 17th June a new treaty was concluded between them; but on the 15th July the Swedes, covering Stralsund, were defeated by Brune (commanding the divisions of Boudet, Molitor, and a Spanish force under Romagna), and the town capitulated on the 20th. The enemy, who had only retreated to the islands of Rugen and Dänholm, were again attacked; the latter taken on the 24th July, and the former given up by a convention made with the King of Sweden on the 9th September.

To deprive Napoleon of the stores and war-vessels in Denmark, a British expedition was organised in August 1807 against that state, which was completely successful, and Copenhagen was bombarded. The year 1807 closed with the despatch of a French army under Junot into Portugal, when the Queen fled to America; and disturbances of no moment also occurred between Reynier and the Calabrians assisted by the British, in continuation of the Neapolitan insurrection against the French occupation of that kingdom.

1808 saw the seizure of the Spanish fortresses and the commencement of the struggle in the Peninsula, with which this book does not deal, though Napoleon himself took part in this war against the last nation that had not succumbed to his sword.

In February Russia invaded Finland, and a British force was despatched to assist Gustavus IV., but it was withdrawn.

In 1809 hostilities again broke out in Germany. The attitude of Austria had been long unmistakable, and on the 10th April the Archduke Charles, supreme generalissimo of the forces—for the Aulic Council had been abolished—directed the armies to cross the Bavarian, Bohemian, and Italian frontiers, the Army of Italy being under the command of the Archduke John. The battle of Abensberg on the 20th April, followed by the capture of Landshut; the battle of Eckmühl on the 22d, followed by the capture of Ratisbon after a severe combat and the retreat of the Archduke to the left bank of the Danube, leaving Hiller only to cover the capital; the advance on Vienna, interrupted by the bloody fight at Ebersburg on the 3d May, and then the occupation of the capital,—closed the first act of the new drama. In Italy, the battles of Sacile and Priuli had been fought with varying success; and then, as in 1805, the Archduke John fell back (by Innspruck) towards the greater theatre. In the meantime the Austrians there had crossed the Danube and destroyed the bridges. Napoleon attempted on the 20th to force the passage by the island of Lobau below Vienna, and this brought on the battle of Aspern or Essling, after which the French retired to Lobau and spent a month in preparing for further operations.

The Austrian forces of Chastelar and Jellachich had occupied the Tyrol, but both being defeated by Lefebvre, retreated to join the Archduke John, who, failing in his effort to reach Bohemia, was retiring into Hungary pursued by the Viceroy of Italy, whose orders were to push him as far down the Danube as possible, and prevent his uniting with his brother. His defeat at Raab on the Lower Danube, on the 13th June, fully effected this object.

The second attempt to cross to the north bank of the Danube was made on the night of the 5th and 6th of July, and the victory of Wagram was won on the following day. On the 10th the armistice of Znaim was signed, and the Peace of Vienna ensued on the 14th October. The Archduke Ferdinand had been detached to watch a force of Poles and French under Poniatowski, on the Vistula, to which was afterwards added a Russian corps; but the Austrians were routed at Gora, and he finally arrived at Znaim during the armistice. The only other event of note was the British expedition to the island of Walcheren, which, designed to distract Napoleon's attention to Antwerp, was withdrawn, having effected nothing.

The years 1810 and 1811 passed without any grave disturbance of the European peace, if the war in the Peninsula—which, though small in itself, exercised far greater influence over Napoleon's career than at first appeared probable—be disregarded.

But 1812 saw the beginning of the end. In April the Czar's ultimatum was forwarded to Napoleon, and was of course refused. At Wilna on the 29th, the plan of forming two armies of Dwina and Dnieper, which, with outposts on the Niemen, should retire on the capital and weary the French out, was decided on. On the 9th May the Emperor reached Dresden, leaving it on the 29th, and on the 2d June established his headquarters at Thorn. All the Powers of Europe, except England, Spain, Russia, and Sweden, were allies of Napoleon.

On the 24th June the French armies crossed the Russian frontier.

Left. Macdonald and De York passed the Niemen at Tilsit.

Centre. Napoleon with the 1st 2d and 3d corps, reserve cavalry, and Guard, at Kovno.

Eugene with the 4th and 5th corps, at Roumcheki.

Jerome with the 5th and 8th corps, at Grodno ; but he was soon superseded by Davoust.

Right Left. Schwarzenberg with the Austrian 7th corps (Reynier) passed the Bug at Bresesc-Litovsky.

Reserve. Victor with 9th corps, on the Vistula.

The main road from the frontier to Napoleon's objective, Moscow, ran from Kovno to Wilna, where it bifurcates, the northern branch by Polotsk and Vitepsk (on the Dwina) to Smolensko on the Dnieper, where it reunites with the southern branch passing by Borissov (on the Beresina), Orcha, and Krasnoi. Thence it continues by Borodino to Mojaïsk, where it again divides—one branch direct to Moscow, the other by Borowsk, near Taroutino and Malo Jaroslavitz, to the same point. That portion of this main artery lying between Vitepsk and Smolensko, crosses the watershed lying between the Dwina, running north-west by Drissa to Riga, and the Dnieper, which has a southerly course, receiving on its right bank, near Bobrinsk, the Beresina ; and this, running north and south, cuts the above main road and also the subsidiary one from Grodno by Minsk, Mohilev, Krasnoi, Kalouga, and Toula, due south of Moscow.

To oppose the enemy the Czar Alexander had three armies ; under Barclay, watching the country north of the Wilna road—Bagration that south of it to Bresesc-Litovsky on the Bug—and Tormassof, who having concluded a treaty of peace with Turkey, was advancing from Moldavia. On the 23d of July skirmishes occurred at Mohilev on the Dnieper, and Ostronov near Polotsk on the Dwina ; on the 28th, Vitepsk was abandoned by the Russians, and their two armies formed a junction at Smolensko on the 3d August. At Vitepsk, the Emperor halted to reorganise his forces, and during this delay Oudinot on the left was checked at Kliastitsky near Polotsk, and Reynier on the extreme right at Kobrin by Tormassof, when Schwarzenberg moved up in support. Bernadotte, now King of Sweden, meanwhile had made a secret treaty with the Czar, and thus threatened the left flank of the French, while the right was endangered by the Moldavian army. On the 7th August the Russians advanced from Smolensko, but again retired ; on the 10th the French also moved, fights occurring at Krasnoi on the 15th. On the 16th, Smolensko was attacked and evacuated by Barclay ; Victor's corps joined the main army here, and was replaced by one under Angereau from the Elbe. Actions occurred in the centre, 19th August, at Valoutina on the Moscow road ; on the right, 12th August, at Gorodeczna (Reynier and Schwarzenberg) ; on the left, on the 18th, at Polotsk (Oudinot) ; and on the extreme left, at Riga (Macdonald), with varying success ; and on the 7th September—the Russians having halted at Borodino—occurred a battle, in which, after a determined struggle, they withdrew in such good order, that their rear-guard was able to hold Mojaïsk on the 9th till the whole of the artillery

and baggage had passed. Moscow was abandoned by the Russians on the 14th September, and they retired towards Taroutino on the Nara, south-west of Moscow on the Kalouga road, thus threatening the French retreat, and the capital was entered by the French on the 15th. From that date until the 20th, constant conflagrations at last led to the conclusion that the attempt to burn Moscow was premeditated.

A long period of rest followed the capture. On the 24th September negotiations were attempted with the Czar, but on the 9th October a distinct refusal was returned to all proposals for peace. The Russians advanced from Taroutino to Winkovo on the 17th October, and attacked Murat, who was defeated. On the 19th Napoleon left Moscow for Kalouga, and decided on retreat. Ney was directed towards Winkovo, but the main army turned towards Borowsk near Malo Jaroslavitz, the other corps on the Smolensko road being also withdrawn. At the latter place a battle was fought on 24th October with no results, the Russians retiring south towards Kalouga. The retreat was continued by Wereia to Wiazma on to the main Smolensko road, Davoust, Grouchy, and finally Ney, forming the rear-guard. The Russians marched by a parallel road by Jelnia on Krasnoi. Continued attacks were made on the French left flank at Federouskoe, Wiazma, and Krapivna, while Cossacks continually harassed the line of march, until Smolensko was reached on the 13th November, when it was learnt that St Cyr at Polotsk and Vitepsk had also been pressed back on the present French right, while Schwarzenberg on the left had been forced across the Bug, and ceased to take part in the campaign.

The relics of the corps again moved on the 14th, headquarters reaching Krasnoi on the 15th, where the Russians again attacked, and the battle of Krasnoi was fought on the 17th, the French retreating to Liadi. Ney had been cut off from the main body by this irruption of the Russian army on the main road, but crossing the Dnieper to the north bank, moved by Gussinoe and rejoined the Emperor at Orcha on the 20th. But the further retreat was barred by the presence of the enemy at Borissov on the Beresina.

Meanwhile on the left Minsk had been occupied, and on the right Victor and St Cyr had been driven from Zemblin on the Vitepsk road by the Russian corps of Tschitchagov from the army of Moldavia, and that of Wittgenstein from the army of the north, which had now united on the Beresina. The passage was, however, forced, and Napoleon on the 27th continued his retreat by the southern of the two main roads, on Wilna.

On the 5th December Napoleon left for Paris, placing the army under Murat's command, and directed it to fall back behind the Niemen. It gained Wilna on the 9th, followed by Kutusow's advanced-guard, and amidst continual fighting reached Kovno, where the last of Ney's rear-guard was destroyed, and the relics of the army fell back behind the river into Prussian territory.

Macdonald, with the Prussian contingent, who had hitherto been protecting the left of the invading army towards Riga, retired upon the

Niemen, reaching Tilsit on the 29th December, when he received orders to retreat behind the Pregel. Hearing of the defeat of the Grand Army, the Prussians under De York joined the Russian forces on the 1st January 1813.

The Austrian corps under Schwarzenberg did not so openly show disaffection, but concluded an armistice on the 21st December, and leaving Reynier retired to Nur, on the Bug.

Thus the year 1813 opened with grave disaster at last staring Napoleon in the face.

Macdonald had retreated behind the Vistula; and Dantzig, Thorn, Marienwerder, Elburg, and Plockzo were designated as the rallying-points for stragglers; but even this was too advanced, and while Rapp remained at Dantzig, and Reynier at Warsaw, Murat withdrew the remnants of the other corps to Posen, and then handed over the command to Eugene. Augereau was then at Berlin with a strong force. But these places were successively blockaded. Wittgenstein pushed by Custrin on Berlin; Tschitchagov watched Thorn; Milaradovitch, Doctorow, and Sacken moved on Warsaw. Before this Reynier fell back and was defeated, the Saxon corps being dispersed at Kalisch on 13th February, when he finally took post at Dresden.

The Poles of Poniatowski had to retire on Cracow, and thence to Czentoschau, wherefore the Viceroy retreated to the line of the Oder, and in March the forces withdrew behind the Elbe, and Berlin was evacuated.

The King of Prussia signed on the 1st March an offensive alliance with the Czar, who from his headquarters at Kalisch, declaring the Confederation of the Rhine abolished, called on all the European States to take up arms against France.

Thus the position of the Allies in the beginning of the campaign of 1813 was as follows:—

- | | | | |
|----------------|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Right.</i> | { | Woronzow
Bulow | } at Berlin. |
| | | Tettenborne and Czernichef | at Hamburg and Lübeck. |
| | | De York and Wittgenstein | near Magdeburg. |
| <i>Centre.</i> | { | Kutusow | on the Oder. |
| | | Blucher and Winzingerode | on the Dresden road, in Silesia. |
| <i>Left.</i> | | Sacken and Doctorow near Cracow. | |

The Austrians, who had not yet joined the alliance, were withdrawing Schwarzenberg in Galicia. The Saxon general Thielmann was in treaty with the Czar, and Bernadotte, with the Swedes, had joined the Confederation.

The Allies had further to watch—

1. Dantzig, Thorn, and Mödlin, on the Vistula.
2. Czentoschau and Zamoszth, in South Poland.
3. Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, on the Oder.
4. Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Wittenburg, on the Elbe.
5. Spandau, near Berlin.

On the side of the French, the Viceroy had been obliged, by the capture

of Hamburg and Dresden, to withdraw behind the Saale ; and in April the corps, chiefly new levies, were thus distributed :—

<i>Right.</i>	{ Bertrand,	50,000, from Bamberg to Saalfeld.
	{ Oudinot,	20,000, Coburg.
<i>Centre.</i>	{ Ney,	48,000, Würzburg to Weimar.
	{ Mortier,	15,000, Frankfrut to Erfurt.
	{ Marmont,	25,000, Hanau to Gotha.
<i>Left.</i>	{ Macdonald,	62,000, near Dessau.
	{ Victor,	
	{ Lauriston,	

The latter force was under Eugene, and all were intended to concentrate on the Saale.

Both sides moved on the 28th April.

On the 2d May, the Allies, attempting to turn the French left, were repulsed at Lutzen. On the 9th May Napoleon entered Dresden ; and as Ney had taken Torgau, and Davoust Hamburg, the line of the Elbe was again in French hands.

The Allies retired to Bautzen, Ney and Victor observed Bulow towards Berlin, Lauriston with Reynier at Weissig were to keep up connection, and the remainder moved in pursuit.

On 19th, Lauriston defeated York, who had been sent to intercept him.

On 20th, the battle of Bautzen was fought. Ney, Lauriston, and Reynier being recalled to operate on the right of the Allies—who were defeated, and retreated in good order—Oudinot was sent towards Bulow ; the rest followed the defeated army, and on the 1st June the left was at Glogau, centre at Breslau, and right at Schweidnitz, while Davoust had cleared Hanover and the extreme left.

Then followed the ill-advised armistice of Pleiswitz, during which the Austrians joined the Russians ; and when hostilities broke out, the belligerents were thus disposed :—

Schwarzenberg, in Bohemia,	{ Austrians,	190,000
	{ Barclay and Wittgenstein,	70,000
	{ Kleist (Prussian),	60,000
Blucher, in Silesia,	{ Langeron and St Priest,	40,000
	{ De York,	38,000
	{ Sacken,	18,000
Bernadotte in the north, at Berlin,	{ Swedes,	25,000
	{ Woronzow and Winzingerode,	28,000
	{ Bulow,	40,000
At Dantzic,	Tauenzlein,	30,000
At Hamburg,	Walmoden,	12,000

In addition, an Austrian army of Italy, in Carinthia, 50,000 ; another at Braunau, watching Bavaria, 25,000 ; and a third at Presburg ; with Beningsen's Russians, 50,000, in reserve at Kalisch,—completed the war strength of the Coalition.

<i>French.</i>			
Oudinot, in the north,	Corps of Oudinot, Bertrand, and Reynier,		70,000
Macdonald, in Silesia,	Corps of Macdonald, Lauriston, Ney, and Marmont,		100,000
Watching { St Cyr,	80,000	Königstein.	
Bohemia, { Vandamme,	80,000	Stolpen.	
{ Poniatowski and Victor,	86,000	Zittau.	
<i>Reserves.</i>			
Napoleon, Guard and Murat,	48,000, &c.,	between Dresden and Bantzen.	
Bavarians,	25,000	on the Inn.	
Augereau,	20,000	Würzburg.	
Eugene, in { Italy,	40,000		

The general plan of the Allied operations was, that, while Bernadotte covered Berlin and drove Davoust from Hamburg, Blücher should engage the enemy in front, and Schwarzenberg should operate against his communications at Dresden. For this the mountains forming the northern frontier of Bohemia offered considerable advantages, both as a means of screening the flank march of the army there, and also reducing the chances of being attacked *en route* owing to the rarity of passes practicable for extended military operations. On the 15th August Blücher advanced to the Bober, but falling back on the 21st, fought an action at Goldberg on the 22d, and retreated. On this date Napoleon heard of the advance of Schwarzenberg's force and withdrew the Guard, cavalry, and Marmont's corps. Leaving Macdonald with his corps, Lauriston's, and Ney's (under Souham) and Sebastian's cavalry, to contain Blücher, he pushed with all haste to Dresden.

BATTLE OF DRESDEN, 26TH AND 27TH AUGUST.

The Allied Grand Army, 180,000 strong, debouched into Saxony from Bohemia on the 22d August in four columns.

Wittgenstein and Kleist by the Peterswalde defile on the Töplitz-Dresden road; Barclay de Tolly by the defile of Altenburg and Barenstein; Schwarzenberg by Kommotau and Marienberg; Klenau by Annaberg and Freiburg.

As soon as the defiles were penetrated and the mountain barrier passed, the Austrian columns wheeled to the right by Töplitz and Sayda.

On the 22d, Wittgenstein carried Pirna; on the 25th, the Allied army, Klenau excepted, reached the heights which enclose Dresden semicircularly on the left bank of the Elbe,

and St Cyr's outposts were driven in. The marshal, who was alone in Dresden at the time, held the Stadsgraben and the barriers, and prepared to defend the *têtes de pont* across the Elbe. The Allies discussed the feasibility of attack on the evening of this day, but finally abandoned the idea, and the troops bivouacked for the night.

Napoleon, before starting for Silesia, had employed many thousand peasants in strengthening the old works of Dresden. The town is divided into two parts by the Elbe—namely, the Altstadt and Neustadt. Three bridges unite these sections and supply means of communication, each being covered on the left bank by a *tête de pont*. The enceinte of the town had been restored, and its defensive capacity strengthened by advanced works of a temporary character; of these latter there were eight on the right, and five on the left bank of the stream: and both palisades and abattis had been constructed to complete the system of defence and obstruct a hostile advance.

The principal approaches to Dresden from the west are eight in number, and at the city bore the names Löbda, Freiburg, Falk, Dippoldiswalde, Dohna, Pirna, Ziegel, and Ramsche gates.

About two miles off are the heights of Reichenitz and Leubnitz arching towards the city. On the left of the field the little river Weisseritz finds its way through a deep ravine, more or less impracticable for the lateral communication of troops, towards the Elbe, which it enters between the city and its suburb Frederickstadt. Thus troops posted between the Weisseritz and Elbe could only communicate by the Löbda and Plauen bridges with the right bank of the rivulet. The space between the heights and the suburbs of the town is studded with villages, the principal of which are Striesen, Gruna, Grunawiese, Löbda, Plauen, Cotta, Schusterhäuser, Töltschen, and Rosthal; with Strehlen, Tescheritz, and Reichenitz on the slopes towards the city.

The leading physical obstacles on the side of the town facing the enemy are the great garden, the Lazareth, Feldschloßchen, and the "Plauensche Grund," the extent of the field from right to left being about seven miles.

Early on the 26th fighting commenced at the Gross Garten;

and later in the day the Austrians, getting under arms, advanced against the city in heavy columns, called by Schwarzenberg "reconnoitring columns."

Colloredo stormed the Dippoldiswalde redoubts, and Kleist entered the Gross Garten.

Wittgenstein pushed on over open ground to the right, and was annoyed by the fire of the guns from the right bank of the Elbe. One division only of Klenau had arrived, that of Mesko—and this, with Gyulai's, stormed the village of Löbda with its redoubts, and held them.

Meantime St Cyr's, and finally Napoleon's, dispositions were as follows: The troops were held behind the town wall and in the redoubts, the reserves being at each barrier. At 9 A.M. Napoleon arrived in advance of the Guard, and riding round the town, arranged his plans, by which Mortier and two divisions of the Young Guard moved on Pirna and Ziegel-schlage, and Ney on Dippoldiswalde and Falkenschlage; while Murat, with the cavalry and eight battalions under Teste, was on the left bank of the Weisseritz. The Old Guard remained principally in the town.

The Allies noticed the approach of the enemy, but this did not deter Schwarzenberg from attacking, and the fight commenced at 4 P.M. by the advance of the artillery and the columns, three guns being fired as a signal for the assault. It was met by a counter-advance of the French from every gate, and the enemy was driven back by nightfall, when the line of heights generally were taken up by the Austrians and Prussians.

During the night Marmont and Victor arrived. Victor and Latour Maubourg's cavalry were placed under Murat, with orders to turn and destroy the Austrian left. Mortier was to attack Wittgenstein, and seek to establish communications with Vandamme, who was near Pirna. The remainder were formed in mass to occupy the centre. One division of both Young and Old Guards were held in reserve. Klenau announced his approach on the 27th, and forwarded more regiments; but Schwarzenberg, uneasy concerning Vandamme's passage of the Elbe at Königstein, drew in his right to Leubnitz, Gyulai being posted *à cheval* on the Weisseritz.

All these measures were taken during pouring rain. The battle was renewed by a successful advance of the French left, which was checked at Reick, where the action languished, affording an opportunity to Barclay to use his cavalry, but he declined. In the centre the battle was maintained by a cannonade only. On the right, Murat first carried Löbda, and occupying the enemy's front, detached a heavy column of all arms upon Schusterhäuser. As it debouched through the Schönen-gründ, he threw himself violently on the Austrians with the 12,000 cavalry of Latour Maubourg, and utterly routed them, taking 10,000 prisoners and many guns. Schwarzenberg, already bent upon retreat, determined to recross the Erzgebirge, moving in three columns on the Dippoldiswalde road.

COMMENTS.

The evil of divided commands, and the want of complete unity of action, are most noticeable in this enterprise against the French communications. Schwarzenberg's operation was trammelled throughout by the presence of the independent sovereigns, and his opinion borne down in the council of war, in which Moreau, who had joined the Allies during this campaign, and Jomini assisted.

The first intention of the Allies had been to operate upon Leipzig, in which they were to be joined by a portion of Bernadotte's force, which was to advance by Dessau on that city; but this plan was suddenly changed on the receipt of the information that Dresden was but weakly held. At first St Cyr's corps was certainly not in a position to hold Dresden for even two days against a force so numerically strong as that Schwarzenberg commanded.

According to St Cyr's account, he had little more than 20,000 men in his command, and of these not more than one-half were French.

The Austrians, on the other hand, had, on the 26th, 100,000 men and 250 guns ready for action, while an equal number might be expected during the day.

The delay was caused in waiting for Klenau's arrival from the extreme left ; and hurry was not deemed necessary, as, on the 25th, a despatch from Blucher had stated that the Emperor had pushed him back upon Goldberg for five miles, and it was calculated that at the earliest Napoleon could not arrive before the 28th. In this the intelligence department of the army was at fault ; for it was possible for the Allies to have arrived at Dresden on the 24th with 200,000 men and 600 guns, and an immediate attack was certainly dictated under such circumstances.

A small garrison called upon to defend a large town is at a great disadvantage. It must occupy outlying posts of importance, and thus disseminate its strength at the expense of secrecy, while the attack can select any point it chooses, and where it effects an entrance can, with a free use of its reserves, paralyse the defence. If St Cyr had had to give way at any point of the circumference, he must at once have retired to the interior of the town.

But these conditions are changed at once as soon as an army, in the hands of an intelligent leader, is present on the theatre, and free for offensive action.

If the attack acted as Schwarzenberg did, it runs the risk of being broken at some point of its line, and advantages gained at other points would but increase the danger. If he concentrated for any particular point, the reserves would find but little difficulty in issuing from the defences and taking him in flank.

In round terms, a large fortified city, occupied only with sufficient troops to fulfil the obligations of local defence, can be stormed by superior force. It cannot be stormed if, in addition, it possessed an active army, proportionately strong and well led. This is the true secret of the difference between the two situations on the 25th and 26th.

Still this conclusion may be modified by a consideration of the nature and value of the opposing artillery. That of the defence may be so strong in guns, that every assault should be repulsed ; that of the attack so powerful, that it would be difficult for the defending army to debouch.

Schwarzenberg, sufficiently strong in artillery, did not use

it well for this purpose, and his dispositions were faulty in the beginning. The so-called reconnoitring column or reconnaissance in force of the Austrian general, was but a piece of pedantic caution. He had his information, and should have acted on it. There is always a risk in war—no plan can be deemed absolutely safe; and to reconnoitre the defence and strength of the garrison first, and then to draw up a scheme of attack, was but a loss of valuable time.

The sovereigns were against attack on the 26th, on hearing Napoleon's arrival; but the orders issued then were too late, for Schwarzenberg, having gone so far, was reluctant to withdraw without giving battle.

Napoleon's earliest intention was to have crossed at Königsstein, and fallen upon the enemy's flank and rear; but on Gourgaud's reporting that Dresden was in actual danger, the plan was modified; and while Vandamme was sent with 35,000 men on Königstein and Pirna on the 26th, the remainder were hurried to the city.

It was the first and last instance in the Emperor's career of attacking a superior enemy on both wings; but by it the Allies were cut off from some of their roads of retreat.

The pursuit was indifferent. Napoleon's own indisposition, and the astounding intelligence of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach, led to a feeling of irresolution and indecision; and thus Vandamme, advancing from Pirna, was left without support.

Meanwhile other blows were struck by the Allies, which tended to neutralise the value of the victory.

Napoleon's original plan had been to concentrate the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 11th corps, with the Guards and cavalry, for a general action in Silesia; while the 4th, 7th, and 12th corps advanced on Berlin.

The advance of the Allies from Bohemia had necessitated an alteration in this first plan; but, while a portion of the Silesian army was withdrawn to Dresden, Blücher had advanced against Macdonald, and defeated him on the Katzbach on the 26th August; and on the 29th and 30th, Vandamme, in pursuit of Schwarzenberg, from Pirna, was routed at Kulm on the Töplitz road. On the 23d August, Oudinot, advancing

from Wittenburg on Berlin, was also defeated by Bernadotte at Gross Beeren, and driven back. After the battle of Dresden, Ney took command of this Army of the North; and while moving to Baruth, where he was to be joined by Napoleon, either with a view of moving on Berlin or operating against Blücher's flank if he pursued Macdonald, he was defeated by Bernadotte at Dennewitz, and retreated to Torgau.

In September both Blücher and Schwarzenberg again advanced, but retreated when Napoleon took the offensive against each successively. Ney was behind Wittenburg and Torgau, with the corps of Bertrand, Reynier, and Sebastiani's cavalry; Marmont, with the cavalry of Latour at Meissen; the rest of the army at Dresden. The Allies intended now to unite the armies of Blücher and Bernadotte; and, crossing the Elbe, to advance on Leipzig, while Schwarzenberg advanced by the Chemnitz road on the same point. On the 23d, Beningsen, with 50,000 reserves, arrived from Poland, and the armies marched.

Blücher moved on the junction of the Elster and Elbe, crossing at Wartenberg on the 3d, though Bertrand tried to arrest him. Bernadotte passed the Elbe at Rossau. Victor and Poniatowski, observing Bohemia, also reported the advance of strong columns from Zwickau and Chemnitz.

Marmont and Latour were sent to Ney; St Cyr remained at Dresden; Lobau at Pirna; Victor and Poniatowski, with the cavalry of Pajol and Kellerman, were placed under Murat to check the Austrians, and fell back on Leipzig, where Augereau, from Würzburg, was ordered to join him; Macdonald, Souham, and the Guard under Napoleon marched for Eilenberg on the Mülde to attack Blücher.

He failed to check the enemy's advance; and partly, perhaps, because of the defection of the Bavarians, on the 12th October, whereby their army, as well as that of the Austrians which watched them, would be free to operate against him, and partly because of the pressure of Schwarzenberg's advance, he countermarched to Leipzig.

Thus, early on the 16th October, the 2d, 5th, and 8th corps (Augereau), with the 3d corps of cavalry, were at Leipzig; 4th corps (Bertrand), Lindenau, on the left bank of the Elster; 6th corps (Marmont), Lindenthal, on the north of the city; 3d and 7th corps on the march from Eilenberg; the Guards, as reserve, were in rear of the centre.

The Allies were also concentrating on the city.

Schwarzenberg was before it with 160,000 men; Blücher, with 60,000, was on the march from Halle; Bernadotte, with 60,000, advancing from Cöthen; Beningsen and Colloredo, with 60,000, were called up from Töplitz.

Then ensued the battles round Leipzig—at Wachau on the south, and at Lindenthal on the north. The Austrian main army and Blücher's Prussians engaged the French on the 16th. On the 17th the armies of the Allies being reinforced by Colloredo, Beningsen, and Bernadotte, and

Napoleon by Reynier, rested in presence ; and the general battle round Leipzig on the 18th, resulted in the decision on the part of Napoleon to retreat. During the night this was carried out in the greatest confusion. The following day the victorious armies pushed on, and in a panic the bridges were blown up, so that the corps of Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Macdonald were cut off from the main army. Of the three generals only the latter escaped.

The French army, reduced to 80,000 men, retreated by Erfurt on Mayence, Bertrand being with about 10,000 men at Weissenfels, whence he moved on the defile of Kosen, near Naumburg, to hold the bridge there. De York and Gyulai were sent in pursuit—the former, going round by Halle, came up with the rear of the main army, which had crossed at Weissenfels, near Freiburg, and with Bertrand at Kosen, where skirmishes occurred.

The forces at Leipzig, after a rest of two days, again advanced,—Schwarzenberg, by Zeitz and Jena on Weimar ; Blücher and Langeron followed De York, and then by Freiburg on Langensalza ; Bernadotte and Beningsen by Lützen and Merseburg ; Klenau returned to Dresden.

In the meantime, the newly-allied forces of Bavarians and Austrians had crossed the Danube at Donauwerth on the 19th, and moving to bombard Würzburg on the 22d, had pushed their advanced-guard to Hanau, where they were defeated by Napoleon on the 30th October ; and on the 2d November, the French army, reduced to 60,000, was at Mayence.

Bertrand, left to defend the position at Hockheim, on the right bank of the Rhine, was attacked by the Austrians on the 9th November, and the place stormed.

This was the last act in the campaign of 1813.

Napoleon left Macdonald at Cologne to organise the defence of the Lower Rhine ; Marmont at Mayence ; Victor at Strassburg, for the upper course of the stream ; and Kellerman at Metz, forming a reserve : he himself proceeding to Paris, arrived there on the 9th November.

Bernadotte, after a short rest, moved against Davoust and the Danes on 4th December ; but the former escaped to Hamburg, leaving his allies to their fate, and they were obliged to sue for peace and join the Confederation. Holland was freed from her foreign yoke in December, with the exception of Hamburg, which remained in Davoust's possession till the restoration, during which time he was blockaded by Beningsen. Dantzic (Rapp) fell on the 30th November ; Stettin on the 21st December ; Torgau on the 26th ; Erfurt on the 20th (though the garrison retired to the fortress of St Petersburg) ; Zamoszth on the 22d ; Mödlin a little latter. Only Wittenburg and Magdeburg remained in French hands, and were blockaded by Tauenzien. Custrin surrendered on 7th March, and Glogau was not given over till the occupation of Paris. At the end of the year Dresden (St Cyr) surrendered to Klenau and Tolstoi ; and on the 19th December, the Duke of Cambridge took possession of Hanover.

Thus, practically, the year closed with the restoration to their original possessors of the results of the French victories in the previous

campaigns, and the famous Confederation of the Rhine was formally dissolved.

In Italy, the army of the Viceroy had engaged the enemy indecisively, and his left flank being threatened by the Austrian reoccupation of the Tyrol, he withdrew behind the Adige, to Verona.

In the south of France the British force had gained French soil, and after the battles of the Nive, were resting in cantonments in the country south of the Adour.

Along the Rhine, the Austrians watched the upper sources, the Prussians the lower stream, and Bernadotte the Netherlands.

CHAPTER VI.

MONTMIRAIL, &c. 1814.

Introduction.—The Allied armies were watching the right bank of the Rhine from the Alps to the sea. The army of Schwarzenberg, extending from Bâle to Frankfurt, numbered 160,000, and consisted of Austrians, Russians, Prussians, and Bavarians. That of Blucher, 60,000, carried on the chain to the Netherlands, and was composed of Prussians, Russians, Hessians, and Badeners. The continuation of the war was decreed until France was circumscribed within the limits of 1790.

Napoleon had delayed to accept the Frankfurt propositions of peace offered him on November 9th, and had given Europe time to reflect till December 1813. England turned the balance, thanks to the influence obtained by Spanish victories and her maritime power.

The general plan adopted, after dangerous discussions, was that Blucher, with the corps of York, Sacken, and Langeron, the Würtembergers and Badeners, 60,000 strong, should cross the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, and should advance among the French fortresses. In the first line were Coblenz, Mayence, Landau, Strassburg; and in the second line, Mezières, Montmedy, Thionville, Metz. At the same time, the Grand Army, 160,000 in number, should move to Bâle, and cross the Rhine there, turning the French defences by penetrating through Befort and Langres. The Bavarians were therefore directed on Befort, the Austrians on Besançon, and Blucher waited near Mayence until the detours were completed. French territory was entered in December 1813.

Napoleon was taken unawares, and did not expect a winter campaign. He now perceived that war to extremity was intended, and prepared to defend the country with the remnants of the Leipzig army.

The invasion of France was hence effected at three points.

On the 20th December 1813, Schwarzenberg with six Austrian columns had crossed the frontier between Bâle and Schaffhausen through the Jura; Blucher crossed the Rhine in

three columns on the 31st December at Mannheim, Caub, and Coblenz; Bernadotte, with the corps of Bulow and Winzingerode (Prussian and Russian), which had been expelling the French from Holland, was moving *vid* Belgium; but his attack was not immediately dangerous, and his forces are not included in the following estimate of strength.

Though the Allies numbered 260,000 combatants, only 150,000 were available for these operations, for large deductions had to be made for the blockade of the fortresses still held by the French in Germany, and 50,000 were in reserve at Bâsle under Barclay de Tolly. A proclamation was issued as the armies passed the frontier, and in it was declared the desire of the Allies not to make war on the French nation, but that "their only conquest shall be that of peace—a peace that shall give permanent repose to France and the whole of Europe."

The French force, in order to conceal their actual weakness from the Allies, had been disposed along the course of the Rhine from Bâsle to Düsseldorf. It was necessary to concentrate them for action; and, as the line of the Rhine could not possibly be held, the several corps under Ney, Victor, and Marmont were ordered to fall back on the line of the Vosges mountains, whilst the divisions further north were directed upon Châlons.

But the marshals constantly found their positions outflanked by Blucher's and Schwarzenberg's vigorous advance, and were consequently obliged to fall back eventually upon Bar-sur-Aube, Verdun, and Châlons.

Here, by order of the Emperor, the armies were to stand firm, and on the 22d the Prince de Neufchatel arrived. Thus the provinces of Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche Comté had been occupied almost without firing a shot. Napoleon arrived at Châlons on the 24th January.

The public feeling in France was similar in many respects to what it is now—that is to say, it was not altogether in his favour, but the invasion sufficed to call forth patriotic resistance.

Of all his enemies, Prussia was now the most inveterate, recollecting the humiliation of 1806 and subsequent years.

The French armies were composed of some old soldiers and veterans from the south, but by far the greater part were new

levies or men of the National Garde. Their confidence in the Emperor was, however, unbounded, and this confidence rendered his troops much more formidable than they otherwise would have been. The material of the army had been greatly impaired by recent defeats, requiring all the Emperor's marvellous activity to repair it.

The Russians were the best of the Allied troops, after them the Prussians, and then the other Germans and Austrians.

Schwarzenberg had general command of the armies, controlled by the sovereigns present—viz., the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia.

Under his immediate orders were the Army of Bohemia, composed of Russian and Prussian Guards, one Russian and four German corps, partly Bavarians and Würtembergers, but mostly Austrian soldiers.

Blucher commanded the Army of Silesia, made up of Russian and Prussian troops; he was subordinate to Schwarzenberg and the sovereigns.

The command was thus exposed to the weakness of all allied operations, that of division.

It is unnecessary to comment upon the military character of Napoleon—it was, as is well known, infinitely superior to that of the Allied leaders.

Schwarzenberg was naturally hesitating, more methodical than energetic, and keenly alive to responsibility; as a strategist, incapable, and, while prone to dissemination of force, was slow in the execution of his plans.

Blucher was of a different character. His influence on the Prussian soldiers was already great. Though old, he was possessed of marvellous energy. Though uneducated professionally, he was a thorough soldier, full of energy and daring. Though ignorant of the higher principles of military science, he was fully aware of their importance; and in such matters alone, placed himself entirely in the hands of his staff, represented by Gneisenau and Muffling.

The territory which formed the theatre of these operations extends from Paris, as the western extremity, to the Vosges mountains in the east, and is of a very varied character, intersected by considerable rivers which play a principal part in

these operations. Immediately west of the Vosges is the Moselle, arching round the mountains, and eventually flowing into the Rhine. On its banks are Epinal, Toul, Metz, Thionville, and Trèves. The line of this river was turned by the sweeping operations of Schwarzenberg, and therefore not defensible; but the fortresses on its banks, as also Strasbourg and Mayence, remained in French hands.

Proceeding westwards is the river Meuse, which forms the next line of defence to an invading army. Rising on the plateau of Langres, it flows north in a narrow valley through the forests of Argonnes and the Ardennes, and so through Belgium into the Rhine near its main estuary. On or near its banks were the important places of Neufchâteau, Verdun, Mezières, Namur, and Liège.

Westward from this river the nature of the country changes. Hitherto the rivers have run generally north and south; now, as far as Paris, their course is rather from east to west. They are six in number, all important tributaries of the Seine, and all formidable military obstacles. Commencing from the north, the Oise, running south-west into the Seine below Paris, is joined, about thirty miles north-east of the capital, by the Aisne, which, rising in the Argonnes, flows about north-west. On its banks are St Meneshould, Grandpré, Rethel, Soissons, Bery-au-bac, the main roads crossing at the last two places, and it enters the Oise near Compiègne.

Parallel to this, and twenty miles south of it, is the Marne, rising in the mountains of the Meuse, which separate the basins of the Meuse and Seine, and running in a wide curve to unite with the latter above Paris. On it, or near it, are Langres, Chaumont, Joinville, St Dizier, Vitry, Châlons, Epernay, Château-Thierry, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Trilport, and Meaux. Thirty miles south of this again runs the Aube, uniting with the Seine at Pont-sur-Seine, and receiving, thirty miles further down, the Yonne, which, like the Seine up to this point, runs north-west: from Montereau, where the Yonne enters the main stream, the Seine flows north-west through Paris.

On the Aube are Bar, Brienne, Arcis; on the Seine, Troyes, Mery, Nogent, Bray, Montereau, Melun, and Paris; on the Yonne, Sens and Pont-sur-Yonne.

This area is well intersected by roads—both lateral, converging on Paris, and transverse.

Of the former there are three of primary importance:—

1. From Bâsle to Paris through Befort, Langres, and Chaumont, crossing the Aube at Dolancourt, the Seine at Troyes and Nogent, and so through Provins, Nangis, Guignes to the capital.

2. From Strassburg by St Dizier, across the Marne at Vitry, through Sommesous, Fère Champenoise, Sézanne, La Ferté-Gaucher, and, crossing the Marne above Paris, enters it by the right bank.

3. From Mayence and Mannheim through Metz (Moselle), Verdun (Meuse), Châlons (Marne), then by the south bank through Epernay to Château-Thierry, where it crosses the river: then by La Ferté-sous-Jouarre to its south bank; then by Trilport to the right bank; and then twice across the Ourcq Canal to the north of Paris. On this road, therefore, there were many obstacles to cross.

There was yet another main road leading from Brussels or Namur through Laon to Paris or Châlons, thus running about south-west.

Of these the most important were those from Bâsle to Paris, and from Metz-Châlons to Paris, and these would not be available for combined operation, unseparated by the prominent obstacles offered by the river line, until they reached, the one, Ferté-sous-Jouarre, the other Provins, offering thus facilities for excellent combinations to the defensive commanders.

The transverse roads were: 1st, from Châlons through Vitry to St Dizier, Joinville, Chaumont; 2d, from Vitry by Brienne to Bar-sur-Aube; 3d, from Châlons by Sommesous and Arcis to Troyes; 4th, from Nogent by Sézanne, to Château-Thierry by Montmirail, and Champaubert to Epernay; 5th, from Ferté-sous-Jouarre through Ferté-Gaucher to Provins; 6th, from Guignes to Meaux and Ligny. All these run north and south, and are generally fair roads, available for all arms at all seasons, with the exception of four or five in bad weather. There are country roads, of course, in addition; but at that time of year they were only available for light troops, the large masses of artillery and train being confined to the made roads.

To oppose the invasion Napoleon had for active operations the four corps of Ney, Marmont, Victor, and Macdonald, with the Guard under Mortier and Oudinot, numbering about 70,000 infantry, 17,000 cavalry, and many guns. His reserves came from Paris and the Pyrenees.

His first general disposition was that Mortier was to bar the Langres road, Ney that from Nancy, Victor to hold the Vosges against the Austrians, Marmont to check Blucher, Macdonald to watch Belgium, and Augereau at Lyons to unite with the army in the Pyrenees, now confronted by the British.

Thus, on the 25th January, the Austrian line extended from Bar to Joinville, where it was joined by Sacken, the left of Blucher's army.

The French had retreated before them, Victor having joined Ney and Marmont at Nancy, whence they had fallen back by St Dizier on Vitry. Macdonald retired before Winzingerode, who was advancing by Düsseldorf, Namur, and Avesnes on Laon, to Châlons.

The operations may be well divided into periods, the first of which relates to those about Brienne, extending from the 27th January to 5th February. Leading the troops from Châlons and Vitry, Napoleon first moved to St Dizier, where he arrived early on the 27th.

His force under Ney, Victor, and Marmont amounted to 45,000; Mortier was at Troyes with 30,000; Macdonald was on the march from Liège and Namur on Châlons with 10,000; but these last are not concerned in the present operation.

The Allied corps about to be involved were strewed over a large tract of country—from Châtillon-sur-Seine to Nancy, on the Meurthe and the Moselle.

Blucher, with Sacken and Olsuvief,	. . .	30,000	at Brienne.
3d Austrian Corps, . Gyulai,	. . .	11,000	„ Bar-sur-Aube.
4th do. and Würtem- bergers,	} Prince of Würtemberg,	11,000	„ „
5th Corps, . . . Wrede,	. . .	27,500	„ Neufchâteau.
6th Corps, . . . Wittgenstein,	. . .	18,500	„ Nancy.
Reserve,	25,000	„ Langrea.
1st Corps, . . . Colloredo,	. . .	25,000	{ Marching for Dijon.

These corps (with the exception of Blucher) numbered 117,000 men, and formed the Grand Army under Schwarzenberg moving for Troyes, the fortresses in rear being blockaded by other troops.

The general objective of the Allies was Paris. Napoleon's plan was to march from St Dizier, to fall upon the head of Blucher's columns moving from Toul independently of Schwarzenberg (who was supposed to be sixty miles off at Langres); to defeat and throw back Blucher towards the Moselle; and then, moving rapidly up the valley of the Marne or Aube, to surprise Schwarzenberg's corps in their cantonments and defeat them separately, aided by Mortier from Troyes.

The plan was able and well conceived, but it was essential to reach St Dizier in time to interpose between the two armies—i.e., to strike the leading corps of Blucher; otherwise that corps, which was beyond interception, would alarm the Grand Army by falling back upon it, giving it thus time to concentrate in rear.

Napoleon was too late. Blucher was already at Brienne, having crossed two days before, York following two days in rear.

What was to be done? To turn against York eastwards was to go out of his way. It were better to follow Blucher to Brienne, in hopes of striking before Schwarzenberg could support him, and, securing the passage of the Aube at Lesmont, to place himself centrally between Châlons and Troyes.

This course was decided on. Marmont was left at St Dizier to meet York, with orders not to move until the afternoon of the next day.

Napoleon reached Montierender on the 28th, and on the 29th, Brienne, by a wretched road. Mortier should have been informed on the 28th, and ordered to support the Emperor; but the officer was taken by the Cossacks, and Blucher thus warned.

He called in his detachments and formed at Maizières, determined not to attack, but to retreat upon Bar-sur-Aube. The head of Napoleon's column reached Maizières at 8 A.M., the tail at 4 P.M., and formed three columns of attack. The right column was successful, and the castle was seized.

Blucher retired the morning of the 30th to the heights of Trannes, seven or eight miles south of Brienne.

Napoleon followed, and camped before the enemy, repairing the bridge at Lesmont which Blucher had destroyed.

They remained thus until February 1st, both receiving reinforcements.

Schwarzenberg, hearing of the movements, suspended his advance to Troyes, and drew his corps together about Barsur-Aube. Colloredo and Wittgenstein were too far off to join in this concentration.

Napoleon was not strong enough to attack Blucher, had nothing to gain by staying in front of him inactive while his opponents were concentrating, and it was difficult then to retire without loss. The delay is accounted for by some by the repair of the bridge at Lesmont, which might have been completed by the 30th; but he was probably waiting for some chance to turn up in his favour.

Marmont arrived on the 31st, and formed on the French left at right angles.

He numbered 42,000 men, but the position was bad; and Napoleon had made up his mind to retire on the 1st February, the Allies preparing to attack him on that day.

The execution of this was put off till mid-day, partly owing to the hope that Napoleon would attack, partly to weather, partly to awaiting Wrede.

The weather was severe, and the rain and snow added to the difficulty of the attack.

At noon Blucher advanced, the distance to the French front being four miles, and at 3 P.M. was before the French outposts, which were pushed in; but in consequence of the state of the roads it was very difficult to bring up the guns.

The French were posted in Dienville, La Rothière, Petit Mesnil, and La Giberie, and hard fighting ensued, resulting in the retention of Dienville, which was strongly occupied, and held; but the others were carried by the Allies, and Marmont was beaten on the left.

The position of the French was desperate, but Napoleon effected his retreat, covered by the cavalry and the Guard, between Aube and the forest of Ajou—which, under the circum-

stances, were very favourable to the French. The Allies did not pursue, owing to the darkness, and the difficulty of moving troops of different nations.

Their loss amounted to about 5000 men, and that of Napoleon to 6000 and 70 guns.

The moral effect of the defeat was not serious, as the soldiers were proud of having fought against such odds as 110,000 men to their small force.

Such was the battle of La Rothière, in which was displayed bad generalship on both sides.

It ought not to have been fought by Napoleon, whose dispositions were so indifferent that he was fortunate to retreat as he did.

The Allies attacked too late, waiting for the development of the flank attack ; they should, on the contrary, have attacked at once.

Blucher's dispositions were bad ; and the absence of all pursuit, when the French had two rivers to cross in retreat, the Aube and the Voire, at Rosnay, rendered the victory of little value.

The retreat was continued through the night by the French, and the Allies followed at 8 A.M. on the 2d February, when Marmont was retiring by Rosnay, and Napoleon by Lesmont ; the forces under Wrede moved on Rosnay, and Gyulai, with Würtemberg, on Lesmont in pursuit.

The Allies reached Lesmont in the afternoon, and Ney, who was halting there, on their approach retired to the left bank of the Aube, destroying the bridge, and occupying the houses with sharpshooters, whose fire rendered its re-establishment difficult. At night Ney followed Napoleon to Troyes.

Marmont was equally successful at Rosnay, falling back by Dommartin to Arcis, destroying the bridge over the Aube, and making for Mery-sur-Seine, where he would be in communication with Napoleon.

At a council of war, held on February 2d, it was resolved that the pursuit of the defeated enemy should be carried on by the Grand Army ; while Blucher should lead the forces he commanded at La Rothière to the Marne, where he would be joined by York, Kleist, and Kapzewitz.

Of these York had been detached to surprise Metz, but had failed; while the last two generals had been relieved from blockading fortresses, and pushed on to the front.

Blucher moved away on the 2d February by Rosnay to Châlons, where he was joined by York, who had driven off Macdonald on the 5th.

On the other side there was delay in crossing the Aube owing to the destruction of the bridge at Lesmont.

The 3d and 4th corps moved back to Dienville, reserve corps to Dolancourt, moving thence by Vaudœuvres on Troyes following Colloredo, who had never passed the Aube at all, and now formed the advance of the Grand Army.

On the 5th, Schwarzenberg ordered a general movement to the left, to threaten Napoleon's retreat.

This affected Wittgenstein, who was to have maintained communication between Blucher and the Grand Army.

The information of Napoleon's movement on St Dizier reached Blucher, at Brienne, on the 27th January; Schwarzenberg being at Chaumont on the 28th. Schwarzenberg's orders tended to a concentration at Bar-le-Duc, and at Joinville: at Bar-le-Duc, in case the purpose of the Emperor should be to fall upon the Grand Army; at Joinville, in order to protect York at Nancy.

In each instance the dispositions evince that the earliest thought of the Austrian general was essentially turned towards defensive measures, superior though he was in force.

Nothing could illustrate in better light the extraordinary ascendancy which Napoleon exercised over his adversaries in the field.

With a keener insight into the situation, Schwarzenberg would have supported Blucher at once at Brienne, recognising the importance of that post. Indeed the possession of Brienne was essential to the Emperor's safety in these operations.

It will be recollected that Mortier was at Troyes, Macdonald at Châlons. The road connecting these two towns on the Marne and the Seine passes through Arcis-sur-Aube; and in order to gain this road in case of reverse or retreat, it was essential that Napoleon should keep the passage of the Aube open at Lesmont, which he could only do by holding Brienne;

otherwise he would necessarily fall back by inferior roads across the Voire, leaving the shorter march to Arcis to his adversaries moving by Lesmont, who would thus sever his communication with Mortier, for the time at least, and gain ground. Blucher might probably have held Brienne had he earnestly so proposed; but he was reluctant to risk defeat with ample reinforcements close at hand; and the action was fought by him principally to cover Sacken's retreat, as well as to give time for Schwarzenberg to concentrate.

On the whole, it would seem that the strategic importance of Brienne was barely recognised by either of the Allied commanders. However, it was due in great measure to his possession of the passages of the Aube and the Voire that Napoleon remained so long in position before the heights of Trannes—long enough to become involved in a very disadvantageous action.

In this battle may be remarked the extreme influence of flanking attack, and the corresponding disadvantage of a rectangular line of battle. Nothing but the early close of the day saved Napoleon from signal defeat. Under these circumstances the value of night marches for purposes of retreat will be borne in mind; and that in order to master the purpose, Napoleon deemed it advisable to organise a general attack with his cavalry and reserves. It will be seen further that, provided passages suffice for the troops, rivers are far from disadvantageous, presuming that order is maintained in retreat, for they check the enemy's pursuit and afford time to the retiring force.

It will be noticed that Wrede, who was ordered, after Brienne, to Vassy and Montierender, did not act upon these instructions, but marched to the battle-field when his action proved of essential service, and credit is probably due to him.

Throughout these first operations the purpose of the Allies was apparently simply to march on Paris, warding off such blows as might be aimed at them during this march. The principle seems not to have been sufficiently appreciated, that the shortest road to the capital of any enemy is by the destruction of his military forces. Determined offensive action here might have brought matters to a much earlier conclusion.

The second phase of the campaign begins on the 6th of February, after an interval of four days.

Napoleon left Troyes by Nogent for Sézanne, which he reached on the 7th; and the Grand Army entered Troyes on the 7th, but did not advance at once.

Blucher, joining York at Châlons, marched thence for Paris on the 8th.

During this march he was attacked and repeatedly defeated in brilliant actions, and eventually forced back to Châlons.

Then the Emperor turned against the Grand Army, which had crossed the Seine and advanced as far as Nangis; but hearing of Blucher's disasters, was about to retire on Troyes.

No great victory was gained against it by the Emperor, and the period closes with the action at Montereau, 18th February.

It had been arranged at Brienne on February 2d, that the armies should move by different routes, as difficulty of subsistence was apprehended.

Each army was strong enough to defend itself; Blucher with York, Kleist, and Kapzewitz, amounting to 50,000, was at Châlons.

The Grand Army, six corps, including Wittgenstein, was to move upon Troyes.

It had been arranged that Wittgenstein should march with a large force of Cossacks on the right of the Aube; but Schwarzenberg's manœuvre to turn Troyes altered this, and he and Leslawin were consequently withdrawn to the left bank on the 5th February, no intimation being given to Blucher, whose left flank was thus uncovered without his knowledge.

As communication between Blucher and the Grand Army was to be maintained by troops belonging to the latter, this accounts for Wittgenstein's want of responsibility to Blucher. The French retreating to Troyes had destroyed the bridge at Arcis, indicating that the line from Châlons to Troyes was about to be abandoned, as it was too extensive, and a better one existed in rear on the line Nogent-Champaubert. The news of Blucher's separation and advance had induced him to leave Troyes on the 5th.

The main passages of Seine were at Nogent and Montereau, between the confluence of the Aube and Yonne, the intermediate passage at Bray being destroyed, and field-works erected for the defence of the river. The troops on the right bank of the Seine, and on the Yonne, numbering altogether from 30,000 to 35,000 men, were under Victor and Marmont; Oudinot was at Provins; and all were independent of each other, but instructed to support each other in case of need.

With 35,000 to 40,000 troops, Napoleon * proposed to march to the Marne and unite with Macdonald, retiring from Châlons upon Paris. He reached Sézanne on the evening of the 9th, the roads being exceedingly bad, and the march difficult.

Turning to Blücher, we find that the passage of the Marne was re-established on the 7th, and he moved on the 8th, Sacken and Olsuvief being between Châlons and Bergères.

Macdonald was retreating along the main road with a large convoy of stores.

Kleist and Kapzewitz, two marches off, could reach Bergères on the 7th.

It was thought that by using the by-road it would be possible to anticipate Macdonald at Ferté-sous-Jouarre.

York was to remain in Macdonald's rear, on the main road; Sacken to move direct on La Ferté;—Blücher with Olsuvief between Sacken, and Kleist, and Kapzewitz, altogether amounting to 53,000 men.

On the evening of the 9th, Sacken reached Montmirail, and York, Dormans (nine miles from Château-Thierry).

Headquarters were at Etages, Olsuvief at Champaubert, the others at Bergères.

The order of march was straggling, and the flank uncovered, the troops moving under an evident sense of security, intent only upon Macdonald's corps. He was on the 6th at Epernay; 7th, at Dormans and Crézancy.

From these points he detached Molitor and Excelmans to cross the Marne at La Ferté and take post on the Montmirail road, in order to guard against the Prussian purpose.

* Guard under Ney; 1st and 2d corps; the troops of Marmont and Mortier, cavalry of the Guard, Bordesoulle and St German.

During the 8th the retreat continued with some fighting, and the bridge was destroyed at Château-Thierry.

On the 9th he reached La Ferté, and being reinforced, crossed the Marne, and beat off an attack of Sacken's advanced-guard.

On the 10th Macdonald continued to retreat upon Trilport, blowing up the bridge at La Ferté while in action with Sacken ; and recrossing the Marne at Trilport, he broke the bridge and reached Meaux in safety, where there were 8000 National Guards.

The Prussian plan had been altogether a failure ; the only result was that their line stretched from La Ferté to Châlons, sixty miles, and in no one place were 20,000 men.

Sacken's Cossacks, by way of precaution, had been pushed to Sézanne, where on the 9th they were forced back, but not much importance was attached to their report.

At the same time Blucher was ordered to detach Kleist to support Wittgenstein, between the Aube and the Seine, and was informed that the Grand Army was about to move by Sens on Fontainebleau.

The first intimation of the character of the French advance was received by Blucher late on the 9th ; Sacken was ordered to halt at Montmirail, York at Château-Thierry—the former was verbally instructed to watch the importance of the movement on the left flank.

On the 10th, the French, coming from Sézanne, marched on Champaubert, engaged the Russians at Baye and Banny. In the action that ensued, Olsuvief's force was dispersed and himself taken prisoner ; the remnants of his corps joining Blucher at Bergères. Macdonald was informed of the movement, and ordered to endeavour to co-operate, and Napoleon was thus established in the middle of Blucher's line.

No further French movements were made that day, but, leaving Marmont with 16,000 at Etages, on the 11th Napoleon turned towards Montmirail, his object being to defeat Sacken and unite with Macdonald.

York's orders were to use his own discretion in details, and at the same time to endeavour with Sacken to reach Bergères ; but he and Sacken were not agreed as to the best course. Sacken was for breaking through, York for retreating ; and

thus, at a critical moment, want of concert existed between the commanders. Both moved on the 11th towards Montmirail, four miles from which the roads meet at Marchais. Thus Napoleon, Sacken, and York were marching at the same time on the same point, but the latter had bad roads to traverse; the French arrived first and took position at Marchais.

About 10 A.M. Sacken arrived and made dispositions to attack, though York had informed him that he could not arrive early. Napoleon temporised, waiting for Mortier, and then turned against Sacken, beat him badly, and interposed between him and York, who arrived, however, in time to save him, and Sacken eventually gained the Château-Thierry road. The Prussians were not engaged to any extent; for while Sacken was too rash, York, on the other hand, was far too cautious.

During the night, York and Sacken were ordered to cross the Marne and retreat by Rheims on Châlons, which was appointed as a general rendezvous; and they retired accordingly on the 12th, pursued by the French, their loss in the battle having been 6000 men.

On February 11th Blucher was motionless at Bergères expecting attack, and during the day became aware that Napoleon had turned against Sacken. He had heard that Sacken purposed attack, and York retreat—thus holding different views; and he should therefore have moved, in order possibly to assist his lieutenants; but he remained still on the 12th waiting for cavalry. On the 13th these regiments came up.

Meanwhile Napoleon had beaten York and Sacken on the 11th and 12th, and was free to meet Blucher.

On the 12th, Marmont fell back before the Allies, west of Champaubert, where Blucher halted.

The advance was continued on the 14th. Vauchamps was held with obstinacy, but was at length carried. Beyond it the French were now in force, and it was soon evident that Napoleon was himself in the field. At mid-day he assumed the offensive, and Vauchamps was retaken, after which the Allies retreated, Napoleon's attempt to envelop them with cavalry failing through their steady bearing. Champaubert

was reached, and the headquarters halted at Bergères. A night attack was carried out at Etages; the loss of the Allies being 6000 men and 14 guns. Thus in five days the army of Silesia suffered the loss of at least 12,000, and some say 28,000 men, inflicted by an army of 35,000 strong.

Napoleon's generalship in this operation must be counted among his first feats. As usual, no doubt it has been frequently exaggerated, by some writers, who give him credit for power of divination.

He was compelled to move on the Marne in order to protect Paris, though where he would find Blucher he hardly knew. The operation was decided on when leaving Troyes, Blucher being still at Châlons.

Blucher resumed operations on the 8th, and Napoleon reached Sézanne on the 9th; but Blucher might have commenced earlier, and had he communicated properly with York, he need not have gone to Châlons at all. Napoleon, moving for Sézanne, took the best chance of surprising and checking his enemy. It was the shortest road to the Marne, where he was likely to find him.

When he had done so, he appreciated his position with wonderful readiness, and herein lies the real merit of his plan.

From Sézanne he had the choice of advancing upon Montmirail or Champaubert, but he could know nothing about his enemy until collision had occurred, and this necessarily carried him to the latter place.

His disposition for attacking Sacken and York and containing Blucher were sound. These two were between him and Macdonald, and already moving on Paris, but the latter had destroyed the bridge at Trilport. The difficulty was to apportion Marmont's force, and this delay against Sacken does not seem sufficiently notified; for in waiting for Mortier, before attacking, he but lost time, inasmuch as that general was sure to arrive during the action, and York might meanwhile have reinforced Sacken in a very disagreeable manner. His pursuit to Château-Thierry and no further was right. To have crossed the Marne would have led him too far, and it was essential to strike Blucher himself before returning to the Seine, whither he knew he must go.

The weather and the fatigue of his troops seems to have prevented the Emperor from making his action decisive, and it is also stated that he himself did not conduct these operations. Blucher has also been unduly blamed. Two faults may, however, be laid to his charge with some justice—delay in commencing operations against Macdonald, and neglect of communicating with Wittgenstein and Leslawin. There can be little doubt that Blucher was glad to get away from the Grand Army; he disliked Schwarzenberg's caution, and wanted to act independently. This led him to neglect obvious measures of prudence.

Had he been with Sacken at the head of the column, the unity of purpose necessary for success would not have been wanting, and with more than equal force he might calmly have met and repulsed Napoleon at Montmirail, though the attack would have been dangerous in character. He had remained in order to place himself in the centre of his line, waiting for Kleist and Kapzewitz, who were behind. In detaching these corps to Fère on the 10th, Blucher disobeyed orders. His inaction on the 11th and 12th February seems open to censure. Want of sufficient cavalry was not quite enough. Success against Marmont would have hampered Napoleon; and when he did advance it was too late, and being too late, he should not have exposed himself on the 14th.

The want of proper communication between the corps is here again apparent.

The foundation of Blucher's misfortunes is laid at the headquarters of the Grand Army. Had Wittgenstein not been withdrawn, Napoleon could not have marched as he did through Sézanne. He must have marched on Meaux, where he would have met Blucher. Müffling says the first intimation of the change reached the army of Silesia on the 9th, the despatch being dated the 6th.

Napoleon did not pursue Blucher beyond Etages. Leaving Marmont there with one corps of infantry and one of cavalry, and Mortier similarly at Château-Thierry, he returned to confront Schwarzenberg. This last general was at Troyes on the 7th, the French being behind the Seine; Victor, with 17,000, at Nogent; Oudinot, at Provins, with 6000; Pajol

and Alix, at Montereau and Sens, with 7000. This position of the French was prescribed by the character of the operations.

The two main roads from Troyes to Paris lay through Nogent and Sens. The first was the most direct, and nearest to Napoleon on the Marne, and it was essential to make this strong for resistance. Sens, on the other hand, was occupied sufficiently strongly to offer resistance, and retard and detach from the enemy's force at Nogent. The Allies first intended to make use principally of this road through Sens for equally intelligible reasons. Wrede and Wittgenstein were directed on Nogent, whilst the rest marched on the Yonne and Fontainebleau. Sharp fighting occurred on the Seine on the 11th and 12th February, and Sens was taken on the 11th by Würtemberg. Wrede forced the passage of the Seine at Bray, and Wittgenstein at Pont-sur-Seine on the 13th; and Schwarzenberg, having heard of Napoleon's success on the Marne, strengthened this force on the right bank of the river.

On the 16th February, Wittgenstein, Wrede, and Würtemberg, having crossed the Seine, were at Nangis, Donnemarie, and Montereau; the remaining corps on the left bank; reserve at Nogent; 3d corps (Gyulai) at Montereau; Colloredo at Troyes; Liechtenstein on the Loing. The French had retired from the Seine, and occupied on the 15th the following position:—

Victor,	Chaulme and Fontenay.	} On the Yéres.
Oudinot,	at Guignes.	
Macdonald,	from Meaux, on Solers.	
Pajol,	at Cramayel.	

Owing to the reverses of Blücher, and the news from Bubna at Lyons, the intention of advancing upon Paris was now abandoned by Schwarzenberg.

Napoleon, having 25,000 on the Marne, had started for his Seine army, and reached the Yéres on the 16th, to find himself at the head of 60,000 men.

The Allied plan was now to withdraw the troops from the north bank of the Seine with as little loss as possible, in order to take position for battle at Troyes, and also to recross the Loing and Yonne, south of the Seine. For this purpose

they held all the passages of the rivers; and the one thing necessary was without loss of time to draw their men across at these points.

Napoleon had only very general information of Schwarzenberg's position and intentions. He would judge that his purpose, on hearing of Blücher's retreat, would be to recross the Seine, and would wish to anticipate him and find him scattered as was Blücher. The direction of the march was on Nangis, as leading to Montereau, Bray, and Nogent.

The advance was made on the 17th on Nangis.

Actions occurred on the 17th; Pajol was marching on Le Châtelet, but was attacked and beaten. One half afterwards moved on Fontainebleau, the other on Montereau. The orders issued for the Allies on the 18th decided Wittgenstein to cross the Seine at Nogent; Wrede, at Bray; Würtemberg, at Montereau; 1st and 3d corps, Pont-sur-Yonne. On the 18th, the battle of Montereau took place—an important action, in which the character of the *ground*, and the fact that the town was commanded from Surville, rendered it imperative to hold the passage on the left bank for the troops to get back. The danger of the position was extreme with an inferior force, and a defile in rear. Montereau was on the left bank of the Yonne at its junction with the Seine; and, since a force was on the right bank of the river at St Nicholas, its defender could not possibly remain in Montereau if Surville was in the enemy's possession. The only way of guarding the bridge was to occupy Surville. The Allied corps, consisting of about 12,000, made good dispositions; and, on the morning of the 18th, the French dribbled into action, and were severely beaten by artillery, their attacks being constantly repulsed, while Victor was displaced; but Napoleon arrived at 2 P.M. with the Guard—and the necessary preponderance thus gained, the French attained their object with a loss on each side of about 3000 men.

Two lines of march were open to Napoleon on starting for the Seine—by the one he came, and by Meaux and Guignes. He knew the whereabouts of the Allies, so that he might expect that the former would carry him to their lines of retreat, and the latter would simply meet their frontal attack.

It was a question, therefore, which he should select—the chief considerations being his inferior force, the doubtful seizure of the bridge at Nogent, and the possibility in one case of surprising, as he had surprised Blucher at the same time that he remained in proximity of Paris; in the other, he was removed from Paris, and might sacrifice his communications with that city. Operations against communications are not always desirable.

The celerity of his march upon Guignes is remarkable.

Arrived there, things were much in the state he desired. His own force was 60,000, that of the Allies 100,000, the separate corps being from 10,000 to 20,000 strong. His decision at Nangis was not so rapid as usual. It was only after delay that he decided moving on Montereau, the considerations being easy passage and interception of the troops on the left bank of the Yonne. Had he concentrated 30,000 or 40,000 men at Montereau by 8 or 9 A.M. on the 18th, he might have destroyed Würtemberg, and have had the choice of subsequently beating Wrede at Bray, or Wittgenstein at Nogent, or the troops beyond the Yonne.

The battle of Montereau was fought badly by Napoleon. Schwarzenberg, in these operations, showed his usual indecision. He left a clear ten days to Napoleon for attacking Blucher.

The rule in such a case, when two distinct armies are operating against a single one on the same theatre of war, is that each of them shall be in the closest possible contact with the enemy opposed; the reason being, that, otherwise, the commander of the single force can throw his weight first on one and then on the other, masking his purpose in each instance with a weak detachment.

Schwarzenberg might have been on the Yères on the 12th February, and have overpowered Victor and Oudinot, which, by forcing Napoleon to return, would have relieved Blucher of the pressure.

In Schwarzenberg's determination to fight, up to the 21st, he overestimated, however, Napoleon's forces, and was no doubt afraid of his antagonist.

He wrote to Blucher, expressing his doubt as to the advisa-

bility of fighting with a defile in rear, and determined on retreating through Troyes. On the 22d the Allies were about that town, and Blucher at Mery with 58,000, while Napoleon was advancing and concentrating for battle about Troyes.

At Mery he came into collision with the Russians, and drove them in, the town of Mery being burnt.

On the 23d, Schwarzenberg had determined to continue his retreat behind the Seine and Aube upon Langres. Bianchi with 17,000 was sent to support Bubna at Lyons. Still Schwarzenberg had 70,000, and Blucher 53,000 men, and there was a favourable opportunity for striking decisively.

Schwarzenberg's retreat exposed Blucher. It was proposed that he should form the right of the Grand Army on the Aube. The position of Mortier and Marmont furnished him with an excuse to disobey, and eventually to obtain sanction for a plan of his own, which was genial in conception, and eventually decisive of the campaign.

By falling on the marshals, who alone stood between him and Paris, he would again recall Napoleon, and relieve Schwarzenberg, enabling the latter to move also on Paris. Moreover, he was no longer dependent on the Grand Army. Bulow, Winzingerode, and St Priest were approaching, so that he would have eventually 100,000 men for independent action if they were placed under his command.

On the 24th, Schwarzenberg retreated to Lesmont, Bar-sur-Aube, and Châtillon; and the French pursued with Oudinot and Macdonald to Bar-sur-Aube, the remainder being at Troyes inactive.

Napoleon had but inaccurate information regarding Blucher up to the 26th, and consequently did nothing; but on that evening, roused by hearing that Blucher had crossed the Aube at Anglure, he started on the 27th February with 30,000 men.

Simultaneously, Schwarzenberg turned, attacked Oudinot at Bar-sur-Aube on the 28th, 29th, 30th; the two marshals retired on Troyes, where Macdonald took command.

On March the 3d, the Allies appeared in force, and Macdonald retreated on Nogent on the 5th, and occupied the line Montebereau-Nogent. The retreat was unmolested, and Schwarzenberg went into quarters between the Seine and Yonne.

Blucher had destroyed the bridge at Arcis, and, establishing pontoons at Anglure, marched on the night of the 23d, crossing the Aube on the 24th, making for Sézanne, where Marmont was about to join Napoleon by Arcis. Blucher made dispositions to cut him off, but the marshal retired on Esternay.

Blucher had ordered St Priest to take post at Vitry, to protect his rear, watch the Aube, and communicate with the Grand Army on his left, and Winzingerode on his right.

Blucher's object was to defeat the marshals, draw off Napoleon, and to unite his command. An officer was sent to Winzingerode to invite him to join Blucher at Meaux.

On the 25th, Marmont retreated upon La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Mortier being at Château-Thierry.

Blucher divided Kleist and York at La Ferté, Sacken at Meaux, which he reached on the 27th, as Marmont and Mortier, having made a night-march, entered on the other side, when the Russians were thrown out, and the retreat of their adversaries on Paris was now safe.

Blucher threw a bridge at Sommesous, and Kleist crossed, marching to Lizy, and pushed advanced posts across the Ourcq; on the 28th he himself followed, before York or Sacken had effected the passage.

The French took advantage of the opportunity, attacked Kleist, defeated him with the loss of 1000, and drove him back on Ferté Milon.

At noon Blucher was authorised to take command of Bulow's and Winzingerode's corps, and in the evening intelligence was received from Tettenborn that Napoleon was advancing at Sézanne; whereupon Blucher crossed the Marne, and destroyed the bridges by the morning of the 1st of March.

The fresh attempt against the marshals had been unsuccessful.

A night-march to Oulchy, in great disorder, followed, but concentration at that place was effected on the 30th of March. Winzingerode from Rheims, and Bulow from Laon, met on the 2d at Soissons, which place was garrisoned by Moreau with 2000 men. Moreau agreed to evacuate the town on condition that the garrison should withdraw, and it was handed over on the 3d; the same morning Napoleon crossed the Marne at La

Ferté, which he had reached on the 1st, but it had taken twenty-four hours to finish the bridge. He was now in full communication with the marshals, whose independent action ceased. They had operated well to avoid Blücher's embrace, and there are many points of interest in the manner in which that result had been obtained.

1. Their junction was recognised as essential, and when Blücher reached Esternay, Mortier was at Thierry; so that Marmont, while seeing the danger of the movement, arranged to concentrate with the other marshal at La Ferté.

2. The danger that lay in the way of effecting this desired junction was met by the rapidity of movement of the troops, and by enlisting night to cover the march.

3. Their energy and decision, their clearness of vision in seeing the isolation of Kleist, which enabled them to make a brilliant counterstroke on the Ourcq, is doubly creditable under the circumstances.

4. And lastly, they obtained security by breaking down the bridges on that river, whereby they also gained, what was equally serviceable, time. Any attempt to add to the advantage they had gained by crossing the Ourcq, or pushing too far in pursuit of Kleist, would but have exposed them to unnecessary danger.

It has been well put by Captain Jones, in his 'Campaign of 1814,' that the two principal objectives of Blücher were incompatible with each other—viz., to effect a junction, and to defeat the marshals; and that this led to faulty dispositions and eventual failure.

On the 2d of March Napoleon had crossed the Marne. Bulow moved by Oulchy on Soissons. Napoleon still had 60,000 and Blücher 100,000 at their disposal respectively. Certain considerations induced Blücher not to stand at Oulchy. He was not altogether concentrated, and was much hampered by his baggage, with the Aisne in rear. His object was to draw Napoleon on, and fight under the most favourable conditions, thus releasing Schwarzenberg.

On the 4th Blücher retreated, and Soissons capitulated. Soissons was the right, Berry-au-bac the left of the Prussians. Napoleon followed to Fismes and Soissons. It was necessary

to deprive Blücher of these passages of the Aisne, as he had contrived to escape Napoleon's blow, in order to hold the river-line and return to the Grand Allied Army.

The attack on Soissons failed, but Rheims was occupied, and Berry-au-bac was carried by surprise on the 6th.

The Silesian army, consisting of the corps of Bülow, York, Langeron, Sacken, and Winzingerode, reached the plateau of Craonne, a strong defensive position, but with indifferent lateral communication. Napoleon occupied Craonne and Corbeny—thanks to Winzingerode's neglect.

Blücher purposed attacking the French as they emerged from Berry, but was obliged now to abandon his purpose and effect other dispositions.

Winzingerode's infantry was to hold the plateau and fall back fighting; Bülow to march to Laon; York, Kleist, and Langeron, to hold themselves in readiness to march; and the cavalry, intrusted to Winzingerode, with the horse artillery, were to concentrate in the valley of the Lette, and fall on Napoleon's right flank and rear when engaged on the plateau with the infantry. Winzingerode delayed in getting his force together, and then took the wrong road; but the Russians showed great steadiness in the battle, and Blücher, finding the cavalry attack could not come off, fell back on Laon. The Russian loss was 5000, the French 8000 men.

On the 8th March the various corps were collected about Laon, and the Soissons garrison, having vacated the town for want of provisions, joined at Laon on the 9th.

The Russian front was thus arranged: right, Winzingerode at Clacy; centre, Bülow at Laon and the suburbs; York and Kleist at Chambry; the reserve being in rear of the town, and the advanced-guards towards Soissons and Berry. These roads were separated by the swampy meadows of the Ardon, and were eleven miles apart.

On the 9th, at dawn, the action commenced, and the Allied outposts were driven in from Etouville by 11 A.M. At noon a heavy French column was announced on the Festieux road. Blücher demonstrated against the French left, while Bülow attacked in front. Marmont debouched at Athies and carried the village; Sacken and Langeron moved up to sup-

port Kleist; Langeron being directed to surprise Marmont at Athies.

The young troops, of which the latter's corps were composed, neglecting outpost duty, were assailed at dusk, and completely routed, the Marshal being obliged to rally behind the Aisne.

Napoleon, with his right wing gone, and isolated, therefore, with 35,000 men, was in a precarious position, and his retreat to Soissons was, with ordinary activity on the part of the Allies, much endangered.

Orders for pursuit were given but countermanded, and Napoleon, left undisturbed, retreated on the 11th to Soissons, where he strengthened the fortress and occupied Compiègne.

While there he heard that St Priest had reached Rheims with 12,000 men on the 12th of March; so moving against him, he surprised the division on the 13th, Rheims being occupied by the Emperor until the 17th.

During the action of the 13th, St Priest was killed.

COMMENTS.

These operations of Napoleon carry with them the stamp of recklessness and despair. His delay at Troyes originated the difficulties with which he afterwards had to contend. Blucher had too long a start, and after having failed in his immediate object, at once and wisely appreciated the situation. Napoleon evidently considered the defeat of Blucher essential to the success of the campaign, and to be attained at all hazard. Failing to catch him on the south bank of the Aisne, he still persevered when every chance was against him.

In his passage at Berry, his attack at Craonne, and subsequently at Laon, he everywhere exposed himself to imminent danger, relying probably on his prestige to escape its results.

Napoleon himself attributed the failure of his operations to Moreau's capitulation; and this was evidently unjust, for Blucher had provided the means of crossing the Aisne had Soissons not surrendered.

Turning to the Austrian army, Schwarzenberg, finding that

the Emperor was not in front of him, had advanced on the 27th February, driving Mortier and Macdonald through Troyes to Nogent, Bray, and Montereau, and by the 17th March had passed the Seine and reached Provins. On this date Napoleon moved towards him, Ney marching on Châlons and the remainder on Epernay, while Mortier was left at Rheims, and Marmont at Berry. On the 18th the French advanced from Epernay, and reached Fère Champenoise and Sommesous.

Macdonald, with reinforcements, was to move on Plancy. Schwarzenberg purposed to concentrate at Frannes. Napoleon crossed the Aube at Plancy on the 19th. Ney, from Châlons, was between Arcis and Plancy, and reinforcements were on the march from the latter, while Macdonald was two marches from the same place. Napoleon, feeling on both sides towards Arcis and Thierry, discovered the enemy in force on his left, at and in rear of Arcis; and this led Schwarzenberg, finding his adversary so weak, to alter his dispositions and concentrate before Arcis; but neglecting to hold the passage in force, it was occupied by Ney, thus securing to Napoleon the roads on the north bank.

Schwarzenberg concentrated near Pougy; but Napoleon had only 20,000 men with him on the 20th, on which day Schwarzenberg might have attacked with great advantage, as Napoleon's position was very precarious.

Napoleon was now under the impression that the Allies were fully in retreat, and pushed on to Lesmont and Troyes; but this produced collision, and he was checked at Torcy.

On the 21st he was reinforced to 40,000 strong, though Macdonald and the 11th corps under Pacthod were still absent, and he advanced again under the same impression; but seeing Schwarzenberg in position at Mesnil-la-Comtesse, in such superior force that he was unassailable, he retreated, masking his movement with cavalry, and occupied Arcis.

Schwarzenberg delayed several hours, and attacked at 3 P.M.; but the French withdrew successfully, and destroyed the bridges, their losses being estimated at 4000.

On the 22d Napoleon arrived at Vitry, which was sum-

moned unsuccessfully, and the Marne was crossed at Frignicourt, Macdonald and Oudinot acting as rear-guard.

On the 23d the Emperor reached St Dizier; and Schwarzenberg, crossing the Aube, followed to Vitry by the 24th, where Blucher's advance had already arrived.

Blucher had remained at Laon until the 17th, then moving he attacked Marmont and Mortier, drove them back to Château-Thierry, and pursued his own march to the Marne, which he reached on the 22d-23d.

York and Kleist followed the French marshals to Château-Thierry on the 23d, and delayed in crossing, but reached Montmirail on the 24th, the Russians arriving at Châlons by Rheims on the same day.

Napoleon, in retreating, sent orders to the marshals to join him by St Dizier, as well as to Pacthod, who on that day had reached Bergères, while Marmont was at Soudé St Croix.

These troops were thus between the two Allied armies, and in perfect ignorance of their presence, and of their own danger, while Napoleon was further from Paris than each Allied army.

His plan was to throw himself on the Allied communications, trusting to precedent and the moral attraction of the movement to separate the Allies again, and draw them off from Paris.

On the 24th the Allies were at last informed of his plan by captured despatches, and the state of Paris exposed.

Napoleon had too great a start to be overtaken: on the other hand, he opened the door to Paris, so important as it was, since there were only some 30,000 French to defend the capital against the enemy's approach.

It was decided, therefore, to march on Paris, leaving a force of cavalry principally to screen the movement, and Winzingerode and Tettenborn with 8000 men were accordingly detached for this purpose. The army of Silesia was to march by Champaubert and Montmirail on Meaux, arriving on the 28th; the Grand Army by Fère Champenoise and Sézanne on Coulommiers.

The Crown Prince of Würtemberg with his cavalry arrived at Soudé St Croix early on the 25th, and there found Mar-

mont and Mortier marching for Vitry, 25,000 strong, including 7000 cavalry, though some accounts state less.

The marshals retired upon Sommesous and on Fère Champenoise, and at the former place they took up a position, not seeing anything in front of them but the enemy's cavalry. Though Würtemberg knew what he had before him, he thought it advisable not to wait for the infantry, and attacked.

The French were engaged first on the Cosle, then on the Soudé rivulet; and having united their entire force they fell back through Connontrey with a view to gain the heights of Fère Champenoise. Meanwhile, fresh enemies were announced on their right, and they retreated in good and skilful order, during a violent thunderstorm, on Sézanne.

During the action, a detachment under Pacthod, which was marching from Sézanne, was utterly routed; but it was reinforced by Compan's division.

At Sézanne, they had to cut their way through Ziethen's Prussians, and then retreating by La Ferté-Gaucher were again headed, and taking the Provins road, on which they were joined by Souham's division, proceeded to Nangis, where Mortier moved by the Guignes road, and Marmont by Melun, on Paris; and, uniting near the capital, they crossed the Seine at Charenton, and took up a position on the heights of Montmartre and Romainville.

Compan's division had escaped at La Ferté-Gaucher and crossed the Seine at Meaux, whence it retreated, fighting, by Bondy on Paris.

Thus on the 29th, Blucher, with Kleist, De York, Woronzow, and Langeron, were near St Denis; Schwarzenberg at Pantin and La Villette; and the Prince Royal of Würtemberg near Vincennes and Montreuil.

On the following day, after a brief contest, the city capitulated.

Meanwhile Napoleon heard of the advance of the Allies, and after a skirmish near Vitry with Winzingerode he turned back towards Paris on the 28th, and, pushing on rapidly before his army, received at Fromenteau on the 30th the news of the fall of his capital.

COMMENTS.

Schwarzenberg's inactivity during the operations on the Aisne have been already considered.

That intelligence from Blucher was necessary with a view to ultimate union, was but an excuse. If this was more important than to march on Paris, it is evident that Schwarzenberg, leaving 30,000 men to face Macdonald, should have marched for the Marne with 70,000 men.

Communication—with the passage of the Marne in hand—might have been effected about the time of the battle of Craonne. But if he arrived only after Laon, he might, with St Priest and his cavalry masses, have dispersed the French reinforcements, and hemmed Napoleon in against the Marne. A fortnight later it was determined to start for the Marne; but at the same time Napoleon, returning, was in a position to beat the Allied corps in detail.

Schwarzenberg avoided the danger cleverly by recalling his corps, scattered from Provins to Brienne, behind the Seine and Aube, for concentration.

Equally in accordance with circumstances was his alteration as he discovered his enemy's faults and concentration against his left flank between the Aube and Voire.

His purpose of attacking on the 20th was equally good, but bad enough in execution. On the other hand, Napoleon's plan of operations, conceived at Rheims, was to concentrate very secretly against Schwarzenberg, to throw himself on that general's scattered line, and master his line of retreat to the Rhine.

But his concentration was badly combined. Macdonald was called in too late, as were the two marshals—or rather, the operations commenced too soon.

He has been justly accused of want of coolness in execution here, and of leaving much to chance.

When Napoleon arrived on the Aube, his march to Plancy instead of to Arcis gave his adversary time to effect his concentration. He should have turned at once against Arcis, where Wrede stood alone, and his signal

defeat might have changed the intentions of the Allied commanders.

As it was, Napoleon was in imminent danger at Arcis, and had only to thank Schwarzenberg's want of resolution for his salvation. But when his error was discovered, the movement in retreat of his troops was skilfully conducted.

Reviewing the general situation now, we see that Napoleon's failures had cost him 25,000 men. He could only fill up this gap by availing himself of resources, which, taken away, would leave Paris defenceless.

The question was, Should he concentrate these and fall back towards the capital, and thus with 100,000 make a stand against 200,000; or, trusting to his adversary's faults and to the chapter of accidents, throw himself with them against his communications?

He decided in favour of the latter, trusting to the moral effect of the combination, and hoping to increase his force by the garrisons of Alsace and Lorraine, and by calling on the population to rise *en masse*.

How faulty this plan was, and how warped his judgment, was now evinced by the results that necessarily followed.

The first step of the Allies was to unite at last, and then, learning the direction of Napoleon's march, to combine.

The first idea of marching on Paris is attributed to Wolkowsky; but Schwarzenberg sums up his reasons for the step as follows:—

1. The state of Paris.
2. That it was not possible to concentrate both armies, in order to beat Napoleon, before he was reinforced.
3. Concentration could be easier effected towards Paris.
4. The defeat of the marshals was certain.
5. Having thus deprived Napoleon of his resources, he hoped to use them for himself, and to trust to circumstances for further guidance.

The result of this decision has been already told. Paris, that had never been entered by a foreign foe since the fifteenth century, witnessed the triumphal entrance of the Allied forces and their sovereigns. Napoleon, at Fontainebleau, assembled yet another army; but the decree of the Senate deposing him, the firm decision of the conquerors to admit of no negotia-

tions with him, the proposed restoration of the Bourbons, had all their influence on the people of France, and even on his followers.

Deserted by every one of those who owed their elevation to him, save Drouot, Bertrand, and Davoust, he signed his abdication on the 12th of April; and on the 24th, taking leave of his Old Guard, retired to Elba.

Meanwhile, in the south, Soult, attacked by Wellington, had been beaten at Toulouse, and a convention was agreed to on the 18th. At Bayonne, which had been invested by Sir John Hope, a sally involving much bloodshed had occurred on the 14th, so that two needless actions terminated the last days of the Peninsular war, in which Great Britain had taken so prominent a part.

Suchet's force in the east of Spain was too weak and isolated to be of further value; and it was finally withdrawn from the Peninsula, the fortresses then in French hands being also surrendered.

In Italy, the Viceroy at Verona had been confronted by the Austrians under Bellegarde; and finally, by Murat's defection, which resulted in his marching 20,000 troops on Rome, he was threatened on his right flank by this army. Crossing the Mincio, a severe combat occurred near Vallegio; and again turning on the Neapolitans he drove them out of Parma; but these operations produced little result; and finally, after the fall of Genoa to the British, and another stubborn struggle in front of Piacenza, the French army retired under the walls of that fortress on the 14th April, when the news of the important events that had occurred in Paris was received, and by May the French armies had recrossed the Alps.

France, shorn of her conquests, had been limited provisionally to her ancient frontiers, pending the decision of the Congress of the Great Powers that assembled in Vienna in September 1814.

The division of the recaptured spoil was no easy matter. Great Britain insisted that Hanover should be restored to Brunswick; and that Belgium and Holland should be formed into a kingdom of the Netherlands; Prussia wanted Saxony; Austria, Lombardy and the Milanese; and Russia, Poland: but these negotiations only aroused mutual discontent; and the close of the year saw the withdrawal of the Russian troops arrested, the Austrian army again placed on a war footing, and the disarmament of that of France checked. But the storm-laden atmosphere was not to burst then. Napoleon, apparently oblivious of his fall, and giving himself up to the pursuit of art, literature, and study, had not ceased to hope for restoration, or to plot with his numerous adherents in France. The last act of the great drama in which he had played the chiefest part was yet to be unfolded, and with it draw to a close the long and almost continuous series of wars which had resulted from the Revolution.

CHAPTER VII.

WATERLOO, 1815.

Introduction.—"With the violets" in the spring came the Emperor back to France. Attended by Bertrand, Cambronne, Drouot, and 400 grenadiers, the remainder of the 1000 men which formed his garrison at Elba following in two other vessels, he embarked on the 27th February on board the brig *Inconstant*. Landing on the 1st March in the Gulf of Juan, near Cannes, he advanced with 4 pieces of artillery on Grenoble, having also purchased horses to mount the Poles of the Guard, who had, since landing, carried the saddles and accoutrements on their backs, and with this small force seized the bridge of Ponthaut, beyond which was drawn up the 5th regiment of the line. Though ordered to fire they refused, and fraternising with the Old Guard the united forces moved to Grenoble, where the remainder of the soldiers declared for the Empire. On the 8th March he advanced on Lyons, which he entered on the 10th in triumph, Marshal Macdonald being powerless to oppose him, for everywhere the magic of his name was calling to his gradually increasing army the soldiers he had so often led to victory. On the 17th Ney joined him at Auxerre, on the 20th he reached Fontainebleau, and pushing on to Paris entered it on the same night amidst the greatest enthusiasm of the people. The king had fled from the capital the evening before. But the Great Powers refused all negotiations with him, and both sides prepared for hostilities. The first blow was struck by Murat, who declared war on the 15th March, and after some slight successes was defeated at Tolentino and fled to France.

The campaign about to be examined has for Englishmen a peculiar interest. It is one that is essentially national, and, short as its duration was, it offers for study the very essence of the offensive and defensive strategy of which Napoleon was the originator, which for twenty years he more or less successfully practised, and which still holds good in all its principal features.

It would be superfluous to touch upon the political circumstances of the time. They are so well known as to make such a course tedious. It will be sufficient to know that, finding all ears shut to his peaceful overtures, war was for the Emperor the only alternative. Broadly on the defensive, the immediate character of the war was at his option. He might await his enemy's attack, remaining purely on the defensive, based on Paris and Lyons; or he might, by rapid preparations, anticipate his antagonists and assume the offensive. It was well known that from various causes the preparations of the Allies, including Austria and Russia, would not be completed until August. Nearest to the French frontier, and in the most advanced state of preparation, stood the forces commanded by Wellington and Blücher. Experience had demonstrated to the Emperor that, however good the understanding between the Allied commanders, complete harmony of action never could be expected. The vital considerations attending supplies drawn from different bases would probably make themselves felt at the very commencement of operations. It was well known that Wellington drew his supplies from the coast; Blücher from Liège and the Rhine. Considering the extended cantonments of the Allied generals, accurately known in Paris, it was reasonable to suppose that a rapid blow struck at the joint connecting the two armies would render general concentration difficult or impossible, and offer opportunity of detailed engagements.

Superior to each singly, the Emperor could count in this case upon success; and their own special interests—almost necessities—must determine the diverging lines of retreat which each commander, in the very nature of things, must adopt.

Such considerations were peculiarly attractive for the Emperor, who had never yet failed to derive advantage from them; and this, together with the certainty that, if he remained purely on the defensive, he must abandon territory, and thus increase the discontent now general in most parts of France, with the conviction, too, that to be successful all defence must be largely leavened with offence, decided the matter.

The Emperor determined to operate offensively against the

Anglo-Prussian armies occupying the line of the Sambre and Meuse.

Even then there were three courses open to him:—

1. To attack the Prussians on the Meuse, and cut them from their base.

2. Enter Belgium by Mons to threaten Wellington's communications with Antwerp.

3. Advance by the Sambre against the point of union of the Anglo-Prussian force.

The western frontier of Belgium is open to invasion by nature, though this is to some extent remedied by art. Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Courtrai, Tournai, and Mons are so many fortresses on the several roads between the Lis, the Scheldt, the Dendre, and the Sambre, and the country was inundated where practicable; the object here being rather to impede than to defend. This territory, with Brussels, the capital, was intrusted to the English general, while the Prussians occupied the line of the Meuse or eastern half of the Netherlands. One fortress, Namur, only was in their hands, but it was covered from France by the Ardennes.

Attack was not contemplated here; if purposed at all, it was probably to be expected on the right or by the central line.

The strength of the armies was—

English,	106,000	196 guns	(Siborne).
Prussians,	117,000	300 „	(Siborne).
French,	124,000	344 „	(Charras).

Their organisation was, English—into 2 corps d'armée and a reserve.

Orange,	{	1st Corps.—Cooke, Alten, and the greater part of the Dutch Belgians under Chassé, Perponcher, and Collaert. The corps was at Braine-le-Comte, on each side of the highway from Mons to Brussels.
		2d Corps.—Colville, Clinton, and the remainder of the Dutch Belgians under Prince Frederick of Orange. This was at Ath, extending right as far as the Lys, left as far as Mons.
Hill,	{	Reserve.—Picton, Cole, Nassauers and Brunswickers, at Brussels.
Wellington,	{	Cavalry.—Lord Uxbridge at Enghien.

Prussians—into 4 corps.

1st Corps,	Ziethen	(Charleroi),	31,000
2d „	Pirch	(Namur),	32,000
3d „	Thielemann	(Ciney),	24,000
4th „	Bulow	(Liège),	30,000

French—into 6 corps, the Guard, and reserve cavalry.

1st Corps,	(D'Erlon)	at Lille,	20,000
2d „	(Reille)	at Valenciennes,	24,500
3d „	(Vandamme)	at Mezières,	19,000
4th „	(Gerard)	at Metz,	16,000
6th „	(Lobau)		10,500
Guard,	}	In the rear	21,000
Reserve cavalry,		towards Paris,	13,500
			<hr/>
			Total. 124,500

One of the first tests of a general's capacity and skill, is his method of concentration for offence. To select the right point; to conceal by demonstrations the contemplated purpose; to execute it rapidly and without confusion; to organise the important question of supply,—are all considerations rendering the task difficult.

In the present instance Napoleon's 125,000 men extended in a long line of cantonments from Lille to Metz, with the rear-guard at Paris. The problem was to concentrate these on a small space of ground, close to the frontier, without attracting the attention of the enemy too much. For safety this could not be too close to it; and to cover the movement demonstrations were necessary, the distance from flank to flank being 250 miles, and from front to rear 150 miles. There was little fear of attention being attracted by a march from Paris by Soissons, Laon, and Maubeuge; it was natural that an army should be opposed to the masses concentrating in Belgium. What would attract more attention would be closing in from right to left towards the centre at Maubeuge, thus revealing the purpose of marching upon Charleroi.

Gerard was farthest off, and therefore started first on the 7th June very quietly, the gates of Metz being guarded and nobody allowed to leave. Even his own officers were kept in ignorance of the true destination, which was Philippeville.

The Guard quitted Compiègne on the 8th, *en route* for Beaumont; D'Erlon's reserve started on the 9th from Lille to Valenciennes; Reille left that town on the 11th, as D'Erlon approached, marching for Maubeuge, whither Vandamme, who was at Mézières, was also directed: thus, while Vandamme moved to his left, D'Erlon and Reille were closing to the right.

Demonstrations were meanwhile made from Lille and Dunkirk to alarm Wellington for his communications with the sea, and to announce a French movement towards Lille, Ghent, and Antwerp.

All the corps were in movement when Napoleon quitted Paris on June 12th. On the 14th he arrived at Beaumont and found his army assembled on the line Beaumont-Philippeville, with the enemy apparently not yet alarmed.

The exact position of the French troops on this night was:—

D'Erlon,	1st Corps,	Solre-sur-Sambre,	}	Left,	44,000
Reille,	2d "	Leers,			
Gerard,	4th "	Philippeville,		Right,	16,000
Lobau,	6th "	Beaumont,		Centre,	10,000
Vandamme,	3d "	"		"	17,000
Guard,		"		"	20,000
Cavalry under Grouchy, Pajol, Excelmans, Kellerman, and Milhaud, in front and rear of Beaumont,					13,000

The *morale* of this force was perfect, and it had but one defect—that of having new officers to old soldiers.

The headquarters of the Allies were—Wellington at Brussels, and Blucher at Namur.

Early on the 14th, a report came to Blucher from Ziethen, who was fully alive to the French concentration, of the assemblage of troops in his front; further information arrived later.

Wellington also learned from the Prussians, according to Hooper, that the French troops had been increased; but did not deem it expedient to make any movement, except for the assembly of the alarm posts, until the intentions of the enemy were declared. He was under the impression that he would not be really attacked by the Sambre and Meuse; but Blucher

moved at once: and on the night of the 14th, Bulow was ordered to Hannut, Pirch to Sombref, Thielemann to Namur, while Ziethen retreated fighting to Fleurus.

The question has been raised by Chesney whether the Allied cantonments were not unnecessarily and dangerously scattered. Müffling points out that it was impossible for the Allies to concentrate in time to oppose Napoleon's attack if made by Lille and Ath, or by Mons and Hal, or by Charleroi and Genappe; for each of the distances from Liège and Ciney to the nearest points of the nearest of the three lines is greater than Napoleon's whole march to Brussels would be. Kennedy asserts, therefore, that the dispositions must be faulty, rejecting as puerile the necessity of spreading out for subsistence; and, admitting the substance of the Duke's assertion that it was necessary for him to observe the first-named routes, he has indicated how the troops might have been disposed so as on the first alarm to have assembled, the Prussians at Genappe, and Wellington at Hal. On correct principles it has been advocated by Willisen that when time is insufficient to concentrate forward, it must be effected rearwards, at any sacrifice of territory—for concentration is the first and paramount object to be aimed at.

The truth is, that although most cases, whether of offence or defence, had been foreseen and talked over by the Allies, the conviction obtained that it was not probable Napoleon would take the offensive; and further, his concentration was a splendid military operation, which found them more or less unready. Blucher was well acquainted with Napoleon, and was the first to act, while Wellington delayed.

Hooper's defence of the Duke is that of an advocate rather than of an historian.

But these very circumstances disprove the assertion made earlier by Chesney (page 37), "That the attempts to restore his throne by arms was the greatest of conceivable blunders." The Emperor's plan was based upon the imperfect preparations of the Allies; and he presumed to engage an army, originally inferior, on equal terms by skill and surprise, which is the great object of all true strategy.

The theatre of war has five natural divisions :—

- | | | |
|-----|-------------|---------------------|
| (1) | Between the | Sea and the Lys. |
| (2) | " | Lys and Scheldt. |
| (3) | " | Scheldt and Sambre. |
| (4) | " | Sambre and Meuse. |
| (5) | " | Meuse and Moselle. |

In this area the fortresses closing or defending the three gaps towards the west were (1) Dunkirk and Ypres, (2) Courtrai and Oudenarde, (3) Tournai and Mons.

The country in the neighbourhood of the Sambre is undulating and partially wooded, with no fortresses, and good roads leading direct to Brussels. This area therefore offered other great advantages besides that of containing the point of junction of the Allies; and viewing all these considerations, the Emperor decided on selecting it, striking at the point of union of both armies, engaging each separately, and, after defeating them, to occupy the capital and enlist the resources of Belgium.

The orders for march were therefore issued; the corps were to move at 3 A.M., so as to arrive on the Sambre by 9 or 10 A.M.

Reille, on Marchiennes, seized the bridge there, pressing Ziethen back.

D'Erlon followed him slowly.

Vandamme was to appear before Charleroi by 10 A.M. with Rogiat and the engineers, escorted by Pajol; Lobau was to start one hour after Vandamme; the Guard an hour after Lobau; the baggage was not to follow the corps; and lastly, Gerard was to move from Philippeville at 3 for Le Châtelet, to seize the bridge and cross the river there.

Thus the first operation was the passage of the Sambre and concentration on the left bank; but already unforeseen difficulties occurred, and while Vandamme was delayed by the non-arrival of his orders till 6 A.M., Gerard was not ready to start till 5, and reaching Châtelet late that day, at 3 P.M., owing to bad roads, only crossed with part of his troops. Still the bridge of Charleroi was in French hands by noon, though Pajol had previously been repulsed. The roads followed by Reille had been bad, and his flanking parties had crossed at

Lobbes, patrolling towards Mons and Binche. Thus by 12 o'clock the heads of the left and centre column were over the Sambre, though the rear of the former was still struggling in the valley of the river, the rear of the centre was yet 2 hours distant from Charleroi, and the right was 3 hours from Châtelet.

The first part of the programme had been imperfectly executed, only Reille's corps, part of the Guard, and two other divisions, were on the left bank. Bourmont's desertion the previous evening had possibly rendered slight alterations necessary, and had caused further delay. Ziethen, pressed by Reille and endangered by the loss of Charleroi, succeeded by skilful handling and hard fighting in extricating his brigade and retreating on Gilly for Fleurus and Bry. Ney arrived at 4 P.M. at the fork of the Namur and Brussels roads, and was directed to take command of the 1st and 2d corps, Pire's cavalry, and the light horse of the Guard, forming the left column, and advance on Brussels, as the Prussians, by retreating towards the north-east, had left the road open. Grouchy, hesitating to attack the Prussians at Gilly, rode back for instructions; but the position was eventually carried at 6 P.M., the Prussians halting at Fleurus, the French at Lambusart.

On the left, Bachelu encountered Perponcher at Frasné, when Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar directed a retreat on Quatre Bras, where, the ground concealing his weakness, he proposed to stand; and Ney reconnoitring the position at 8 P.M. decided that, with his men fatigued by 17 hours' marching, he would not attack. He therefore halted the troops at Frasné and returned to Charleroi. Thus, on the evening of the 15th, the positions were as follows:—

French.

<i>Left.</i>	{	Ney's cavalry and 1 division, Reille,	Frasné.
		2 " "	Gosselies.
		1 " Gerard,	Wangenies.
	{	D'Erlon	between Marchiennes and Gosselies.
<i>Centre.</i>	{	Infantry of the Guard, at	Charleroi.
	{	Its heavy cavalry and two of Grouchy's reserve cavalry divisions with Lobau, South of Sambre.	
<i>Right.</i>	{	Vandamme, before Fleurus and Gilly.	
	{	Gerard, half north half south of the Sambre.	

Thus 35,000 men at least were not over, though the order of the day designed that they should be across by noon.

Prussians.

Ziethen at Fleurus and Bry, after fighting on both roads.

Pirch at Mazy, 4 miles from Sombref.

Thielemann at Namur.

Bulow marching for Hannut, delayed by contradictory orders, receiving one order at 5 A.M. on the 15th, to concentrate, and then another to march at once on Hannut, which was 25 miles from Ligny.

English.

Headquarters and reserve at Brussels.

Prince of Orange to collect at Ath, Braine-le-Comte, and Nivelles.

Perponcher spontaneously occupied Quatre Bras, instead of Nivelles, as ordered.

Lord Hill at Enghien with also the cavalry.

Prince Frederick's Belgians at Sotteghem.

COMMENTS.

From Charleroi the main road diverges a short distance north of the town, sending one branch through Gosselies, Quatre Bras, Mont St Jean, and Brussels—the other by Gilly, Fleurus, Ligny, and Sombref, to Liège. The great highway from Namur to Nivelles passes through Sombref and Quatre Bras, and thus the three points Charleroi, Sombref, Quatre Bras, form what is called the Fleurus triangle, the sides of which are respectively—

Quatre Bras	Charleroi,	13 miles ;
Sombref	Quatre Bras,	8 miles ;
Charleroi	Sombref,	13 miles ;

while Brussels is 21 miles from Quatre Bras.

It was on the northern face of this triangle that the junction of the Allied forces was to take place. The Prussians were to assemble between Sombref and Charleroi, the English between Marchiennes and Gosselies. As Müffling asserts, "had these positions been attained, the Allied armies would have guarded the approaches to the Brussels and Namur roads, and the one attacked would be aided by a flank attack from the other."

At 3 P.M. on the 15th, but one *Prussian* corps was on the

ground—and, save Perponcher, not one man of Wellington's army was within reach of it; while 40,000 French had crossed at Marchiennes, and 70,000 were crossing at Charleroi.

If this be so, not only is the dislocation of the troops open to criticism, but dispositions based on such a possible dislocation are open to censure as marking a miscalculation of time and distance.

Bernard of Saxe Weimar had concentrated his brigade at Quatre Bras, with one battalion and a light battery at Frasne, and was prepared to check Ney. But the rising ground and woods obscuring his position, and the fatigued state of the French left wing, which, marching since 3 A.M., was considerably in advance of the right, justified Ney in not advancing unless his orders were peremptory. His own division stretched far back, and Napoleon himself could not know what force confronted him at Quatre Bras.

The first intelligence of the advance was received by Müffling from Ziethen about 3 P.M. on the 15th, but none had arrived from the other Allied outposts; orders for divisional concentration were therefore transmitted about 6 P.M. Ziethen has stated that at 4 A.M. he despatched the news that he was attacked to Wellington also; but it was late in the afternoon when, receiving a brief account from the Prince of Orange, the first order directing the troops to be in readiness was issued; the Prince of Orange was to collect at Ath and Braine-le-Comte with the Dutch Belgians at Nivelles, where the 3d division was also to march if necessary.

The Prince of Orange had remained at Brussels and gone to a ball, but reached Braine at 3 A.M. on the 16th, after having been treated with some petulance by Wellington, on account of his anxiety regarding the French advance. Nevertheless the second order for actual movement was at length issued.

As we have seen, at this time Prince Bernard *had* concentrated his brigade at Quatre Bras, and Constant Rebecque (Orange's chief of staff) had at 10 P.M. received orders to support him.

The second order directed a concentration at Nivelles, which, if carried out, would have left the Quatre Bras and Brussels road open to Ney as far as Waterloo.

The night passed, therefore, without a man of Wellington's force having moved towards the enemy, save those Dutch Belgians who had concentrated without orders from headquarters, and who recognised the danger of the situation.

Hooper asserts that Wellington would have done what Perponcher did had he been at Nivelles or Braine; but that brings the question to the real issue,—Was Wellington in his right place at Brussels on the 15th? The best answer is to refer to Muffling's own opinion.

On the French side the concentration had been far from perfect. Vandamme's delay in receiving his order, probably due to the despatch of only one messenger, who was prevented by a fall from conveying it until Lobau had closed with the 3d corps, has been described by Napoleon "un funeste contretemps;" the vital position, the line Quatre Bras-Sombref, had not been gained, for neither Ney nor Grouchy had, thanks to Ziethen's fine bearing, been able to advance as far that day.

Much discussion has taken place with regard to Ney's orders. Undoubtedly verbally given, their character has been generally a subject for dispute. There were evident reasons why he did not reach the necessary point, in the fatigue and want of concentration of his own force; and at any rate, the orders issued to move at break of day on the 16th beyond Quatre Bras, occupying then the Brussels-Nivelles-Namur road, made no reference to any previous neglect, nor does it appear that Grouchy was expressly directed to occupy Sombref.

Still the balance of strategical success was assuredly with Napoleon. He had nearly 100,000 men north of the Sambre on the very ground on which the Allies were to have met him. Blucher had but one corps there, two were near, and the fourth not available at all. Wellington had moved not a man, but had ordered a concentration which would have kept Ney at liberty to push on to within 15 miles of Brussels.

16th June.—Ney spent many hours of the night with the Emperor, and left him at 2 A.M. without positive orders.

Grouchy reported at 6 A.M. that the Prussians (Pirch only) were deploying before Fleurus; but it was not till 8 A.M. that the dispositions for the day were conceived. The general plan was to form the army into two wings, each to act on one side of the Fleurus triangle.

Grouchy with Gerard, Vandamme, and three out of the four corps of reserve cavalry, was to march on Sombref, take up a position there, push on an advanced-guard towards Gembloux, reconnoitre well to the front, and establish communication with Ney.

Ney with Reille, D'Erlon, one corps of reserve cavalry, and the cavalry of the Guard, was directed to put himself in motion for Quatre Bras, reconnoitring the Brussels and Nivelles roads; and, if not inconvenient, to push a division and some cavalry to Genappe, and another to Marbais, connecting these with the cavalry of the Guard.

The Emperor went to Sombref.

Simultaneously with these orders a separate letter was dictated to Ney, concluding,—“At 3 P.M. or perhaps in the evening at Gembloux, will decide on my course according to circumstances. I wish you to arrive at Brussels to-morrow morning.”

Evidently the Emperor concluded at this period that the Allies, surprised, would endeavour to unite by retreating, if they had any intention of uniting at all.

The orders were transmitted to Ney at 11 A.M. He had reported that the enemy was concentrating at Quatre Bras; and in reply received a third despatch, directing him to concentrate D'Erlon, Reille, and Kellerman, and drive the British out, afterwards detaching D'Erlon to operate on the Prussian right.

This answer to the evident importance of Ney's report, evinces some previous uncertainty of action on this side.

Ney then issued his instructions to his lieutenants. D'Erlon was to send three divisions to Frasne and one to Marbais, the cavalry under Kellerman to remain at Frasne for the time. Reille, who had waited for distinct orders, owing to Gerard's report of the concentration of the Prussians on the Ligny heights, moved off at 11 to Frasne (about six miles), and at

2 P.M. the French advance in force brought on the battle of Quatre Bras.

Meanwhile Vandamme had advanced through Fleurus, and the rest of the French had crossed the Sambre. Grouchy's advance had come into contact with the Prussians, and at 3 P.M. commenced the battle of Ligny.

<i>French.</i>	{ With Ney,	45,000
	{ With Napoleon,	64,000
	{ In support, Lobau,	10,000
	{ In rear,	5,000
		<hr/>
		124,000
<i>Prussian.</i>	Blucher, 3 corps,	87,000
<i>British.</i>	{ Perponcher's division only at first,	
	{ but finally in all,	30,000

At 11 A.M., Wellington had arrived from Brussels, and had an interview with Blucher at Bry, where it was decided that if Wellington were not attacked he should support Blucher, but if assailed, he should endeavour to drive back to Frasne the force opposed to him at Quatre Bras, though he was ignorant of its strength. On his return to Quatre Bras, the position of the force there was extremely dangerous, and the Prince of Orange was hard pressed; but Picton and Van Merlen's arrival at 3 P.M., the former after a delay at Waterloo, the latter from Nivelles, somewhat restored the battle.

At 6 P.M. came the last order from Napoleon to Ney. The severe nature of the fight at Ligny was commented on, and the Marshal was directed to manœuvre so as to fall on the right rear of the Prussians, for "the fate of France is in your hands."

But the force confronting him was too strong to be neglected, and the battle was far too pronounced. Another attack, aided by Kellerman, was defeated by the English Guards, and Ney was driven back to Frasne, while his opponent bivouacked on the ground. At this time the force at Wellington's disposal amounted to 30,000 men.

The failure of the French plan on this side was chiefly due to the eccentric movements of D'Erlon's corps: first, when advancing towards Ney, it had diverged towards the

field of Ligny, where it was mistaken for an enemy's column; then countermarching towards Frasné, it reached there after Ney's defeat, so that the 1st corps, which would have been valuable in either battle, was lost to both.

Napoleon had fought the Allies in two battles, in which the English leader had 62,000 men absent, and the Prussian 30,000, with nevertheless inferior numbers at both points. D'Erlon had not assisted Ney; Lobau had not been used at Ligny.

COMMENTS.

No orders were issued till six hours of daylight had passed away, and the French remained inactive while Blücher concentrated at Ligny three-fourths of his army. This was because clearly Napoleon expected no serious opposition from either the English or Prussians at present, and he had exaggerated the value of his own success so far. He hesitated too, in indecision whether to press on between the Allies to Brussels, or to strike heavily the Prussian right. This delay was in fact due to false impressions of the enemy, and to waiting for information before acting. Blame has here again been unjustly thrown on Ney; but there was evidently no delay on Ney's part when the orders were really issued, for the Marshal actually exceeded his instructions in not waiting for D'Erlon, who, left till 11 A.M. in rear of Gosselies, was consequently late in coming up, and then turned off the road to Frasné, owing to the mistaken zeal of an aide-de-camp, when he should rather have marched on Quatre Bras. When he did so in obedience to Ney's imperative order, the Emperor tacitly consenting, he arrived too late to influence the action, and Ney was consequently outnumbered, defeated, and driven back.

Nevertheless Ney had fully employed Wellington, and had prevented his active co-operation with Blücher, who was beaten by the Emperor's superior tactics.

It is important to bear in mind the original problem Napoleon had to solve—viz., being inferior in force, to prevent the general concentration of his two adversaries, and to engage each singly on terms of equality at least. Having crossed the Sambre, no time was to be lost. Strategic success is of no

value unless followed up immediately by the tactical blow, for the enemy recovers and has time to meet the emergency.

One danger was attached to the enterprise—that in dealing with two armies, each equal to him, in the manner proposed, he would be jammed in between them, as was subsequently the case at Waterloo. Here was an additional reason for rapid action.

Probably he was of the opinion, judging from the precedent mentioned by Chesney, that, if they were unable to effect concentration, each Allied army would retire along diverging lines to their respective bases, thus exposing Brussels.

In this case there is a strange alteration in the personal character of the man, and the true cause of the lost opportunity must be sought in the Emperor's own shortcomings. To shift these on the shoulders of subordinates, to retain untarnished the most splendid military reputation ever gained by man, was his own object and that of his advocates, causing endless controversies, now cleared up by the efforts of Charras, Quinet, Kennedy, Chesney, and Clausewitz.

The effect of these shortcomings was the indecisive result of the 16th—that is to say, the opportunity of effecting concentration was still left to the Allies if they knew how to avail themselves of it. This question of reunion is all-important to a clear understanding of the campaign. It could be answered only by the Prussians, who were defeated at Ligny. Wellington victorious at Quatre Bras, could not unite with Blucher retiring on Namur and Liège; nor could he dictate his line of retreat to Blucher when his communications were concerned, for subsistence must come before all. His determination would therefore be dependent on the resolution of the Prussian commander in his hour of defeat.

Blucher, unhorsed at Ligny, was absent, so Gneisenau assumed command and issued orders for retreat upon Wavre.

From the readiness of the order, the point had probably been talked over during the progress of the action, the result had been foreseen, and the all-importance of seeking communication in rear was at once recognised. The real merit and value of the step is to be sought in the sinking of individual considerations for the general purpose of the campaign.

Retreat on Wavre signified unassured subsistence in 24 hours, and the risk was encountered for the purpose of advantageous battle. This was precisely what Napoleon did not expect. He wrote on the early morning of the 17th to Ney, "The Prussian army has been put to rout; Pajol is pursuing it on the road to Namur and Liège." By deciding to retire on Wavre, therefore, the Prussians not only deprived Napoleon of any strategic results at Ligny, but they repaired their own early faults, and by deceiving the anticipations of the Emperor, induced him to commit a series of mistakes.

We have seen Wellington remaining in possession of Quatre Bras, having narrowly escaped losing the position by withholding so long the advance of the reserve.

The question of the absolute value of Quatre Bras has been contested. Clausewitz urges that Ney could not have pushed on towards Brussels without risk; that his advancing could not have prevented Wellington's concentration at some point beyond; that in occupying Wellington, Ney's task was fulfilled; and that intervention at Ligny was an afterthought. It is evident, however, that if the Prussians purposed to fight at Ligny, Quatre Bras was all-important. Wellington's concentration would be impeded by its loss, his subsequent communication with Blucher would be rendered difficult, and co-operation at Waterloo improbable.

Favoured by fortune in not having lost that point, where he had only three-eighths of his infantry, one-third of his guns, and one-seventh of his cavalry, henceforth Wellington shines with singular brilliancy.

17th June.—The Prussians started for Wavre at the earliest daybreak, Bulow being at Sauviniere; Ziethen by Tilly, Gentinnes, Mont St Guibert to Wavre, where he crossed the Dyle; Pirch followed, halting on the south side; Thielemann with the reserve parks moved by Gembloux (2 P.M.), reaching Wavre so late that the whole corps was not carried to the north bank; Bulow by Walhain and Corbaix to Dion-le-Mont, relieving Pirch and covering the rear of the army. More direct movement across the Dyle was not feasible, owing to

the nature of the country and the necessity for uniting with Bulow, whose reinforcements were valuable. Wavre therefore united the requisite demands both for junction and concentration.

Wellington slept at Genappe, ignorant, it is said, of the Prussian intention and the events of the day at Ligny. During the night his force had been increased to 45,000 ; but Hill was still at Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte, and Enghien—and Chassé still at Nivelles. He rode early to Quatre Bras, where he communicated with Ziethen, and received messages from Blücher, when retreat became of course necessary. The French were inactive under his eyes ; and this, coupled with the Prussian retreat, influenced his resolve to halt and fight in front of Brussels on the previously-reconnoitred position of Waterloo, which, from its situation and proximity to Blücher, seemed appropriate, provided that the Prussian general would assist him with a part of his army. The retreat was therefore conducted in good order. Hill moved direct from Nivelles on Waterloo, Prince Frederick and Colville from Enghien to Hal, where they remained to cover Brussels on that side ; and during the day, Blücher, who had recovered from his fall and resumed command, sent the cheering message that he would march with his whole army to join Wellington on the heights of Mont St Jean. Such a resolution of a commander of a defeated army without supplies requires no comment. Napoleon, who had slept at Fleurus, visited the battle-field at 8 A.M. There were three courses open to him : 1. To follow the retreating Prussians with all the force in hand ; 2. To march away from them, and, uniting with Ney, crush Wellington ; 3. Pursue the beaten army, and advance against the other. He selected the latter ; and a first despatch was sent to Ney containing the provisional order that if only an English rear-guard was at Quatre Bras, he was to "beat it off," as the day was required for reorganisation. Lobau (*minus* Teste) therefore advanced to that point at 10 A.M., and was followed by the Guard an hour later. A second letter was forwarded to Ney at noon, directing him to attack the enemy in his front, in which he would be supported from Marbais. After this he sent for Grouchy, and, giving him verbal instructions, intrusted

him with a detached command to pursue the Prussians. His force was composed of—

Vandamme,	13,400
Gerard,	12,200
Pajol,	1,300
Excelmans,	3,100
Teste,	3,000

Total, 33,000, with 96 guns.

Grouchy's remonstrances on the ground of the start obtained by the Prussians, were made in vain. Positive written orders from Marbais followed, directing him to march on Gembloux, pursue vigorously to complete Blucher's defeat, find out what the enemy was doing, and communicate with Napoleon by the Namur road.

Already doubts began to rise in Napoleon's mind relative to the course the Prussians had adopted. But Grouchy's cavalry had started, though the infantry were delayed; and finally, heavy rain having rendered the march on bad roads inconceivably slow and tedious, the tail of the column reached Gembloux at 10 P.M. Here he reported on Thielemann's march, and inferred from it that the Prussians had divided—the right to join Wellington, the centre with Blucher on Liège, the left to Namur; but he did not, until 2 A.M. on the following morning, decide on marching to Wavre rather than to Perwez. Excluding the Guard, which was left at Ligny, the French force at Quatre Bras on this day numbered 72,000 men and 240 guns. The pursuit of the British was continued through a day of rain, without any great delay except that caused by a cavalry action at Genappe; and at dusk the army halted in presence of the enemy, and bivouacked at La Belle Alliance.

The inaccuracy of Thiers's account of this day is singularly noticeable, as, indeed, is that of many other historians; and the blame thrown on Ney seems to be without foundation. Bulow's position at Dion-le-Mont was ill chosen, as the crossing of the columns became unavoidable. The lack of information from the Prussians exposed Wellington to grave danger on the 17th, had the French been disposed to push their advantage.

The delay of the French, the misappreciation displayed by Napoleon of the Prussian line of retreat and the nature of the hostile combination, coupled with the lateness of his departure for the Quatre Bras road, were errors pregnant with the gravest results. When the Emperor started at noon, Wellington was already retreating, and the Prussians were assembling at Wavre, while Grouchy was outside the Prussians. He has been unjustly blamed for not reconnoitring the Tilly road, for his last instructions were not verbal, but written and explicit.

18th June.—At Mont St Jean. The night of the 17th had passed with heavy rain until 4 A.M., and the troops suffered much. The Emperor was calmly confident of victory, and, enjoying the sight of the enemy in position, did not hurry his preparations for battle. No allusion was made to his expecting any active support from Grouchy; and this fact, coupled with his inactivity, serves to show how completely he was deceived as to the nature of the purposed Prussian co-operation. At 8 A.M. he learned that Wellington was not intrenched, and deployed his army in three lines. The deliberation of this parade of his strength was designed to exercise a moral influence on the enemy.

Wellington was equally prepared at 8 A.M., and rode down the front of his line of battle.

NUMBERS.—Wellington, 69,000 (of which 12,000 were cavalry), and 156 guns. Napoleon, 72,000 (of which 15,000 were cavalry), and 240 guns.

Muffling meanwhile was engaged in making arrangements for the Prussian co-operation. There were three lines by which their assistance could be rendered :—

1. Should Wellington's right be attacked, the Prussians could march to Ohain.

2. If the centre or left, one corps should move on St Lambert, and the rest on Ohain.

3. Should the French advance on St Lambert, the Prussians should receive the attack while Wellington operated on the French flank and rear.

Of these the second was finally seen to be probable; and at 11.30 word to that effect was sent to Blucher.

There were two roads from Wavre to the battle-field :—

1. By St Lambert and the Lasne valley to Plancenoit and the Caillon farm on the Brussels road.

2. By Froidmont and Ohain to Mont St Jean.

Both therefore were to be used by the Prussians on the 18th—the first by Bulow and Pirch, the second by Ziethen ; while Thielemann, covering the march if no enemy pursued, was to follow to Plancenoit. The country between Wavre and Waterloo is broken into wooded hills with country lanes in the hollows between them, which had been rendered unusually bad by the heavy rain. Thus there were many things which delayed Blucher's advance. Bulow's position on the wrong side of the Dyle on the 17th, necessitated, in order to get him into his position in retreat, his crossing Ziethen's line of march ; a fire broke out in the town while the corps of Bulow was passing through ; and lastly, the late muster of the troops, for they did not start till 7, all tended to render their advance slow, so that it was noon before Bulow's leading brigade reached St Lambert, and 3 o'clock before the troops had closed up. Still, at 4.30 Blucher advanced with what troops he had in hand against the French right.

Napoleon was aware before going into battle of the line taken by Ziethen from Ligny, but he was still under the impression that the mass of Blucher's force had gone eastward from that battle-field. He did not know that round Wavre were then assembled, and even moving towards him, 100,000 Prussians.

At 10 A.M. a letter was sent to Grouchy to inform him of the impending battle, and directing him to march on Wavre, thus implying the conviction that he was between Blucher and Wellington.

It is not intended to go into the details of the battle. The position was strong and well chosen. The tenacity of Wellington's soldiery enabled him to hold out against, on the whole, better troops ; but there were still two striking defects in the Allied dispositions—the retention of the detachment at Hal, and the tardiness, unavoidable in some respects as it was, of the Prussian march. The leading events of the action may be summarised as follows :—

11.30. Artillery-fire.

12. Attack on Hougomont (a demonstration).

1.30. Ney's attack with D'Erlon on the left centre. About this time columns of troops were seen towards St Lambert, and 3000 cavalry were detached, while a second letter was despatched to Grouchy directing him to "crush Bulow." A Prussian hussar was also captured; and Napoleon at length began to see clearly the danger that threatened him.

2 P.M. Lobau was detached to the right with 10,000 men.

4. Cavalry attack on the British centre.

6. Infantry assault renewed and La Haye Sainte carried. This endangered the British centre, but the attack was unsupported. About this time the full pressure of Bulow's column was felt by Lobau; and at

6.30. The Guard, 4000 strong, reinforced him.

7.30. Ziethen appeared on Wellington's left, thus relieving the pressure on his centre by releasing the cavalry divisions there; and Lobau was again reinforced, having received altogether 16,000 men. The assault of the Imperial Guard took place about this time, and was repulsed; and at the same time the capture of Plancenoit terminated the action.

Thus there were five distinct attacks—viz., Hougomont, D'Erlon, Cavalry, La Haye Sainte, and the Guard; and of these the first four were received by Wellington without direct help, against an army which Kennedy estimates as superior to him in the ratio of 7 to 4.

Turning to Grouchy, the delays that had attended the operations of the belligerents had been equally shared by him. He had not left his bivouacks till 9 o'clock, and moving by one road reached Sart-les-Walhain, where he heard the cannon of Waterloo. This caused a halt, and a discussion as to the course to be pursued—whether to continue the march according to Napoleon's existing orders, or move on Mousty and Ottignies, and so to Plancenoit, distant 14 miles. Gerard was of the last opinion, Grouchy of the former; and finally the march was resumed on Wavre, an engagement with Pirch's rear-guard occurring at Baraque.

At 2 o'clock the Prussians had crossed the Dyle at Bierges, by which time Ziethen was approaching Ohain, and Bulow St

Lambert, leaving only Thielemann at Wavre, where he was preparing to follow when Vandamme's column appeared. At 4 P.M., when the column had closed up, and Grouchy was making dispositions for attack, the Emperor's first letter reached him; and, congratulating himself on having followed out his superior's express wish, he proceeded to attack. A sharp encounter, lasting until dusk, obtained for him the passage of the Dyle at Limal, two miles higher up than Wavre, though he only succeeded in crossing with one wing of his army; and repulsing there a night attack, the action ceased with both of the contesting parties in ignorance of the greater events that had taken place at Waterloo.

The pursuit from Mont St Jean was conducted in the most perfect manner by the Prussian troops. Gneisenau, with untiring energy, conducted it in person; and some of Bulow's cavalry even reached Gosselies before daybreak on the following day.

COMMENTS.

There are three supposititious reasons for Napoleon's delay in attacking :—

1. To give Grouchy time to arrive; but this is untenable.
2. To let the ground harden after the heavy rain, as it was unfavourable for offensive action.
3. To display his strength, and intimidate his adversary.

All the evidence known shows that he was totally ignorant of Blucher's approach. Even if he had known, under the existing circumstances it would be hopeless to expect any assistance from Grouchy. What with the inclemency of the weather and the state of the roads, he had taken twenty-four hours to traverse the 20 miles between Ligny and Wavre. Had he changed direction, it would have been too late, for, according to Quinet, he could not have reached the battlefield for nine hours.

Blucher's dispositions to support Wellington with 20,000 men, while he threw 70,000 on Napoleon's flank, were excellent; and his errors of detail were due to circumstances which it would have been difficult, though not impossible, to foresee.

The influence of personal character upon soldiers under an emergency is well illustrated by the energy his bearing threw into those he commanded.

Grouchy has been charged with committing an error in not crossing the Dyle at Limal; but while this is refuted by what is known of the opposition he encountered at Wavre, it is Jomini's opinion that two corps at most would have been detained. A minor risk was no doubt incurred by Blucher but it was for the major advantage.

Charras argues that Grouchy's great inferiority to the Prussians prevented his forming an element of importance in the day's operations. This is true enough. The original numerical inferiority was so telling that Grouchy would have been insufficient to counteract it. The flank march of Blucher was equally unsuspected by both Napoleon and Grouchy; and owing to the detachment of Lobau, the French troops engaged with Wellington were reduced to 56,000.

The tactical errors of Napoleon were in themselves serious enough, and were partly due to his altered individuality. Brialmont sums up his criticism by pointing out that the over-deep masses in which the attacks were made, the too early employment of cavalry, his hesitation in pushing his local successes, and the want of support afforded to all his attacks, were distinct errors. For one of these, that of want of support, there is, however, one powerful excuse. Through not recognising the strategic possibility, no arrangements were specially made for the protection of the right wing; and when his attention was drawn to it, his original order was disconnected, and support of other parts of the field became most difficult.

Though Wellington's subdivision of his force by leaving the detachment at Hal is not to be defended, his bearing on the battle-field was perfect; and such a combination of skill and mutual support as was evidenced by the co-operation of Blucher and Wellington at Waterloo, has never before been witnessed in Allied armies led by independent generals. But the victory had been dearly purchased. The Prussian loss was 7000; the British 15,000; and though the French loss

is difficult to estimate, it can scarcely have been less than 30,000 men.

Throughout the whole of the operations of the 17th-18th, Grouchy's conduct is characterised by want of real resolution. He was in possession of 5000 cavalry; and with this force, which was capable at any rate of more speedy movement than the other arms, even under the circumstances of bad roads, &c., the delay in marching off, and the slow progress of the extreme head of his advance, is unaccountable. Above all things, information was required; and for such a purpose ample means were given. A marshal of France, intrusted with 35,000 men for a distinct purpose, is supposed to know his duty without instructions required for a subaltern. No doubt the Emperor was under a false impression, but it was Grouchy's duty to have corrected this. Again, at Sart-les-Walhain there could be no mistake regarding the tenor of the instructions received; but the fact was becoming every moment more palpable that these instructions were issued under false premises.

Before his troops had closed up, he was aware that the bulk of the Prussians were at Wavre, and at the same time there was no doubt on his mind but what Napoleon was engaged with the British at Waterloo. He simply had to examine the possibility of the Prussians manœuvring towards Wellington. The probability was they would; what, otherwise, would have been their object in abandoning their proper line, or in Wellington's standing to fight? If this were so, a further advance on Wavre would be directly opposed to the *spirit* of his instructions. If all this be taken into account, it will probably be considered that Grouchy evinced a lack of those qualities required in an independent commander, and that Soult's and Thiers's strictures in this respect are just.

19th June.—Thielemann attacked Grouchy on the morning of the 19th and was repulsed by the French, who, driving him from point to point, then prepared to march on Brussels. But at 11 A.M. the marshal learnt the events at Waterloo, which news Thielemann had received at 8 or 9.

Pirch halted at the close of the battle, and was ordered to face about so as to march on Sombref; and crossing the Dyle

at Bousval, he, at 11 A.M. on the 19th, reached Mellery (five miles from Sombref), where, 16,000 strong, he halted for the rest of the day waiting for communication with Thielemann.

Grouchy after Wavre had still 30,000 troops; but on his right was Thielemann with 13,000, and on his left Bocke* with 5000 men.

Chesney's view of the situation—viz., that Grouchy's position was desperate—is, however, not apparent. The retreat to Charleroi was doubtless closed, and the Ardennes offered no means of subsistence; but Namur was still open, as the fortress had been abandoned by the Prussians, and if it were seized, the probability of escape was great. Excelmans was therefore despatched with seven regiments of cavalry, and the marshal followed with Gerard, leaving Vandamme at Wavre to mask the retreat. Grouchy reached Sombref the same evening, and Vandamme Gembloux, in seven hours, from Wavre, while Thielemann took up the pursuit at daybreak. Both French corps started for Namur at 7, and both were attacked fruitlessly. At 6 P.M. the whole of the French were in Namur, which Pirch assaulted, and was bloodily repulsed. The next day they moved to Dinant, Givet, and Soissons.

The action of the Prussian commander in this pursuit has been severely criticised, but his best defence is in his inferiority in numbers, and in the wearied condition of his soldiers.

The later events of the campaign are unimportant. On the 21st and 22d of June Ziethen stormed Avesnes, and the Allied armies moved on Paris, the British by the right bank of the Oise, the Prussians by the left, each army further turning its attention to the frontier fortresses on its respective side. Thus Kleist moved on Mezières, Pirch to besiege Mauberge, Landrecies, Phillipeville, Rocroy, and Givet, and the 2d Netherlands corps blockaded Quesney and Valenciennes. On the other side, Cambray was carried on the 25th by Colville, and Peronne on the 26th by Maitland. On the 28th the Prussians came up with Grouchy's rearguard on the Soissons road and near Meaux.

On the 29th and 30th, the Allies had crossed the Oise and Seine near Bondy and St. Germain respectively, and after some slight skirmishes the capital surrendered, and the Allied armies entered it in triumph on the 7th July.

Meanwhile Napoleon had abdicated and retired to Malmaison, leaving it finally for Rambouillet, and thence for Rochefort, where on the 15th

* Of Thielemann's division.

July he surrendered to Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon*, and was conveyed to St Helena. But the return of the Bourbons was not like that of Napoleon at the beginning of the ninety days. To his credit be it said, "not a drop of blood for or against him had stained his restoration to the Imperial throne." But out of a long list of proscriptions delivered to the new conquerors, fifty-eight were sentenced to banishment. Colonel Labédoyère and Ney were sentenced to death and shot. Monsieur de Lavalette was also condemned, but effected his escape. Murat, reaching Corsica, made another effort to regain his throne of Naples, but met with no assistance from the populace, was taken prisoner, and after going through the form of trial, was led at once from the court-martial and shot. And so the last days of the First Empire ended in the death of two of the bravest marshals who ever fought for France.

The final conditions of peace imposed on the French king were sufficiently onerous. The frontiers of the kingdom were to be limited to those occupied in 1790; the expenses of the war and the indemnity for the spoliation committed by Napoleon on the confederated states amounted to £81,500,000; and finally, an army of occupation was to hold seventeen of her fortresses for five years, and to be supported by the French Government.

This was finally reduced to three years; and on the 30th September 1818, a general parade of the army of occupation was held on the plains of Farnas near Valenciennes, and the Allies withdrew from French territory.

Thus terminated the wars of the Republic and the First Empire which followed the great Revolution, and which were in part, if not chiefly, caused by the assistance the sovereigns of Europe had rendered to the deposed and banished Bourbons, as well as by the hostility they had shown to the form of government first adopted by the French people.

CHAPTER VIII.

NOVARA, 1849.

Introductory.—The peace of Europe remained unbroken for many years after the treaty of Paris. An alliance between England, France, and Russia against the Turks, in support of the independence of Greece, led to the naval battle of Navarino in 1827, and in the following year a war broke out between Russia and Turkey, which was the result in some degree of this intervention. France and England again became allies in 1830, when the Belgians revolted against the Dutch rule; and in 1831 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was proclaimed king, the neutrality of Belgium being guaranteed by the great Powers. The five great European States again acted in concert in 1840 against the Pacha of Egypt, and despite the withdrawal of France from the coalition, enforced the abandonment of Syria by the Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Pasha, when Acre, Sidon, and Beyrout were bombarded by Stopford and Napier, and the integrity of Turkey was once more preserved. But in 1848 the elements of discord again appeared in two quarters, and led indirectly to the greater campaigns that have occurred since that date.

Denmark had in 1846 incorporated Schleswig and Holstein into its kingdom; but in 1848 these Duchies, during the continued disturbances and revolutions that were then shaking almost every throne in Europe, proclaimed their independence, and were supported in their demands by Prussia. On the other hand, Sweden and Russia supported Denmark; and while the German ports were blockaded, some fruitless fighting occurred at Düppel and Gravenstein—after which, owing to the mediation of Great Britain, an armistice was concluded at Malmö.

In Italy, Venice and Milan attempted to throw off the Austrian yoke, and Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, marched to the assistance of the insurgents; but he was finally defeated at Somma Riviera and Milan, and falling back on Turin, concluded an armistice with Austria.

Throughout the whole of this year and part of the following, nearly every Continental State was torn by intestine revolutions. France had declared a republic, and Louis Philippe had fled to England. Disturbances occurred in Prussia, and Berlin was at one time in a state of siege.

Revolts occurred at Naples, Sicily, and Rome, and at the latter place an attempt at French intervention by Oudinot eventually succeeded. In Vienna and Frankfurt the insurgents had to be reduced to submission by force of arms; and when the Emperor of Austria resigned his crown to his nephew Francis Joseph, the Hungarians refused to accept his sovereignty, and a fiercely-contested struggle began in Hungary, which was only crushed by the active intervention of Russia (1849).

Thus the troubles of this stormy period shattered the long peace which had followed the mighty wars of the Napoleonic Empire, and from Denmark arose directly or indirectly the campaigns of 1864 in Schleswig, 1866 in Germany and Italy, and 1870 in France; while the Italian revolt resulted in those of 1849, 1859, and 1866, by which, chiefly, Italy became a united kingdom, and ceased to be merely a geographical expression.

The political frame of Europe rests upon certain treaties usually executed on the termination of long wars. It is in the nature of things that that power which has been defeated in war should find many of its best interests disregarded, or damaged, on such occasions. The first fitting opportunity is consequently seized by the sufferer to remedy those national grievances which he may have been compelled to put up with on the morrow of military disaster. Thus it comes to pass that these very documents, upon which, as a basis, the peace of Europe rests, themselves necessarily contain the seeds of future wars. Such eventualities may be deferred, or precipitated, according to the moderation, or greed, displayed by the victorious combatant; but until a tribunal for the periodical revision of settlements, which after-events have rendered no longer necessary or absolutely unjust, be constituted by the common consent of the European community, it is difficult to discern by what means the evil, which all concur in deploring, may be avoided.

It was but natural that the Powers which had contributed so much blood and treasure towards the purpose of the long wars which characterised the commencement of the present century, should be eager to consolidate their own interests, when the common object was effected by the downfall of Napoleon. The treaties of 1815, therefore, calculated to satisfy the demands of Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, must inevitably contain the elements of future political discontent for France, Poland, and Italy. As a conse-

quence, each of these countries became, in turn, the scene of revolution or insurrection; and the second campaign of the first war of Italian independence merits careful attention.

The war originated in 1848, in the endeavour of the inhabitants to make a first step towards national unity, by expelling Austrian influence from Italian soil. By right of treaty, Austria was in actual possession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and, by virtue of dynastic relationship with the other reigning houses, she asserted her supremacy in the peninsula. Her rule throughout the territory which belonged to her had at first been mild and beneficent; but the form of government she employed was despotic, and as such, peculiarly odious to the Italians. Twice already, since the peace, military power had been effectually employed to quell violent outbursts of popular disaffection; but the fire still smouldered, and, on the elevation of the present Pope—then known for his liberal tendencies—to the Chair, in 1846, threatened to break out once more into open flame. The revolution in Paris, which deprived Louis Philippe of his throne, in February 1848, sufficed to produce the catastrophe which all were daily expecting. On a signal, given by those who had organised the movement, Italy rose in insurrection against her rulers. Some of these sought safety in flight; others, with more or less sincerity, joined the popular movement, which Austria now found herself called upon to confront.

Strange as it appears, in spite of the indications of coming storm which had been faithfully reported from Milan to Vienna, no preparations had been made to provide for it. Forty years of peaceful slumber had blinded the imperial statesmen to impending commotion, and when the tempest really arrived they found themselves powerless to resist its influence. The military force maintained in Italy was small, and scattered; in order to garrison the many populous towns, from the Ticinus to the Isonzo. The viceregal court and the headquarters of the army were both seated in the Lombard capital, and now formed the object of attack of the revolutionary leaders.

Fortunately for the Empire, the fate of her soldiers in Italy since 1831 had been intrusted to an officer whose

experience of actual warfare has seldom been surpassed. Field-Marshal Count Radetzky had held responsible position in the Austrian army since the days of Montenotte and Millesimo, having first earned his spurs in earlier campaigns against the Turks. As a colonel on Mélas's Staff he witnessed the slaughter on the banks of the Fontanone, and, in command of a regiment of cuirassiers, shared the subsequent disaster at Hohenlinden. In 1805 he fought under the Archduke Charles at Caldiéro; and four years later, as Lieutenant Field-Marshal, commanded a division at Eckmühl, Aspern, Wagram, and Znaim. Throughout the subsequent war of German liberation he was chief of the Austrian Staff, witnessed in that capacity Vandamme's destruction at Kulm, was wounded at the battle of Leipzig, which he personally planned, and again in the year following at La Rothière. Foreseeing, from his intimate knowledge of the temper of the Italian people, the certainty of eventual collision, he had carefully prepared the instrument with which he might be called upon to act. For years past he had superintended the progress of the fortifications on the banks of the Adige and Mincio; and every autumn his soldiers were gathered from distant garrisons, to practise evolutions adapted to the country. Long and intimate acquaintance with the officers belonging to his command had enabled him to select men eminently suited to the responsible posts to which he appointed them. Few generals have made the physical wants of their soldiers the subject of such careful study; none have better understood how, by amiable condescension, to gain the affections of subordinates in every degree. Though eighty-two years of age when called upon again to draw his sword, Radetzky was still tolerably active, and in perfect possession of his intellectual faculties. The apathy of the Government, however, whose servant he was, had not permitted Radetzky to take the precautions which his own sagacity suggested. The outbreak of the insurrection, admirably planned throughout the northern portion of the peninsula—then the unexpected intervention of Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, with his regular army, in favour of the national movement—forced the Field-Marshal to abandon the capital, in order to concentrate by converging retreat

behind the Mincio in the strongholds prepared at Peschiera, Verona, and Mantua.

This defensive action was determined by the inequality of the Austrian field-force. Concentration was the one thing necessary; and Radetzky showed an intelligent appreciation of his position in his determination to evacuate Milan. His difficulties were singularly great. Insurrection, open or suppressed, reigned in all the occupied provinces; armed intervention by Sardinia was to be feared; the garrisons he commanded were small and scattered; grave disaffection was prevalent in his army; and, lastly, the revolution in the capital rendered all assistance from Vienna for some time impossible.

The recovery of the balance of power was sought in positions aided by fortifications, where the army might be enabled to stand, both in order to cover territory and to gain time for complete concentration.

The positions found on river-lines are of two principal kinds in direction—that is, either perpendicular to, or parallel to, the frontier or base; and both offer peculiar advantages.

When united, they permit of the finest military combinations with the command of each; but the value of such positions had been overlooked by Austria in 1815, and what she actually possessed—viz., the Adda and the Po—was not fully utilised; but, on the other hand, her entire attention had been concentrated on the Mincio and Adige, the configuration of the ground in that area having attracted the eye of the engineer at a time when the military value of intrenched camps on a large scale was not sufficiently appreciated.

Without artificial aid, river-lines are defenceless, as the first retreat of the Austrians, and subsequently that of the Piedmontese, shows; but when fortified, they are of the highest value. Thus, the Quadrilateral (Peschiera, Verona, Mantua, and Legnago) fulfils all the requirements of a good defensive position, which are to cover rearward territory, to offer absolute shelter to a defending army whenever required, and to permit of ready offensive: first, by the parallel course of the Mincio and Adige; secondly, by the fortresses on these

rivers ; thirdly, by passages offered at fortified points which insure the command of the rivers.

But Radetzky's position in the theatre was soon recovered. Though the Italians were four months in full possession of the Po, they failed to utilise it, evincing utter ignorance of military science. Cremona, Piacenza, Pavia, were all unheeded, though the effect of fortifying the first-mentioned place covering the main road to Pavia, and also an important point of passage on the Po, is evident.

Radetzky, under cover of the Quadrilateral, maintained at first a strictly defensive attitude, and parrying easily the first assault delivered by his adversary, awaited the reinforcements which would enable him to retake the field. Repulsed at Goito on the 27th of May 1848, in his first attempt to resume the offensive, the incaution of his adversary presented him with a more favourable opportunity two months later. At the battle of Custoza, 22d to 26th of July, Charles Albert was signally defeated, and forced to retreat in great disorder upon Milan. This town he again evacuated on the 6th of August, and having recrossed the Ticinus into his own territory, concluded on the 9th of that month an armistice with the Austrian general, with a view to permanent peace.

Venice, however, still remained in the hands of the national party, and whilst the Austrian commander was conducting the siege of that town, political factions at Turin were arguing the advisability of continuing the war. Ultimately the war party gained the upper hand, and as Austria refused to negotiate on any other terms than the *status quo ante bellum*, insisted upon the resumption of hostilities. Although Charles Albert may have recognised the hopelessness of a second struggle, the current of public opinion was now too strong for him to resist. The same extreme democratic faction which was all-powerful in the Sardinian capital, had simultaneously established its influence at Florence and Rome, forcing the Grand Duke of Tuscany, as well as the Pope, to seek safety in flight.

Thus it was that the seven days' notice for resumption of hostilities, agreed to in the armistice of the preceding August, was now issued from Turin on the 12th of March 1849.

There can be no doubt but that the renewal of the war was singularly distasteful to both officers and men of the regular Sardinian army. If the object of the struggle had not been effected under circumstances the most favourable, how could it now be hoped to humble an adversary, who had enlisted on his behalf the *prestige* of recent victory? The troops, too, which had served to swell the numbers of the Sardinian army on the Mincio, had all returned to their native States at the termination of the first campaign, so that the conscription which was now introduced with a view to obtain the numbers necessary to wage offensive war, weighed most heavily upon the subjects of Charles Albert. The hopeless task of disciplining unwilling recruits, forced from their homes to serve a cause which the most ignorant recognised as desperate, increased the general want of confidence which notoriously existed. Popular clamour, too, attributed the recent failure to the military incapacity of the king and his superior officers. Upon whom, then, was the responsibility of the difficult operations in prospect to devolve? In his embarrassment the king turned in vain to those officers of the French army who had gained reputation in the service of their own country. But his offers were respectfully declined, and ultimately his choice fell upon a Pole, Chrzanowsky, who had given proofs of ability in the war of independence which his country had waged against Russia in 1831.

The task of this officer, as might be expected, proved no sinecure. Ignorant of the language, and a stranger to the habits of the people in whose service he was enlisted, little sympathy could exist between him and his subordinates. Moreover, the general officers superseded by his appointment were grievously hurt by the slur thus cast upon themselves, and criticised in no friendly spirit the orders issued from headquarters.

The effective force which Chrzanowsky found at his disposal consisted of about 85,000 men, with 150 guns, organised into seven divisions and two detached brigades. These divisions, varying in strength from 8000 to 13,000 men, were commanded by the two sons of the king (the Dukes of Savoy and Genoa), Perrone, Bés, La Marmora, Durando, and Ramorino.

That commanded by La Marmora was posted, at the period of the suspension of the armistice, on the frontiers of Tuscany, and one of the detached brigades observed Piacenza at Castel St Giovanni, on the right bank of the Po. The determination of the Sardinian Cabinet to renew the war had been carefully concealed, with a view to secure the full advantage of the initiative in a war of invasion; and owing principally to this circumstance, as well as to the rapidity with which the issue of the campaign was decided, these troops took no part in the active operations, and may therefore at once be dismissed from further consideration.

The first object of the aggressive war now undertaken by the Sardinians, was necessarily the reconquest of Lombardy and the Duchies watered by the Po. The only two defensive lines of which the Austrians might avail themselves, without retiring at once to the Mincio, were those of the Ticinus and Adda, both tributaries of the Po. In the level and highly-cultivated lands of Lombardy, no military positions were elsewhere offered by incidents of ground, or by any system of permanent fortifications. The purpose of the invading army must therefore be to force the enemy to abandon successively the above-mentioned lines, and with them the much-coveted Lombard territory. It has been considered that the soundest course of operating, with this object in view, would have been for the Sardinian army to have advanced, on both or even on one bank of the Po, preserving sufficient means of communication with both sides of the river to insure rapid concentration, or ordered retreat, according to circumstances. The reasons which induced Chrzanowsky to reject this plan were probably of a political nature. Much stress was laid upon a renewal of the insurrection in Lombardy and the Venetian States, which in the previous year had proved so signally successful. Under these circumstances the occupation of Milan would be of primary significance, more especially as it was held, with considerable show of reason, that the Austrian general would not commit himself to the defence of the Ticinus, with the disaffected population of Milan, ripe for enterprise, immediately on his rear. The Sardinian commander determined, therefore, to make the Lombard capital his

first objective point, selecting the line from Novara to Milan, by the bridge of Buffalora, as that presenting the most advantages. To this end he massed five of his divisions and the brigade Solaroli, between Novara and the Ticinus, and placed the sixth, commanded by Ramorino, in observation of Pavia. The conclusion that Radetzky would not defend the line of the Ticinus, in a passive sense, was certainly sound, but it by no means followed that the Austrian general must consequently fall back upon the Adda. It was evidently on the cards that the Austrians would themselves enter Piedmont, in order thus to confront and deter invasion of their own territory. The Ticinus is bridged at several points on its short course from the Lago Maggiore to the Po. The principal of these passages are found at Sesto-Calende, Turbigo, Buffalora, Vigevano, Bereguardo, and Pavia. Close to the last-named fortress the river throws off a narrow arm which shortly rejoins the parent stream, enclosing by its deviating course a small strip of land, called the Gravelone Island, which belonged to Austria. The position of the fortress, as well as the favouring character of the stream alluded to, certainly pointed to Pavia as that spot which the Austrians would select for passage in case they intended to enter Piedmont. This was the risk which Chrzanowsky felt he incurred by selecting the northern line of operations. In order to meet it, he placed Ramorino in the angle formed by the confluence of the Ticinus with the Po, with a view to meet any danger proceeding from that quarter. La Marmora was ordered up from the Tuscan frontier towards Parma, in order subsequently to co-operate with the main army on its victorious march to the Mincio.

The notice of the suspension of the armistice could not take the veteran Austrian general so much by surprise as was generally anticipated in Piedmont. It is true that he had consented to forego the instant advantages which must have accrued from the invasion of Sardinian territory, in August 1848, on the full understanding that peace should now be the future aim of both Powers. But he soon became aware of the powerlessness of the king to fulfil his engagements, when the extreme national party had established its ascendancy at Turin. Well informed as to all that was passing in the Sar-

dinian capital, and aided by his own vast experience, he easily foresaw the turn events were about to take, preparing accordingly. Nevertheless, his position in Lombardy was far from secure. The war of Hungarian independence which was now raging, absorbed the full attention and all the resources which the home Government, but recently re-established at Vienna, could command. The defensive attitude which circumstances seemed to impose upon him was replete with difficulty. The configuration of the valley of the Po is such that the defence of Lombardy has ever proved a very arduous undertaking. In all the large towns of Northern Italy disaffection to Austrian rule still prevailed, and Radetzky well knew that the opportunity for renewed insurrection was eagerly awaited by the populations. Concentration of force was thus rendered difficult, and communications with the Mincio whilst engaged in operations on the Ticinus, would in any case be exposed to dangerous interruption. Those who can appreciate justly the immense responsibility attaching to the security of the line which conducts from its base to the operating army, will understand the extent to which the nerve of a commander is thus tested. Proverbially, victory often remains to the bold, the reason of this being, that, under certain circumstances, calculated boldness is the most rational method of confronting peril. In the present instance, retreat to the Mincio involved the loss of the fruits of the late campaign, the abandonment of valuable territory, and the proportionate increase of military resources to the enemy. The passive defence of the Ticinus was both difficult and dangerous, inasmuch as sufficient time might thus be obtained by the agents of the revolution to raise insurrection on the rear of the defensive army. Partial retreat to the Adda would seem pre-eminently one of those half-measures which are the plainest symptoms of military mediocrity. The reoccupation of Milan would then assuredly raise the impaired *morale* of the Sardinian army, increase enthusiasm for the national cause, and seriously affect the confident spirit which now existed amongst the Austrian soldiers. From a military point of view, too, the position on the Adda was by no means secure. Considering the direction of La Marmora's march, it was liable to be turned from the

southern bank of the Po; and this doubtless was the reason why Ohrzanowsky had instructed that officer to march upon Parma, instead of recalling him to the common point of concentration. If each and all of the courses indicated were thus insufficient for the occasion, one other remained. It has already been remarked that the Sardinian commander recognised the possibility of an offensive movement on the part of his adversary, but he certainly did not expect its actual execution. Strategic enterprise had seldom characterised the operations of Austrian armies in earlier wars under circumstances of much greater promise. It was the less to be expected from the aged commander whose well-timed caution in the previous year had borne such excellent fruits. Nevertheless, Radetzky had instantly expressed his determination of marching upon Turin. At times, the best method of concealing one's intentions is openly to avow them. It was as little believed by the inhabitants of Lombardy and Piedmont that the Austrian general really purposed the invasion of the principality, as the existence of the Army of Reserve was credited by the Coalition Governments in 1800. The study of military science had not been cultivated to any great extent in Italy twenty years ago. Civilians were profoundly ignorant of its truths. All failed to perceive that the strongest reasons must prevail for the assumption of the initiative by Radetzky. The old general himself had correctly appreciated his position. To be relieved of his difficulties, he felt that his stroke must be sharp, short, and decisive; that his safest course was to confront at once his principal danger; and that the early and signal defeat of the Sardinian army must necessarily entail the total failure of the national cause.

It will generally be found that where similar resolutions are framed, confidence must exist between the chief and his soldiers. The ability of the leader is responded to by the devotion of his subordinates. It is not too much to say that the spirit of every army is dependent upon the qualities of its responsible general. In no army is this more the case than in that of Austria. Wanting in the strong tie of patriotism which binds together the soldiers of more homogeneous empires, the peculiar military qualities which unquestionably characterise

the subjects of the Emperor are only elicited by personal attachment to their superior officers. For once in the history of Austria her general stood unfettered in the field. The baneful control which before, and since, has ever been exercised from some source or other at the capital, was now necessarily and fortunately absent. No Aulic Council stood between Radetzky and his well-judged aims, no dynastic hesitation hampered his authority. Were further proof required of the all-important truth that independent action is indispensable for the success of a commander in the field, it surely may be found in the history of the two brilliant campaigns conducted by the veteran Radetzky.

The Austrian army in Italy at the commencement of hostilities was estimated at 90,000 combatants, with 200 guns. This force was organised into six corps d'armée, commanded by Wratislaw, D'Aspre, Appel, Thurn, Wocher, and Haynau, each about 15,000 strong. Five of these were available for field operations, the sixth being necessarily employed in continuing the blockade of Venice, and in securing the Austrian base on the Mincio, as well as the communications of the operating army. During the autumn and winter these troops had garrisoned the towns of Lombardy as well as those belonging to the duchies of Parma and Modena. The discipline and condition of the several regiments were excellent; if some disaffection existed in the Hungarian battalions, their contact with the remainder of the army sufficed to repress it, and no soldiers did better service during the war. From the fact that no reinforcements had been received from the recruiting districts in the interior of the empire, the waste of the previous campaign had not been repaired, and probably the actual fighting force was much inferior to that given above.

The skill of a commander is seldom better evinced than by his power of concentrating widely-scattered bodies of men for offensive action. The notice for renewal of hostilities had no sooner been served at Milan than orders emanated from headquarters for the converging march of every available battalion towards Pavia. The excellent and numerous communications in Lombardy assisted the movement, which was so quietly and secretly effected that it altogether escaped notice. On the

18th of March, Radetzky moved his headquarters from Milan to San Angelo. He left the city by its eastern gate, the Porta Romana, as though marching for Lodi on the Adda, but soon changed his direction for the south-west. The report of this circumstance, promptly carried to the Sardinian camp, served to confirm Chrzanowsky's erroneous view of his adversary's intentions. On the morning of the 20th of March two bridges were thrown across the Ticinus at Pavia, which, with the permanent passage, permitted the simultaneous march of three columns of troops. At noon of the same day the armistice expired, and with the last stroke of the clock, D'Aspre set his soldiers in motion and crossed to the Gravelone Island, which for the most part is covered with high poplars, serving to conceal the operation.

The eastern frontier of Piedmont, touching Tuscany, the duchies, and Lombardy, extended at this time from the Mediterranean to Switzerland. The river Po divides the enclosed territory into two parts. That between the river and the sea is exceedingly strong, its natural defensive properties being still further increased by artificial aid. Genoa, Alessandria, and Valenza, form a solid line of defence towards the east, protected on that front by the Apennine spurs, and the rivers and torrents which stream from those mountains into the main river. With France as an ally, it is impossible to overrate the value of this position to Sardinia, as recently demonstrated in 1859. Under present circumstances, its importance was of a secondary character. The fortresses on the southern bank could exercise but little influence on operations conducted on the level plains between the Po and the northern Alps. Here the country, to all military intents and purposes, is open and unprotected. The Ticinus presents but a feeble barrier towards the east, the Sesia is indefensible, and the Dora Baltea too long in its course for prudent occupation. On this bank of the river, too, is the Sardinian capital, safe only from hostile seizure so long as the army in the field remains undefeated. That Turin, under such circumstances, could offer but a very insecure base for military operations is self-evident, affording further proofs of the incapacity of those who entered so recklessly upon this second aggressive war.

During the months which intervened between the conclusion of the armistice and the resumption of hostilities, ample time was afforded for the construction of temporary fortifications at points of strategic value. An intrenched camp at Novara would have rendered the position subsequently assumed by the Sardinians more or less unassailable. A few redoubts thrown up on the heights of La Cava, which command the passage of the Ticinus and Po, at Pavia and Mezzana Corte, would seriously have interfered with the Austrian plan of operations. The value of a secure base, of fortified positions, of places of refuge and security in case of disaster, was equally neglected and despised, in spite of the experience which an intelligent study of the late campaign was well calculated to provide.

All these considerations could not fail to attract the notice of Radetzky. He was well informed as to the positions which the Sardinian divisions occupied, and this known, their plans could be no secret to him. Starting from Pavia, two rapid marches would carry his army across the Ticinus to Mortara, where the numerous roads in the Lomelina centre. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that, from this point, the communications of his adversary were at his mercy, whereas his own, carried from Pavia by Pizzighetone and Cremona to the Mincio, could not, under any circumstances, be touched in the same space of time. In this operation the forward movement of the Sardinian army upon the Lombard capital, anticipated with confidence, would singularly serve Radetzky's plan. The time would thus be gained to grasp his enemy before he could sufficiently recover from his surprise. In order to carry similar operations to a successful conclusion, one condition seems indispensably necessary,—that is, the fixed resolution to force an adversary to decisive action on the earliest possible opportunity. Where this determination exists, it argues unbounded confidence in the fighting superiority of his soldiers on the part of their commander. As this sense can hardly prevail in both armies to an equal extent, the initiative in war is mostly determined by its predominating influence. The preponderance of *morale* in this instance was unquestionably to be found on the side of that army which could boast

of recent victory, which rested on institutions based on the experience of past centuries, which belonged to one of the great Powers of Europe, and which blindly trusted to its own discipline and the guidance of its commander. The duty of Radetzky consisted simply in bringing his army into action under the most favourable terms of which circumstances would admit. Such is the object of all strategy; when actual collision ensues, the result is often determined by influences beyond the control of a commander-in-chief.

About two miles away from the right bank of the Ticinus, opposite Pavia, stands the village of La Cava, situated on a line of heights overlooking the Po as well as the river named above. The road from Pavia, after crossing the Gravelone Island, divides, conducting in a north-westerly direction to Mortara, or by the left to La Cava, and further to the south bank of the Po, which is crossed at Mezzana Corte. The position offered by the high ground alluded to was capable of being rendered very formidable for defence, and directly obstructed the march of the invading columns. Here, according to Austrian expectations, the struggle would commence, and great was D'Aspre's relief on finding his progress comparatively unopposed.

It has been already stated that the defence of this ground was intrusted to the division commanded by Ramorino—composed exclusively of Lombards. The selection of this officer,*

* Some interest attaches to the personal history of Ramorino, owing to the responsibility incurred by him during these operations, as well as on account of his subsequent tragic end.

He was born in 1792 at Genoa, the illegitimate son of the subsequent French Marshal Lannes. Pursuing his father's profession, he served with the French against Austria in 1809, and in Russia in 1812. Declining to serve the Bourbons on their restoration, he soon became mixed up with the several insurrections which agitated different parts of Europe subsequent to the peace.

Ultimately he obtained independent command, as a partisan, in the Polish war of 1831. Here he was equally known for successful enterprise and insubordinate conduct. Hence, too, his acquaintance with Chrzanowsky, whose present position in the Sardinian army appears to have excited his envy.

In 1848, on the outbreak of hostilities, he hurried to Italy and offered his services, which were declined. He owed his appointment to the command of the Lombard division to the interest of the democratic party then in power.

with troops notoriously the least reliable in the Sardinian army, for the duty, would seem to indicate the small amount of probability originally attached by Chrzanowsky to offensive intentions on the part of the enemy. His instructions to his subordinate, however, were precise and clear. The Lombard division was ordered to take post at La Cava, thence to observe the Gravelone Island. Should no hostile movement be perceptible from that quarter, Ramorino was directed to occupy the island, and to endeavour to gain possession of Pavia. In case of success he would continue his forward march, without delay, in the direction of Lodi, with a view to rejoin the main army on the river Adda. Should the enemy endeavour to debouch in force from Pavia upon Sardinian territory, Ramorino was instructed to oppose his march by all the means in his power. If pressed by superior numbers, he would either fall back upon Mortara, or on the road leading to San Nazzaro, whence he would readily regain communication with the other divisions, recalled from their first direction by the sound of his cannon.

These orders, for reasons never altogether explained, were entirely disregarded. Ramorino remained, with the mass of his command, in the neighbourhood of Casatisma, on the south bank of the Po. Four battalions only were detached by him to the north bank. One he stationed at Zerbolo, which, cut from Mezzana Corte by D'Aspre's rapid advance, retired in disorder to Mortara. The second, posted at La Cava, exchanged a few shots with the Austrian riflemen and then fell back towards the Po, where the remainder of the detachment guarded the bridge over that river.

At the termination of the war, Ramorino was arrested, placed before a court-martial on the charge of disobedience of orders, condemned, and shot at Turin, 22d May 1849.

In extenuation of his conduct, he urged that he was misinformed as to the point of passage of the Austrians; also, that he was in no position to resist their advance at La Cava with 8000 men. He died with great firmness, loudly protesting his innocence.

Some writers have supposed that, owing to his jealousy of Chrzanowsky, he was eager to manœuvre independently. Others, that he had ulterior republican designs, for which he wished to preserve his command. The probability is that he failed to recognise the full importance of the post intrusted to his care until it was too late to repair his omission.

Meanwhile D'Aspre, finding his path clear, and followed by Appel, pushed briskly forward on the Mortara road, halting at Gropello for the night.

Wratislaw, marching by his right, occupied Zerbolo. Thurn moved upon La Cava, detaching one brigade to Mezzana Corte to cover the left flank of the army. Wocher halted with the reserve opposite Pavia, having left a garrison in the fortress to guard the Austrian communications on that bank of the Ticinus.

Thus, on the night of the 20th March, Radetzky's army, 68,000 strong, had completed the passage of the frontier river without impediment, and now, with either flank on the Ticinus and Po, bivouacked on Sardinian soil. One brigade, belonging to Wratislaw, left at Magenta to mask the Austrian concentration, was moving upon Bereguardo, with a view to cross the river at that point and rejoin the 1st corps on the day following.

Whilst the Austrian forces were thus quietly entering Piedmont from the south-east, the Sardinians prepared to meet them at San Martino, should they not already have retired to the Adda. Since break of day the five divisions destined by Chrzanowsky either to cross or to defend the Ticinus, had been at their posts. The Duke of Genoa stood in advance of Treocate with his outlying pickets on the river. Perrone held Romentino and Galliate on the left. Bes, Cerano and Cassel-Nuovo on the right. Durando occupied the ground about Vespolate, on the right rear of the last-named division; and the Duke of Savoy, commanding the reserve, camped on the Mortara road, close to Novara. Solaroli's brigade, posted on the extreme left of the army, was intended to manœuvre in the hilly districts about Como and Bergamo in Lombardy, on the flank and rear of the position likely to be occupied by the enemy.

At noon on the 20th of March, the Duke of Genoa's division, accompanied by the king and the commander-in-chief, stood massed on the road at San Martino, ready to cross the river. Nothing on the opposite bank indicated the presence of the enemy, nor was any firing heard from the direction of Pavia. Indeed the Austrian concentration was still unknown

in the Sardinian camp. At 1 P.M., a reconnoitring party crossed to the left bank of the stream and occupied Magenta. With the exception of a solitary vedette in the distance, still no signs of hostile presence were perceptible. Moreover, the Lombard peasantry, from the first averse to the war, refused any information it was in their power to give. The king, who had been one of the first to enter Lombardy, appears to have been much disappointed by the freezing reception prepared for him at Magenta. Was it to be interpreted as indicating similar absence of enthusiasm for the national cause at Milan? If so, it was obviously better that he should look to the defence of his own territory, compromised afresh by the renewal of the war, which the nation had demanded so peremptorily at his hands. Leaving the Duke of Genoa at Magenta, he returned with Chrzanowsky to Trebate, very uneasy at not having ascertained the true position of the Austrian forces. The reports which had been sent in to headquarters from the several divisions offered no explanation of the mystery; it was resolved, therefore, to await further information before the rear divisions were pushed into Lombardy.

The hesitation thus displayed at the very commencement of hostilities by the offensive Power, indicates the false position assumed by the Sardinian king. To have declared war, and not to have been prepared to invade Lombardy, would have exposed him to general ridicule. Yet the invasion of Lombardy by the direct road, which it was considered offered more advantages than any other, was inevitably attended by the possibility of a counter-stroke on the part of the enemy, aimed at the vital parts of his territory. This danger had been thoroughly appreciated by Chrzanowsky, who was fully alive to the exigencies of military science. The order intrusting the position of La Cava to Ramorino's keeping, was not the only precaution taken to meet this emergency. In reality it formed a leading item in the Sardinian plan; and, from Chrzanowsky's reluctance to commit his army to Lombard soil, it seems that his own conviction now inclined towards the course which facts really assumed. At eight in the evening, Bes reported the passage of the enemy at Pavia, and

the absence of Ramorino from his post. A little later full intelligence of the Austrian concentration, numbers, and movements, was conveyed to headquarters from other private sources.

The country about to form the theatre of the short but interesting and decisive operations which ensued, is enclosed laterally between the Sesia and Ticinus rivers—the highroad from Vercelli to Buffalora, and the course of the Po from Valenza to the mouth of the Ticinus, completing the parallelogram, of which Mortara may be considered the central point. From this town communications radiate to Pavia, Vigevano, Abbiate Grasso, Novara, Vercelli, Casale, Valenza, and Cambio, all points of military value, within reach of one forced march. The district itself, highly cultivated and but slightly undulated, presents few other features of interest. The ground is watered by numerous minor tributaries of the main river, the principal of which are the Terdoppio and Agogna, more or less parallel in their course to the Sesia and Ticinus. Numerous canals, cut transversely, and supplied by them with water, connect these streams, and serve to irrigate the cultivated land.

One of these, the Roggia Biraga by name, passes about three miles to the east of Mortara, intersecting by its course the two roads which conduct from this town to Vigevano and Pavia.

It was behind this canal, between Trumello and Mortara, fronting to the south-east, that Chrzanowsky purposed to concentrate his divisions. Considering the present position of these, such a manœuvre was still perfectly feasible, provided no time was lost in issuing marching instructions. But, for some reason or other, the orders transmitted during the night from headquarters were quite insufficient for the occasion. They affected Bes and Durando only. The former was ordered to take post in advance of Vigevano, the latter to take ground to his right with a view to cover Mortara. The remaining divisions, as well as Solaroli's brigade, only received marching orders on the following morning; whilst Fanti, appointed to replace Ramorino, cited to headquarters, was left for the present to follow his own inspirations. Probably it was con-

sidered that these dispositions would suffice to check the Austrian advance on the 21st March in both directions, until their intentions were more fully developed. By retaining full command of the road connecting Vigevano with Mortara (ten miles distant), concentration might still be easily effected, at either extremity, on the 22d. The expediency of adopting offensive or defensive measures would in the interim be determined by the character of the Austrian movements. In abandoning the Ticinus, it was very possible that the enemy might expose the line connecting him with Pavia to advantageous attack. This eventuality could only be turned to good account by concentrating in sufficient force at Vigevano. On the other hand, the position in advance of Mortara was essentially defensive in its character. To adopt it entailed the tacit admission of forfeited initiative, humiliating to the general and discouraging to an army bent upon offensive action. The risk incurred by Chrzanowsky, in what must certainly be considered a half-measure, was the imminent danger which the possible loss of Mortara would entail.

Durando reached his destination early in the morning of the 21st; on the afternoon of the same day he was joined by the Duke of Savoy with the reserve. According to the calculation of the Sardinian general, these two divisions, posted on the strong ground assigned to them, would suffice to check any force which Radetzky could adventure in that direction. Bes marched through Vigevano at break of day, and finding, at La Sforzesca, the position he was in search of, halted there, his vanguard pushing forward to Borgo St Siro to watch the passage of the river at Bereguardo. Here he awaited the arrival of Perrone and the Duke of Genoa, both of whose divisions had subsequently been directed upon Vigevano. These troops reached their destination by five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, having lost some hours by faulty commissariat arrangements.

Meanwhile, on the 21st of March, the Austrians were in full movement upon Mortara. D'Aspre, Appel, and the reserve followed the road to Garlasco; Thurn marched to the left for St Giorgio; Wratislaw on the right, in the direction of Gambolo, detaching one brigade towards Vigevano.

This last detachment drove in the Sardinian advance at Borgo St Siro, and then attacked Bes in his position at La Sforzesca. Simultaneously Wratislaw, with a second column, found himself engaged at Gambolo. In each encounter the Austrians were repulsed with loss, but no further effort was made by the Sardinian commander to improve his advantage in this direction. Obviously it was of the last importance for Radetzky to hold his ground here. To succeed at Mortara with the 2d and 4th corps, it was imperatively necessary to hold the roads leading from Vigevano to Trumello and Garlasco. For this reason, when Wratislaw's report reached headquarters, Appel was halted at Trumello, and Wocher, with the headquarters of the army, remained at Gropello.

D'Aspre, whose orders directed him to occupy Mortara, approached that town towards five o'clock in the afternoon. Finding it occupied, he at once prepared to attack in spite of the advanced hour of the day. His force consisted of about 14,000 men in two divisions, commanded by the Archduke Albert and Count Schaaffgotsche, with forty-eight guns.

It appears that no detailed instructions accompanied the first order, which directed Durando and the Duke of Savoy upon Mortara. Chrzanowsky preferred despatching La Marmora, chief of his staff, and brother of the divisional commander, with these, in order that he might personally superintend their execution. La Marmora left Treccate at 9 A.M., and reached Durando at Mortara at 1 P.M. The Duke of Savoy had not yet arrived, and Durando's soldiers were busy cooking. It was fully three o'clock when the troops were ready to take up the line pointed out in Chrzanowsky's instructions. It has been urged that these orders were conveyed in language either too curt or obscure. Certain it is that they were not carried out. Instead of occupying the Roggia Biraga, Durando posted his own division across the Garlasco road, a mile only in advance of the town. The Duke of Savoy watched the road to St Giorgio with a portion of his command, placing the remainder in reserve in rear of the town. Both generals were independent of each other, but concurred in the opinion that, as the presence of the enemy

in the neighbourhood of St Giorgio, Trumello, and Gambolo had been ascertained by the patrols, the position indicated for occupation in the orders brought by La Marmora was too advanced for safety. Notwithstanding this, the Sardinian generals by no means expected to be seriously attacked that evening. Continued firing in the direction of Vigevano indicated that the enemy was hotly engaged on that ground, which fact, taken with the lateness of the hour, diminished what probability existed of collision. For this reason many necessary precautions were omitted, whilst both commanders were unacquainted with the locality. At half-past four, D'Aspre's approach was announced; at five o'clock that general's cannon was already dealing destruction in the Sardinian ranks. The visible impression produced by his artillery-fire caused D'Aspre to press his attack. Forming his leading division on both sides of the road, he charged the centre of Durando's line, which, routed, at once gave way. If anything could have added to the injudicious dispositions effected by Durando, it was the fact that whilst for him the direct line of retreat passed through the streets of Mortara, the reserve could only advance to his support by the same avenues of approach through that town. The fugitive battalions that hurried wildly through the streets barred the entry of the Duke of Savoy. In vain that Prince endeavoured to restore order. The darkness which had meanwhile supervened rendered all his efforts fruitless; whilst the thoroughfares, choked with waggons belonging to the artillery and train, were simply impassable. He therefore considered it prudent to withdraw the reserve, retreating first upon Castel d'Agogna, and ultimately in the direction of Robbio.

Meanwhile the Austrians pushed vigorously on to the gates of the town, but hesitated, in the darkness, to enter. The leading battalions belonged to a Hungarian regiment, commanded by Colonel Benedek,* an officer who had already distinguished himself for resolute action in the preceding campaign. Confident in the discipline of his men, and forming a correct estimate of the state of things in the town, Benedek entered alone with two battalions, cleared it of what

* Afterwards commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Bohemia.

troops remained there, and captured the equipages of the Duke of Savoy with a large quantity of baggage. Then, imagining his work completed, he halted for the night on the open space in the centre of the town, through which the principal street, continuing the road from Pavia to Vercelli, passes. It has been seen that the centre of Durando's line was broken by D'Aspre's first charge. The subsequent rapid advance of the Austrians naturally severed the defeated fractions. The left wing could, and did, retreat by the Novara road. The right wing, which had fought with much obstinacy, ultimately fell back towards the road leading from Mortara to St Giorgio. Here it will be recollected that a portion of the reserve had been posted prior to the action. By Benedek's occupation of Mortara, the retreat of these troops through the town was now cut off. La Marmora, perceiving their isolation, and ignorant of the fact that, a little further on towards St Giorgio, a cross-road would have conducted him to Castel d'Agogna, where the Duke of Savoy stood, placed himself at their head. Concealing from the soldiers that Mortara was in the hands of the enemy, he formed them in order of march along the road, placing the artillery in the centre of the column. Then he marched for Mortara, resolved to force his passage at the point of the bayonet. Entering by the gate from St Giorgio, to encourage his soldiers, La Marmora sounded the charge, and soon gained the centre of the town. Benedek, quite unsuspecting of attack from that side, had bivouacked in the square. As La Marmora debouched with the head of his column from the street into the open space, the Austrian soldiers hurried to their arms, and both parties commenced firing. A courageous effort on the part of the Sardinian infantry would unquestionably have effected their leader's gallant purpose. But his troops, for the most part, were young, and not yet inured to the circumstances of war. The darkness and confusion, added to the suddenness of the rencontre, caused them to hesitate. Benedek, still without support, recognised his danger, but very soon appreciated the facts to which the presence of the Sardinians could be attributed. Assuming that they were intercepted in retreat, he boldly summoned the column to surrender, if it wished to

escape destruction. Conceiving themselves surrounded, and much shaken in their firmness by the previous events of the day, La Marmora's men wavered, and ultimately laid down their arms. The general himself, with some fifty of his soldiers, succeeded in rejoining the Duke of Savoy at Castel d'Agogna, where he also found Durando.

On this disastrous day the Sardinians lost 2000 prisoners, 500 killed and wounded, and 5 guns. They also lost, with the town of Mortara, the strategical key to their line of communications with Turin, a circumstance calculated greatly to embarrass the further operations of the Sardinian commander-in-chief. These signal advantages, moreover, were attained by the Austrians at the small expense of 300 soldiers placed *hors de combat*. The decisive character of the action, which greatly affected the *morale* of the Sardinians two days later at Novara, was chiefly owing to Benedek's resolute conduct. It earned for him the Cross of Maria Theresa.

Many points of interest present themselves to the student of military operations in the foregoing narrative.

On the expiration of the armistice, both armies were concentrated on the Ticinus—Radetzky at Pavia, Chrzanowsky at San Martino. The Sardinian concentration was known to the former, whilst the Austrian intentions had been successfully concealed from the latter general. Each army was about to assume the offensive, with its first objective point plainly delineated. Chrzanowsky purposed the occupation of Milan—Radetzky, the seizure of Mortara; both towns equidistant from the several starting-points. Now the Austrian base was behind the Mincio, and the principal line of communication upon which Radetzky depended conducted from Mantua, by Cremona and Pizzighetone, to Pavia, which now formed his immediate depot. The Sardinians derived their supplies principally from Turin, in part from Alessandria. From Novara, therefore—the intermediate base—communications with either town would be maintained through Vercelli, or even by Mortara. It follows that Radetzky, at this last town, was already nearer to the Sardinian communications than Chrzanowsky, at Milan, would be to the Austrian. No doubt this was a great advantage, but in the present instance not neces-

sarily conclusive. The essence of the Sardinian plan consisted in the fact that the invasion of Lombardy would carry the army amongst friends ready to receive it with open arms. In point of fact, it entertained the practicability of effecting a temporary change of base. Based upon Milan, Chrzanowsky was in a position to repeat the manœuvre executed by Buonaparte in 1800, with this difference, that his adversary, instead of endeavouring to escape, was now actually playing into his hand. Why, then, did the Sardinian commander hesitate to follow an example from which such decisive results might be anticipated? The answer will be found in the small amount of confidence existing between Chrzanowsky and his army. All manœuvres conduct, sooner or later, to the issue of the sword; according to the eagerness for battle will be the character of the manœuvre. Where confidence and extreme moral superiority prevails, the shortest road to decisive collision will generally be selected. Where doubt, anxiety, and, above all, a sense of inferiority, whether individual in the commander or general in the army, exists, the manœuvres adopted will surely be stamped by the prevailing spirit. Chrzanowsky felt that, if he marched into Lombardy, his adversary would follow on his footsteps, seize his trains, and fall upon his columns before their position was sufficiently secured. The circumstances were found to be widely different from those which ushered in the campaign of 1848. Then, the insurrection was ripe and the Austrians unprepared; now, Radetzky was armed to the teeth, whilst the Lombards had been stripped of weapons of all descriptions. There was an alternative, too, which admitted still of offensive action, without necessarily entailing, in case of failure, the absolute ruin to be anticipated from a battle lost in Lombardy. This was, to check the Austrian advance at Mortara, and simultaneously to fall upon Radetzky's flank from Vigevano. In case this attack should fail, the beaten columns would find safe retreat by the highroad leading from the above-named town to Mortara. The danger of this course consisted in the possibility of Mortara being carried by the enemy, whilst the left of the army was engaged at Vigevano. The communications of the army would then be intercepted, and the army itself severed

from its base. This is what actually occurred through a combination of circumstances for which it would be unjust to make the Sardinian general entirely responsible.

Again, there are other lessons to be drawn from the battle itself, and these may be summarised as follows:—

That where earnest offence is contemplated, not a moment should be lost before seeking a collision, as in nine cases out of ten unforeseen advantages accrue.

Where armies are divided into corps or independent units, it is indispensable, before commencing operations, to initiate the commanders into the general spirit of the operations, whether offensive or defensive.

That when a flank is turned or threatened, to meet which emergency dispositions have been made, not a moment is to be lost in carrying the dispositions projected into execution, as all delay is vain. That where the possibility of an offensive flank movement on the part of the enemy exists and is recognised, especially where the flank in question immediately covers the army's communications, it is indispensable to protect it by every available artificial aid.

Lastly, there is considerable danger in taking up an extended position with a large town immediately in rear.

In consequence of the events of the 21st of March, the position of both armies during the succeeding night may be thus described:—

Sardinian Army.

Three divisions.	{ Bes. Perrone. Duke of Genoa. }	At Vigevano.
Two divisions.	{ Durando. Duke of Savoy. }	In retreat upon Novara and Robbio.
Brigade.	{ Solaroli. }	At the Buffalora Bridge.

Austrian Army.

D'Aspre,	Mortara.
Appel,	Trumello.
Wratislaw,	Gambolo.
Thurn,	St Giorgio.
Wocher (reserve),	Gropello.

The result of this state of things was, that direct retreat upon Vercelli was no longer open to the Sardinians; and further, that in case the enemy made good use of his time, the re-concentration of his army would prove a matter of some difficulty to Chrzanowsky.

With the same improvidence which had characterised their previous dispositions, the generals who had suffered such severe defeat at D'Aspre's hands, neglected now to report with sufficient promptitude the result of the day to headquarters. It was by accident,* at one o'clock on the morning of the 22d of March, that Chrzanowsky ascertained what had really occurred at Mortara. The situation which now presented itself was, perhaps, the only one for which no provision had been made. With regard to the safety of Mortara no concern had been felt at Sardinian headquarters. Two divisions of the army, well furnished with artillery, in a strong position, seemed amply sufficient to check any troops which it was possible for the Austrians to push beyond Trumello on the 21st of March. It was beyond the power of ordinary foresight to provide for the thoughtless disobedience of Durando, with the grave consequences it entailed. However, no time was to be lost, for the peril of the army was extreme.

Three courses presented themselves to the Sardinian general. The readiest and most simple was, at the head of the divisions assembled at Vigevano—elated by recent success—to march boldly for Mortara. Then, inviting co-operation from the beaten divisions, to open a path through the enemy's lines, which would at once re-establish and reconcentrate the army. Ignorance of the direction pursued by Durando and the reserve in retreat, with the consequent uncertainty of communication, was, perhaps, the motive which induced Chrzanowsky to abandon what is believed to have been his earliest intention. Considering the admirable order of the Austrian corps, the result of the operation; had it been attempted, seems very uncertain. Wratislaw, Appel, and

* The report was delivered by two officers belonging to Durando's division, who, during the action, had been separated from their corps, and had spontaneously taken the direction of Vigevano.

Thurn were all nearer to Mortara than was Chrzanowsky himself. Nevertheless, resolutions similarly bold are frequently crowned with success in war.

Another alternative, peculiarly attractive under the circumstances, was to cross the Ticinus into Lombardy, to join La Marmora on the north bank of the Po, and finally to select a favourable battle-field on the Austrian communications, where the issue of the war should be determined. In each case, no doubt, defeat would have been fatal to the army, a consideration which prompted Chrzanowsky to select a less enterprising and apparently more prudent course.

On the road leading from Vercelli to the Ticinus, on high, commanding ground, stands the city of Novara, capital of the province of that name. In earlier centuries the town was fortified, and in former wars had constantly asserted its military importance. Now, it constituted the first depot of the Sardinian army, and, since the loss of Mortara, formed its readiest rallying-point. The position, moreover, offered certain strategical as well as tactical advantages. Before Radetzky could pursue his original object, he must needs turn aside to face his adversary posted at Novara. His march upon Turin could only be continued at the peril of his communications with Pavia. As a battle-field, too, the ground south of Novara is exceedingly favourable, so that a double object would be served by forcing the Austrians here to general action. Plausible as these arguments might seem, it is very doubtful whether in reality they were the most sound. To fight a decisive action with front formed to a flank, as must perforce here be the case, and consequently, with the true line of retreat parallel to, and in continuation of, the one flank is a very hazardous experiment. Moreover, in the present instance, if beaten off the roads leading to Turin, the Sardinian army must necessarily retreat northwards—as it subsequently did—towards the Alps, where its fate would be sealed. Such, however, was Chrzanowsky's resolve. With dawn of day he set his divisions in motion; at noon he reached Trecate, where he left the Duke of Genoa in position, and the same afternoon gained Novara. Here he found Durando, and received information that the reserve

would arrive in the course of the night. Solaroli, further, had reached Romentino; so that, on the night of the 22d of March, the Sardinian concentration at Novara was effected without further mishap.

The fact that the concentration of the Sardinian divisions was not seriously opposed by Radetzky has subjected that general to much criticism. There can be no doubt that, had he wished so to do, the Austrian commander might equally have arrived at Novara with three of his corps d'armée on the afternoon of the 22d of March. By this means he would probably have prevented the Duke of Savoy from uniting with Chrzanowsky; he would also have anticipated the preparations for action which his adversary subsequently found time to complete: important advantages, it is true, provided their attainment be not secured at too great expense or danger. The three corps alluded to were the 2d (D'Aspre), the 4th (Thurn), and the 1st (Wratislaw). The 3d (Appel) and the reserve (Woche) might also have reached Vespolate, on the Mortara-Novara road, the same evening. The army would thus have been in a position to continue its well-ordered march upon Novara with break of day on the 23d of March, and would probably have engaged Chrzanowsky's forces on very advantageous terms. It has been seen, however, that concentration at Novara was not the only alternative which Chrzanowsky, under the circumstances, might select. Until the Sardinian retrograde movement was clearly pronounced, it would have been rash for Radetzky to have jumped to any conclusion. What if, whilst the Austrian corps were pressing on the heels of Durando's men, to Novara, Chrzanowsky had turned the direction of his columns on Mortara? What, again, if he had crossed into Lombardy, leaving his victorious opponent toiling northwards in search of him? But little skill was demanded at the hands of the Sardinian chief to mask his purpose sufficiently long to secure the few hours which he required to effect his object, and these hours were unwillingly conceded by the field-marshal. It was noon, therefore, on the 22d, before the Austrian corps continued their march for Novara. Wratislaw moved from Gambolo to Civatelegna; Thurn marched from St Giorgio, through Mortara,

towards Torre di Robbio ; the three remaining corps, in the same order as before, were echeloned on the main road leading to Novara. D'Aspre, with his advanced-guard, reached Garbagna, five miles south of Novara ; Appel halted on the northern side of Vespolate ; the reserve bivouacked at Lavezzaro. By this means the same serried order was maintained, whilst a partial change of front had been effected. One inconvenience, however, resulted from the delay at Mortara, short as it was—Radetzky lost the touch of his adversary. Up to the evening of the 22d of March he could account for his enemy's movements with tolerable accuracy ; on the morning of the 23d all had become conjecture. Chrzanowsky could either continue his march upon Vercelli, or might stand to fight. In the former case, it was necessary to intercept his march in the direction of the last-named town ; in the latter, it was desirable to appear in full force at Novara. To reconcile these conflicting demands was a matter of great difficulty. Had Radetzky continued the march of his army towards Vercelli, he would doubtless have directly intercepted the Sardinian communications with Turin. But in doing this, he might have opened another door of escape for his foe. A rapid march along the Austrian rear would have carried Chrzanowsky from Novara, through Mortara, to the Po. By crossing at Valenza or Cambio, he would then unite, on the south bank of that river, with his other divisions, and also gain the important shelter of his fortresses. On the other hand, by changing his direction northwards, in case the Sardinians should decide for battle, Radetzky had already enlisted one favourable circumstance on his side. His army would fight with its front perpendicular to its proper line of retreat, covering its communications. The Sardinians, on the contrary, if called upon to retreat after battle, must necessarily sacrifice their communications. These, doubtless, were the motives which swayed the Austrian commander in determining his second objective. Nevertheless, he was harassed by fears similar to those which so nearly lost for the First Consul the battle of Marengo. Behind the Sesia, in case he could succeed in arriving there, Chrzanowsky would re-establish his military position, and necessarily prolong the war. It was

this which Radetzky so earnestly desired to prevent, his anxiety inducing him to depart from the simple order of march hitherto maintained. His dispositions for the 23d of March directed D'Aspre, Appel, and Wocher to continue their advance along the single road conducting to Novara. Thurn was ordered from Robbio to Confienza, where he would be guided by circumstances in taking the direction of Vercelli, or that of Novara. Wratislaw received instructions to march from right to left, along the rear of the army—from Civalegna, through Robbio, to Vercelli. He would support Thurn in intercepting the enemy in case he should be making for the Sesia, or return with that general to Novara, should the Sardinians there make a stand. Further, the field-marshal ordered the brigades left at Pavia and Mezzana Corte to move forward to Casale, in order to close the passage of Sardinian troops from the south bank of the Po at that point.

There can be no doubt but that this dissemination of his army exposed Radetzky to considerable danger. The Sardinian leaders had resolved upon accepting battle in the strong position of Novara. Standing on the defensive here, with 60,000 men, they would seriously outnumber the force with which the field-marshal was now about to attack. This force, moreover, could only be developed in the course of hours; it advanced by a single road through a country where lateral movements were not practicable. It would seem, then, that a little ability on the part of Chrzanowsky, supported by a fair amount of devotion from his soldiers, would now suffice to reverse on the present occasion the issue of Mortara. Comparing the actual state of affairs with what might have ensued had Radetzky followed up his success, there certainly appears room for criticism. A few hours' respite conceded to Chrzanowsky sufficed not only in great part to relieve that general from a most perilous position, but to enlist on his side decided advantages which it remained with himself to utilise. The truth is, that the execution of manœuvres similar to that now practised by Radetzky is so precarious, that the one object of the assailant must be to bring it to the earliest possible issue. Presuming that Radetzky had avoided serious conflict at Vigevano on the 21st, with a view to profit more decisively from

the character of his operation a day or two later, the possession of Mortara must at once have released him from his semi-defensive attitude on the Pavia-Garlasco road. Obviously, any offensive purpose harboured by the Sardinian commander in that direction, was necessarily thwarted by the results of Durando's defeat. D'Aspre's report, moreover, offered sufficient evidence of the force at Chrzanowsky's disposal at Vigevano. This we are aware was considerably inferior to the three corps which Radetzky held in hand to cover his communications. A well-supported forward movement during the night of the 21st and 22d upon Vigevano, with Wratislaw, Appel, and the reserve, would now seem to have been the operation best adapted to all aims. It would have diminished the risk incurred by D'Aspre in his advanced position at Mortara, and have left that general available, in case the enemy accepted battle, to operate by the Mortara-Vigevano road against his right flank. In the alternative of the retreat of the Sardinians upon Novara, D'Aspre, supported by Thurn, who arrived at Mortara at seven o'clock on the morning of the 22d, would have continued his march—about eighteen miles—upon the former city. The presence of these two corps before Novara on the afternoon of the 22d, would probably have sufficed to complete the disorganisation which was already spreading in the Sardinian ranks. Under any circumstances, it would have impeded the Sardinian concentration, and have marred the preparations for general action, which Chrzanowsky subsequently found time to complete. Nor would any greater risk have been incurred by these two corps in their work of interception, than afterwards attached to Thurn and Wratislaw in the actual dispositions.

During the night of the 22d and 23d, Chrzanowsky was engaged in preparing for action. Between the Terdoppio and Agogna, a large elevated plateau slopes gently from Novara southwards in the direction of Mortara. On it, about a mile and a half from the town, the village of La Bicocca, traversed by the Mortara road, is the most conspicuous point. To the left (facing south), towards the Terdoppio, the ground falls rapidly, and is intersected by two small canals; on the right, towards the Agogna rivulet, it is less commanding, but covered with

vines and rows of mulberry-trees, whilst many single houses or villas, belonging to the Novarese, dot its surface. A third canal runs parallel to the Agogna on this side of the plateau. From the canal D'Olengo on the left to the canal Dussi on the right, the entire position extends for a distance of about two miles. With the exception of the dangerous proximity of the town, it seems to comply with most of the demands required from a defensive battle-field. The enemy must approach by a single road, greatly exposed to the Sardinian artillery. The front was strengthened by the presence of La Bicocca—the key to the position—and of the many detached cascines scattered along the slope. Both flanks were doubly secured by the rivers and canals alluded to above, and could only be turned by a wide circuit from Trecale on the left, or by the Vercelli road on the right. No attempt, probably for want of time, was made to increase the natural strength of the position; La Bicocca was not intrenched, nor were any of the villas artificially prepared for defence. To occupy the ground where he had selected to make his stand, the Sardinian commander could dispose of about 55,000 men and 111 guns: 20,000 soldiers under La Marmora, Fanti, and Belvidere, stood paralysed on the south bank of the Po. The combats at La Sforzesca and Mortara, then the marches and counter-marches of the preceding days, had thinned the ranks of the five divisions present, which were further weakened by desertion, now very prevalent. The Sardinian soldiers, far from eager for battle, suffered considerably from fatigue, depression, and hunger. In the absence of sufficient provisions, grave excesses were committed by the men on the night of their arrival in the town. Even the presence of the king failed to elicit any expression of devotion or enthusiasm in the ranks of the several regiments mustered before him on the eve of the battle.

Early on the morning of the 23d of March, Chrzanowsky formed his line of battle.

Perrone, posted at La Bicocca, occupied the left, Bes the centre, Durando the right of the position. These three divisions were deployed in two distinct lines, extending from left to right for nearly two miles. Their front was covered by

three battalions of skirmishers, and wherever the ground favoured its action the Sardinian artillery had taken post. The two remaining divisions, commanded by the Royal Princes, were stationed in close column, in reserve. The Duke of Genoa stood in rear of Perrone, near the cemetery of San Nazzaro. The Duke of Savoy, somewhat nearer to the town, touched with his right the Vercelli road. On the extreme left, outside of the actual position, Solaroli, behind the Terdoppio, watched the roads leading from the Ticinus through Trecate and Galliate.

With troops thus well in hand, on a strong front, with secure flanks, the Sardinian commander might well court the assault of his adversary, hoping by a tactical success to recover his lost ground. All dispositions were completed by nine o'clock in the morning, the army awaiting in defensive attitude the onset of the enemy.

It was nine o'clock on the morning of the 23d of March when D'Aspre's soldiers first moved from their bivouac at Garbagna. Probably the field-marshal was expecting more certain intelligence as to the enemy's intentions before he set his columns in motion. In this, however, he was disappointed, for both Thurn and Wratislaw moved off in the direction of Vercelli, according to the first dispositions. At ten, D'Aspre's light troops first touched the Sardinian outposts at Olengo, and drove them back upon Castellazzo. With the same impetuosity which had been accompanied with such happy results at Mortara, D'Aspre, though warned to be cautious, at once prepared his attack. Ordering up the Archduke Albert, he formed that general's columns on both sides of the road, and prolonging his left with part of Schaafgotsche's division and the cavalry, retained the remainder in reserve. The action had hardly been opened by skirmishers and artillery, when D'Aspre learnt that the entire Sardinian army was in position before him. Reporting the fact at once back to headquarters, he assumed the responsibility of ordering Appel to advance, and Thurn to retrace his steps from Confienza. A more prudent general, under the circumstances, would probably have been satisfied with engaging the enemy's attention until the supporting divisions could have arrived.

Not so D'Aspre. Eager, ambitious, and brave to a fault, he aspired to monopolise the glory of completing the enemy's defeat with a single Austrian corps. Covering their advance with a cloud of skirmishers and a quick fire of artillery, he launched the Archduke's battalions without any hesitation against La Bicocca, occupied, it will be remembered, by Perrone. The vigour of his charge drove the brigade Savona headlong out of the village in great disorder. But Perrone brought up the Savoy brigade from his second line, recovered his lost ground, and made many prisoners in the detached houses in which the Austrians had endeavoured to settle. Then D'Aspre ordered up his reserve, from which, fearing to be outflanked, he had already detached to Torrione on the left to occupy Bes, and again to the extreme right to contain Solaroli. These fresh troops carried everything before them, completing the utter rout of Perrone's division.

It was now noon ; and the Austrians, for the second time, were in full possession of the village of La Bicocca. No doubt, in engaging so earnestly, D'Aspre had relied in great extent upon Appel's timely appearance upon the battle-field. But no support arrived ; and Chrzanowsky now ordered the Duke of Genoa to advance and to retake, with his two brigades, Piedmont and Pignerol, the important position which Perrone had lost. This duty was admirably executed by the Prince. Supporting his battalions very skilfully in their forward movement, and making destructive play with his artillery, he carried La Bicocca, Castellazzo, and even Olengo, in succession. At the same time the left Austrian column fell back from Torrione, and the troops detached to the right had been easily repulsed by Solaroli.

It was two o'clock in the afternoon, and D'Aspre's position had now become critical in the extreme. His losses had been exceedingly severe ; and, in spite of the constancy displayed by his troops, it was evident that one more vigorous effort on the part of the enemy was all that was required to involve him in defeat. To avert this, and to gain the additional hour upon which so much depended, the Austrian commanders applied themselves with the utmost devotion.

It would seem that to make this effort formed no part of

the plan which Chrzanowsky had framed for his guidance. He had proposed during a great portion of the day to remain strictly on the defensive. His calculation was, that the Austrians arriving by the Mortara road would in vain assault the front of the strong position he held, and that, frustrated in this object, they would then endeavour to turn the right of his line. This moment he purposed to seize, in order to quit his defensive attitude, and, with the troops which he held in reserve, and with Solaroli, to execute a formidable offensive manœuvre. Nothing would appear more indicative of mediocrity in a general than obstinately to adhere to a proposed course of action, which may be excellent under given, but absolutely worthless under actual, circumstances. Nevertheless, this was the error now committed by Chrzanowsky. Blind to the fact of D'Aspre's isolation—unable, apparently, to take intelligent account of the real state of affairs—he failed to utilise the proffered advantage. His mind was solely intent upon maintaining himself successfully for the present at La Bicocca. To this one end he had successively engaged the brigades belonging to Perrone and the Duke of Genoa; and far from purposing to continue the offensive, which the Duke had so brilliantly initiated, he now proceeded to recall that general, deeming his position too advanced for safety. The consequences of this blunder were serious, and ultimately fatal. It was quite possible for Chrzanowsky, with a genial appreciation of Radetzky's true movements, to crush D'Aspre before the arrival of Appel, and to defeat Appel before the reserve could form up to support him. The true moment, in fact, for the execution of the purposed offensive movement, had prematurely arrived, owing to D'Aspre's rash generalship. To detect and to punish this fault was here the golden chance which, once missed, so seldom recurs in war. Seized, with resolute conviction, it would have entailed Radetzky's defeat under circumstances which might probably have forced him to recross the Ticinus.

With the relief thus opportunely accorded to him by his antagonist, D'Aspre's audacity returned. Once more he moved his men forward upon Castellazzo, where he constantly gained ground from the very superior numbers opposed to

him. Ultimately he prepared for the third time to storm La Bicocca. Then at last Chrzanowsky drew sparingly three regiments from Bes and the reserve, which sufficed to render further efforts on the part of the shattered and exhausted Austrians altogether abortive.

Radetzky had received D'Aspre's report about noon at Lavezzaro. Orders were immediately transmitted to Appel and Wocher to advance, and to Thurn and Wratislaw to change their direction for Novara. At Vespolate, where Appel had camped for the night, that general was distant little more than two hours' ordinary march from Olengo. But the several corps marched with their entire baggage; and in rear of D'Aspre a cumbersome bridge equipage almost closed the road. It was with the greatest exertion that Appel at last succeeded in reaching the scene of action at four o'clock. Then he carried his two divisions, Lichnowsky and Taxis, to the front, relieving D'Aspre from the unequal struggle which for five hours he had maintained unaided. But little change was effected by the arrival of these fresh troops. Chrzanowsky still adhered to his passively defensive attitude; whilst Radetzky, who was now present, purposely temporised until his other corps could arrive. Thurn had arrived at Confienza before noon. For some short time previously heavy firing had been heard in the direction of Novara, which induced him to halt his column, and take counsel with his superior officers. It was determined to march for Pettrengo, where the country road, upon which the corps was now marching, debouched into the *chaussée* leading to Novara, close to the Agogna bridge. At five o'clock his advanced-guard reached and seized this bridge, which was watched by a picket of Sardinian cavalry. At the same hour Wocher reached the field of battle with the reserve, and then Radetzky, thus reinforced, at once prepared the final blow.

The four divisions of D'Aspre and Appel, supported by a brigade of grenadiers from the reserve, were formed up in front of Castellazzo. The remainder of Wocher's corps deployed to the left in order to contain Bes and Durando, and to seek communication with Thurn. At the same moment Chrzanowsky, with a view to effect a diversion in favour of

the defenders of La Bicocca, perhaps also in the hopes of maintaining the battle-field, ordered Bes and Durando to advance. These two generals found little resistance from the thin line which opposed their front; and Chrzanowsky, who had been present with the king to direct the movement, now hurried back to La Bicocca. He arrived just as the Austrians entered the village. The combined movement initiated by the field-marshal had proved irresistible. Castellazzo and La Bicocca were both carried in the forward rush; and henceforth this last post remained finally in Austrian possession. One more desperate effort was made by the Duke of Genoa to regain the village, which had already cost so many victims. But the few soldiers that he could now rally for the purpose fought in vain; and all soon hurried in a confused mass towards the town. Radetzky's victorious advance upon Novara naturally compromised Bes and Durando, who now hastened to retrace their steps. At first their retreat was conducted in good order, but Durando was taken in flank by Thurn; and Bes, mistaken for the enemy, was fired upon from the ramparts of the town. Then the rout became general; and the scenes enacted in the town defy description. The Austrian cavalry pursued the fugitives to the gates; but no further attempt (probably from motives of humanity) was made by Radetzky against the place itself. The corps belonging to D'Aspre, Appel, and Thurn bivouacked under torrents of rain on the field. The reserve returned to Olengo; and Wratislaw halted for the night at Monticello.

The loss of the Sardinians in this battle amounted to 4000 killed and wounded, 2000 prisoners, and 12 guns. The Austrians lost 3000 killed and wounded, and 1000 prisoners. The king had been present throughout the several struggles for the possession of La Bicocca during the day. He witnessed, entirely oblivious of his own fate, the feeble dispositions of his general, and the indifferent bearing of his soldiers. Returning to Novara with the rear-guard, when all was over, he sent to the Austrian field-marshal to demand an armistice. Radetzky expressed his willingness to enter into negotiations, with sufficient security for future good faith. He insisted upon occupying the territory between the Sesia and Ticinus,

and garrisoning Alessandria; he also demanded the Duke of Savoy as a personal guarantee. Charles Albert then assembled his generals in council, eagerly inquiring whether retreat to Alessandria was impracticable. On being assured by all present that the army was utterly unfit for further service in the field, he abdicated, proclaiming the Duke of Savoy king.

After the abdication of Charles Albert, further steps were taken to secure an armistice; and Chrzanowsky ordered the general retreat of the army northwards towards Momo and Borgo-Manero, where the several divisions, in extreme disorder, were ultimately placed in position. The king left the camp immediately, and returned to Turin, upon learning which, Radetzky showed more inclination to treat. He expressed, however, the desire to meet Victor Emmanuel personally, a request which was reluctantly accorded by the young king. The interview took place at a farmhouse near to Vignale, and the negotiations were eventually terminated on the following mutual agreement:—

1. Occupation of the territory between the Sesia and Ticinus by 20,000 Austrian troops at the expense of Piedmont.
2. The citadel of Alessandria to be garrisoned by a mixed force of Austrians and Sardinians.
3. Disbandment of the Lombard division and all other troops of foreign origin; then the general reduction of the army to a footing of peace.
4. The negotiations for a permanent treaty of peace to be commenced at once upon the basis of the territorial settlement effected in Italy by the treaties of 1815.

The armistice was signed by the contracting parties on the evening of the 24th of March.

Wimpffen, who commanded the Austrian detachments, amounting to nearly 10,000 men, on the Po, appeared before the *tête de pont* of Casale on the 24th March. He was still endeavouring to obtain possession of the bridge when the news of the termination of the war, and the order to retire behind the Sesia, reached him.

Fanti, who had replaced Ramorino in command of the Lombard division, had attempted, during the 21st and 22d of

March, to cross to the north bank of the Po at Mezzana Corte. On ascertaining that the Austrians had left the vicinity of that village during the night of the 22d-23d, he completed the repair of the bridge. On the point of crossing, he heard of Durando's disaster at Mortara, and then at once abandoned his project, doubling back to Alessandria in order to assist in the defence of that important stronghold.

La Marmora crossed the frontier of Parma on the 20th of March, and reached the capital on the 22d, where he held himself in readiness to execute any further orders he might receive. After the cessation of hostilities he at once returned to Piedmont, and subsequently rendered good service to his new sovereign by promptly suppressing the republican movement in Genoa, called into life by the disastrous issue of the war.

In Lombardy the inhabitants of towns left without garrisons, incited by Italian refugees who had crossed from Switzerland, prepared to raise the standard of insurrection. Most of these movements collapsed at once when the issue of the first serious encounter was promulgated. But at Brescia, a town of 40,000 inhabitants, which had evinced the liveliest interest and devotion in the preceding campaign, the population rose on the day of the battle of Novara, and, unfortunately for themselves, committed isolated acts of cruelty towards a few straggling Austrian soldiers. Haynau, who had been left in command of the 6th corps at Verona, hurried with a few battalions to the spot. A most sanguinary struggle ensued, in which many valuable lives were uselessly sacrificed; and the reprisals eventually enforced by the Austrian general contrast strangely with the humane consideration evinced by Radetzky.

From the commencement of hostilities, four days thus sufficed for the collapse of this second effort on the part of Piedmont in the cause of Italian independence. The character of the military operations offers ample evidence of the rashness of those statesmen who plunged their country into this ill-advised war. The Piedmontese army was in no condition to undertake it. It entered the field full of sinister presentiments, and with a keen sense of its own inferiority.

In the hands of a man of genius such a state of things might possibly have been speedily and effectually remedied. A few telling words sufficed to secure to Buonaparte the confidence of the ragged soldiers who followed him across the Apennines. To expect the same results from a foreigner, equally ignorant of the habits and language of the troops he came to lead, was a strange infatuation on the part of the king and his ministers. Chrzanowsky soon became aware of the true spirit of the Sardinian army. In his correspondence he more than once alluded to the reluctance with which his soldiers anticipated a renewal of the war. From the first his position was more or less untenable. It required all the authority the king still exercised to maintain him at his post. It would have been wiser, therefore, for him to have resigned an office which he naturally must have felt could bring him no credit. That he did not do so was an error in judgment, but certainly did not proceed from interested motives. Chrzanowsky served Italy without emoluments of any sort or kind. As a soldier of the revolution, he considered his sword equally at home in Poland or in Italy. In his conduct of the operations he certainly displayed but little ability, his dispositions throughout being characterised by want of vigour and resolution. If it be harsh to make him responsible for the indiscipline of his battalions, and the disobedience of his generals, it must be acknowledged that little had been effected by him to establish the confidence which alone could dispel the existing defects. Personally he seldom showed himself to his troops. His character was cold and retiring, ill calculated to rouse feeling or awaken sympathy. The orders which he issued were short and to the point, but not sufficiently explicit and far-sighted for the officers who held independent commands under him. Finally, he appears to have admitted no one but the king to his confidence. None of his divisional commanders were initiated in the spirit of his operations. Ramorino was not informed of the real value of La Cava with regard to the Sardinian plan. Durando was kept equally ignorant of the purpose which dictated the position assigned to him at Trumello. Reticence similarly ill-judged will always entail the merited punishment. Where armies are organised as they

then were and still are, there can be no excuse, on the plea of secrecy, for keeping those in the dark who must necessarily be the chief instruments of success. It may be argued that such a state of things may be fully compensated for by extraordinary activity on the part of the commander-in-chief. And so, no doubt, it may; but no such quality was displayed by Chrzanowsky. No effort was made on his part to ascertain that the orders issued had been duly executed. It is even urged by his enemies that his apathy was such that, on the first evening of the campaign, where all was doubt and anxiety, he retired at eight o'clock in the evening quietly to his room. Certain it is, that although sufficient reasons existed for mistrusting Ramorino's intentions, that officer was instructed to occupy La Cava on the morning of the 20th of March (not before), and no precaution was taken to insure his action.

The dispositions for opposing the possible entry of the Austrians into Piedmont were certainly faulty. It was not without great show of reason that Ramorino, on his trial, urged the folly of the order which committed his division at the last moment to the post of La Cava. To oppose seriously the passage of the entire Austrian army, his force was certainly disproportioned; as a post of observation only, a couple of battalions would have answered the required purpose, without endangering the entire command. In the absence of all certain intelligence as to the enemy's intentions, it would have been better to have placed two divisions at Buffalora and two at La Cava, with the reserve echeloned so as to offer timely support in either direction. The forward movement into Lombardy would have been furthered rather than prejudiced by this disposition, supposing Radetzky to have retired behind the Adda. The total absence of any indication of the Austrian plan must not be attributed solely to the skill of Radetzky. It is gravely stated that, in their anxiety to reap the full advantage expected from surprise, the Sardinian ministers gave earlier notice to the Austrian field-marshal of the suspension of the armistice than to their own general, who had eagerly and repeatedly demanded more time at their hands. This would certainly relieve the Polish general of

much of the responsibility which Italian critics have heaped upon his memory. But whether the fault lies with the Sardinian ministry, or with its general, the cause of military science is equally served by the results of the campaign.

It has been demonstrated in this chapter, that before an army enters upon its operations it should be well and securely based ; that the selection of its line of operations should be such as to cover its line of communications with its base ; that its objective should be clearly understood, and, in most instances, firmly sustained ; and that, finally, no creditable action can be expected, either from the officers or soldiers of an army who obstinately close their eyes to the terrible danger of disobedience and insubordination.

In the concluding battle of the campaign there are some points of special interest. From it we see, that having turned a flank when the first tactical success has been achieved, it should be pursued relentlessly ; if you tax the energies of your troops, you may lead them to easy victory. If you lose time, you forfeit all the advantages already gained, by giving the enemy an opportunity of discovery.

The occupation of Novara by the morning of the 22d with three corps, would have disturbed the Sardinian communications, and completed the victory, without the risk subsequently incurred.

Under similar circumstances, it is indispensable that corps should be kept close together to avoid being defeated in detail.

The defender must seek to concentrate, sword in hand ; if this is effected without opposition, it is evident that the adversary is in doubt. It is also probable that with different alternatives he has separated, therefore it is essential to seize the first opportunity of asserting the advantage of numbers.

CHAPTER IX.

MAGENTA, 1859.

Introduction.—The first decided attempt to drive the Austrians from the Italian peninsula in 1848 and 1849 had failed. Venice held out for a brief time after the defeat at Novara, but on the 22d August of the latter year it capitulated after a five months' siege.

In 1850 hostilities again broke out between Denmark and Holstein in Schleswig, the Duchy being again supported by Prussia; but the latter Power finally concluded a separate peace, and then united with Austria in compelling the submission of the insurgent state.

In 1854 occurred the Crimean war. Russia in 1853 had claimed the protectorate of the Christians in Turkey, and seized Moldavia and Wallachia as a material guarantee, whereupon the Porte declared war against the Czar Nicholas, and entered into an offensive alliance with France and England; while Austria and Prussia made a separate engagement, the former placing a strong corps of observation on her eastern frontier, and in September 1854 occupying the Principalities. Single-handed the Turks had defeated the Russians at Oltenitza, but her fleet had been destroyed at Sinope. The Allies, after bombarding Odessa, landed at Old Fort in the Crimea, and the battles of the Alma, Inkerman, Balaklava, and the Tchernaya, were followed in September 1855 by the assault and capture of the southern side of Sebastopol. A treaty of peace was agreed to in 1856, and signed at Paris on 15th April, by which the integrity of Turkey was guaranteed, and Russia excluded from the Black Sea. Sardinia had joined the alliance in January of the previous year, and the conferences at Paris placed the kingdom among the great European Powers. But the prominent position she had thus taken was to become still more pronounced. Her king, Victor Emmanuel, was looked on hopefully and favourably by all those minor States which under Bourbon dynasties or Austrian rule dotted the map of Italy. The secret combination of these States looking on Piedmont as their possible leader, together with the skilful diplomacy of Count Cavour, by which France was led to interest herself in the cause of Italian freedom, resulted in a declaration of war by Austria, and her armies crossed the Ticinus to oppose the allied forces of France and Piedmont.

On the 1st of January 1859, at the reception in the Palace of the Tuileries, the Emperor Napoleon III. said to M. de Hübner, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, "I regret that our relations with your Government are no longer so cordial as they were, but I request you to tell the Emperor that my personal feelings towards him have undergone no alteration."

The words, passing through Europe with the rapidity of lightning, were understood to imply a threat, if not an actual declaration of war; indeed they led people to expect a great European conflict. But even these expressive words could not possibly convey all that was concealed in them. Let us consider, then, what had taken place that they should indicate so startling and menacing a state of affairs.

The relations of the principal European Powers towards each other had undergone great alterations since the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The Eastern war had not attained the object for which it had been undertaken. Peace and its attendant negotiations scattered the seeds of fresh disagreements, and caused the Powers composing the European pentarchy to form intimacies entirely differing from those which had existed during the still recent struggle.

As the most distinguishing feature of these negotiations, we must notice the friendly advances of France towards Russia, with whom she had so recently been at variance.

With regard to the question of the organisation of the two Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, Russia and France stood on one side, Austria and Turkey on the other; England, and still more Prussia, pursued a middle course. Russia and France wished for the union of the States, which would naturally make them more independent of the Porte. For this very reason the Sublime Porte opposed it, and Austria joined her. She would perhaps have lent her influence to the other Powers had these provinces been annexed to her; such not being the case, she wished Turkey to keep them, and consequently advocated their continued separation. The Convention of 19th August 1858, completed with so much difficulty, was a compromise. To all appearance Austria had gained her point; the Principalities received a divided government; but several branches of administration

were common to both, which was in accordance with the wishes of Russia and France. A further development of events was necessary in order to determine which side had in reality been successful.

In Serbia, the same parties pursued like tendencies.

Montenegro, always in close alliance with Russia, was openly taken under the protection of France, when the Turks prepared to assert their unconditional sovereignty with armed hand in 1858.

Greece, Russia's old *protégée*, entered into the warmest relations with that same France which in 1854 had occupied the Piræus, in order to prevent her from taking part in the war against the Ottoman Empire.

The noiseless coalition of France and Russia was evident in all these cases, and was directed principally against Turkey. But how is it that France, which had just concluded a three years' war, undertaken for the purpose of defending the integrity of Turkey against Russia, was found suddenly forming a close alliance *with* Russia, and against that integrity? thus endeavouring to carry out her "civilising mission" by totally different means.

Answer: because Austria stands behind Turkey. Austria equally in opposition to Russia and France, is the link which connects these two Powers.

When, in the last days of the year 1858, a quickly-assembled political meeting in Serbia deposed Prince Alexander Kara-georgiwitch, in order to substitute Michael Oberanowitch, Austria despatched a small corps of observation to the Servian frontier, and was inclined to place it at the disposal of the deposed Prince and the Porte. This called forth most bitter reclamations on the part of France; and without the slightest urgent cause she threatened to consider any interference on the part of Austria as a *casus belli*, inasmuch as it was opposed to Article 29 of the Treaty of Paris.

Austria did not supply her with this pretext; she gave explanations which were necessarily satisfactory.

But Austria, with one foot on the Danube, rested her other on the Po. Other causes of difference might easily be found in her Italian provinces, where she was in closer approxi-

mation to France, and where a French army would find a more favourable point of attack, should such an eventuality arise.

Sardinia, humbled by her short campaign of Novara in 1849, had never relinquished the hope of gaining her revenge, and of ultimately obtaining that increase of territory to which she had already aspired. But Victor Emmanuel, the successor of Charles Albert, had promptly recognised that this end would prove to be as unattainable to him as it had to his father, without foreign assistance. In 1854 he sent a contingent to the Crimea to join England and France in the war against Russia, without in reality having any just pretext for so doing. On the contrary, he had every reason to endeavour to guard his small and already heavily-taxed kingdom from the expense attendant upon war. Nothing but an ulterior design could have induced him to diverge from this policy. What this was is evident enough,—viz., to gain the assistance of France, and perhaps England, against Austria—to slip into the council of the great Powers, and then to advocate to all appearance the interests of Italy, but in reality only those of the Piedmont dynasty, and thus to strengthen its claims on the Italians (which had met with great opposition in 1848 and 1849) for the sceptre of Italy.

To say the truth, considerable progress in this course had already been effected. Sardinia had taken her place by the side of the great Powers in concluding the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and in the after-conferences found an opportunity of calling the attention of those Powers to the state of Italy,—a question which was entirely new, and which in reality had nothing to do with the Eastern war, or its termination. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is true, avoided any direct allusion in these after-conferences to the position of Austria in Italy. He confined himself to the expression of the wish that reforms calculated to promote a more liberal development of their peoples might be introduced in the Papal States and Neapolitan dominions. Count Cavour, the Foreign Minister of Sardinia, was not so cautious. His language was directed entirely against the Austrian occupation: he enlarged particularly upon the endeavours of Austria to extend her

influence throughout the Italian peninsula, and the consequent danger and injury to Sardinia.

The commencement was thus made, although the discussion introduced by the Sardinian Minister was not further entered into. At that moment neither France nor England showed great inclination to commence a new war for Sardinia,—the less so, as the old one had proved barren of results to all parties except the Emperor Napoleon. Thus Piedmont remained in the first instance alone. But by degrees she took up an openly hostile position towards Austria. The Piedmontese press systematically questioned her right of occupation of her Italian provinces. Similar attacks were made in the Houses of Assembly; the Ministers themselves were not the least prominent in these discussions. Sardinia was continually violating the cartel treaties. She encouraged desertion from the Austrian provinces, and refused to give up the deserters. Austria, warned by Cavour's language at the conferences of Paris, proceeded with double energy to maintain her position in Italy; she made the broadest possible use of her rights of occupation and fortification in the Duchies and Legations; she formed new, and renewed old treaties with other Italian States, and so certainly gave great ground for fresh and angry reclamations on the part of Piedmont, which ultimately induced her to recall her ambassador from Turin, without, however, breaking off all diplomatic communication with Sardinia.

In the course of the year 1858, it was observed that the language of Piedmont gradually became more and more confident. It seemed tolerably certain that she had gained an ally;—this was no other than the Emperor Napoleon.

Orsini's conspiracy to assassinate him on the 14th January 1858 had made a great impression on the mind of this monarch; it had caused him a severe shock. Under its effects he had hastened to plunge France into the deepest abyss of despotism by introducing the "Loi des Suspects,"—thus destroying all confidence in right and justice.

No nation will continue to bend its neck to such a yoke for any length of time, unless its thoughts are diverted from its contemplation by intense interest in foreign events. The

absolute lord of France found war a necessity,—doubly so because the army was his chief support, and naturally desirous of it. He also found it necessary to place himself at the head of that army. Circumstances had prevented his doing this in the Crimea; but his family traditions demanded it. A war in Italy was particularly welcome to him: such a one could be waged against Austria; and he found a natural ally in Russia. With regard to England, he could reckon with certainty upon finding her in a neutral position; for although her interests might lead her to oppose him, she could not possibly enter the lists against Italy struggling for that freedom for which she had so often expressed her sympathy.

Besides this, the war in Italy would be carried on in close approximation to the French frontier; and the distance from the French capital, which prevented Napoleon from taking the command of the Crimean army, no longer presented any obstacle. His uncle had gained his first laurels in Italy, and the well-known tendency of his mind to imitate him was thus gratified.

Weighty reasons thus speak for the fact that Napoleon wished for war—war in Italy, and against Austria. Are more required? Shall his well-known superstition and old obligations be urged?

It may not be superfluous to consider the individuality of the Emperor. Faith in the connection of certain phenomena of nature with personal destiny, belief in prophecies and suchlike—in short, what is generally termed *superstition*, is more or less shared by all who have passed a life of adventure, and recognised the wonderful dispensations in this world. An old gipsy woman is said to have prophesied to the Emperor Napoleon that he would gain a great victory in Italy. Report says he believed it.

The attempt of Orsini is said to have urgently called to the Emperor's mind the solemn oaths he had taken on joining the party of "Young Italy" in 1830, and the engagements towards Italy which these oaths imposed upon him.

Whatever such suggestions are worth, this is certain, that in the course of the year 1858 the intimacy of Napoleon the

Third with Sardinia increased in the same proportion as his coolness with Austria.

He first intimated his intention of interfering in Italian affairs for the furtherance of Piedmontese interests, to the detriment of Austria, by vague remarks either in the papers or in diplomatic communications. The mutual occupation of Papal territory by French and Austrian troops gave the first occasion for such remarks.

This subject had been mooted at the conferences of Paris, and it was generally agreed upon that this occupation could not last for ever. As, however, there was no probability of its termination until the Papal States were thoroughly quieted, it was a good opportunity for France and Austria to come to an understanding for the purpose of introducing reforms calculated to produce such desirable effects. During the different discussions on this point, France continually hinted at Austria's disinclination to promote such reforms, and indirectly accused her of wishing to make her influence preponderant. The same remarks were made to her with regard to her Neapolitan policy.

Piedmont alone spoke out with increased decision against Austria. This was done, however, through the press, and not by means of diplomatic correspondence.

Again, as France had sided with Russia in the East, so now Russia joined France in the West. Russia's negotiations with Sardinia for the purpose of securing the harbour of Villafranca, here call for particular attention.

Different measures of reform introduced by Austria in 1858, in pursuance of her idea of centralising the empire, were very unpopular in her Italian provinces, and were used by Piedmont to stir up the flame of discontent. Prominent amongst these were the New Currency and Recruiting laws. The movement going on, more especially in the towns of Austrian Italy, could not long remain a secret; and this, added to what she already knew of Piedmont's plans, in concert with France, to encourage the insurrection against her rule in Italy, naturally excited her full attention. It could no longer be doubted, from all that was taking place, that she was the object of a double attack—which was the more dangerous, as

the mask which was still worn might at any moment be thrown aside. She found herself consequently compelled to take precautionary measures; and with this object in view, her policy may be thus defined: To endeavour to avoid giving the slightest plausible pretext for the outbreak of the pre-meditated attack, and at the same time to improve her military position in Italy by reinforcing her army there.

It is now plain enough for what reasons the New Year's greeting of Napoleon III. made so deep an impression, and was considered of so much importance.

Up to this moment, then, were on the one side Austria, allied, so to say, with the Porte and the majority of the governments of the Italian States; on the other, France, Piedmont, and Russia in concert with the insurrection in Italy, as well as in the Sclavo-Roumanian countries—or, in other words, the countries professing the religion of the Greek Church. England and Prussia have still to be dealt with.

The outbreak of the Indian Mutiny in May 1857 had drawn largely upon the resources of England. She was nevertheless forced to continue to keep a watchful eye upon the Continent. One subject in particular was of the greatest importance to her. The plan which had been so long entertained, of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, was looked upon very favourably by France. It offered to the Mediterranean States, if carried out, an easy and very advantageous connection with India. Under all circumstances, it was probable that it would effect a great change in the commercial relations of the world—at any rate, England would find an opposition to which she could not afford to be indifferent. It might prove to be of still greater ultimate importance to her if the Napoleonic idea of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake were carried out, and England excluded from it. France in particular would then be possessed of the shortest road to India, and in the course of time might seriously menace her rule in that country. As a matter of course, therefore, England opposed the project with all her influence, and besides this, commenced taking precautions for the protection of her Indian dominions.

After France, Austria, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Russia

would derive the greatest benefit from this new road of communication, consequently none of these Powers had any interest in opposing the French undertaking, not even Austria.

Further complications in European politics altered this. It was evident enough, that whatever other Mediterranean States there might be, France was then the real mistress of that sea, as well as of the road to Suez. This was owing to the great superiority of her naval resources, for the increase and improvement of which Napoleon III. had made incredibly successful exertions within the previous years. Austria could offer no objection to her preponderance there.

But to all appearance it was the purpose of her enemies to expel her from Italy, and even from Istria and Dalmatia—or in other words, from the entire Adriatic coast—should they be successful. This clearly changed her position altogether. Austria and England, by force of their respective interests, became natural allies, and found themselves compelled to lose sight of any matters of smaller importance, for the purpose of mutually assisting each other.

The idea of the exclusion of England from the Mediterranean, furthered by the project of the Suez Canal, in connection with the expulsion of Austria from the Adriatic, now increased in dimensions, and drew other countries and nations into its vortex.

Once successfully completed, Roman and Slav-Grecian States would rule alone on the shores of the Adriatic. The Roman race, headed by France, would soon assert her superiority on the ocean. England, however, would not be the only country excluded from the Mediterranean—it would be equally closed to the Germans. The struggle by means of which this end was to be attained would be a war of races, the Roman and Slavonic against the German. To conceal and disguise the real character of this war as long as possible, was the great and necessary object of the “Imperator” of the Roman race, in order to attain by degrees entire success. But it would prove difficult to keep England off if Austria were to be first attacked; much more probable would it be that Austria would hold aloof were England to be attacked first. The impatience of the Italians, however, and the prospect of

winning other allies to be gradually brought into play, prevented the execution of this part of the plan.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR IN LOMBARDY.

Political outbreaks in Lombardy, the language used by the Piedmontese press, the warlike preparations of France explained by the New Year's greeting of the Emperor of the French, led the Austrian Government to strengthen her army in Italy in the last days of January. For this purpose the 3d army corps was ordered off from the neighbourhood of Vienna, together with several border regiments. These troops were forwarded by rail from Vienna to Trieste; and in a few days the whole movement was completed. But the army remained on the peace establishment; and fresh regiments were drawn in from Galicia and Transylvania to replace those taken from Vienna.

While these military movements were taking place, King Victor Emmanuel opened the Piedmontese Chambers. His speech described the position and expressed the purposes of Piedmont, more particularly where he stated that the country could not remain indifferent to the cry of anguish in Italy.

Immediately after, the Sardinian troops were drawn in from the more distant parts of the country, such as Savoy and the isle of Sardinia, and concentrated towards the Austrian frontier on the Ticinus and about Alessandria.

The Piedmontese formed recruiting offices on the frontier for the purpose of enrolling youths from the other Italian States and forming them into organised bodies.

A report which had gained ground since the commencement of the year was now confirmed. On the 15th January, Prince Napoleon, the Emperor's cousin, landed at Villafranca, and was married on the 30th January to the Princess Clothilde, eldest daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, then in her sixteenth year.

The preparations of France, which had hitherto been confined to the artillery and fleet, now took another direction. Extensive purchases of horses were made, more especially in

Germany. An Army of the Alps, the formation of which had long been rumoured, now took up its position, the Army of Lyons forming its nucleus. Transport vessels were sent from Toulon to Algiers for the purpose of bringing over veteran and seasoned battalions. The commencement was made with the division Renault, the advanced-guard of which landed at Marseilles on the 12th February.

All these circumstances could no longer admit a doubt but that the closest alliance existed between France and Sardinia, and that, in fact, an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded between them against Austria. Uneasy glances were also directed towards Russia, in consequence of the report that preparations menacing to Austria were being carried on there.

Napoleon III., in his speech on opening the Chambers on the 7th February, acknowledged that the state of Italy was such as to cause just ground of apprehension to diplomacy in general; but he expressed the hope that peace would be maintained. Public opinion here took different directions: while some were of opinion after this speech that peace would not be disturbed, others openly affirmed that the Emperor only desired time to complete his preparations, and showed his determination not to allow Piedmont to hurry him into the war, but to choose his own time for striking the blow.

A congress before the war would doubtless have been welcome to him, in order to isolate Austria from her natural allies. The Emperor's real speech was contained in a pamphlet inspired by him, entitled 'Napoleon III. and Italy.'

The public press of France advocated more or less the same views, only interrupted by an occasional quieting article in the 'Moniteur,' or some other paper.

During this time Austria was not idle. Indeed, how could she be, when matters in the East were taking an equally hostile turn?

On the 12th January Colonel Couzar was elected Hospadar of Moldavia, and on the 5th February to the same office in Wallachia. The union of the Principalities, which should have been prevented by the Convention of 19th August 1858, was in reality effected by this.

Russia and France immediately recognised this double election, while Austria and the Porte entered their protest against it. The latter Power sent troops to the Danube.

This double election was of importance to the progress of events in Italy, inasmuch as it afforded an excuse for the assembly of a congress where the "Italian question" could be dealt with more decidedly and distinctly than had yet been the case. Austria naturally opposed this course, as she could not admit that an Italian question, as viewed by France and Sardinia, existed.

At this critical moment England, with Prussia at her side, appeared on the stage.

The English ambassador in Paris, Lord Cowley, on terms of intimacy with both the Emperor Napoleon and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Buol, was selected to commence the work of mediation, and was to be assisted at Vienna by Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador in that capital.

After conferring with Napoleon and Count Walewski, Lord Cowley came over to London to make himself acquainted with the views of the Derby Cabinet; on the 24th of February he left Vienna. At the same time the English Government called upon the Piedmontese Minister to specify the causes of complaint against Austria. Count Cavour replied in a memorandum on the 1st of March, in which he attacked the treaties of Austria with the States of Central Italy, by means of which Piedmontese influence in the peninsula was improperly interfered with. These treaties were thus made the open cause of dispute. Count Buol and Lord Cowley talked the matter over. The former denied that any Power was justified in disputing or questioning the right of Austria to conclude these treaties; any sovereign State possessed that right. He laid the matter before Lord Cowley, and ultimately stated that Austria would not object to having this point discussed in a Congress under certain conditions. Amongst these were: that other means of preserving the peace in Italy must be devised; that Sardinia must not be allowed to extend her pretensions as the great Italian Power; that the other Powers present at the Congress should likewise lay their treaties with

the Italian States on the table; and lastly, that all negotiations should be based on the final treaties of 1815, which must in no way be encroached upon.

Whilst this was going on at Vienna, the friends of peace became more sanguine in their hopes that it would be preserved. The Emperor Napoleon did his utmost to encourage these hopes. On the 5th of March his Note appeared in the 'Moniteur' denying that any warlike preparations were being made by France. He acknowledged, it is true, that an alliance existed between France and Sardinia for the protection of the latter in case she should be attacked, but attributed the general feeling of insecurity that existed to the exaggerations of the press; whereas there was in reality no ground for apprehension. Three days afterwards the recently-married Prince Napoleon was relieved from his office of Minister of the Colonies. This was intended as a sure sign of peace. It was generally asserted that Napoleon III. was unconditionally in favour of peace—he was the essence of moderation; the real disturber was the Prince—he it was who urged Piedmont on to such reckless daring! Unmistakably convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Emperor, he had retired from the Ministry of a Power which could desert the cause of his father-in-law!

The incredulous shook their heads. All this, they said, was but jugglery: Napoleon III. was sufficiently prepared to assist Piedmont against an attack of Austria, if that were all; but he had gained the conviction from different manifestations of public feeling, particularly in Germany, that Austria was by no means so isolated as he thought. He was not prepared for a war in which Germany and perhaps England would take part with Austria. He required time to complete his preparations, and a Congress in order to isolate Austria. By gaining time he gained the advantage of ruining Austria, already so deeply involved, in a financial point of view, and might perhaps force her under the strain of this difficulty to attack. By this means he desired to throw the whole unpopularity of the war on Austria, and gain public opinion for himself.

The incredulous were right. It is only to be wondered at that they never doubted as to whether Napoleon would suc-

ceed in securing his double object of getting a Congress if he found it advisable, and of commencing the war at his own time.

This is either strong testimony to the power of intellect of the man, or to the want of it in his adversaries.

That the Emperor of the French was not very well contented with the mediation of England, of which he of course received instant and accurate information, is natural enough. Was he to expose his treaty with Piedmont? The demand was reasonable enough on the part of Austria, but reasonable demands may be very inconvenient to those who should comply with them. Besides which, to all appearance England's mediation did not seem to tend directly to a Congress. In concert with Russia she was desirous of settling the question quietly and alone. That scheme must be thwarted, and nothing could be easier.

When Lord Cowley returned from Vienna to Paris on the 16th of March, he learnt that a lively interchange of communication had been going on between the French and Russian Courts during his absence, and that the Court of St Petersburg had proposed a Congress of the five great Powers for the purpose of settling the Italian question. At the same time Lord Malmesbury, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, was informed of Russia's proposition by the French ambassador in London, and acquainted with the fact—it was in accordance, also, with the views of France.

These communications perplexed him. He did not feel justified in declining Russia's proposition of a Congress with regard to Lord Cowley's mission. On the other hand, he did not wish to allow Russia to have entirely her own way in the matter. He consequently took a middle course.

He accepted the proposition, but laid down four points which were to serve as the basis on which the Congress should work.

The Russian ambassador in London, Baron Brunow, gave his consent to these points on the 22d March. They were as follows:—

1. To devise means for the maintenance of peace between Austria and Sardinia.

2. Evacuation of the Papal States by the foreign troops of occupation, and deliberation on reform in the Italian States.

3. Consideration of a substitute for the special treaties of Austria with the Italian States.

4. The territorial distribution and treaties of 1815 were not to be disturbed.

On the 21st of March, Balahine, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, communicated to Count Buol the proposition in favour of a Congress. On the 28th March, Lord Loftus, the English ambassador, handed in the basis determined by Lord Malmesbury.

Austria felt that she must be very careful here, as the proposition proceeded from Russia evidently in concert with France, in order to thwart the English mediation which was becoming inconvenient. Count Buol answered Balahine's Note on the 23d March, before the points insisted on by England were officially communicated to him.

He declared that Austria was prepared to entertain Russia's proposition equally with France, England, and Russia. In his opinion the position taken up by Sardinia in her foreign relations was the only difficulty—and that must be satisfactorily settled at once. In case other questions were to be brought before the Congress, they must be previously clearly defined; and if the affairs of any other sovereign State were to be talked over, according to the principles laid down by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, those States must be duly represented in the Congress.

Consultations carried on simultaneously with the "clash of arms" were not only dangerous in a material point of view, but morally absolutely impossible. According to Austria's views, Piedmont must disarm before a Congress could assemble.

Count Buol replied to the Note of Lord Loftus on the 31st of March. He again laid the greatest stress upon the necessity of Sardinia's disarming before the Congress could meet, and declared most positively that Austria would not accept the Congress before this had taken place. England had promised to use her influence with France in order to promote this end,

a point much dwelt upon by Count Buol; who in his turn engaged that Austria would not attack Sardinia during the Congress.

In an appendix to this communication he made special remarks on the "Four points" from an Austrian point of view.

With regard to the first point—the Congress should devise means of compelling Sardinia to perform her international duties, and to prevent the renewal of similar complicities in future.

He consented to the discussion proposed in the second point, but demanded that the settlement of the detail should be left to the Powers immediately concerned—France, Austria, and the Papal States.

He declined a discussion concerning the legality of the Austrian treaties; at the same time, if all the Powers represented at the Congress agreed to make known their treaties with the Italian States, Austria would do the same, and come to an understanding with the other States interested in it, as to the necessity of a revision of them.

Count Buol expressed his entire concurrence with the fourth point; and then added a fifth—That the great Powers should come to an understanding about a general and simultaneous disarmament.

People in Turin began to doubt the Emperor Napoleon—without much reason, it is true: they strongly objected to a Congress, more especially a Congress where Sardinia was not to be represented. At the latter end of March the Emperor sent for Count Cavour to Paris, and he returned from thence on the 30th with his mind fully at ease. It was about this time that the saying originated that "a Congress was a necessary implement of war." The preliminary negotiations were necessary for the completion of military preparations, and it would prove easy in the meantime, or actually during the Congress, to irritate and thus isolate Austria, and throw the whole blame of the war on her.

It was necessary to continue to appear to give way, taking care not to go too far; and where France gave way, thus

evincing her love of peace, it was Piedmont's business to raise fresh difficulties, which France in her position of mediatrice would not altogether ignore.

To judge by after-events, such may have been the purport of the conferences between Napoleon III. and the Piedmontese Minister.

Sardinia declared that she could not begin to disarm unless she be admitted to the Congress on an equal footing with the other Powers. The English Government made the proposition to France that they united should guarantee Sardinia from an Austrian attack if she would disarm. This was unsuccessful, for France declined to give this joint guarantee. Then Austria proposed a general disarmament before the meeting of the Congress.

France accepted the proposition of the general disarmament, in such form that the principle should be recognised before the meeting of the Congress, but its actual execution should be deferred, and settled at the Congress.

By the introduction of the question of general disarmament, and more especially by the counter-proposition of France, the matter became complicated to the utmost.

The deliberations had arrived at this phase on the 9th April.

It may be well here to examine this question of disarmament. In order to form an estimate of the meaning of the term, we should know what the three Powers had already effected in the way of arming.

At the commencement of January, as we have already seen, Austria had pushed forward a fresh army corps, though not on the war establishment, for the reinforcement of her Italian army. She had increased and armed her fortifications in Italy, and, more particularly, erected new works on the coast of the Adriatic. She had concentrated fresh troops from the eastern to the central provinces of the empire, for the purpose of sending them with greater despatch to Italy. Towards the end of February she began to increase the strength of many regiments by calling in the furlough men. The army in Italy was composed entirely of regiments not recruited in

Italy. The recruiting districts of many of these regiments in Italy were far distant in the eastern Crownlands—the furlough men were being called in here in order to be forwarded to their regiments in Italy. Those regiments which had their recruiting districts in Italy were quartered with three battalions in other provinces of the empire, leaving only the fourth battalion in these districts. They also called in their furlough men, and the four battalions marched out of Italy with them, leaving only the so-called depot division, consisting of two companies, as a nucleus for the fifth battalion (which was to be newly formed) behind. By the 9th March it was calculated that about 65,000 furlough men had been called in. This measure was gradually extended. In the beginning of April it was determined to reinforce the army in Italy with another army corps drawn in from the neighbourhood of Cracow to Vienna, and to place the whole of the Italian army on the war establishment, by calling in the reserves, forming fifth battalions of the depot divisions, and erecting the grenadier battalions. This last measure was counter-ordered, owing to the short prospect of maintaining peace which appeared about this time, but was renewed shortly afterwards.

The disarmament of Austria would thus mean the withdrawal of all reinforcements, including the furlough men who had been called in from Italy, and the dismissal of them to their homes.

France had made enormous purchases of horses, had increased her fleet, had drawn in different divisions from Algiers, and collected immense stores in the magazines of her southern ports; she had further strengthened the troops along the Alpine frontier by large reinforcements, had added a fourth battalion to each of her hundred infantry regiments, and marked out fresh camps at the foot of the Alps, and was prepared to reorganise the national code.

Nevertheless France declared that she was not arming; and, to speak the truth, her measures were of such a nature that she was able to affirm this with some appearance of truthfulness.

To the insinuation that she was heaping up stores of war,

she replied,—“Quite right; but that is continually taking place in all well organised States. If we have done more than usual in this way, it is because we have recently entirely altered our naval and military system. We are busily engaged in manufacturing rifled and other newly-invented cannon; our navy is undergoing a period of transition, owing to the general improvement in artillery and the introduction of steam.”

“But is it necessary on that account to detach a party from each infantry and lancer regiment to the artillery?”

“Certainly; they are to be instructed in the use of the new guns, and form a kind of regimental artillery, so to speak.”

“What is your object in purchasing such large supplies of biscuit at Toulon and Marseilles?”

“For the use of the naval squadron assembled there for manœuvring purposes.”

“Why are you working day and night in your laboratories for the construction of ammunition?”

“Every State should take care to have ample supplies of ammunition in store. We are entirely deficient of the ammunition required for our recently-improved artillery, and are now constructing it.”

“But you have formed 100 new infantry battalions?”

“So we have. Previously each regiment contained three battalions, eight companies to the battalion. We have altered this, and instead of three battalions of eight companies each, have now four battalions per regiment of six companies each. The measure is easily explained. We now manœuvre in two ranks instead of three, as formerly. Owing to this change, the large battalions have proved to be unwieldy, and smaller ones handier and preferable. It is simply a matter of improved reorganisation. The army is on the peace establishment. We have not called in our reserves.” (This was perfectly correct. No other measure in this respect had been taken in the French army, besides curtailing the furloughs and keeping men still in their regiments who were entitled to their discharge. But nothing is easier than to increase the infantry from the peace to the war footing, more especially

now that railways are used for such purposes, if everything else is prepared.)

"Surely you have brought over troops from Algiers?"

"We have, but we have despatched others in their places."

"And you intend bringing over more, especially troops which only quit that province in time of war—for instance, the Foreign Legion, the Zouaves, and the Chasseurs d'Afrique."

"True; but they have not yet arrived in Europe. They will only be brought over if war is not to be avoided. The fact that they are still in Algiers speaks strongly for France's love of peace, and for her hopes of its preservation. At the same time, we do not wish to deny that we also share the general apprehension. How could it be otherwise? How could we be blind to the probability of war, which everybody else considers imminent? Of course it is our duty to be prepared for this eventuality. For this very reason we, like others, have been purchasing horses; but nobody can say with truth that we are making extraordinary preparations."

Such may have been the language of the French. They might have added that their troops were not in Italy, but where they had full right to be—on French ground; and if the question of disarmament was left for a Congress to deal with, it might be thus placed before it:—By a general disarmament are all States meant, or only those which are now standing opposed to each other in Italy? Take for granted that this question were answered according to the wish and in favour of France, and that Piedmont and Austria had disarmed within reasonable limits—that the Congress, however, had proved barren of results—that outbreaks had taken place in Italy beyond the boundaries of the Austrian provinces, where Austria found it necessary to interfere with her police, and Piedmont had opposed her with the troops at her disposal,—how much free scope would then be left to France, bound as she was by treaty to defend Piedmont?

Now to Piedmont.

She had pushed forward the troops garrisoning Savoy and the island of Sardinia towards the frontier of Lombardy. When Austria began to call in her furlough men, she also ordered out the whole of the reserve of the 1st class, and

part of the reserve of the 2d class. She armed her fortresses, and erected new lines of fortification, principally for the protection of her railways. Her last and most important act was to recruit and enlist volunteers from all the Italian States, some of whom were drafted into the regular army, and the remainder organised under Garibaldi's command. By this means she encouraged desertion from the armies of other States, particularly from Austrian Italy. She stirred up the flame in the whole peninsula, and awakened hopes which it would prove difficult to disappoint.

It will be easily understood that it was difficult for Sardinia, without undergoing an amount of moral degradation which would make it impossible for her ever again to raise the Italian standard, to dismiss these volunteers after she had once commenced their enrolment. Austria was very well aware of this, and for this reason insisted upon her disarming first. By this step Piedmont would lose all influence in Italy. Besides, there would still remain well-matched enemies on both frontiers of Sardinia—France on the one side, and Austria on the other. Their turn was to come next. She afterwards consented to the proposition of a general disarmament, in order to make it less humbling to Sardinia ; but the effect of that measure would not be materially altered by this.

Austria could not consent to the counter-proposition of France—viz., to accept the *principle* of a general disarmament, but to leave its execution to a Congress—because she saw through the object of this French manœuvre, which was to place Austria in the same position as Piedmont, and to lay equal obligations on both ; whilst France herself, evading the restriction, remained as free in her actions as the other great Powers who were not immediately concerned in the matter.

At the same time, Austria saw clearly enough that the very difficulty of Sardinia's position, and the impossibility of any alteration in her own propositions, would hardly allow of a peaceful solution of the question.

To avoid being duped, she therefore determined, in case the mediating Powers should not succeed within ten days in satisfactorily settling the matter, to make a direct demand

on Sardinia to disarm, and, in case of non-compliance, to intrust the issue of the question to the sword.

The determination was confirmed by the conviction that it would be impossible for her to avoid the war which Napoleon III. had willed; and that it was her true policy to commence it as soon as possible, on account of the enormous expense the continued maintenance of her increased army for the sake of a rotten peace entailed upon her.

She was naturally desirous of securing allies which circumstances might offer to her. The prospect of these was very uncertain, to say the least. Austria had found mediators, but not one ally. She turned her thoughts first to Germany, with which she was most nearly connected through the Confederation. It will here be well to say a few words with regard to the feelings and expressions of opinion evinced there from the 1st January to the commencement of April.

In Southern Germany public opinion declared itself *for* Austria; whereas in Northern Germany, more especially in Prussia, some few voices only were raised in her favour.

At the same time, the sympathy expressed was of a very divided character, not only with regard to its sources, but as to the manner and amount of assistance offered.

Some said—Austria is a German State, and we must consequently hold with her for good or bad; others were of opinion that the same danger with which Austria was immediately threatened was ultimately in store for them if, said they, we allow Austria to fall alone. The same calamity will befall us in our turn, if we allow Napoleon “to localise” the war with Austria. She in her turn will be obliged, if defeated in this first act, to look on while we are being annihilated in the second.

In these German sentiments we see the one party speaking directly in favour of Austria, the other more opposedly to Napoleon than sympathising with her.

These latter took nearly the same view as that previously expressed. Observe this great man, they said, who now appears as the liberator of Italy. Do his antecedents pronounce him capable of playing this rôle? Was France ever so enslaved as she now is? The liberator should commence at home. For

the present we can only divine that he wishes to substitute French for Austrian influence in Italy, and that he is anxious to extend the blessings of the "loi des suspects" and the parched guillotine at Cayenne to Italy. Do you flatter yourselves that the man who wishes to divert the eyes of France from her own misery to the glory he is winning abroad—who, hurried on by the army which supports him in France, is burning with ambition and the desire to avenge the memory of his uncle—will stop short in his career when he has "freed Italy"? Is it not on all Germany, more particularly on Northern Germany, that he must avenge his uncle? Let us, then, make a stand together against him; let us defend the rights of Germany; let us return from this mistaken enthusiasm for all that is foreign, in order to give a thought to ourselves.

If the question be, whether France or Germany, represented by Austria, rule in Italy, let us quickly and plainly declare for Germany. In reality there is no other question immediately before us. Again, if the question be whether we allow ourselves to be attacked and defeated by the man of the 2d of December, or whether united we turn the tables, who will then for an instant hesitate?

Opinion was equally divided in the opposite party, which advocated the neutrality of Germany during the war between France and Austria in Italy. The one side was directly for Napoleon, the other more or less opposed to Austria.

What! said they,—has Austria suddenly become a German State because she requires our assistance? Austria, who can only count 8,000,000 Germans in a population of 38,000,000! When did Austria ever stand up for German interests? Was she not always ready to sacrifice German territory when she had an opportunity of increasing her own? What did she do for Germany in 1848? Did she not in 1850 exert herself to the utmost to humble Germany by helping to clench the grasp of Denmark on Schleswig and Holstein? Can any one expect enthusiasm from us for Austria, who has introduced the Concordat, for the purpose of converting her subjects, on the leading-string of priestcraft, and with the bait of sensual enjoyment, into a blind and senseless instrument of the great

central despotism? Suppose that Austria, with the assistance of German armies under the auspices of German princes, should prove victorious, would not then the whole of Germany be subjected to the yoke of the Metternich system, well seasoned with Popery? Is it for this we are to send our sons and brothers to the slaughter-house? Admit that Austria is somewhat preferable to Napoleon III., but do not forget that Austria represents a principle. Napoleon is but an individual. In case of victory, Austria will remain stationary, whoever may take the palm. If Napoleon is defeated, he becomes a nonentity. Should he be victorious, his policy will disappear sooner or later with him: and a natural end is by no means insured to him.

The answer to all this was: The approaching struggle will not be confined to a war between Napoleon III. and Austria; in reality it is the commencement of the attacks of Roman-Slavonic races upon the German. So that Napoleon is not merely an individual, he also represents a principle; if he should fall, his idea will be perpetuated. It was not Napoleon I. who exhausted and enslaved Germany, it was the race to which he belonged; and for this reason Germany should be united. As regards the 8,000,000 Germans in Austria, they are the reigning class there. Nations possessing a higher degree of civilisation maintain their position by ruling others. Are all the French departments populated by Frenchmen? If this is the case, it is because France has always remorselessly enforced her nationality wherever she rules, a principle which the Germans have never adopted; if they had, the national language would long since have disappeared in Hungary, Bohemia, and Austrian Italy, as it has in Elsass and Lothringen.

If we are always to look on and applaud when we see a province which can lay a claim, however slight, to separate nationality torn away from Germany, there will soon be no Germany left.

The Poles will prove that their ancestors were domiciled on the Weser; the French will fish up the possessions held by Charles the Great, and demonstrate that Berlin is, properly speaking, a French town, because it contains a French

Protestant community; the Bohemians will establish their kingdom in the middle of Germany; the Danes will have their claim to make; and we shall resemble a class of Jews, who, however badly they may be off, possess sufficient philosophy to regard it as a just and proper dispensation. If we are to avoid this, and prevent a stranger ruling and living where we now rule and live, we cannot continue to play our rôle of good philosophers, nor give our ready consent to every enterprise and undertaking of our neighbours. Let us keep what we possess, and help any member of our body to keep what belongs to him; for however bad our claim may be, it is certainly better than that of him who gets possession after us. Let us renounce the glory of being a nation of "thinkers," and strive to be a nation. Let us forget the sins of Austria for our own sakes, for the sake of Germany. Recollect that it is a thousand times better to be subjected to a despotism of our own than a foreign one. Our ancestors would soon tell us how they relished the French visit, and whether a repetition of it would prove desirable.

These and many other sentiments were generally expressed. Some inspired individuals saw in Napoleon III. the "man of destiny," the "instrument of God," the "scourge of God." Whether he wished it or not, he was destined to regenerate and reform the state of Europe; for this reason he ought not to be opposed or interfered with in his designs.

It was intelligible enough to the other European Powers, that Austria should insist on the preservation of the treaties of 1815. It was also natural that Napoleon should advocate their revision, inasmuch as he occupied the throne of France in direct contradiction to them; but had Austria always been the champion of their integrity?

How was it Cracow had become part of the Austrian dominions? and how did Belgium become a kingdom?

Again, what is to become of History, of Progress, if treaties a hundred or a thousand years old are to exist for ever? There would be an end to all history! It is positively necessary to revise them from time to time. All who believe in progress and civilisation must join issue with the Emperor of the French in this broad question. The only doubt was whether

he was the proper man to effect this, in the interest of progress and civilisation; and the only question whether he had the intention and wish to do it. There is plenty of room for both doubt and question.

Many of the German Cabinets—Nassau, Bavaria, Hanover—declared for Austria. They urged the necessity of prohibiting the export of horses, calling attention to the large purchases already made by France. This measure was ordered by the Zollverein on the 5th of March, and enforced on all its frontiers, so that it extended to Austria—a fact which characterises Prussia's position, particularly with regard to her relations with Austria.

Prussia and Austria at that time were rivals in, but not for, Germany. Whenever the question of mutual assistance arose, little inclination was shown for it by either side. Recriminations were never wanting, and instances were recounted by both where the one had deserted the other in time of need. Truly, enough of these may be found if we chance to dive into the depths of history for them.

At a time when war was overhanging the whole of the Fatherland, Prussia might easily have put aside old injuries received at the hands of Austria, and have induced England to join in assisting her.

It is more than probable that if this coalition had firmly opposed the demands made by France, Napoleon would have found himself compelled to put off his attack, to say the least. The Prussian Government did not take this course—the danger did not appear to her either sufficiently near or pressing to demand it. She therefore joined England in the work of mediation, and once on this course, considered it her duty to act according to the strictest notions of neutrality, and avoid giving the slightest expression of opinion either for the one side or against the other. One can hardly reproach her for this, and this position explains many of her actions. A necessary consequence of it was, that Prussia regarded the question at issue as being strictly an Italian one; and whenever opportunity allowed, she laid great stress upon her position as a member of the German Confederation, the duties of which by no means necessitated an

interference on her part in a quarrel between France and Austria concerning the Italian possessions of the latter.

These, then, were the views taken by the Prussian Government: though we may not agree with them, we can perfectly understand them.

But though it was very right and proper for the Government, under such circumstances, to avoid any open expression of sympathy for Austria, no such obligation existed either for the Chambers or the press. Indeed, the Chambers were generally reproached for not speaking out plainly for Austria as the other German assemblies had done. Their singular answer to this was, that an expression of public opinion in the political assembly of a great country like Prussia, was of much more importance than it could possibly be in the smaller German kingdoms or duchies, and that consequently it was necessary to be more cautious.

This caution, however, proceeded in reality from other causes. Fresh hopes in the future are always coupled with a fresh accession to power. This was the case with the accession of the Prince Regent; and to speak the truth, the political atmosphere in Prussia was greatly improved by this event, and the subsequent change of ministry. The party leaders were of opinion that if they supported the views of Government in the present crisis, instead of opposing them, that it would greatly promote their chances of progress in the development of constitutional liberty. This accounts for their anxiety on all occasions to avoid causing the slightest embarrassment to the Government.

The greater portion of the Prussian press opposed the idea of assisting Austria at the commencement, unless Austria in return agreed to alter her system of government altogether. Of course the Concordat met with its share of abuse here. Gradually, however, the press appeared to become alive to the greater depth of the question, and, with few exceptions, changed its ground. This was at the beginning of April.

On the 11th of April the Emperor of Austria sent the Archduke Albrecht, governor-general of Hungary, to Berlin, for the purpose of informing the Prussian Government of his intention, and of seeing up to what point he might reckon on

its co-operation. The choice was a proper one. The Archduke had commanded the leading division of the Austrian army at Mortara and Novara in 1849 ; and particularly distinguished himself in the latter action by holding his ground for many hours, until Radetzky had concentrated his whole force.

The Archduke was received in Berlin with due distinction ; but although every politeness was shown to him, it was soon evident that any hopes formed on the co-operation of Prussia were doomed to disappointment. When the determination to which Austria had arrived was communicated to the Government, it expressed its strong disapprobation of such a measure. It vaguely admitted the probability of assistance at a later period, but only on condition that Austria allowed the work of mediation to proceed quietly, without impeding its action by "ultimata" and suchlike. It was comprehended in Berlin that Austria had become naturally impatient ; but it was not considered politic to place the odium of the initiative, which in common justice belonged to her adversaries, on her own shoulders.

The general opinion had become prevalent in Austria that any procrastination of the decisive step was wrong, that it only allowed her enemies further time to complete their preparations, and that it was expedient, in a military point of view, to anticipate them. The Prussian Government did not coincide with this view, and was right in not doing so. There could be no possible advantage politically in an early invasion of Piedmont. Such was, however, the general opinion at Vienna as early as February. The general impatience for action remained even now unaltered, although the Archduke Albrecht returned from Berlin with the simple promise that Prussia would provide for the safety of the Rhenish frontiers. Sanguine of the success of his mission, on his arrival it is possible that the Archduke attached too much value and importance to this promise.

Meanwhile, days elapsed without any gleam of hope for the success of the mediating Powers in the arrangement of the differences between the Cabinets of Vienna, Turin, and Paris. On the 17th, England, in concert with Prussia, made a fresh proposition.

A general disarmament should take place previous to the Congress. This was to be effected by a commission independent of the Congress. The commission was to be confined to six members—one from each of the five great Powers, and the other from Sardinia. As soon as the commission had commenced its task, the Congress was to meet for the consideration of the political question. The representatives of the Italian States immediately interested were to be admitted to the Congress according to the precedent of Laybach.

Russia and France agreed to this; Austria refused, and abided by her resolve.

On the 19th of April, the following communication from Count Buol to Count Cavour was despatched from Vienna:—

“As your Excellency is aware, the Imperial Government has willingly consented to the proposition of the Cabinet of St Petersburg, according to which a Congress should assemble for the purpose of unravelling the complications which have ensued in Italy. Convinced of the impossibility of succeeding in this object in face of the warlike preparations carried on in the adjoining country, we have demanded that the Sardinian army should be replaced on the peace establishment, and the free corps disbanded before it meets.

“The Government of her Britannic Majesty found this demand so reasonable and necessary, that it at once coincided with it, and agreed, in concert with France, to urge the necessity of Sardinia’s disarming, giving in return a joint guarantee against any attack from our side. We need not say that we should have respected this guarantee. The Cabinet of Turin appears to have resolutely refused to disarm and accept this joint guarantee. We regret this deeply,” &c.

The result of this despatch was at once to destroy all hopes of peace. The intervention of England became futile under the circumstances, for political questions became henceforth secondary, the more important strategic considerations becoming of primary importance. The sword only could now decide the question.

From a purely military point of view, this step on the part of Austria was distinctly justifiable.

At this period the French preparations were by no means

completed; only the Algerian troops were ready; the batteries were not completed to war strength; and troops and material had to be carried across the ocean and the Alps to the theatre of war.

In point of distance alone, the Austrians had greatly the start; and there was every prospect of destroying the Sardinian army and occupying Turin before the French could arrive.

The ultimatum, dated Vienna, 19th April, was handed in on April 23d, at 5.30 P.M., to Cavour; and the answer, declining to comply with the terms, returned to Milan on the 27th.

Owing to further negotiations, military movement was, however, delayed for two days longer, until the 29th—an important fact, when every hour was of consequence.

The imperative demand of Austria should have been followed by immediate action; and it remains, therefore, to see what forces she had at her disposal at this juncture.

By the end of April five corps had assembled in Italy; and supposing these to have been on a war footing, they should have numbered 200,000 men; but deductions must be made for the garrisons in Lombardy, Venetia, the Papal States, and a flying column under Urban—in all, 50,000 to 60,000 men.

The detachments were an evil, and an unnecessary one. There was an evident endeavour to maintain political influence by the presence of troops in the above localities. Everything should rather have been subordinated to the success of the principal operations; and at least 135,000 men should have been ready to enter Piedmont.

As it was, the so-called 2d Army under Gyulai numbered but 99,000 men. Thus, in reality the army was—

2d Corps, Liechtenstein,	17,000
3d „ Schwarzenberg,	18,000
5th „ Stadion,	21,000
7th „ Zobel,	17,000
8th „ Benedek,	22,000
Cavalry, reserve, and extra corps,	3,700
	<hr/>
	98,700

In this force the battalions were 800 strong, the brigades

4000, the squadrons 110 horses each; and of the whole, 80,000 were infantry, 5000 cavalry, 6000 artillery and engineers, with 264 guns.*

The 9th corps, which was to be available in May on the Ticinus, was to be the nucleus of the "1st Army," and, numbering 21,000 men, was pushed forward to support the 2d Army, while the 1st corps moved from Prague on the 22d May. These reinforcements would in the course of the operations raise the Austrian effective to 140,000 men.

In the Sardinian force under King Victor Emmanuel, the battalions were 600 strong, and the division 10,000 to 11,000: so that, deducting detachments, it numbered 55,648 infantry, 3984 cavalry, and 2700 artillery, with 90 guns; in all, 62,232 men, divided into five divisions—exclusive of artillery, reserve, and cavalry—under Castelborgo, Fanti, Durando, Cialdini, and Cucchiari, Sambuy commanding the cavalry reserves. Garibaldi had organised three regiments of volunteers for independent partisan movement; and the national guard, 26,000 strong, defended Turin.

The French battalions were 550 strong; the cavalry regiments had 500 horses; and the divisions varied between 6000 and 9000. The army, under the supreme command of the Emperor Napoleon III., was organised as follows:—

Guard,	Regnaud de St Jean d'Angely.
1st Corps,	Baraguay d'Hilliers.
2d "	Macmahon.
3d "	Canrobert.
4th "	Niel.
5th "	Prince Napoleon.

The whole numbered 107,656 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, 10,000 artillery, engineers, &c., with 312 guns.

Thus, when united, about 187,000 allies could face the Austrians, with a marked numerical superiority; but, on the other hand, the Austrians, at first only two marches distant from the Sardinians, had a superiority over them singly of 35,000 soldiers.

It must have been known to Gyulai that the French could

* It is elsewhere stated that the Austrians had 350, the Sardinians 108, and the French 426 guns.—Ed.

not interpose with weight for fourteen days, for their army was then concentrated at the foot of the Alps at Grenoble, in the valley of the Durance, and towards the Mediterranean harbours.

From Lyons to St Jean de Maurienne there was only a branch-line, with but scanty means of transport, which terminated at the latter place; and the railway communication ceased until Susa, sixty miles distant on the other side of the Alps, was reached, and from this point a single line led to Turin. Moreover, there were but two roads—by Mont Cenis and Mont Genève—across the mountain barrier; so that the calculation is not difficult to prove that to move from the frontier to Casale or Alessandria at least fourteen days would be required.

The same calculation is applicable to the transport of troops from Marseilles and Toulon to Genoa, taking the embarkation and disembarkation into consideration. Safety and probability of success for the Austrian arms could therefore only be sought in expedition.

It had been reported in Milan that the Sardinian forces were still not concentrated; and on the 26th, the day when operations should have commenced according to the ultimatum, 12,000 men were in the defiles of the Scrivia, 32,000 at Casale and Alessandria, thirty miles apart, and 20,000 on the Dora Baltea, the latter being further from the headquarters of the army than the Austrians themselves. But by the 10th May the 1st division was at San Salvatore—2d at Alessandria—3d, 4th, and 5th near Casale.

The French army was still mostly on French soil. It had been ordered to start on the 23d April, Susa and Genoa being selected as the points for concentration, the cavalry marching by Nice and the Col di Tenda.

The first French troops, the head of the 3d corps, reached Chambery on the 25th, Susa on the 29th, and Turin on the 30th, where the entire corps was concentrated on the 2d May. Neil's last columns passed through Susa on the 7th May, and moving thence on Alessandria, had pushed forward, by the 10th, along the Po on each side of Valenza.

The first arrivals at Genoa by sea landed on the 20th; and

by the 29th the whole of the 1st corps was disembarked, and was speedily followed by the 2d, Imperial Guard, and 5th corps.

Communication was opened with the Sardinians by way of Novi. On the 10th, the 1st corps occupied Cassano Spinola, in the Scrivia valley, with its advanced troops, and the 2d corps Gavi, the remainder being echeloned in rear; while the Guard lay between Genoa, Bochetta, and Buzalla, and the 5th corps at Genoa. On this date, therefore, the Allied armies had fairly taken up their ground, and were collected in two strong masses near Alessandria and Genoa.

Meanwhile the Austrian army had at length advanced. They had been for some time ready to do so, but had been checked by orders from Vienna; so it was not until the afternoon of the 29th, three days after that fixed by the ultimatum, that the columns crossed the Ticinus.

This river, the frontier boundary of Lombardy, had been but weakly fortified. Field-works only covered the points of passage of the river at Pavia and elsewhere. It was rather a source of weakness than of strength to her, for she had concentrated all her energies on the defence of the Mincio and Adige; and thus, leaving her frontier unprotected by fortresses, it became almost a political necessity that she should defend it by her armies, even if at a disadvantage, rather than surrender it without a blow.

The theatre of war is practically a vast plain rising gradually north and south to the Alps and Apennines. In the southern half of this runs the Po, a wide and deep river, passable only at the permanent points of passage, and difficult to bridge, owing to the liability of its tributaries to sudden and not inconsiderable risings, from the occasionally rapid melting of the snow on the lofty mountain-ranges in which they take their rise. South of this stream the Apennines close on the river near the mouth of the Ticinus, and form the somewhat difficult defile of Stradella; and this, the right bank of the Po, is drained by the Scrivia, the Tanaro, and Bormida (which unite and form one river at Alessandria), tributaries of the greater stream.

The northern plains are drained by the Ticinus, the Sesia,

and the Dora Baltea, which, taking their rise in the Alps, and running, roughly speaking, north and south, are so many barriers in the way of an advance on the capital of Piedmont on this side.

The country between the Sesia, near the mouth of which is the strong fortress and bridge-head of Casale, and the Ticinus, is, like the rest of this part of Italy, much intersected by rivulets and canals, is densely populated and closely cultivated, has many villages and numerous substantially-built farm-buildings, and is well provided with good roads. The southern half of this area is called the Lomellina, the northern the Novarese; and it was into this part of Piedmont that the first phase of the campaign, that commonly known as "the Austrian offensive operations," which terminated on the 10th May, took place.

On the 30th April the army crossed the Terdoppio, and on the 1st May the Agogna, small rivulets running into the Po between the Ticinus and Sesia. On the 2d May it was thus distributed along the Sesia:—

Headquarters,	Lomello.
7th Corps,	Robbio and San Angelo.
5th „	Candia and Terrasa.
2d „	Mede and Sartirana.
3d „	Torre di Beretti.
8th „	Pieve del Cairo and Gambarana.
Reserve cavalry,	Trumello.

The army had marched twenty miles in four days.

On May 3d, thanks to Canrobert's advice, the Sardinian army was concentrated between Casale and Novi. The French were advancing from different directions towards both flanks, but few had arrived by the 6th of May even, so that a well-directed blow by the Austrians against the centre might still have been struck, with every hope of its being fatal to the enemy's concentration.

Crossing into the Lomellina was not, however, the only line of advance open to the Austrian leader; for it was at his discretion to march either by the north or the south bank of the Po. In this instance the courses at his disposal did not lead to the same objective. The northern led to the capital

—the southern, to the military forces and lines of communication.

It will be interesting, therefore, to study the memorandum dated 20th April 1859, which examines into the strategical situation, and which is entitled the "Scheme of offensive operations for the Austrian army, consisting of five corps 100,000 strong, concentrated on the frontier river Ticinus, under command of Count Gyulai, and prepared to move on the 26th inst." It is to the following effect:—

The military situation may shortly be summed up as follows: Our enemies in the first line are the Sardinians, in the second the French. The Sardinians, 60,000 strong, having been somewhat abruptly disturbed in their military preparations and plans, have a double object in view; 1st, to preserve intact their capital—2d, to secure their army from defeat until the arrival of the French.

Probably they will consider that both of these objects are not to be attained, and having to select, will possibly prefer to sacrifice Turin for a time in the general interests of the war, to exposing their army to an unequal contest in its defence, which may entail its destruction.

It is to be expected, therefore, that the Sardinian forces will be found concentrating under shelter of their fortresses on the strong ground south of the Ticinus, with the further purpose of covering the defiles and communications between Genoa and Alessandria.

Should this anticipation not be realized—should the Sardinians have divided their forces in pursuit of a double objective, or should they have preferred to concentrate on the Dora Baltea, which river has been recently prepared for defence, with a view to cover Turin directly—the problem to be solved by the Imperial army will be considerably simplified.

In either of these cases, assuming the Sardinian army to be inferior in numbers as well as in quality, the decisive result of early collision would seem still more certain than if the remedy for inferiority were sought by enlisting such artificial aid as is presented by the permanent fortifications south of the Po.

On the other hand, it may be safely assumed that every

nerve will be strained by the French to arrive sufficiently early on Sardinian soil to support their allies in the impending struggle. From information in our hands, the Emperor is concentrating his troops in two distinct masses, the smaller of which, consisting of two army corps, is preparing to cross the Alpine frontier from Grenoble by way of Chambery and St Jean de Maurienne, with a view to debouch at Susa, thirty-five miles west of Turin.

The larger portion, consisting of three corps and the Imperial Guard, is held in readiness to embark from the harbours of Toulon and Marseilles in steam transports, destined for Genoa. Assuming that our ultimatum will on delivery be immediately telegraphed to Paris, it may be calculated that the French will move within twenty-four hours from that time; and considering further the character of the communications across the Alps on the one hand, and the difficulties attending the maritime transport of so large a body of men on the other, though the distance does not exceed 300 miles, we may safely calculate that the Sardinians, unless they retire upon Genoa or Susa, will, during the first six days, be entirely unsupported, and that in no probable case will our operations be exposed to serious danger from the arrival of the French—under proper precautions—for a fortnight at least. Assuming, therefore, that our correct objective must be sought in the Sardinian army and not in the Sardinian capital in the first instance, from considerations precisely similar to those which influence our adversary, the question is how best to utilise the time at our disposal for the purpose in view—the destruction of the Sardinian army.

The choice of objective is not further discussed in this memorandum, inasmuch as it is clear that the temporary occupation of Turin can present no permanent military advantage to the Imperial army; and equally intelligible that, from the direction of the principal line of operations of the French, from the expected concentration of the Sardinians between Alessandria and Casale, and the fact that this last fortress secures to them free passage to the north bank of the Po, any such operation can only be undertaken at serious risk—a risk which is not diminished if we consider the distance which

already separates our army from its base, and the state of the province through which our communications are carried.

It would seem advisable, therefore, that the advance upon the position presumed to be occupied by the enemy, should be made by both banks of the Po; the army operating thus *à cheval* along the river, with a view to secure the passages as we proceed, and to enlist the largest possible number of communications for the rapid transit of our forces towards the objective. Thus the 2d corps would cross the Ticinus at Vigevano, marching for Mantua and Valenza; the 3d corps at Bereguardo moving by way of Trumello and S. Nazzaro upon the same point. The 5th corps crossing at Pavia would seize the passage of the Po at Mezzana Corte, marching by way of Salé for the same point, but on the south bank of the river.

The 7th and 8th corps echeloned accordingly, would cross the Po at Vaccarizza by bridges rapidly thrown in the morning for the purpose. Both here and at Mezzana Corte *têtes-de-pont* of sufficient dimensions would be constructed at once.

The 7th corps would take the road leading by Broni, Casteggio, Voghera, to Tortona. The 8th corps would follow the 5th corps in reserve.

The march of the army on both banks of the river would be covered by the light cavalry, pushed well in advance of the several lines of march, and maintaining constant communication between the columns. The cavalry reserve crossing the Ticinus at Boffalora, would occupy Novara and Vercelli, covering thus the right flank of the army, and patrolling towards the Dora Baltea. Pavia and Piacenza would be sufficiently garrisoned, and a detachment from the latter fortress would be pushed to the head of the Trebbia valley, where it should intrench at once.

The 2d and 3d corps, as well as the 7th and 8th, should be furnished with bridge equipages calculated for the several obstacles on their line of march. On the main river, and from its tributaries, all boats should be seized, and collected at such points as the commander of corps may deem expedient.

At Piacenza a siege-train should be held in readiness for

march, in case it should be required in the course of operations.

It will be observed that the first objective points, marking the earliest phase of operations, are Valenza and Tortona. It is deemed essential that the permanent passage at the former town should be seized at once, and if the bridge be destroyed or impaired, steps taken to restore immediate communication with the north bank of the Po. The construction of works on the south bank of the river will be commenced at once.

If the enemy stands here, dispositions for attack should be issued to the army. If he prefers to cling to the high grounds about Occimiano, the passage of the Ticinus will be effected, and the 2d and 3d corps would cross at Valenza to the south bank of the Po, the latter leaving one brigade on the north bank. Equally important is the possession of Tortona, bearing in mind the direction from which our principal adversary is approaching. It will be necessary for the 7th corps to detach from Tortona one division, in order to occupy in strength the defiles leading from Genoa. If possible, Mori should be seized and held, and every preparation for obstinate defence, in such localities as may seem favourable, be made by the engineer officers attached. The commander of this division will be instructed that upon his activity and intelligent resolution may depend, in considerable measure, the safety of the army. The remainder of the 7th corps will be employed to mask the garrison of Alessandria, and to maintain communication between its other division and the main army.

It may be expected that Valenza will pass into the hands of the Imperial army on the 28th, and Tortona on the 29th. On the 30th, or 31st at latest, the army should be concentrated for attack on the Sardinians in a probably intrenched position.

If victory be gained, the pursuit of the Sardinian army will be undertaken by the 5th and 8th corps, with all available cavalry. The 2d and 3d corps would proceed at once with the heaviest batteries, furnished from the artillery reserve, to assault Casale.

Unless checked here, the Imperial army will then continue its march upon Turin, concentrating, as it approaches the

capital, upon the north bank of the river, which will now protect its entire line of operations. It may be estimated that the Imperial army may reach the Sardinian capital about May 3d, and further operations would then be dictated by circumstances which cannot now be foreseen.

In case of repulse at Occimiano, the army would retire upon Valenza, where the necessary preparations for its retreat to the north bank will have been made. The 7th corps would fall back along the road by which it advanced, and the army generally would take up a defensive position in the Lomellina, holding the passages of the Po and Sesia, leaning with its right upon Vercelli, which should be strengthened for that purpose.

The army will draw its supplies during the operation in part from Pavia, in part from Piacenza, where large magazines will be formed. The principal line of communication will be carried along the north bank of the Po to Valenza, where it will be protected by the brigade left for that purpose, and by the cavalry patrolling from the Sesia.

It will be perceived that the Imperial army will have to rely for success in the event of collision, rather upon its superior military qualities than upon any great numerical preponderance.

The imperative demands made by considerations for the safety of the army necessitate detachments, which will probably reduce our fighting means to an equality with those which the Sardinians may concentrate in a defensive position, provided they operate correctly. At the same time, it is considered that in this manner the operation may be conducted without risk to the safety of the army; and recognising the extreme importance of such advantages as may possibly be gained from the character of the military situation, and from the present division of our adversary's forces, the occasion seems well deserving of a vigorously sustained effort; at the same time, the extreme necessity of early reinforcements will be evident.

It will be seen from this memorandum that the subject had been fully and carefully examined by the Austrian staff, and it is difficult to see how they could have finally selected the very line the weakness of which they clearly recognised.

The seizure of Turin, and the repulse of the French arriving in detail and disorder from Susa, was the utmost success that could be expected from a march along the left bank of the Po only.

But it must be recollected that during its execution the French were constantly arriving from Genoa to swell the Sardinian ranks at Casale, that therefore each day increased the danger which might accrue from that quarter on vital posts; and considering further that France and not Sardinia was the principal foe, the entire operation seems faulty in the extreme. Clearly the object of the hurried invasion should have been the defeat of the Sardinian army. This, as we have seen, stood mainly behind the Po and Tanaro.

The passage at Pavia was in possession of the Austrians, but led towards the strongest part of the Sardinian front (Pavia-Casale) on the left bank of the Po.

In order to move by the right bank upon the Tanaro, a bridge was necessary at Vaccarizza for passage, and this was actually constructed later. No interruption was to be anticipated; and Piacenza, also at their disposal, was important for protecting a possible retreat.

One corps of 20,000 men would have to be directed *via* Tortona to Novi, to occupy the defiles of the Scrivia and observe Alessandria, also checking the French arrival; while 80,000 remained to force a passage of the Tanaro, and attack the Sardinian army. Doubtless this was no easy undertaking, but very far from impossible, and the only one leading to ultimate success. In case of victory, the Austrian army stood between the divided French to follow up the advantages it had won.

But the Austrians elected to operate by the left bank, and their march was unopposed, the Sardinian headquarters being in San Salvatore, and the troops were concentrated in great anxiety, utterly unable to comprehend the enemy's delay.

On the 2d May the Austrians reconnoitred only. First shots were exchanged at Candia. The strength and preparations of the enemy at Valenza, where the wooden bridge had been destroyed, was recognised.

On May 3d rain commenced, and continued several days, causing further delay in movement. Then followed a series

of half-measures, which terminated eventually in entire inactivity.

On the 4th May the Po was crossed at Cornale by Benedek, and the 2d corps also advanced in support, indicating that the true point of attack had been discovered, and showing an intention of correcting the first error.

The movements of the other troops were, however, quite contradictory.

The 7th corps halted while the 3d demonstrated again towards Valenza and commenced mining the railway bridge, a sure sign that no attack was purposed here; and the 5th corps demonstrated towards Frassinetto, but retired at night.

Meanwhile objections were raised in the Austrian headquarters as to the prudence of pushing more troops to the south bank of the Po, and the difficulties of subsistence and transport were urged.

From Cornale to Alessandria or Novi was only 20 miles. Six days had been frittered away already, but it was yet improbable that the French had arrived in force, and retreat upon Piacenza was still perfectly secure. Benedek on the 5th pushed one brigade to Voghera and a second to Tortona, meeting with no opposition. It was clear that the Sardinians would not leave their position, and that the French were not ready. If the Austrians had pushed on to Novi, 10 miles distant, they would have found it unoccupied. It is true that the French had arrived at Genoa on the 4th, but, owing to the intelligence received of the Austrian advance from Cornale, Baraguay d'Hilliers had halted on the 5th and fortified the defiles he held so as to secure the Bochetta road. To destroy the rail from Genoa was of great importance; but instead of doing this, the Austrians only destroyed the bridges at Tortona and Voghera, and after raising contributions departed again quite undisturbed by cavalry. Meanwhile the Po had risen thirteen feet and carried away the pontoons.

The expedition only served, by the destruction of the railway bridge at Tortona, to prove to the Sardinians that no attack was purposed against the Tanaro.

Turin then alone could be the object, and now, indeed, movements were commenced in that direction. The army

was to be carried up the Sesia to Vercelli, while part of the 8th corps remained in the Lomellina to observe the Po.

On the evening of the 6th, the bridge at Cornale was restored and the 8th corps returned. On the 7th, general movements were made on Vercelli and Palestro, and were continued on the 8th, when Gablenz's brigade of the 7th corps, detached to mask Casale, skirmished with the enemy and found the works there incomplete. The railway bridge at Valenza was blown up the same day.

Urban was ordered by telegram from Brescia to Piacenza and Stradella, to demonstrate between Stradella and Pavia and cover the left of the army. He reached Piacenza on the 10th May with a weak brigade, and Stradella on the 12th, his outposts being at Broni.

Meanwhile the Austrian advanced-guard was within two marches of Turin and still no enemy was to be found. He had made up his mind to the Austrian occupation of the capital. But suddenly the movement was suspended on the morning of the 9th, for reports had reached headquarters that 40,000 French had marched from Turin to Alessandria in order to move on Piacenza. It was true that the French were now arriving, but they were by no means ready for offence; nevertheless on the 10th the entire Austrian army returned by forced marches to the Lomellina. Two days' rest were given to the tired troops, and then the following cantonments were occupied: the 7th corps at Palestro, Robbio, and Vercelli; the 2d at Albonese; the 3d at Mortara; the 5th at Trumello and Garlasco, and the 8th at Lomello; the reserve cavalry and artillery at Vespolate and Vigevano, Boer at Vaccarizza, and Urban at Casteggio.

The Austrians here occupied ground between the Sesia and Ticinus; the 7th and 3d corps were on the Sesia, and the 8th on the Po; in rear, the 2d and 5th. Piacenza was left to its own garrison and to the 9th corps, which was marching towards it; but Urban, alone, was at this time on the south bank, and received intelligence of the Emperor's arrival on the 12th at Genoa, which was reported immediately to headquarters. On the 14th Napoleon reached Alessandria.

The result of the first phase of the campaign may be thus

summarised. A hurried invasion was only justified by a rapid victory over the Sardinians ; but whilst they were still isolated, there was no apparent inclination to attack, either in front or on the strategic flank, for merely a feigned effort was made in each direction, and then the army was hurried off to the left. No partial advantages had been gained, and the *physique* and *morale* of the army had decidedly suffered. The result would certainly have been more satisfactory if the Austrians had remained on their own territory between Piacenza and Pavia, completing their battalions and awaiting the arrival of the 1st and 9th corps ; but by invading Piedmont they had gained solely the minor advantage of subsisting in the enemy's country.

Doubtless the position so occupied was strong, and so long as they held their ground Lombardy was protected from invasion ; but though it was liable to be attacked, as all positions are, on either flank, or to be centrally forced, still two out of the three contingencies were here so provided for that these operations could only be undertaken at signal risk and disadvantage. Retreat was secure, for the communications were covered, the ground was prepared and favourable, a second line of defence was found in the Ticinus, and lastly, subsistence was obtained on the enemy's soil, thus husbanding their own resources and depriving the enemy of the same. The third contingency could only ensue if the invader was willing to execute a complicated flank march and to forego every strategic advantage. But it was a *sine quâ non* of such a position to secure the left flank ; for, if not, the fate of Beaulieu might be impending, and, moreover, the communications were on that side.

To do this the line must be stretched, and the right especially thinned, with this result, that the front would be too extended for timely concentration on the right, which was thus liable to be turned, and the more so as Vercelli had been abandoned.

Moreover, rivers are admirably adapted to a system of active, not passive, defence—though, in order to adopt this, means of movement are essentially necessary, and passages across these rivers must be secured and held for the purpose ; but the

Austrians held no passages over the Sesia, and but one principal one over the Po.

If a line of river occupied thus screens the defender, it also effectually screens the assailant, and outlets on the enemy's bank are imperative.

One other radical defect of the Lomellina was that it was too far from the base of supply, considering the political feeling in Lombardy and the consequent constant sense of insecurity.

During the period of inaction that followed the retreat, the important points in the Lomellina (Mortara, Lomello, Pieve del Cairo, S. Nazzaro, Vercelli, Palestro, and Candia) were fortified. The bridges over the Ticinus at Vigevano, Bereguardo, Boffalora, and Pavia, were covered by field-works. At Vaccarizza, just below the confluence of the Ticinus with the Po, a bridge was thrown across the river; but it would have been well if, in addition to this, passages at Cornale and Mezzana Corte had been made.

Meanwhile the Allies were concentrated in two strong masses on each bank of the Tanaro; the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps in Salé, Voghera, and Tortona—the 4th and Sardinians at Casale and Valenza, and the Guard at Alessandria—bridges being constructed across the Scrivia and Tanaro to facilitate communication.

On the 13th May the Austrians were thus distributed in their cantonments:—

7th Corps,	.	.	.	Palestro, Robbio, Vercelli.
2d "	.	.	.	Nicorvo, Albonese.
3d "	.	.	.	Mortara, Castel d'Agogna.
5th "	.	.	.	Trumello, Garlasco.
8th "	.	.	.	Lomello, Torre Beretti, Zinasco.
Reserve cavalry,	.	.	.	Vespolate, Gravellona.
9th Corps,	.	.	.	Nearing Piacenza.

On the 18th Vercelli was abandoned, and the railway bridge destroyed, the army moving somewhat to its left.

On the 20th, Gyulai, in order to discover the position of the enemy, directed a reconnaissance in force to be made by Stadion with one division of the 5th corps, a brigade of the

8th corps, Urban's brigade, and a brigade of the 9th corps, from the bridge of Vaccarizza against the enemy's right.

This led to the affair of Montebello, after which the Austrians, 18,000 strong and forty or fifty guns, retired with a loss of 1293 men, the French only losing 723 out of the 8500 men that Forey brought into action. The action was singularly resultless to Gyulai if its object were to oblige the enemy to display his force. As a matter of fact, the limit of the Austrian advance was the Fossagazzo, on which only the outlying pickets were stationed, and therefore they never got within four miles of the extremity of the actual position occupied by the Allies at Voghera. The purpose of the reconnaissance was not in the least answered; and only mistakes and false impressions resulted from an attempt made with far too weak a force, and carried out in so hopeless and dispiriting a manner.

His adversary was not slow to take advantage of the erroneous conclusion at which Gyulai was arriving. Further to strengthen it, a forward movement of the French was made towards Voghera, and even Casteggio, directly after the action; but in order to secure the line of the Sesia for future use, Cialdini was directed on Vercelli, where he crossed the river, Castelborgo moving on Candia and Durando on Prarolo, so as to demonstrate and withdraw the attention of the Austrians from Vercelli. On the 23d, owing to a rising of the river and the consequent fear of isolation, Cialdini withdrew again to the right bank.

On this date the French forces were stationed as follows:—

5th Corps (1st Division),	.	Genestrello.
1st Corps,	.	Montebello and Casteggio.
2d "	.	Voghera.
3d "	.	Ponte Curone.
4th Corps and Guard,	.	San Salvatore, Alessandria, &c.

Garibaldi had also been employed to still further distract the attention of Gyulai, and moving from Biella on the 17th, crossed the Sesia at Romagnano on the 22d, and the Ticinus at Sesto Calende on the 23d. At Varese, on the 26th, which he reached in two days, he defeated the small force Urban had sent against him, and again at Como on the 27th; but Urban

having turned towards him with all his force, he retreated in the direction of Laveno on the Lago Maggiore. An attempt to assault this failed, but he was only released from his dangerous situation by the unexpected retreat of Urban's column.

The bulk of the Austrian army had remained inactive in the Lomellina, but the constant countermarching and purposeless movement of the troops had given them no rest. Notwithstanding all this, there was no information whatever as to the true position and plans of the enemy. Spies were not procurable, the river barriers were difficult to pass, and armed reconnaissance had failed. But the concentration on the French right and the demonstrations along the entire line, had done their work. All that he had seen or could discover confirmed Gyulai in his impression that the coming blow would be aimed at his left flank.

Having produced this impression, the Emperor proceeded to put into execution the plan for which he had been long preparing,—that of making a flank march from right to left under cover of the Po and Sesia, and turning the Austrian right on the Novara-Milan road.

The reasons that led to this conclusion require careful study. The left flank was, from a strategical point of view, that which, if turned, would place the Allies in the best position for threatening and securing the Austrian main line of communication, and flank marches in the presence of the enemy are always viewed with suspicion; but the question still remains, whether in war, as in whist, the true master may not under given circumstances violate the ordinary rules, not only with impunity, but with the greatest possible results to the successful issue of his operations.

It will be universally admitted that, after having completed his concentration at Alessandria comparatively undisturbed, the French Emperor stood committed to offensive operations. In criticising these operations, everything then becomes relative to the nature and advantages of the position selected by the defence.

Assuming the peculiarities of that position to be known, it is evident that three distinct lines were available for the invading army :—

1. To turn the Austrian left, and at the same time the line of the Ticinus, by bridging the Po below the mouth of the former river, thus entering Lombardy, the objective, directly at or near that point.

2. To force the passage of the Po between the Sesia and the Ticinus (or that of the Lower Sesia only by making use of Casale) in the very teeth of the defending army, thus attacking the centre of the position, with a view then to operate along the northern bank of that river.

3. To turn the extreme right of the Austrian position by crossing the Po at Casale and the Sesia at Vercelli, necessitating the execution of a flank march in the continuation of the Allied left.

The strategical merits of the defensive position adopted by the Austrians is sufficiently attested by the obvious difficulties attending the execution of each of these courses of action—the problem therefore to be solved was, the selection of that which involved the smallest danger of failure, and which in case of success gave promise of the most decisive results.

It will be well to consider in a few words each in its turn.

1. The Austrian left rested on the first-class fortress of Piacenza, which of course commands the passage of the Po, and the defile of Stradella on the southern bank of that river. It was strongly garrisoned and prepared for defence: from it a capital road leads to Pavia, distant one good day's march, which in its turn commands the passage and mouth of the Ticinus. An invading army, therefore, adopting this line, would have first to carry the defile of Stradella, strongly intrenched and possessing great capabilities of defence, in order to invest Piacenza from the south; then to select a point in the narrow limits between Pavia and Piacenza, every yard of which was closely watched, for the construction of its bridge across the Po; and this effected, it would debouch into the plains of Lombardy between the two strongholds already mentioned.

But this point, leading directly, as it does, from the French position into Lombardy, was most narrowly guarded by the Austrian commander, who had not hesitated to weaken his right for that purpose. Is it then surprising that the French

Emperor should have declined the attempt to crack a nut to all appearance so hard?

2. With regard to the passage of first-class rivers immediately in face of a powerful army drawn up for their defence, and that within a limited area (here marked by the Sesia and Ticinus), that subject has been so fully dealt with by General Clausewitz * that the reader cannot do better than refer to his remarks on the subject, bearing in mind, however, that the general character of the Lomellina is extremely unfavourable to rapid offensive operations, that the ground had been prepared for defence by all imaginable means, and that not less than four Austrian army corps were so echeloned upon the Po between the two above-mentioned tributaries, that they could be easily concentrated at any one point within a few hours, in far superior numbers to that of any French force it was possible to throw across within the same time.

If, then, the argument adduced carries with it sufficient weight, it appears self-evident that the Emperor was compelled, by the very nature of the circumstances by which he was surrounded, to rivet his attention upon Casale as the one point by which to effect the passage of the main river: that point, we need not say, he already held in his hands. This admitted, the question then arose, "Should the passage of the Lower Sesia be forced, and the operation parallel to and supported by the Po, already alluded to, be attempted? or should he (the Emperor), adopting a bolder strategy, utilise the various circumstances and chances which all seemed to point in the same direction—circumstances which rendered risks theoretically great practically small, promising results in a ratio precisely proportionate to the theoretical risk, and calculated to stamp the character of his operations with the brand of military genius peculiar to his family?"

It appears that, in the first instance, there was some inclination on the part of the French to adopt the safer and more ordinary of the two courses above named. The King of Sardinia received orders to attempt the passage of the Sesia near its mouth. The character of that portion of the river, however, and of its left bank especially (the attempt had been foreseen

* Clausewitz, *Camp. 1796* (Italy), pp. 69-72.

by the Austrians), rendered the operation so difficult that after the first failure it was abandoned ;—this the more readily, as, in point of fact, the line along the northern bank of the Po was not calculated, even with success, to offer decisive results. The Austrians might fight on ground of their own choosing, or retire ; in either case their retreat (in case of defeat) was perfectly secure to the Ticinus—which river, from the first regarded as the principal line for the defence of Lombardy, had been prepared accordingly. The evacuation, then, of the Lomellina by the Austrians, would have formed the sole result of the course alluded to, if successful, and would have terminated the first phase of the operations of the campaign. Here, then, we arrive at the operation selected and executed by the French, which has afforded ground for so much criticism, and which contains the real point at issue.

3. The Austrian right, after the evacuation of Vercelli (where the bridge connecting both banks of the Sesia had been destroyed), rested upon Palestro and the high ground contiguous to that village.

In order to turn it with effect, it would be necessary to move the whole of the French army * unknown to the enemy from right (Voghera) to left (Vercelli), with a view then to concentrate at Novara in rear of the Austrian position. This implies, as stated above, the execution of a flank march.

Before proceeding to consider the peculiarities of this much-dreaded operation, the probable advantages accruing to the French, when once safely massed upon the heights of Novara, must be clearly defined.

It has been already stated that after Gyulai had lost the initiative, Napoleon was necessarily committed to offensive operations—a general engagement the primary, the occupation of Milan his secondary, objective. Indeed, superior in numbers as in the marching and manœuvring powers of his veteran troops, under experienced leaders, on ground every step of which recorded the victorious exploits of a preceding generation, the Emperor found every reason to seek a general action, none to avoid one, provided he could find a fair field and sufficient time and space to develop his forces.

* The Sardinian army was already north of the Po.

Such a field, denied elsewhere, the position of Novara presented.

With the material advantages of ground admirably adapted for a defensive-offensive action, it united the moral effects of strategical victory;—within one easy march, too, of the Ticinus, supposed to be entirely undefended on its upper course, it offered prospects, almost amounting to certainty, of the unopposed passage of that river—always a dangerous obstacle to a French advance into Lombardy.

It was hardly, however, to be expected that the Austrians would have left the door to such advantages open and unguarded, had not the danger of passing through it appeared to them so extravagantly great that no general in his senses would make the attempt. This danger consisted in the execution of the flank march already mentioned, which, if safely effected, would land the French in a position where they exposed themselves to the chances of a general action, backed upon the Swiss Alps, with no line of retreat in case of defeat, and, as a natural consequence, with exposed communications.

Well can it be understood how "Theory" would stand aghast at such a conception!—how the Austrian staff at once dismissed such an eventuality from their calculations! And yet, examined in detail, the grave objections justly urged against similar risks in war, fall in this instance harmlessly to the ground. For, with proper dispositions, the march from Voghera to Novara presented no extraordinary dangers, and the selection of Novara as a battle-field was a bold and genial combination which enlisted every advantage on the side of the French, and virtually necessitated the Austrian retreat behind the Ticinus.

Now, in order to understand the real state of affairs immediately subsequent to the battle of Montebello, it must be borne in mind that the French were possessed of certain substantial advantages, well calculated to counterbalance the difficulties attending offensive operations in the face of a strong and in many respects well-selected defensive position.

As usual in wars of independence, they obtained constant and reliable intelligence of all that was passing in the Austrian camp; they possessed a numerical superiority—50,000 men,

at least; and, from the very nature of their own position and of that selected by the Austrians, were freed from the slightest apprehension of counter-attack.

A glance at the map, too, will convince the reader that, posted within the *rayon* of the group of fortresses centring at Alessandria,—veiled by the broad barrier of the Po and its principal southern tributaries, as well as by the intersected character of the country—the most ordinary precautions were all that the French required, with the ample means of communication at their disposal, in order to mass their divisions rapidly and unobserved at Casale and its vicinity. The difficulty and danger of the flank march was thus virtually reduced to the thirty miles of road which intervene between Casale and Novara.

Rüstow says, and with great truth, that the proverbial danger of these marches vanishes before good dispositions and proper precautions—any danger attending them can only exist pending their execution, and is therefore diminished or increased according to the distance to be accomplished. Once completed, it stands to reason the advantages to be gained from them should be great; why else incur risk for negative results? Executed from a more or less parallel position to that of the enemy, the very name implies the direction to which they lead—the flank, perhaps rear, of the enemy's line.

In the present case it is obvious that on the north bank of the Po the whole movement assumed a more difficult and delicate character. The Sesia, indeed, partially covered the early portion of the march, but the latter half would be entirely unprotected without special dispositions.

Here then lies the key to the operations of the Sardinians, supported by the 3d Zouaves, and by Canrobert's army corps. Upon the importance attached to the strength, position, and use of this army by the French commander, the whole question of the safety, success, and soundness of his manœuvre hinged.

Notoriously on the 31st of May the King of Sardinia established himself firmly at Palestro, Confienza, &c., pushing his van well forward on the road to Robbio and Mortara, and feeling with his left for the French, who, on the following

day (June 1st) were drawn up in order of battle, 90,000 strong, facing south, in the formidable position of Novara. This concentration completed the flank march, the latter portion of which had been executed, as will be seen, without the slightest interruption, during the two days on which the Sardinians were engaged in carrying and defending the heights of Palestro, with the double object of covering and concealing the French march, and of afterwards flanking any possible attack on the part of the Austrians upon Novara.

It may well be asserted then, that, for clearness of design, forethought of detail, and well-ordered accuracy of execution, this operation may justly be classed with the strategy initiated by the first Napoleon. Less complete in its results, because commenced under different auspices, it still breathes the spirit of the manœuvre which entailed Mack's disaster at Ulm. It has always appeared that here, as then, retreat was the one course dictated to the Austrian general by every consideration proceeding from an intelligent appreciation of his altered position. It may be added too, as a humble and valueless tribute to his unfortunate career, that nothing could surpass the brilliant conception which directed the oblique converging movement on Magenta, by which the advantages of numbers and position, lost in the Lomellina to the hardy ability of his adversary, might, with ordinary execution, so speedily have been re-enlisted in his favour.

To these opinions, expressed with the force of conviction, but presented with great deference to superior authority, strong objections will be raised. It is affirmed by more than one historian of the campaign, and by men of experience and marked ability, that in rashly posting himself at Novara, Napoleon exposed his communication with his base, and his army to entire ruin in defeat.

This naturally implies that the course acted upon by Gyulai was false; that, giving him credit for the smallest amount of military talent, he should at once have availed himself of the faults of his adversary, either by fighting at Novara in order to repeat the decisive victory of 1849, or by operating on the exposed communications of the French between Vercelli and Casale, in order to force the Emperor to retrace his steps.

Study each of these proposed alternatives. Gyulai first received intimation of the French advance upon Novara on the night from May 31 to June 1. At that time he held 21 brigades, in round numbers, 100,000 men, at his disposal between the Sesia and the Ticinus; the whole of this force might be concentrated at Mortara by the following evening—June 1. The other Austrian army corps at Piacenza, Pavia, and Magenta could not be made available, for well-known reasons.

On the evening of the same day (June 1), Niel (4th corps), Macmahon (2d), and the Imperial Guard were already massed at Novara, 90,000 strong; the 1st corps was at Vercelli and Lomelungo; the 3d (Canrobert), with the whole Sardinian army, except the 5th division left on the south bank of the Po, at and in advance of Palestro.

Glancing at the map it will be perceived that from Mortara an excellent road leads due north to Novara; parallel to it and immediately adjacent is the railway; in an opposite direction the continuation of the same road leads to Pavia, and formed the natural line of retreat to an Austrian army concentrated at Mortara, with its line of communications to the Quadrilateral organised along the north bank of the Po.

In the north-west the *chaussée* runs through Robbio and Palestro to Vercelli, and a highroad crossing obliquely connects Vigevano on the Ticinus with Candia and Casale.

Gyulai, then, having concentrated 100,000 men at Mortara on the evening of June 1, might advance on the following morning at daybreak to attack the French at Novara. Leaving Zobel with 20,000 men at Robbio to observe the Sardinians, he could march 80,000 strong in two heavy columns to Bicocca, where, in about four or five hours, he would touch the French outposts.

Considering, as has been already stated, that 90,000 French were at this time already drawn up here in order of battle, that the position of Novara is by no means to be despised (attested by the recurrence of battles there), and that Baraguay d'Hilliers was moving up from Vercelli and Lomelungo in support, it must be admitted that no small amount of confidence in himself and his army would have been required

for any general to have risked the chances of a general action under circumstances so unfavourable.

If, then, the first step northwards on the part of the Austrians from Mortara would infallibly have entailed a corresponding movement upon that town by Victor Emmanuel and Canrobert; if the disparity of force necessarily left for its defence, and the parity of space on both advances be borne in mind; if, lastly, it be remembered that this same town lies immediately on the sole line of retreat open to the Austrians fighting unequally at Novara,—it will be readily conceded that nothing could justify an attempt so hazardous for the sake of any results, however great, which might accrue from a most improbable victory.

It has always seemed that critics, in denouncing the flank march, have more or less lost sight of the obvious importance of the occupation of Palestro in such formidable strength. Thus it is difficult to understand the extent to which it is stated that the French communications were exposed. Is it for one moment supposed that, during the eight days ending June 1, no forethought had been expended upon the provision of ammunition and supplies for the utmost requirements of 150,000 men during a possible succession of engagements? With two lines of railway converging from Genoa by Alessandria and Casale, and from Alessandria by Asti and Turin upon Vercelli, the one direct, the other circuitous, is it possible for an instant to admit that the advantage of that town as a *place d'armes* had been lost sight of? There need be no hesitation in expressing the conviction that from the completion of the flank march all future operations were to be based upon Vercelli, and that any blow aimed south of that point by the Austrians would have struck nothing but air. At the same time, a direct advance upon that town would have exposed Gyulai to eventualities precisely similar to those described above.

But there are still other objections to such a course based upon broader grounds.

It must be recollected that in this war, the object of which was to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, Lombardy could only be considered by Austria as an outlying province,

to be retained if possible—if not, to be abandoned, in order to fall back upon the Mincio, there to defend the Quadrilateral and her Venetian territories (to which she attached so much importance) *à outrance*. How, then, could Gyulai operate in a direction which would increase the distance from his base, and which would allow his adversary to interpose his army between him and the Ticinus, thus forcing him to fight a second Marengo for existence?

It is this consideration which doubtless explains the nervous anxiety for his communications displayed by the Austrian commander at an earlier stage of the campaign—a timidity well calculated to enlighten his adversary as to his resources and instructions, and to add vigour and boldness to his offensive operations.

Again, the pages of military history teem with parallel cases. Everywhere can be found (the crisis once attained) the one army dictating imperiously to the other; not unfrequently, indeed, with its own communications exposed.

Could the connection of an army with its base be more neglected than that of Buonaparte in 1796 on this very theatre—notably in his dashing march through the defile of Stradella, in order to seize Piacenza, and there gain the passage of the Po? Why then did Beaulieu, instead of crossing from Pavia in order to seize the much-coveted prize, and indemnify himself for previous defeats, retire breathless to Lodi? Why—to illustrate the proposition still more appropriately—why did Chrzanowsky, marching upon Milan in 1849, suddenly halt and retrace his steps on hearing that Radetzky had entered Piedmont?

Well may Clausewitz remark upon this subject, “Where will argument find an end, if it be unfairly allowed always to fall back upon a similarity of circumstances, without taking the trouble to inquire where the deciding influence really exists?” That influence, asserting itself with unerring accuracy, is sometimes contained in superior numbers, sometimes in superior *morale*, occasionally in the individuality of a commander; everywhere the instinct of inferiority may be trusted, and it seldom occurs that a general following it can be justly blamed for pusillanimity or excess of caution.

Whatever view may be taken of the plan, it was finally decided on, and the Emperor visited Vercelli on the 26th May, orders for the march being issued on the 27th.

It was his intention to mask it by posting the Sardinians and 3d French corps at Robbio.

Canrobert led the advance on the 27th by rail to Casale, and demonstrations were made along the Po and Sesia, which were carefully patrolled.

Small reconnoitring parties pushed forward towards Stradella and Vaccarizza found the enemy still motionless, and Macmahon made a feint of throwing a bridge over the Po at Cervesina. The passages at Vercelli were improved by the construction of three bridges.

On the 28th the general movement was continued.

Sardinians (less Cucchiari),	.	.	at Vercelli.
3d corps, .	.	.	Casale.
Guard, .	.	.	Occimiano.
4th corps,	.	.	Valenza.
2d „	.	.	Salé.
1st „	.	.	Ponte Curone, with outposts along the Po.
D'Autemarre and Sardinian cavalry,			Voghera, Casteggio, Montebello.

On the 29th —

3d and 4th corps and Guard,	.	.	Casale.
2d corps, .	.	.	Valenza.
1st „	.	.	Salé.
D'Autemarre, &c.,	.	.	Tortona.

The Sardinians were directed to cross the Sesia at Vercelli, the Guard moving on Trino. These movements brought on actions at Palestro on the 30th and 31st.

On the 30th, the 1st, 2d, and 3d Sardinian divisions crossed at Vercelli, and moved on Palestro, Vinzaglio, and Confienza. The 3d French corps from Casale marched on Prarolo to support their allies, and threw bridges across the Sesia. The 4th corps, followed by the 2d corps and Guard, reached Vercelli with their advance. The result of this day's fighting was to drive back the Austrian outposts of the 7th corps.

On the 31st, Canrobert commenced crossing, and joined in the small affair produced by an attempt on the part of Zobel to retake Palestro. The 3d corps reached Palestro, the 4th was between Borgo, Vercelli, and Novara; the 2d at Borgo, Vercelli, and Cameriano; the Guard at Vercelli, and the 1st corps at Casale by the close of the day, during which, moreover, demonstrations had been made by the 1st corps at Valenza.

On the 1st June the positions were as follows:—

4th corps in front of Novara. •

2d corps on its left.

Imperial Guard in Novara.

1st corps, D'Autemarre and Sardinian cavalry at Vercelli, cavalry detachments being pushed forward to Trecate, Galliate, and Vespolate.

On the 2d June, the 4th, 2d, and Guard corps were still near Novara, Espinasse's division being at Trecate, and Camou's at Turbigo. The 1st corps reached Lumello.

The concentration towards the left was now virtually concluded, and, as may be seen, consists of two distinct movements:—

1. The transfer from the Po to the Sesia;
2. The march on Novara.

The advance from the latter place was dependent on subsequent circumstances; but the success of the plan so far was due to wise arrangement of the original dispositions.

The 3d corps being on the railway between Voghera and Casale, was in a position to be moved secretly and rapidly behind the screen offered by the 1st and 2d; and on the 29th, the entire corps was at Casale with the four Sardinian divisions at Vercelli, with bridges constructed.

Gyulai had not moved a man, and it was practically impossible for the Austrians now to contest the passage of the Sesia.

The problem had all along been how to invade Lombardy with the least possible risk. Of the three doors by which such an invasion could be attempted, two were closed, and one, that which led circuitously into Lombardy, but direct upon the capital, was alone open. Doubtless to enter by this placed the French army relatively in a worse strategic position, inasmuch as, if victorious, the enemy would be defeated, not

ruined; while if they themselves were repulsed, they would be in a position of grave danger.

But what were the relative chances of defeat or victory? These were but dependent on certain easily understood data:—

1. Numerical force of the assailant.
2. The character and marching-power of the force.
3. The complete development of the force.
4. The position it would eventually occupy.
5. The secrecy of the combination.
6. Rapidity and skill in execution.

The closed doors, on the other hand, were certainly capable of being forced, though at great sacrifice and tactical risk; but if merely defeated, the results to the beaten army would be less disastrous than if the only open passage were chosen.

Hence it is that most critics, starting from the danger of the flank march, unhesitatingly condemn it; but the operation should not, as has been argued, always be viewed from results. It would be dangerous from beginning to end in face of a competent adversary, and while the communications would be exposed, there was no other secure line of retreat.

Better, say they, to fight at a disadvantage where defeat is not ruin, than to fight at advantage, even with every chance of success, where decisive defeat would entail ruin.

The question must always be an open one, for it is dependent on the character of the commander and commanded.

The move from Vercelli on Novara has been much criticised, and it has been suggested that Mortara should have been the true point of further concentration, as leading to the heart of the Austrian position, and further covering both lines to Turin by Casale and Vercelli ('Operations of War,' p. 242).

Such a movement would have brought them into contact with the bulk of the Austrian force; for, according to the Prussian account, Gyulai, on the 1st June, had 26,000 men at Robbio, 38,000 at Mortara, 32,000 at Lomello, and 10,000 at Vaccarizza—so that it would have been possible to concentrate 90,000 men at Mortara, either to meet this attack, or make a counter-stroke against Palestro.

But viewing matters as they stood on this date, the 2d June, both skill and rapidity in execution had been displayed

by the Allies, and great judgment had been shown at the headquarters in organising the movement, whereby no opening for a dangerous counter-stroke had as yet been afforded to the Austrian generals. The question, however, arises, What had been gained by the combination with reference either to tactical or strategic advantage?

It may be answered thus: 1st, That the enemy's preparations and expectations had been thwarted. He was called upon to act without being able to deliberate. A battle, if fought, would be engaged under circumstances which enlisted every chance in favour of the French, on the highroad to and close to Lombardy, where the attitude of the people was such as to render Gyulai already anxious for his communications.

Meanwhile, what had Gyulai done? Declining to comply with Zobel's rash proposition to attack Novara with three corps, he prepared to concentrate in retreat at Abbiate Grasso, proposing to take his adversary in flank should he march on Milan, at a moment when he would be involved in crossing the Ticinus and canal.

The movement was commenced on June 2d, under cover of the reserve cavalry and 3d corps; the 2d and 7th corps marched from Robbio to Vigevano, the 5th from S. Nazzaro to Garlasco, and the 8th from Lomello to Trumello. These marches were very severe, for the detachments now marched in twenty-four hours the distance accomplished before in four days, while the transport of train and wounded increased the difficulties.

A part of the 9th corps was moving on Pavia. The 1st corps had been directed on Piacenza, owing to Garibaldi; but this was afterwards altered, and on the 1st June Gordon's subdivision was at Magenta, with the other still at Milan.

The Emperor reconnoitred in person on the 2d June; and then, as soon as the 1st corps had reached Lumello, ordered a division of the 2d corps to Trecate and San Martino, while Camou marched to Turbigo with the artillery and bridge equipments. He proposed to effect the passage of the Ticinus before the enemy was in sufficient force to defend it.

Camou arrived at 4 P.M., and effected a lodgment; and by 7.30 the bridge was finished, and covered by twenty-four guns, works being thrown up at once on the left bank. At 2 A.M. Turbigo was seized, and a passage over the canal secured.

The bulk of the French were still in position at Olengo with the Sardinians at Palestro. The retreat of the Austrians was not molested, or even closely observed.

On the 3d June, Espinasse, on the point of attacking the *tête-de-pont* at Sau Martino, found it abandoned, and occupied it, to find the bridge only in part destroyed; whereupon, being relieved by the Guard, he marched to join La Motterouge at Turbigo.

Gordon retired to Magenta.

The French were uncertain concerning the Austrian intentions, and Niel was therefore ordered to reconnoitre towards Mortara; but he discovered at Vespolate that the Austrian 3d corps had left for Vigevano. This movement indicated a concentration of the enemy on the left bank; but the position at Novara was maintained on the 3d to cover the passage at Turbigo, for which purpose, therefore, the Sardinians and Canrobert were now called in.

The 3d corps arrived at 8 P.M. at Novara, and the two Sardinian divisions joined the 1st corps at Lumellogno, two other Sardinian divisions being pushed on towards Turbigo, where they arrived the following morning. On the night of the 3d the mass of the Allied army was assembled between the Agogna and the Ticinus in a depth of about four miles; but three divisions only had crossed the river.

If the Austrians attacked on the right bank, the French would be called upon to fight with a half-inverted front, and all their communications on their flank. All strategic circumstances were in favour of the Austrians, but tactical success was hopeless under the circumstances; and this consideration was final. They could not fight until the enemy had lost his superiority by division of force; and this only was to be expected in the passage of the existing obstacles, particularly the rivers, which for this reason were their true lines of defence.

The fact, therefore, that the Austrians retired from an unequal contest is the best justification of the French operations. In thus retiring, the Austrians resumed the ground they held prior to the declaration of war, only in a much less advantageous position. In the first instance, they might have completed their preparations, and been concentrated on two rivers; but now they were scattered from Piacenza to Varese, and the *morale* of the army had been sensibly impaired.

General Hess arrived at Gyulai's headquarters at Bereguardo on the 3d; and six hours' delay insured orders being sent to the troops at Vigevano and Garlasco to halt.

The possibility of concentration on the right bank was reconsidered, but abandoned on the arrival of Clam's report. He was now at Magenta with 13,000 men, having evacuated San Martino on the 2d and 3d, but failed to destroy the bridge owing to insufficiency of powder. The position of the 1st corps was consequently endangered with the French in possession of the passage at Turbigo, and continued retreat, therefore, became indispensable.

The original plan to place three corps in front line, and two in second parallel to Milan road, was disturbed by Clam's danger, and support was instantly necessary.

The 2d corps and 1st division of the 7th were hence ordered to Magenta, together with reserve cavalry, the headquarters being moved to Rosate and Bereguardo.

The 2d, 7th, and 3d corps moved on Vigevano, the 5th and 8th on Bereguardo. On the night from the 3d to the 4th June, therefore, the Austrian position was as follows:—Round Magenta, 41,000 men, consisting of 2d corps, Gordon, Reischach, and reserve cavalry; at Abbiate Grasso, 27,000, consisting of 3d corps and Lilia; below Falla Vecchia, 5th and 8th corps, 47,000; below Pavia, 9th corps, 21,000; at Varese, Urban with 11,000; and at Milan, Montennovo with 13,000 men.

Disregarding detachments, there were 115,000 troops between Magenta and Bereguardo, a good march of eighteen miles in extent, so that concentration was only feasible towards the centre by mid-day, and nowhere else. No cooking had been permitted during the halt; and the only result

of this was, that more time had been lost, with additional distress to the men. The six hours of delay on the 3d were of evident importance.

A day of rest was hence deemed necessary, considering the long marches the troops had undergone, and orders were issued for such to be observed on the 4th June. In reality, not much was lost by this, as the French could not well march on Milan without first attacking the Austrians, who would meanwhile have time to concentrate.

But one thing was indispensable, not to allow Clam then to accept action. The position of Magenta must be vacated. If this were not desirable, then the rest day was impossible and unwise.

If in spite of this the battle of Magenta was fought on the 4th, it was because the situation was not clearly appreciated by Gyulai, and because he allowed himself to be drawn into a general action in consequence of his first error in supporting Clam with insufficient resources at hand.

The Emperor, however, expected it as little as the Austrians on this day. After the evacuation of San Martino, he did not expect to find 40,000 Austrians behind the canal; nor was he aware of Clam's timely arrival. The following dispositions for the 4th were hence made: Mellinet to Boffalora, to unite with Camou; 2d corps on Magenta (left of the army); 3d corps on San Martino; 4th on Trecate (facing south); 1st at Olengo; and the Sardinians in reserve at Galliate.

Bridges were thrown across the Ticinus; and thus the position now held was *à cheval* the river, with three-fourths of the army on the right bank, but concentrated for a passage on the 5th. The gravest inconvenience of the position was the crowding of troops on one road; and while they were executing these orders, the clearest information was given that Gyulai had definitely abandoned the right bank, and was marching for Magenta.

The Emperor then decided to push forward at the points of passage, and the alteration explains the subsequent confusion of troops. Meanwhile the Sardinians were ordered to Turbigo. The *terrain* over which the operations were to take place is of a very difficult character. The advance was to be made

in two directions converging on Magenta. The front attack proceeded from the bridge of San Martino—or, as it is also called, Ponte Nuovo di Boffalora—in an easterly direction, the second or flank attack from Turbigo in a south-easterly direction. The flank attack led over nearly level ground, studded with villages and isolated farmhouses, and closely cultivated. The fields are large, and enclosed by hedges of the common thorny acacia; the crops are mostly maize and grass, but these are divided at about every fifteen yards by rows of mulberry-trees, with vines trained over them and from one to another. No commanding view is therefore to be had, even on horseback; but a wide extent of country can be overlooked from the church towers, which exist in almost every village. The front attack led directly on the canal, and had there a very serious obstacle to overcome. As already noticed, it is quite impassable except over the bridges. Of these, five must be noticed. 1st, That of Boffalora. The only approach to it is by an indifferent road branching off from the great Novara-Milan *chaussée*, about a quarter of a mile beyond the Ticinus bridge; it is completely commanded by the houses of Boffalora, and may be swept by artillery-fire from the high ground about the village. 2d, That of Ponte Nuovo di Magenta, by which the great *chaussée* crosses the canal. This road starting from the Ticinus bridge, slopes gradually down to nearly the level of the high ground which forms the sides of the valley, and through which the canal is led. At the canal bridge there are four buildings—one in each angle between the road and canal; those on the left, or eastern bank of the canal, are particularly strongly built, and were in 1859 the Austrian custom-house. 3d, The railway bridge about 500 yards below Ponte Nuovo. This crosses the canal at a lower level than the last. The railway, which crosses the Ticinus by the same bridge as the *chaussée*, instead of sinking to the valley, as that does, runs on an embankment across it, rising with a uniform but very easy gradient to the point where, through a cutting, it enters the high banks which frame the valley in. This long and uniform slope is seen in its whole length from the high ground, and lies completely exposed to the fire of guns. 4th, Ponte Vecchio di Magenta. A tolerably large village, on both

banks of the canal; the part on the right bank consists of older and less substantial buildings than that on the left. There is no direct road to Ponte Vecchio from the Ticinus bridge, but roads run along both sides of the canal at the top of the cutting through which it flows from Ponte Nuovo. 5th, Robecco. A large and important village built on both sides of the canal. From Ponte Vecchio downwards, the canal becomes shallower and more rapid, and its banks are less high and steep. As it gradually diverges from the river, the breadth of the high ground enclosed between it and the low river-valley widens gradually from near Boffalora, where it begins to have a breadth of two miles between Robecco and Casterno. In cultivation and character, the plateau, often called the plateau of Carpenzago, resembles the ground between Turbigo and Magenta. The low ground or valley bed of the Ticinus, though not absolutely impassable, is practically unfit for the movements of troops. The advance of the French from the bridge of San Martino was virtually restricted to three roads,—that leading to Boffalora, the *chaussée*, and the railway embankment; at the edge of the high ground to the north of the latter, the Austrians had thrown up a field-work. With the exception of those at Boffalora and Ponte Vecchio, which had been broken down, the bridges on the canal had been left standing, ready mined, but the chambers not charged.

It is very noticeable, in examining Clam's disposition for the defence of the position, that he evidently regarded the attack from the west as the most dangerous, and therefore fronted in this direction. His knowledge of the strategic situation was evidently imperfect, for the French at Turbigo had the passages of both the canal and river in their hands; and by acting as he did, he exposed his flank to a certain blow. Had the bridge on the canal been destroyed, an advance on this side in face of even a small containing force would have been dangerous, slow, and difficult, if not impossible, and he would then have been able to confront the northern attack unhindered, because his left, resting on the canal, would have been comparatively safe.

But he judged otherwise, and his dispositions for battle were therefore as follows: His command consisted of 30,000

men of the 1st and 2d corps, and of these Burdina's division was placed behind the canal between Boffalora and Ponte Nuovo, four brigades at Magenta, one at Robecco, the outposts extending from Robecco to Inverimo. The advance of the French was reported from San Martino, and Burdina was thereupon ordered to defend the bridges and to occupy the redoubt near the railway on which the guns were stationed.

One brigade was held in reserve at Casa Girola, one brigade directed on Boffalora, another to Cascina Nuova in support, and a fourth remained in reserve at Magenta. These dispositions were completed undisturbed, thanks only to the delayed attack of the French.

Mellinet reached San Martino at 9 A.M., and repaired the bridge, a pontoon-bridge being also added, so that one brigade of the Guard and two guns crossed. At 10.30 a partial advance was effected, producing collision with the Austrian outposts; but it was discontinued, as the Emperor was desirous of waiting till the pressure of the turning movement from Turbigo was felt. Still it was not time lost, for it gave an opportunity for an examination of the ground, during which the presence of guns on the canal proved that the bridges had not been destroyed; and while Macmahon pressed on, the Sardinians were directed on Turbigo. No orders, however, were sent to Niel or Canrobert.

Clam did not apparently expect an attack from the north, and while reporting an advance from the west, he did not demand support. Still Gyulai, abandoning the idea of a rest day, ordered the 5th and 8th corps to march towards the battle-field.

Macmahon had moved at 9 A.M., La Motterouge on Cuggiono, and Espinasse on Marcallo, to which place the Sardinians were also to proceed as soon as they had crossed.

About 12.30 the Turcos of the right column, supported by two batteries, attacked Boffalora, but were repulsed; whereupon Macmahon, perceiving considerable forces before him, and fearful of being separated from Espinasse and Camou, broke off the engagement. Espinasse reached Marcallo at 2.30, and Camou soon after arrived at Cuggiono.

But the sound of the cannon had reached the Emperor's

ears, and, desirous of supporting the marshal, he gave orders for the advance to be made in two columns, one the 3d Grenadiers, 2000 strong, along the railway embankment, covered by three companies of Zouaves along the railway, and flanked by the 1st Grenadiers on the right, the remainder of the Zouaves being held in reserve.

The other column, the 2d Grenadiers, settled in Boffalora, but on the right bank only; but the 1st carried the redoubt and railway bridge, whereupon the rest of the Zouaves advanced by the *chaussée* and carried Ponte Nuovo, assisted by the Grenadiers from the railway. At 2 P.M. the passages were in the possession of the French—a remarkable feat, considering the disproportion existing between the numbers.

Clam now first reported his danger, and Reischach was called up from Castellazzo di Barzy. The 3d corps was directed on Robecco, and Lilia to Corbelta.

There is no truth, therefore, in the report that Gyulai delayed to support his lieutenant; but half the day was already gone, the 5th corps was eleven miles off, and the 8th seventeen miles, so that the 3d and 7th only were available, and one division had been most unaccountably detached towards Milan. The Guards continued pushing back the Austrians from Ponte Nuovo until the arrival of Reischach's division of the 7th corps, when they were driven back to the canal, though they still retained possession of the right bank.

Gyulai reached Magenta at 2 P.M. The canal was lost, but the enemy was unable to debouch, and all was quiet on Macmahon's side.

Espinasse's arrival was, however, soon signalled, and Reznischek's brigade was sent there, while Benedek hastened back to Robecco to direct the 3d corps.

About 3.30 the first French reinforcement, Picard's brigade of the 3d corps, appeared, and the Austrians were again driven out of Ponte Nuovo; but Schwarzenberg, recognising the danger of the situation, placed himself at the head of Kintzil's brigade (2d corps) to make a counter-attack. An Italian regiment bore the brunt of the fight, and was defeated, when Picard extended his right to Ponte Vecchio.

The situation was still precarious, as Macmahon remained

inactive on the left, while danger was approaching on the right. Niel and Canrobert were only just alive to the fact that a general action was being fought, and the former had already entered on his bivouack at Trecate, while Canrobert could not pass, as the roads were blocked by the train. The Austrian 3d corps was ready to enter into action at 4, and advanced on both sides of the canal, Hartung west, and Ramming east of that obstacle, with Durfeld in rear of the former, and Wetzlar along the river. Though at first successful, the corps was at length everywhere repulsed.

Vinoy (4th corps) reached San Martino at 4.45, and was shortly followed by a brigade of Canrobert's.

The French had not as yet moved from Boffalora, where two bridges had been thrown, but Macmahon was ready to move at 4 P.M., and the Austrians formed front to their right (all reserves being hurried north by Gyulai, who had returned to Magenta), Reznischek and Baltin being in first line, and Kudelka and Lebzeltern in second.

Baltin had abandoned Boffalora, and thus the line of the Naviglio Canal was practically lost, for the French, advancing from Boffalora, formed a junction with Macmahon.

The two first brigades attacked Marcallo unsuccessfully; but Cascina Nuova was occupied at 5.30.

This was assaulted by Macmahon, assisted by a part of Niel's corps, and carried, and Magenta was gained possession of by 7.30.

Macmahon had now all his force in line, and was supported by a Sardinian division and detachments from the canal, the brigades Bataille and Collineau reaching the ground when the victory which gave the Emperor the passage of the Ticinus and canal was fully assured.

The Allied loss amounted to 246 officers and 4289 men, against 281 officers and 9432 men on the Austrian side.

Of the troops present in the theatre, only 60,000 French and 58,000 Austrians were actually engaged—a clear proof that battle was not expected by either party. The Austrians were from their dispositions evidently surprised by Macmahon; and Reischach, originally intended to face this northern danger, was recalled westwards, owing to the brilliant attack of

the grenadiers, by which an almost impregnable position was carried by 6000 men. All through the action the superior fighting power of the French was most noticeable, and even Schwarzenberg's advance would have been most dangerous to the French, with Kintzil and Lilia numbering 30,000 men; but Kintzil's troops, of whom many were Italians, were very unreliable, and Lilia was too far detached, so that Picard's weak force of 10,000 men was sufficient to check the counter-stroke. The 3d corps was then too far away to be of service.

From all this it appears that when Clam's report reached Abbiate Grasso, it was evident that sufficient strength was not present to support him, and the only course was to withdraw his force and not oppose the passage. As it was, the Austrian troops were brought into play in a most partial manner, and there seemed to be almost a reluctance to engage.

The battle-field gave few opportunities for the employment of artillery.

The desire to keep reserves in hand is very apparent, and was pushed too far. What would have happened in 1815 if the Prussian corps had dribbled into a general battle-field in support of Ziethen at Marchiennes?

Macmahon's force was too weak for the purpose, and was not well backed up. But even with the small force he had, the use of both roads was indispensable, and his early caution to afford time for a better distribution of his columns is commendable. The entire absence of communication with the Emperor throughout the early part of the day, seems inexplicable; and knowing this, and that the general-in-chief might possibly be misled by the firing which occurred in the first attack on Boffalora, his after-delay was indiscreet, and might have resulted in disaster to the French. An advance in echelon from his right as soon as possible would have been the safest and best course for the marshal, under the circumstances of the case.

The operations as conducted up to this point, are particularly instructive when compared with the movements in the preceding campaign of 1849.

The operations conducted in 1849 and 1859 are peculiarly instructive in connection with each other.

In 1849, an Italian, wishing to invade Lombardy, selected the northern line in defiance of strategic rules, which point to that *south* of the Po, and the enemy stood behind the Ticinus. In 1859, he was already concentrated between that river and the Sesia—that is to say, the Italians operated in 1849 under circumstances infinitely more favourable than did the French in 1859. Nevertheless, the Italian army was ruined in four days, whilst the French completed the same manœuvre in the teeth of a position selected to prevent it, and thus initiated a brilliant campaign. How, then, is the difference in results to be accounted for? Why did Radetzky, under circumstances less favourable, succeed, whilst Gyulai succumbed on the same ground without an effort? Evidently a military truth of importance is concealed here.

If by operations in utter neglect of strategic principles, the enemy can be forced to abandon territory without an effort, it is clear that in war a principle is latent, other than strategy, which is dominating; briefly, that tactical considerations are primary, strategic secondary only—that is to say, it is safer for a superior army in offensive warfare comparatively to expose communications by turning a practically strong position, than to take the bull by the horns by assailing it. This explains the French manœuvre in 1859 and its results. The *sine quâ non* of course is, that the operations must be effected with the necessary precautions for success. Secrecy and rapidity are essential so as to bring the entire force, superior of course to the enemy who is on the defensive, to the right point at the right time.

The remainder of the campaign does not offer much attraction to the military student. No pursuit was attempted by the French either after the battle or on the 5th, the time being employed in bringing up the troops beyond the Ticinus.

The Austrians neglecting to defend the strong position behind the canal running from Milan to Abbiate Grasso fell back on the Mincio, abandoning Pavia, Milan, and Piacenza, and the Allies occupied the Lombard capital on the 7th June; but on the 8th a small action occurred at Melegnano, a village on the river Lambro, where the Milan-Lodi road crosses it—after which the Austrians retreated without interruption. Urban joined the main army on the 12th, and the Chiese was crossed on the 15th, on which day an attack by Garibaldi on Urban's rear-guard was repulsed.

By the 21st the Austrians had evacuated the whole of Lombardy and the district south of the Po, and retreated into the Quadrilateral to reorganise their army.

The French advanced very slowly, only completing the passage of the Chiese on the 23d June, the Sardinians and Garibaldi being on the extreme left towards Lake Garda. On this date the Austrians recrossed the Mincio, formed into two armies: the first consisting of the 3d, 9th, 11th corps, and 1st reserve cavalry division; and the second, of the 1st, 5th, 7th, 8th, 6th corps, and 2d reserve cavalry division.

This advance brought about the battle of Solferino on the 24th, when the Austrians were again defeated, and once more retired unmolested into the Quadrilateral.

The Mincio was crossed by the Allies on the 1st July, and preparations made for the investment of Peschiera; while on the 3d the French 5th corps (Prince Napoleon) joined the main army. The fleet, with a force for the attack of Venice, had meanwhile arrived in the Adriatic, while the Austrian army was collected round Verona.

But neither of the emperors cared for a continuance of the war: Napoleon, because he had done enough for Italy, and gained, what were probably his private ends, the promise of the cession of Savoy and Nice; Francis Joseph, because Prussia was anxious to appear upon the scene, and this might possibly endanger his existing supremacy in the German Confederation.

The treaty of Villafranca was therefore cordially agreed to, and by it Austria surrendered to Italy all her possessions west of the Mincio.

This was far from satisfying the Italians. Freedom for all their States from the Alps to the Adriatic was their constant aim; and from the termination of this war, until their desires were fulfilled, they left no stone unturned to promote the objects they had in view.

CHAPTER X.

KÖNIGGRATZ AND CUSTOZZA, 1866.

ONE of the chief results of the campaign of 1859 was to produce the first great disturbance in the political equilibrium of Europe since the wars of the Empire. But it was to be the precursor of greater and more important alterations in the balance of power. Italy consisted, even then, of but the Lombardo-Piedmontese kingdom, &c.—the southern portion of the peninsula remaining under Bourbon sway, while Venetia was still governed by Austrian generals.

The year 1860 saw the beginning of the end. Garibaldi aided the Sicilian insurrection by his presence, and, owing to the patriotic enthusiasm that presence evoked, gained the battle of Calatafimi, compelling the abandonment of the island of Sicily by the Neapolitan troops. Crossing to the mainland, his advance on Naples was followed by the evacuation of the capital by Francis II., King of the Two Sicilies.

But the insurrection spread, and the Sardinian king joining in it, became again the recognised leader of the cause of Italian unity; and, as the supporter of their efforts, gained once more the sympathy and confidence of the people. Battles at Castelfidardo, Ancona, Isernia, and Volturno by the Piedmontese and Garibaldians, led to the latter hailing Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, a title afterwards confirmed by the European Powers. But the prime mover in this nearly realised dream, Cavour, lived to see his great idea but partly fulfilled; for the successes of this year were dimmed not only in Italian eyes, but in those of every dispassionate politician of Europe, by his death, which occurred on the 1st June 1860.

Still the Papal States and Venetia yet remained in the hands of strangers, or did not share in the union that had linked together the hitherto disconnected States of Italy. The attempt made by Garibaldi, who, landing in Sicily in 1862, raised the cry of "Rome or Death," was deemed premature both by the king and by all those who felt an interest in Italian politics, or shared their aspirations. The action of Victor Emmanuel in taking the field against the rash patriot, whose ill-considered attempt might have led to unfortunately-timed complications, was, in one sense

regretfully, recognised as just and right by the general feeling of the great Powers. It led to the battle of Aspromonte, between the volunteers and the Italian army, in which Garibaldi was wounded, and the movement checked.

A bloodless revolution in Greece in 1862 led to the placing on the throne of Prince George of Denmark, and the cession of the Ionian Islands, by the British, to the new king.

But already the war-clouds that were soon to be so heavily charged with disaster to more than one of the European Powers, were rising on the political horizon. The Emperor Napoleon himself recognised their danger, but his attempt at procuring a European conference on the Polish, German, and Eastern questions in 1863 failed. And the following year, as if to justify his prescience, saw one of them, that of Schleswig Holstein, assuming serious importance.

The death of Frederick VII. of Denmark led to the refusal of many of the Holstein officials to recognise the new sovereign, Christian IX., and to the advancement of a claim on the part of the son of the Duke of Augustenberg to the sovereignty of the duchies. He was supported by the Diet at Frankfurt, which decreed federal execution, and the union of the States with Germany. After the occupation of Altona by the Saxons and Hanoverians, and the abandonment of Rendsberg by the Danes, Austria and Prussia declared war against Denmark, and the capture of Dybbøl and Alsen was followed by the peace of Vienna, 13th October 1864. By it the duchies were given over to Austria and Prussia; and, in the convention of Gastein, a temporary arrangement was entered into between them by which a joint occupation was agreed to, and Lauenberg was sold to Prussia. But these latter arrangements were not in accordance with the wishes of the Frankfurt Diet. In 1865 it condemned the treaty, and Prussia, seizing the opportunity of striking for the great aim of her ambition, supremacy in the councils of Germany, formed an alliance with Italy in the spring of 1866, and prepared for war.

PART I.—CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866: KÖNIGGRATZ.

The causes of the collision of the two great States, which for many years past have alternately asserted their supremacy in the German Confederation, must be sought in the constant rivalry occasioned by their coexistent history within this body politic. The rapid rise of the Hohenzollern dynasty to influence and power, its just aspiration to represent the tendency of the German peoples towards unity and political progress; then the adverse, reactionary policy of Austria, and

the utter incompetence of the Diet, her offspring, for national purposes,—had served to bring long-standing jealousies to a crisis which, when finally settled, bids fair to initiate a fresh period of national vigour for the ancient German race. In order to understand this, it will be well to trace the antecedent parts which Austria and Prussia have played in the history of their common fatherland.

The Confederation of States known to us as Germany, existed from the ninth to the commencement of the present century in the form of an empire. The empire, however, by no means represented a compact political mass. On the contrary, it was composed of a great number of lay and ecclesiastical sovereignties, more or less powerful and independent, the rulers of which owed allegiance to the emperor, whom some few of their number elected. It was in fact a feudal institution, which united, as far as possible, in medieval times, the scattered fractions of the Germanic race.

Amongst the sovereign States alluded to, we find in the early history of the *Reich*,* the Margravate of Austria, an outlying territory on the banks of the central Danube, and the Marquisate of Brandenburg, a sandy, sterile district, enclosed between the Oder and the central Elbe. Here were the cradles of the two great monarchies to whose history some passing reference is necessary. In the race for power which has since ensued between them, the start is singularly unequal. The house of Hapsburg, Dukes of Austria, had, early in the fifteenth century, already attained such preponderant influence in Germany—thanks principally to their external possessions, acquired by marriage—that the imperial crown of Germany was thenceforth regularly vested in the chiefs of that family. The first of the Hohenzollern dynasty, on the other hand, had but some twenty years previously (1415) been raised from comparative obscurity to the rank of Elector of Brandenburg. Two things are therefore evident; first, the original inferiority of the house of Hohenzollern to that of Hapsburg in point of rank and influence—and secondly, the connection between the external territories of the latter family and the German empire. It was, in fact, what is

* The German name for the Empire.

generally termed a personal union—that is to say, the Dukes of Austria, successively elected German Emperors by their compeers in the empire, were, by other rights, simultaneously Kings of Hungary, Bohemia, &c. Indeed it was to these external possessions, as has been already remarked, that their influence within the Reich, where their territory was comparatively small, was due.

During the two succeeding centuries which preceded the Thirty Years' War, the disparity of relative rank is still more remarkable. Whilst the Electors of Brandenburg were struggling against various difficulties, to establish the foundations of permanent rule, the house of Hapsburg had attained the summit of dynastic ambition in the person of Charles V., in whom the sceptres of Germany, Spain, Italy, and Austria, were simultaneously united. But, as though to illustrate the transient character of human combinations, together with the inheritance of such vast possessions by this prince, an event occurred, which was destined not only to revolutionise the social condition of Germany, but to sap the base upon which the power of the Austrian dynasty rested. This was the Lutheran Reformation. It is probable that, but for the external connections of the house of Hapsburg, this event would at once have proved of unmixed benefit to the peoples of Germany. As it was, it created a religious schism, which, culminating in the Thirty Years' War, destroyed all hopes, for many years to come, of closer national unity. Nevertheless, from this moment the death-blow was dealt to feudalism, and to all the institutions based upon it. Henceforth the doom of the empire was sealed. Henceforth the rise of the Hohenzollerns, who with characteristic prescience soon embraced the Protestant cause, and conversely the decline of Hapsburg influence, constantly exerted against it, may be clearly traced.

The year 1618, which ushered in the Thirty Years' War, also witnessed the annexation of the non-German Duchy of Prussia to Brandenburg, and the acquisition of the Cleve territories on the Rhine, by the Elector John Sigismund.

At the peace of Westphalia (1648), in spite of the undignified rôle his father had played during the war, Frederick William, justly styled the "Great Elector," increased these

possessions by some valuable additions. He quickly recognised that the vitality of the empire was wasting, and that a brilliant political future was now dawning for his own favoured race. To heal the wounds inflicted by the war; to establish an independent position towards external Powers, and as far as possible towards the empire itself; to organise an efficient military force, and introduce, with a view to State unity, a form of mild despotic rule which has lasted, more or less, to the present day; to initiate a system of strict financial economy, whilst he repopulated his dominions by encouraging immigration of his persecuted co-religionists from France and Holland,—were some of the far-sighted measures adopted by the prince whom the Great Frederick has since delighted to call the founder of his dynasty.

During a long reign, the Elector so fully succeeded in increasing the resources and consequent influence of his house, that in 1701 his successor, elevated to royal rank, was crowned King of Prussia as Frederick I. This important step, however, had not been attained without considerable difficulty. The terms under which it was at last conceded by the Hapsburg Emperor, in stipulating for the continued loyalty of the Hohenzollerns towards Reich and Kaiser, are sufficiently suggestive. The second King of Prussia, frugal to eccentricity, and devoted to the military profession, prepared the means and the instrument, which the genius of his son, the Great Frederick, turned to such good account.

Simultaneously with the accession of Frederick, in 1740, the male line of the imperial house had come to an end by the decease of the Emperor Charles VI. With a view to secure the inheritance of his various possessions to his daughter, this monarch had long been engaged in obtaining the consent of all parties concerned to the celebrated Pragmatic Sanction. But Frederick, with an army burning for service, and with a well-filled exchequer, was not the man to allow so favourable an opportunity to slip, or, where the engagements of his forefathers stood in the way of the interests of his dynasty, to hold himself bound by them. He invaded Silesia, claimed by ancient but doubtful right, defeated the imperial troops, and ultimately annexed the greater portion of that duchy to his

own dominions. At the same time he eagerly espoused the cause of Charles, Elector of Bavaria, a candidate for the imperial dignity, in opposition to the husband of Maria Theresa. It is perfectly clear that his fixed purpose was already directed towards the exclusion of the Austrian dynasty from further exercise of power in Germany. The result of such bold policy was the Seven Years' War, characterised by his own great genius, and sufficiently illustrating the military virtues of his subjects. From it Prussia, exhausted though she was, issued as a great European Power. If the crown of Germany remained with the Hapsburgs, it was an emblem of past, not of present power. Henceforth the younger dynasty asserted its claim rightfully to represent German interests, German progress, and German intellect. To guard this claim Frederick once more, before he died, unsheathed his sword against Maria Theresa's son, and the last act of his political life was to organise against Austrian aggrandisement a league of German princes.

From this short historical sketch it may be observed that, during the three centuries which closed with the death of Frederick II., the fate of the German peoples was entirely deposited in the hands of the two ruling dynasties. One of these represented youth, thrift, nationality, in a restricted sense, religious tolerance and comparative enlightenment, promoted education, and furthered the dissemination of knowledge. If the executive power was exclusively reserved for the use of the dynasty, that power was certainly exercised for the public weal, for the benefit of those whom it protected. The other was already old in years before the first had started into life. Its influence had grown with the power and influence of the medieval Church of Rome, of which it formed the strongest pillar. It was the representative of priestcraft and feudalism, the opponent of progress, liberty, and learning. The absolute rule which it maintained had not been turned to the advantage of the subject, but to the exclusive benefit of the dynasty. Both dynasties had this in common, that they reserved to themselves the absolute right of ruling their peoples according to their own views. The difference lies in the consistent direction of those views,

whether turned with prescient intelligence towards the dawning future, or clinging with obstinate infatuation towards the dark, irrevocable past.

In truth, with the close of the eighteenth century, the time had arrived when a fresh element in national existence burst suddenly into life. Its power startled those whose rule had hitherto rested, unassailed, upon divine right. Instinctively they coalesced, forgetful of earlier personal jealousies, against a common foe. The war of American Independence, and subsequently the great French Revolution, offered unmistakable signs that the populations of the civilised world were about to emancipate themselves from dynastic tutelage, and to assert their right to some kind of self-government. But revolutionary France had soiled the first page of her recent history by needless excesses, and by vindictive violence on the person of her sovereign. Worse still, the blood of innocent victims, crying for vengeance, had blinded kindred peoples to the value of her cause. Thus the monarchs of Austria and Prussia, united now by a common tie, led willing subjects against her. Throughout the years of blood and war which followed, the political bearing of the two German Powers, nevertheless, was widely different. Three years of alternate victory and defeat appear to have enlightened Prussian statesmen as to the tendency of the times and their own interests. In 1795 Prussia receded from the coalition which she had joined against France, and with the treaty of Basle at once entered into friendly relations with the Republic. Austria, on the other hand, had recognised in the Revolution a mortal foe, whom she determined to vanquish, or die in the attempt. The individuality of Napoleon Buonaparte, however, soon changed the character of the conflict. His views of conquest, and extension of empire, alarmed but failed to draw Prussia from her neutral attitude. For ten long years she witnessed with calm satisfaction the series of disasters which laid her former rival prostrate and powerless at the foot of her conqueror. Then she opened her hand for the territorial reward which had purchased her base neutrality. But retribution, equally to be expected in national as in individual life, was at hand. The same arm that struck down Austria at Auster-

litz, in 1805, crushed Prussia at Jena in the following autumn. Half the territory she had accumulated by years of sacrifice and unremitting toil was rudely torn from her on that fatal field, and for six subsequent years her voice was unheard in the councils of Europe.

With the mutual disasters of the two German Powers, the old spirit of rivalry naturally disappeared. The question was no longer whether Austria or Prussia should preponderate in Germany, but whether Germany herself would be able to preserve her independence. In the struggle which ensued for this purpose, on Napoleon's return from Russia, Prussia memorably retrieved her position in Europe. The patriotism of her peoples, the ability of her statesmen, and the valour of her commanders, all contributed to place her in the foremost rank of European Powers in 1815, when she assumed the geographical proportions she continued to occupy until the commencement of this war.

The external danger from which the Crowns of Germany had escaped, had been too imminent that these should soon recur to ancient causes of domestic difference. Indeed, Francis II. had formally exchanged, on the morrow of Austerlitz, and in presence of the Confederation of the Rhine, the imperial crown of Germany for that of Austria. Thus in 1815, the empire having ceased to exist both in substance and name, it became necessary to initiate for Germany a fresh form of political cohesion. The endeavour was, with due regard for the conservation of dynastic rights, to frame a structure more in consonance with modern ideas. Hence the origin of what has hitherto been styled the German Confederation. It formed a mass of thirty-three sovereign States and four free cities, all of which, with many others, had previously existed under the empire. The evil of all confederations of independent States is believed to consist in the difficulty of defining the limits, and insuring the action, of the central authority. But where, as in this case, two of the States were great European Powers, whilst many of the others were almost unknown to the world at large, the disproportion and unwieldiness of the body must have been at once apparent to all who assisted in its creation. But the ancient jealousies of the two great States

had, for the time at least, been quenched in blood, and Europe sighed at that period for speedy and permanent peace.

During the years of war which had followed the French Revolution, a great advance was made by the peoples of Europe in general political knowledge. The conquering legions of Napoleon had carried the doctrines of liberty and equality into the farthest corners of the Continent. The more prudent sovereigns of Germany, therefore, on the restoration of peace, wisely anticipated the demands of their subjects by granting constitutions more or less liberally based upon the recognised principles of the time. In his days of distress the Prussian monarch had promised, if his power were restored, to admit his people to a larger share in the government, so that the eyes of all were confidently turned in this direction. But Frederick William III. was unable to rise to the occasion : misguided probably by Metternich's policy in Austria, which zealously excluded the pernicious seeds of liberty drifting from the West, he declined to part with one atom of the royal prerogative, and joined the Holy Alliance.

One great result, then, of the French Revolution, and of Napoleon's era of conquest and disaster, to Germany, was the intimate political union of the two dynasties for the maintenance of a system of paternal or absolute rule, with a view to repress the spread or growth of the modern doctrines of the Revolution.

The discontent caused by this reactionary attitude of the leading German Powers was great. For thirty years it slumbered in the bosom of the nation ; but when France, expelling her king in 1848, again restored the Republic, the blaze of revolution spread with startling rapidity across the whole of central Europe. The baseless structure which Metternich had erected in Austria collapsed in an instant, whilst the whole military effort of the empire was required to preserve its political existence.

There can be no doubt that the eyes of all intelligent men in Germany were now once more turned wistfully to Prussia. It was not only that the Prussian dynasty had hitherto, on the whole, conducted its peoples steadily on the ordered path of political progress, but that Austria, whose past history was the

embodiment of reactionary principles, was altogether engrossed with her own intestine struggle. The constitutional deputies assembled in Frankfurt from all parts of Germany to replace the Diet, resolved therefore to tender the imperial crown to the Prussian monarch, with the assurance that a free and united people was prepared to rally under the banner of the Hohenzollerns. But the dread phantom of democracy appears to have frightened the Prussian king. He rejected the bloodless prize, offered as a tribute to the virtues of his ancestors, unless the free consent of sovereigns, as well as the people, accompanied the gift. The inviolability of dynastic right must be asserted in spite of the expressed will of a great people. At the same time, it must not be supposed that the king was unwilling to initiate such change as accorded with his own views and special interests. The headship of Germany, as we have seen, had long been the aim of his race, and present circumstances made it more than ever the object of ambition. The States, therefore, were invited to meet in conference at Berlin, with a view to form a closer "union" than had hitherto existed under Prussia's presidency. A general Parliament, in which those States which had joined this Union were to be represented, was then to meet at Erfurt. Of course, the double object of this subtly-conceived project was to exclude Austria from further influence in Germany, and, at the same time, to effect a compromise with the revolution. But Austria was now rapidly emerging from her troubles. Radetzky's victory at Novara had forced Italy to her knees, whilst, with the aid of Russia, the Hungarian insurrection was shortly afterwards bloodily repressed. An indignant protest against the subordination of the Austrian Emperor to any central authority exercised by any other German prince, had already reached Berlin. It was shortly followed by the peremptory demand for the suspension of the Union, and the reconstruction of the old Diet, which had ceased to sit since July 1848.

At first Prussia seemed inclined to stand her ground, in which case the contest, which has but now terminated, would probably have been fought out sixteen years ago; but the irresolute character of the King, the want of military preparation as compared with that of Austria's well-seasoned battal-

ions, the readiness with which the secondary States receded from her influence, were so many causes which induced Prussia, with a bitter feeling of humiliation, to eat the leek of necessity and bide her time.

The victory thus gained for Austria by the vigorous hand of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, was one of very doubtful value. The reactionary period, now introduced, diminished the sympathies which were still claimed for her by the traditions of the past in many parts of the old empire. The restoration of the Diet, which had never commanded the respect of the nation at large, increased the universal feeling of dissatisfaction. In general the peoples of Germany relapsed, with a feeling of keen disappointment, to their former political insignificance; at the same time the old dynastic feud was reawakened in all its bitterness, and a smarting sense of the indignity they had suffered was retained by the Prussians themselves. Lastly, the easy success of Austria's military demonstration was calculated to lead her into fatal error regarding the military power and national spirit of her now despised antagonist.

The weak reign of Frederick William IV. was coming to a close. In 1857, incapacitated by what soon proved to be fatal illness, he handed the reins of government to his brother. The change was joyfully hailed by all those who anticipated more energetic action on the part of the prince regent. But the first acts of the present king disappointed the national party, as well as his own subjects. In his address to his ministry in 1858, he sketched out the programme of his future policy. It indicated little sympathy with the national aspirations of the day, whilst the stress laid upon the necessity for further expenditure for the reorganisation of the army soon brought him to an open conflict with the Prussian Chambers. At first his relations with Austria were of a most friendly character; but in 1859, so little inclination was shown actively to aid that Power in her struggle against France and Italy, that Francis Joseph cited the apathetic attitude of his expected ally as one of the principal reasons for concluding the early peace of Villafranca. It is indeed evident that, from this moment, the influence of a man who had already obtained

some note in the political and diplomatic world was making itself felt in the councils of Prussia.

Count Bismarck had raised himself to public notice in Germany by his fearless advocacy, during the revolutionary period, of all those principles which had so long retarded the political progress of Germany. Originally, he was the strenuous supporter of the Austrian alliance, with a view of co-operating with her in restraining the democratic tendencies of the time. But the humiliating collapse of Prussia in 1850 seems to have turned the current of his vindictive energy into a totally different channel. The conviction appears to have then settled in his mind, that before Prussia could recover her position in Europe, it was indispensably necessary that Austria's influence in Germany should be for ever destroyed. As minister to the Diet at Frankfurt, and subsequently at the Courts of Paris and St Petersburg, he gained the practical experience, and established the connections, which might some day serve him in effecting his ambitious aims. He studied attentively the boldness of conception, secrecy of design, the forecast, and exceeding vigour of execution which have characterised the successful epochs of the reign of Napoleon III. There is reason, too, to believe that on more than one occasion his enterprising projects reached the ears of the monarch to whom he was accredited. But the timid nature of Frederick William IV., so long as he lived, proved an insurmountable obstacle to the practical execution of designs considered by him so dangerous and subversive. The last thought, however, in Bismarck's mind was to play into the hands of the popular German party. His bold and original intellect had embraced the possibility of reviving the influence and power of the dynasty he served, by a brilliant and daring course of foreign policy, which for a time, at any rate, would divert the attention of the nation from internal affairs. Prussian aggrandisement in Europe, Prussian ascendancy undisputed in Germany, the maintenance of dynastic privilege, and the suppression of constitutional freedom, such appear to have formed the leading and well-digested objects of this original and enterprising mind.

The present monarch, at first, like his predecessor, rejected

the suggestions which speedily reached him. But King William, a soldier by habit and early education, had already expressed his conviction to his ministers, that Prussia's future, equally with her past, depended exclusively upon her military power. The mobilisation of 1850 and 1859 had exposed the defects of the Prussian system, and the one unalterable purpose of the sovereign was, that these faults should be remedied. So soon, therefore, as he found that the recent growth of Prussian constitutionalism was sufficiently vigorous to infringe on the royal prerogative, by opposing his darling project of army reform, his eyes turned eagerly towards the resolute and unscrupulous nobleman from whose agency he could alone expect success.

The advent of Bismarck to power in 1862, was received, both in Prussia and throughout Germany, as a lamentable indication of the reactionary tendencies of the Prussian Court. The overbearing *hauteur* (indeed, positive contempt) with which the deputies, individually and collectively, were so frequently met by the Prussian Premier during the parliamentary debates, seemed calculated at any moment to produce revolution. But Bismarck, aided by other able men in the king's confidence, succeeded in retaining full command of the executive power, so that the military reorganisation was perfected in spite of all opposition. Meanwhile Austria had also been busily employed in removing the causes to which she attributed her reverses in 1859. But the sincerity with which her monarch at last consented to enter upon the path of constitutional government, the general desire for peace, and the necessity for financial retrenchment, were causes which tended rather to the reduction, than increase, of her military establishment. At the same time, the proceedings at Berlin, coupled with the many evidences of Bismarck's ill-concealed hostility, created some uneasiness in the highest circles.

With Lombardy lost, Venetia slipping from his grasp, attention to his dynastic interests in Germany appeared all the more necessary to the Emperor Francis Joseph. Fully alive to the fact, that the German Diet, as at present constituted, was viewed with great aversion by the nation at large, he prepared a project for its reform in 1863, and then convoked

his fellow-sovereigns for its consideration, to Frankfurt. But Prussia ominously declined to accede to the summons, declared that the true interests of Germany and Prussia would not be forwarded by the plan in question, and loudly asserted her own right to coequal rank with Austria within the Confederation. The Convocation consequently passed without results, and whilst the question was still pending, the King of Denmark died. No other event could possibly have better served the designs of the Prussian minister. How eagerly he grasped at the revival of the Schleswig-Holstein question is within the recollection of all; but what is not so clearly understood is the fact, that a much more serious political problem was in connection with it, and that Bismarck was preparing, through the Elbe Duchies, to strike the death-blow to the German Confederation.

Before embarking in the Dano-German war he found it, however, necessary to invite the co-operation of Austria. This was advisable, in order to remain fully master of the situation, inasmuch as a coalition of the minor German States, supported by various democratic elements, at one time threatened to take the initiative in carrying out the great object of national enthusiasm. Thus Austria, unwilling to abandon to her rival the sole prestige which the successful expulsion of the Danish element from Germany would inevitably secure, soon found herself dragged into an unsought, inglorious war, which, in its consequences, was quickly to illustrate, for Prussia's benefit, her own false position in the Confederation.

No sooner had the purpose of the unequal contest—the severance of the Elbe Duchies from Denmark—been effected, than the different objects of the two Powers concerned became sufficiently apparent. Austria, in obedience to the force of circumstances which she had done nothing to create, and was powerless to control, had fought for the annexation of the provinces in question, under the rule of a legitimate German prince, to the existing Confederation. It was for her undoubtedly the readiest and fairest manner of disposing of the difficulty. But Prussia had entered the lists with very different designs. Her first object was to annex for her own use

territory which she had long coveted—by fair means if she could, by open rupture with Austria and the Confederation should her will be opposed. The general apathy with which the spoliation of Denmark had been viewed by the great Powers of Europe was therefore soon turned to account by the Prussian minister. Negotiations were at once opened with Austria for the surrender of Holstein, to which she held the common claim of conquest, in return for pecuniary indemnification. But that Government had recently obtained too convincing evidence of Prussia's menacing ascendancy to consent willingly to an acquisition of territory, without equivalent, which would soon establish her preponderance in the Confederation. She proposed an exchange which would restore to her some of her old Silesian possessions. This again was rejected by Prussia, and so the relations of the two Courts soon became more and more difficult. In the meantime it was necessary to adopt some provisional system of government in the Duchies themselves, which had remained after the war in a very unsettled condition. For this purpose, and with a view generally to arrange the matters in dispute, the two monarchs concerned met at Salzburg, in August 1865, and there concluded the treaty so well known as the Gastein Convention. It is probable that Count Bismarck was already convinced, in his own mind, that a peaceful solution of the question was not to be looked for; but he saw no objection to a gain of time which would enable him fully and quietly to complete his military preparations. It was a concession, too, to the royal mind, which regarded with natural reluctance the rupture with a dynasty so closely related. The advantages of geographical position were all equally in favour of Prussia, should the crisis culminate in war, so that the minister could well afford to allow matters to take their natural course. But the tension of the Courts increased, in spite of the Convention, which was soon violated by both parties in turn. Then followed the mutual recriminations which were published to Europe, and offered sufficient evidence of the aggressive designs which Bismarck, in full accord with Italy, still endeavoured to conceal from the world. Ultimately Austria referred the entire question of the Elbe Duchies to the de-

cision of the Diet, the authority of which body both Powers had recently set at nought. By this step Prussia declared herself released from the stipulations of the Gastein treaty,* and at once marched her troops into Holstein. The vote of the Diet was in favour of Austria; but Prussia rejected its competency to decide the question, and immediately seceded from the Confederation. In the meantime, the Austrian troops which occupied Holstein, outnumbered, and separated entirely from their communications with the empire, were forced to abandon their ground, whilst a second vote for Federal execution against Prussia was carried by Austria at Frankfurt. The challenge thus offered was eagerly accepted by Prussia, and the war commenced.

From an impartial consideration of the foregoing, the following conclusions may therefore be arrived at:—

That the house of Hapsburg, perpetuated in the present Austrian dynasty, maintained its leading position in Germany from the fifteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, when it was first disputed by Frederick the Great:

That the foreign possessions of that house prejudicially influenced its rule in Germany:

That its tendency to sanction ecclesiastical intolerance, and to suppress freedom of thought, in great measure originated the Thirty Years' War:

That the religious and political elements engendered during this protracted struggle, and subsequently utilised with marked ability by a succession of Hohenzollern princes, eventually raised them to influence and power, as kings of Prussia:

That henceforth the antagonism of the two dynasties, fed by jealousy and divergence of policy, commenced:

That the collision which ensued, whilst it raised Prussia's position in Europe, did not effect Frederick's purpose of expelling the Austrian dynasty from Germany:

That, during the French Revolution, and Napoleon's era of victory and conquest, dynastic jealousies slumbered for the time under pressure of common interests:

* By the terms of this treaty, Schleswig was occupied by Prussian, Holstein by Austrian troops, each of the Duchies being severally governed by the respective powers.

That on the restoration of peace in 1815, in the place of the Empire, which had lost its political value, a Confederation of States was framed, with a Central Diet at Frankfurt:

That by this means Austria recovered her old precedence; for, where questions of importance arose, she was enabled to command a majority of votes by appealing, as the advocate of Conservatism, to separate dynastic interests:

That, consequently, the Confederation was equally distasteful to Prussian ambition, thus legally held in check, and to the national party, whose aspirations for unity and constitutional freedom were systematically ignored:

That the attempt to dissolve it in 1848 failed, in consequence of the pusillanimity of the Prussian King, and of want of unity of purpose on the part of the German peoples:

That the recent difficulties of Austria in Italy, and her great financial distress, coupled with her present state of political transition—all transparent causes of internal weakness—presented a favourable opportunity for decisive action on the part of an enterprising rival: and, lastly—

That this was turned to account by an able minister, in the interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty and for the aggrandisement of Prussia.

The Act containing the Constitution of the German Confederation, as signed by all parties concerned at the Congress of Vienna, professed "the preservation of the internal and external security of Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the various German States." So long, then, as this remained in force, it is clear that unity, in the national sense, and Prussian aggrandisement, were equally impossible. The overthrow of the Diet was indispensable to the realisation of either object. In counting his enemies, therefore, the Prussian minister must include all those German States which were interested in maintaining the existing state of things. Foremost amongst these were the four kingdoms—Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Würtemberg. Indeed the authority of the Diet was supposed to be supported by an army belonging to the Confederation, composed of contingents supplied by each State, according to its size and population.

It numbered altogether, under ordinary circumstances, 500,000 soldiers constantly kept under arms.

Nearly three-fifths of this large force were contributed by the two leading States, and some 30,000 or 40,000 men might further be counted upon either as neutral or favourable to the Prussian cause. Still a formidable force of at least 150,000 men would be ready to side with Austria, and to fight for the maintenance of the existing constitution. Further, if sufficient time were allowed for development, the private resources of the minor States, over and beyond the contingents supplied to the Federal army, would soon be thrown into the struggle, for the cause of the Diet was, in reality, that of their own independence.

Such means, in addition to the whole military power of Austria, were decidedly superior to any which Prussia could command, however excellent her new system of organisation might prove in the result to be. Nor could Prussia expect, on the present occasion, to claim much popular sympathy. The national party would hardly desire to support the aims of a minister who had done his best to strangle liberty in the Prussian Parliament. In order to equalise the contest, it would therefore be necessary for Prussia to seek an ally. Probably the idea of a Prusso-Italian alliance had long presented itself to the acute mind of the Prussian minister. It offered political as well as military advantages of no mean order. It seemed likely to enlist the sympathies of the powerful sovereign who had already fought for the independence of Italy in 1859, at the same time that it would force Austria to divide her armies in the field, in order to defend opposite extremities of her empire.

Since the peace of Villafranca, indeed, Italy had never ceased to proclaim her intention of seizing the first opportunity of completing her emancipation from the hated Austrian dominion. When, therefore, the friendly hand of Prussia was stretched across the Alps, it was eagerly seized by the royal warrior, who so earnestly desired to complete his father's mission. The result was, the early conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance, which bound each of the Powers concerned to remain in the field until the aims of both were

accomplished. Thus Prussia and Italy entered the lists against Austria supported by those States which had voted with her at Frankfurt. At first sight the combatants appeared evenly matched, and the result of the collision was awaited with intense anxiety throughout Europe. It remains then to consider,—1st, the military forces of Austria; 2dly, those of Prussia; and lastly, those of the minor German States.

The Austrian empire, as is well known, is situated nearly in the centre of Europe, and comprises a great diversity of nationalities, differing from each other in language, habits, and comparative civilisation. Amongst these, the German element had, from the earliest times, asserted its right to priority. The language of the Court, army (as represented by its officers), and administration was German. From Germany, too, may be traced the varying degrees of civilisation which characterise the several provinces. The number of inhabitants may be roughly estimated at 37,000,000, and the superficial area of the empire is considerably greater than that of France. Since the peace of Westphalia, Austria, or rather the dynasty, had constantly maintained a standing army. From that time to the present, no country in Europe has been called upon to engage so frequently in war, none has experienced, much less survived, similar military disaster. Considering the great attention which has always been paid to the army by the Austrian sovereigns, whose difficult, absolute rule was mainly reliant upon it, this last fact is somewhat remarkable. It may be traced to various causes: to the heterogeneous character of the material which fills the ranks; to the absence of national spirit, and the usual indifference of the soldier to the cause for which he is fighting; to the want of that individual independence which can only be derived from free institutions; to the crushing system of discipline, which sacrifices individuality to collective value; and, lastly, to the difficulties of language which separate the soldier from his officers, to whom alone he looks for protection.

For these reasons the Austrian infantry has always proved inferior to that of other powers with which it has recently been matched. The excellence of the other branches of the army has never been able to atone for this one fatal defect.

The infantry of an army is its mainstay. A battle, it is true, may occasionally be decided by the vigorous action of cavalry, as was the case at Marengo ; sometimes be influenced by the happy concentration of artillery, as was seen at Wagram and Solferino ; but success can never be confidently relied upon in war, unless the fighting powers of the infantry may be fully trusted. The elements from which this power is extracted, are patriotism, national pride, intelligence, political content, military ardour, and general confidence in his superiors on the part of the individual soldier ; in a secondary degree, it is due to careful training, manœuvring power, excellence of arms, and appointments generally. If the professional observer may bear impartial testimony to the minute attention paid to tactical details, to the admirable *physique* and general powers of endurance displayed by the Austrian soldiers, he looks in vain for those higher qualities which in the long-run must ever prove decisive. The patriotism of the Austrian is restricted to the nationality to which he specially belongs ; his intelligence has been cramped by the feudal incubus which has so long denied to him the advantages of education ; military ardour is the offspring of a long course of national victories, as is political content that of internal wellbeing and municipal freedom, neither of which can he claim as his own ;—and if at last he refuses his confidence to the system which has so seldom rewarded his exertions with the sweets of victory, how can this form matter of surprise ? Nevertheless, the Austrian army has always proved a most formidable engine of war, more especially from the obstinacy with which it has sustained continued defeat, and from the tenacity with which, in spite of this, its discipline and organisation have been preserved. The Thirty Years' War, the War of Spanish Succession, the Seven Years' War, the campaigns which terminated with the downfall of Napoleon, all bear witness to the staying powers which have formed its principal characteristic. The reason of this is not difficult to find. Austria, essentially an agricultural nation, with vast resources poorly developed, but without moneyed capital, is incapable of a rapid offensive effort ; on the other hand, the amount of her population enables her to repair period-

ical losses, and so to remain in the field with little comparative effort.

In spite of recent innovations, a strong medieval taint still adheres to the system of interior administration which characterises the Austrian army. The military jurisprudence is essentially feudal, both in spirit and practice; for the subordinate, whether officer or private, practically there is no appeal against the arbitrary exercise of a superior's power. The judicial authority vested in the *Inhabers*, or full colonels of regiments, who also regulate all promotion up to the rank of field-officer, is, according to our ideas, excessive. No doubt the difficulty of introducing one uniform system of discipline into a military body composed of such various elements has impeded any reforming attempt to mitigate the evils which unquestionably exist. But the effect on the morale of the infantry, in particular, remains, and is easily noticed by the careful observer of its conduct in action. It is wanting in the intelligent elasticity which so peculiarly distinguishes the French soldier, for instance. The links of authority are preserved with a pedantry so remarkable, throughout all grades, both in peace and war, that all responsibility of action, even under circumstances of decisive emergency, devolves upon the head of the army, producing that cumbrousness of movement which invariably offers the advantage of the initiative to an enemy. The regiments themselves vary greatly in quality, according to the race to which the soldiers belong. The best infantry regiments are unquestionably those recruited in the German provinces. In every struggle of recent date they have exhibited the highest military qualities, which have only served to render the deficiencies of Italian, Wallachian, and even Hungarian battalions still more prominent. It must doubtless be conceded, that the fidelity of troops, drawn from districts which for some time past have notoriously been politically disaffected, is of a very questionable character; and if the terrible consequences of the too early surrender of a post like Chlum, or the Cascina Nuova at Magenta, be considered, a further element of the military weakness which has astonished Europe will be realised. The prestige which the Austrian army has hitherto retained, in spite of disaster,

is probably due to the high spirit, the devotion, and *esprit de corps* of its regimental officers. Owing to the absence of a middle class in Austria, these are drawn principally from the territorial aristocracy, and from foreign countries ; to a limited extent they are promoted from the ranks. The differences of social rank, however, are not carried into the army ; a system of *camaraderie*, altogether unique in its character, originating, probably, in the isolated position, claimed for centuries past for the emperor's soldiers, distinguishes it from most other similar establishments.

The staff of the Austrian army, forming a special corps, is composed, for the most part, of a highly-educated class of men. The plans of campaign, drawn up by its ablest members, though seldom successfully executed, are rarely deficient in strategical merit. It may, however, be earnestly questioned whether the system of appointing competent officers for the inspiration of incompetent generals, who owe their positions to hereditary influence, can ever tend to the true interests of any army. No better illustration can be adduced of the feudal propensities of the service, than the list of Liechtensteins, Schwarzenbergs, Gyulais, Stadions, &c., who, throughout successive generations, have held superior and highly responsible commands. Where military rank can be inherited, of course the stimulus to that exertion which alone can lead to distinction and success is absent ; and conversely, where the road to well-earned position is effectually barred, individual energy is stunted, and turned into other, less profitable, channels.

The flower of the Austrian peoples congregates in the cavalry regiments, which are considered by competent judges some of the most perfect in Europe. The men are very carefully picked from the better class of peasantry, and hard as their duties are, serve without reluctance. The officers all belong to the higher strata of society, as a rule are excellent horsemen, and have preserved much of the chivalric tone which characterised their arm in earlier centuries. Though present on almost all her battle-fields in sufficient force to make their decisive action felt, the mounted soldiers of Austria have seldom found the leader who was willing or able to

turn their splendid military qualities to account. The principal purpose which they have served has been to cover the retreat of defeated infantry—a thankless duty, always admirably performed.

On a war footing, including her reserves, Austria could at this time place about 700,000 soldiers in the field, of which nearly 600,000 were infantry, 57,000 cavalry, and 60,000 artillery, engineers, and pioneers. This force was organised into four distinct armies, each army consisting of two or more army corps. The heterogeneous character of the empire has greatly interfered with the organisation of the Austrian military forces; the instances are rare where regiments remain in the districts where they are recruited, and any such system as that of Prussia would for this reason alone be impossible in the Austrian dominions. In 1848-49, for instance, the depot battalions of the Hungarian and Italian regiments deserted in a body, and subsequently formed the principal nucleus of the revolutionary forces. The Landwehr system had for some time past been abolished in Austria, but every man who had reached his twentieth year was liable to military service for a period of eight years in his regiment, and two more in the reserve, after which he was free. In times of peace this service was greatly curtailed by the furlough system, according to which those men whose services were not required were sent temporarily to their homes. The re-enlistment of old soldiers was encouraged by the Government, which for a stipulated sum undertook to procure substitutes for those who desired to be freed from service.

The mobilisation of the army for active service requires time in Austria. In the eastern provinces of the empire, where population is scarce, distances are great, and means of communication very indifferent, the furloughed men are not always available at a moment's notice. When mustered, the soldier first joins his depot, where his arms, appointments, and clothes are stored, thence he is gradually drafted to his regiment, probably on some distant frontier. Railway communication is scanty in the Austrian dominions; for the purposes of such armies as are now required in the field, for the rapid passage of troops, materials, and the enormous amount of sub-

sisting stores required, altogether insufficient. If it be added, that for very many years past the national expenditure of the empire—virtually uncontrolled—has far exceeded its revenue,—that constant military requirements have drained its available resources, whilst its credit abroad has been exhausted in a succession of loans,—the terrible disadvantages under which Austria entered upon the present war may, to a certain extent, be realised.

The troops which Austria had succeeded in equipping, after preparations which had been commenced early in 1866, may be estimated at about 500,000 men. Of these, at least 280,000 were employed in Italy, Hungary, and other parts of the empire, so that the force about to assemble in Bohemia never exceeded 220,000 men of all arms. These formed seven army corps, which were commanded as follows :—

- The 1st by Count Clam-Gallas.
- „ 2d „ Count Charles Thun.
- „ 3d „ Archduke Ernest.
- „ 4th „ Count Festitta.
- „ 6th „ Baron Ramming.
- „ 8th „ Archduke Leopold.
- „ 10th „ Baron Gablenz.

To these must be added five cavalry divisions under Baron Edelsheim, Prince Thurn and Taxis, Prince Glücksburg, Count Coudenhore, Major-General Zaitschek.

It is confidently stated, that when Prussia commenced the war, but half of the regiments composing the above commands had reached the positions designed for them—that portion of the army which was most ready for service having been sent to Italy, where the outbreak of hostilities was considered most imminent. The whole force was placed under the supreme command of Feldzeugmeister Benedek, in whom army and nation alike placed unbounded confidence. With him was Baron Henickstein, an officer of some repute, as chief of the staff. The concentration of the army had been carefully shrouded from observation, and there is reason to believe that the confident tone assumed by Austria was intended either to avert war altogether, or to gain the time which was indispensable to the full development of her power.

The infantry were armed with the Lorenz rifle, and the artillery with muzzle-loaders.

Of all armies in Europe, none probably has been made the subject of more scientific study than that of Prussia. King William was not in error when he attributed the European prominence which Prussia has so rapidly and successfully asserted in great measure to the splendid development of her military resources.

The Brandenburg infantry first made itself a name under the Great Elector, and later again whilst serving the German Emperor in the War of Spanish Succession.

So admirable, too, was the system of economy introduced in all branches of military administration by Frederick, that, at his death, although Prussia numbered little more than 6,000,000 of inhabitants, an army of 200,000 men, including 40,000 cavalry, was kept on a war footing at an annual cost of about one million and a half sterling.

But many of the characteristics still retained by the Prussian army are due to the agency of Prince Maurice of Dessau, during the reign of Frederick William I. Extreme discipline, and great perfection in drill, insured an amount of flexibility, and manœuvring power on the field of battle, which Frederick's genius quickly turned to account in his Silesian campaigns, and during the Seven Years' War.

A long course of victory is apt, however, to induce a nation to pin its faith too rigidly to the system under which its successes have been earned. Since the introduction of firearms the military art has constantly progressed ; and no army can afford to rest long upon its laurels. In 1806, the tactics which had carried Frederick to victory collapsed before the genius of Napoleon, to an extent that endangered the national existence. The lesson sank deeply into the minds of the younger generation of Prussian leaders ; and during the sorrowful years of French occupation Scharnhorst devised the system which bore such glorious fruits in the War of Liberation. In 1814, when Prussia had regained the position she lost at Jena, she suddenly found herself called upon to maintain a military establishment considerably beyond her means. Her one aim, however, was to preserve, at any sacrifice, her

claim to coequal rank with the other great Powers. With less territory, inferior population, and poorer pecuniary resources, this was no easy matter. But the spirit of the Great Frederick had remained with his people. They accepted the Landwehr system, tantamount to universal conscription, which, subject to occasional alterations, has remained in force to the present day. Since this war, all the leading States of Europe have studied the method by which Prussia has succeeded in solving the difficult problem of producing a maximum of military power with a minimum of expenditure.

In Prussia, every able-bodied man, without distinction of rank, must personally perform his military duty. The material thus gained by universal conscription was at this time divided into—

1. The standing army.
2. Its reserves.
3. 1st levy of Landwehr.
4. 2d do. do.
5. Landsturm.

Each recruit on joining served for three years—from twenty to twenty-three—with his regiment; and then for four more years—from twenty-three to twenty-seven—on furlough in the reserve. So far the system was analogous to that of Austria, except that the period of service was shorter by three years, and that the furloughs were better regulated. Assuming the number of recruits annually called up at that time to be about 60,000,* the men paid, and actually present with their regiments in time of peace, would muster 180,000 strong, without the reserves; with these, when the army was mobilised, it would step into the field with 420,000 soldiers, including depots, before any appeal to the Landwehr was made. This was the first important result of the reorganisation of 1859. Previously, under a similar system, but with a muster of 40,000 recruits only annually, with three years' service with their regiments, but with two only in the reserve, the standing army formed but 120,000 men without, 200,000 with, the reserves. The consequence was, that the first levy of the Landwehr invariably accompanied the regular

* These numbers are approximate only.

army into the field, the Landwehr being then divided into two levies, composed of men from twenty-five to thirty-two, and from thirty-two to thirty-five years of age respectively. Now the Prussian Landwehr tallies in many respects with our own militia, but with this important difference, that whereas our regiments, when first embodied, are composed of raw recruits without training or discipline, the Prussian Landwehr consists of men who have certainly served three years with their regular regiments, perhaps more, and who are consequently both trained and disciplined. Still, on retiring to the Landwehr, the Prussian soldier considers his services as practically dispensed with; he marries, takes to trade, and often acquires habits which interfere with his military efficiency. Thus the summons to the regimental standards in 1848, 1850, was very reluctantly obeyed by this class of men, and seriously compromised the State policy. It was found, too, that the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Landwehr were often barely up to their duties, and were, consequently, frequently exchanged at the last moment to the line, by which grave detriment to the service was occasioned. The new system, by increasing the strength of the annual levies, as well as the period of reserve service, removed those defects; for the regular army alone was quite equal in strength to the regular army, plus the first Landwehr levy under the old regulation, and this without material increase of expense. Indeed, the first Landwehr levy, producing quite 190,000 men, was called upon for garrison duties only, and not necessarily to take its place with the standing army in the field as before. The second levy, equal to 110,000 men, was also liable, if needed, to be called out for similar purposes. Thus the total force which Prussia could wield in case of war, exclusive of the Landsturm, which enlisted the services of all between the ages of seventeen and forty-nine who were not serving in either line or Landwehr, amounted approximately to—

Standing army,	180,000
Reserves,	240,000
1st Landwehr levy,	190,000
2d do.	110,000
Total,	<hr/> 720,000

—a prodigious power if Prussia's population be then estimated at twenty-two millions of souls.

By this arrangement two great points were already gained ; the whole of the material obtained by universal conscription was gradually trained throughout a course of years to military duties, whilst the force actually under arms, paid and maintained by the State, was comparatively small, and sat lightly upon the national purse. But this is not all that is demanded from a military system by the exigencies of the present day. It is not enough to possess the material, and to hold it at a small expense, organisation is required, which will enable it to take the field at the shortest possible notice. The political power of a great State, possessing vast latent resources, may unquestionably now be destroyed for a long period, if these cannot be developed. Thus it is necessary that every system should possess that amount of elasticity which will enable it to augment rapidly, or to reduce according to circumstances.

No State has hitherto devised the means to this end with such ingenuity as Prussia. Her army, both in peace and war, was divided into eight army corps, and the Guard, which formed the ninth. These corresponded with the number of provinces into which the kingdom was divided : 1, Prussia ; 2, Pomerania ; 3, Brandenburg ; 4, Saxony ; 5, Posen ; 6, Silesia ; 7, Westphalia ; 8, Rhenish Provinces. Each garrisoned its own province, and each regiment its own garrison town, from which, in time of peace, it was never removed. In most instances, the officers also served in their own provincial regiments, and, like the men, were all more or less known to each other. The corps consisted of two divisions of infantry equal to twenty-four battalions, each 1002 strong on a war footing ; six regiments of cavalry ; and two regiments of artillery, with ninety-six guns. The same general who commanded it during time of peace, was also intrusted with its mobilisation, and led it in the field. It was an admirable unit of organisation for administrative purposes, as the number of men composing it corresponded exactly with that raised for the standing army from the province to which it belonged. Each district, and consequently each army corps, possessed its own general staff, commissariat, auditoriat,

its own chaplains and medical staff, and its own arsenal. In this was stored all that applied to instant preparation for the field—clothing, arms, transport, ambulances, hospital stores, &c. The elasticity of this army unit depended upon the strength of companies. Every battalion in the army contained but four companies, numbering, in time of peace, 518 men. This number was increased in time of war to 1002, by calling in the reserves, and the important augmentation of a mobilised army thus principally effected.

An army may be mobilised in part or altogether, according to emergency. The process of mobilisation includes,—1. The filling up of the line regiments to their war strength; 2. The formation of depot battalions, composed of reserves and recruits, which are drafted to the battalions in the field, to supply the waste of war; 3. The formation of the Landwehr regiments for garrison duties, by calling in the men, and appointing the necessary staff; 4. The increase of the administrative departments; 5. The formation of headquarter staffs for each district, to supply the place of those about to take the field.

The important peculiarity of these measures in Prussia is, that in peace everything is, or should be, kept ready for instant mobilisation. Every officer and official knows during peace the post and duties which will devolve on him in case of war, and is ready to commence these without special instructions, or time-wasting explanations.

The demand for officers occasioned by mobilisation was supplied by promoting cadets from the military colleges, as well as deserving non-commissioned officers. A strong infusion of line officers was also drafted to the Landwehr, the officers of which, as a rule, were country gentlemen in the districts to which the regiments belonged. This step was rendered easy, from the intimate connection which existed between line and Landwehr regiments in their own districts.

The time then required by Prussia for the successive development of her forces for active service may be reckoned as follows:—

Line regiments,	14 days.
Depot battalions, and 1st Landwehr levy,	4 weeks.
2d Landwehr levy,	6 „

So that, in the course of two months, the whole of her vast military power could be gradually unfolded.

Lastly, the entire Prussian army was armed with the needle rifle, a breech-loading firearm, which Prussia alone, of all the great Powers of Europe, had thought fit to introduce. Its properties were amply tested in the Danish war, and fully satisfied Prussian officers as to its extraordinary merits in action when opposed to the ordinary rifle. The artillery were provided with breech-loading field-guns.

It is desirable to observe, that the reformed system of 1859, of which the above is necessarily a very imperfect outline, had not yet had sufficient time to get into full working order. Seven years were requisite to effect this, a portion of which only had lapsed at the commencement of the war; so that, in many instances, measures were extemporised in the spirit of the new system.

A comparison between the Austrian and Prussian armies offers many points of essential difference. Indeed it would be difficult to find two bodies in which the most important features are so entirely antagonistic. The Prussian army, with the exception of the Polish element, was homogeneous throughout, one language existing for officers and men. In Austria, five distinct races supplied the material for her regiments — Germans, Hungarians, Sclavonians, Italians, and Wallachians—each containing internal elements of difference and discord. Prussia claimed nineteen years of liability to military service from every citizen, whilst Austria demanded but ten. In Prussia, the perfection of a great military system, initiated at the commencement of the eighteenth century, reformed in 1814, and adapted in 1859—based, too, on the solid foundation of national interest—had been consistently followed up, and ultimately worked out. On the other hand, each successive defeat had led, in Austria, to constant change, based more upon the expediency of the hour, than on sound and permanent principle. In Prussia, again, an element of great moral strength was gained from the earlier local associations, which knitted the officers and men of each military district in one firm bond of union. In Austria, many of the recruiting districts furnished men of distinct, and sometimes antagonistic

race, to one and the same regiment—disunion characterising the source itself from which the supply was obtained. Further, the education of all classes in Prussia compared most favourably with the standard existing in countries possessing even a higher grade of civilisation, and more fully developed political institutions. As a consequence, the Prussian army might justly be considered the most intelligent in Europe, as it certainly was the most respectable in its bearing in the field. Murder and plunder rarely accompanied its march ; a general was seldom called upon to add vigour to the soldier's action by the promise of loot. The object of a war was clearly comprehended, and the soldier fought his way to the end of it. In Austria, but little had been done to civilise or educate a large proportion of the populations belonging to the empire. The ignorance prevalent amongst the peasantry in the Tyrol, Styria, many parts of Hungary, Galicia, and Transylvania, was notorious, and formed one of the chief difficulties with which the army has had to contend in late wars. The day is past when power can be based upon general ignorance of existing conditions, and that State which rests its faith upon it will never again be placed in the international race. If it be urged that an army recruited and disciplined on the Austrian principle is, as a rule, more handy for State purposes, and less likely to question its policy ; it must be conceded, on the other, that the Prussian system is admirable for national defence, as well as in any cause which is intelligible to the nation, and in accordance with its aspirations. There is no doubt that the system produces great inconveniences, and is a heavy burden to the peoples. It is no small thing that these should be asked for twenty years of their life to leave their homes and shoulder their rifles at a moment's notice. But this very fact would seem eventually to act as a security against unjust aggression, as the check-string of the nation against the possible propensities of its ruler, in all future times.

Considering the Prussian army, in point of force, organisation, manœuvring power, discipline, and arms, as it is now known, it certainly appears remarkable that it should not have attracted earlier observation. The fact is, that Prussia had been viewed by the other great European Powers rather

in the light of a political *parvenu*. The crushing defeat she sustained at Jena has been more prominently placed before the world than her admirable action in 1813-14-15, for which sufficient merit has as yet, perhaps, been barely claimed for her. The political discontent, too, which has agitated the intelligent peoples of Germany since 1815, has impaired, in the public eye, the value of a system which is based upon an entire population. The long period of peace, which enabled Prussia so happily to improve and consolidate her resources, had this disadvantage, that it prevented her from ascertaining the weak points of the valuable legacy which Scharnhorst bequeathed to his country. But officers who have mastered the experience, and share the intelligence, of such men as Bulow, Clausewitz, Gneisenau, and Müffling, have not been slow to remedy defects so soon as opportunity had laid them bare. The masterly action of the Prussian staff has of late been everywhere visible. Whether in tactics, strategy, organisation, or arms, their intelligent application of all that has hitherto been known in war, has certainly entitled them to the respect and admiration of all soldiers whose profession is dear to them. Still more remarkable is it, that the one Power which was most interested in all that pertained to military progress in Prussia, should have remained so utterly ignorant of the importance of the recent changes introduced. It can only be explained by the conviction, on Austria's part, that the system which collapsed in 1850 must again prove valueless in 1866—a conclusion which certainly indicates want of perception on the part of those whose duty it was to report on the subject.

The nine army corps of the Prussian field-army were commanded as follows :—

The Guard, headquarters Berlin, recruited from all provinces of the kingdom, Prince August of Würtemberg.

The 1st corps, Königsberg, General Bonin.

The 2d, Berlin, the Crown Prince of Prussia.

* The 3d, Berlin, Prince Frederick Charles.

The 4th, Magdeburg, General Schach.

* The 3d and 4th army corps were broken up by Prince Frederick Charles at the commencement of war, and manœuvred by divisions.

The 5th, Posen, General Steinmetz.

The 6th, Breslau, General Mutius.

The 7th, Münster, General Vogel von Falkenstein.

The 8th, Coblenz, General Herwarth von Bittenfeld.

The proper headquarters of the 2d corps was Stettin ; of the 3d, Frankfurt on the Oder. They were removed to Berlin for the convenience of the royal princes who commanded them.

For purposes of war, the whole force was divided into three armies, over which the King in person assumed the chief command. In this he was assisted by General Von Roon, as Minister of War, and by General Moltke, who acted as Chief of the Staff.

The 1st Army, consisting of the 2d, 3d, and 4th army corps and the cavalry of the Guard, was commanded by Prince Frederick Charles.

The 2d Army, composed of the Guard, 1st, 5th, and 6th corps, by the Crown Prince.

The Elbe Army, with the 8th and one division of the 7th corps, was placed under General Herwarth of Bittenfeld.

General Manteuffel commanded a mixed force in the Elbe Duchies ; and some of the regiments belonging to the 8th corps, which had formed the garrisons of the Federal fortresses Rastadt and Mayence, had been withdrawn from there, but left at Wetzlar, at the head of the valley of the Lahn.

Further, a reserve corps of Landwehr regiments was formed at once at Berlin, and placed under command of General von der Mülbe. Indeed the whole of the field-army, as well as the first levy of Landwehr, was mobilised by the end of May, and a part of the second levy with the commencement of hostilities. Altogether, the field-army which Prussia was about to oppose to Austria, on her Bohemian frontiers, amounted to fully 290,000 effective soldiers. This large force was constantly fed from the depot battalions in each district, and was supported in second line by the first levy of the Landwehr, which, assisted by the second levy, also garrisoned the fortresses. It is confidently stated that by the 1st July Prussia had 600,000 soldiers under arms ; the best eulogy which can be paid to a system which requires to be carefully studied in order to be understood, and which certainly

surpasses, both in conception and execution, all which have ever preceded it.

The allies of Austria in Germany were—

Bavaria,	Baden,	Saxe-Meiningen,
Saxony,	Hesse-Cassel,	Reuss-Greiz,
Hanover,	Hesse-Darmstadt,	Hesse-Homburg.
Württemberg,	Nassau,	

The military contingents supplied to the Confederation by these several States amounted in round numbers to about 160,000 men. But this by no means represented the total of their joint military resources. With a collective population of fourteen millions, if sufficient time were accorded to them for development, a very considerable force might be placed by the side of Austria in the field. In point of political influence, as well as of military power, Bavaria took the leading position. With an old history of her own, and with certain more recent aspirations to the leadership of Southern Germany, she was likely to prove at once a formidable enemy and a most valuable ally. But the self-interest which naturally characterised her State policy, would barely admit of any decided course of action on her part at the commencement of the war. Once quieted on the score of Prussian aggrandising tendencies, she might reap more benefit from a Prussian than from an Austrian alliance, though by religion and dynastic ties she was more closely related to this last Power. On the other hand, if Prussia could not be trusted, the preservation of her independence as a State forced her into the arms of Austria. This last motive had proved predominant, and decided, ultimately, her espousal of the Austrian cause. The minister who led her foreign policy, whether from closer knowledge of the internal causes of weakness at work in the Austrian empire, or from other causes at present not clearly defined, was not altogether in accord with the sentiments of the people and army, who were cordially anti-Prussian in their sympathies. This influence, as we shall presently see, was reflected in the subsequent conduct of military operations. Nor were the reasons for a vacillating course of action by any means confined to this kingdom alone. They prevailed in Hanover, Nassau, and especially in Baden, the ruler of which last duchy

was son-in-law to the King of Prussia. Thus, geographical position, popular feeling, and dynastic relationship, all combined to produce an amount of uncertainty, which depended in great measure upon the development of events for ultimate decision. If we consider that none of these minor States had been engaged in active war since 1815, that their pecuniary resources were limited, and their military organisation defective; if we bear in mind that each State had its own special interests, whether dynastic or territorial, to defend, that each varied from the other in military system, drill, and armaments, and that all were totally unprepared for instant action,—it is evident that in case of energetic assumption of the initiative by Prussia, the co-operation from this side, which was so indispensable to Austria in her double struggle, could hardly be relied upon with just confidence.

The army of the Confederation was organised in ten separate corps. Of these, the 7th, supplied entirely by Bavaria, and the 8th, composed of the Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt contingents, had alone remained unimpaired owing to the secession of other States. Both now prepared for hostilities: the former under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria; the latter, augmented by the other allied contingents—exclusive of Hanover and Saxony, which would probably be called upon for separate action—under the leadership of Prince Alexander of Hesse, an officer who had earned distinction both in the service of Russia and on the fields of Montebello and Solferino.

The Prussian monarchy, before the war, was composed of three distinct territories, very different from each other in size. The first, or eastern portion, extended from nearly the centre of Germany to the frontiers of Russia and the Baltic. The second, or western portion, smaller in extent, and divided altogether from the former by a strip of land between thirty and forty miles in width, began on the frontier of Holland, Belgium, and France, and reached the river Weser. The third portion consisted of the small Principalities of Hohenzollern, enclosed within the States of Baden and Würtemberg. The land frontiers of Prussia were: 1st, of the eastern portion,—Russia and Poland on the east; Austria, Saxony, and

Thuringia on the south; Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Mecklenburg, on the west. 2d, of the western portion,—Holland and Hanover on the north; Lippe, Brunswick, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Waldeck, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and Rhenish Bavaria on the east; France on the south; Luxembourg, Holland, and Belgium on the west.

Now, the division of her territory by the smaller intervening States had always been an eyesore to Prussia. It was also a source of military weakness, as increasing the extent of frontier she would have to defend. This was one great reason why the acquisition of Hanover had formed the principal object of her foreign policy in former years. Free and unimpeded communication with her rich western provinces was now more than ever necessary, in order to enable Prussia to engage her powerful adversary on the Silesian frontier on sufficiently favourable terms. Nor would it be prudent, at the commencement of what might prove a desperate struggle, to leave a State like Hanover, with a small but compact military force, in a position of doubtful neutrality, immediately in her rear. The first necessary step would therefore appear to be the occupation of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, with the double object of mastering the communications which traversed those States from east to west, and of neutralising contingents which otherwise would soon find their way into the enemy's camp.

Still more pressing considerations prompted the simultaneous seizure of Saxony. The attitude of this last kingdom had been openly hostile throughout the recent complications. Moreover, the strategic value of Saxon territory to either belligerent could not be over-estimated; to Prussia, whether for offence or defence, it was paramount. An Austrian army, settled in Saxony in sufficient force, would directly menace the Prussian capital, which no obstacle, natural or artificial, protects. In case of its advance upon Berlin—the objective loudly proclaimed from Vienna—the Prussian troops occupying Silesia must necessarily be withdrawn for the defence of that city, and the much-cherished province thus be subjected to invasion. At Dresden, too, the lines of railway meet by which Austria would soon effect the all-important communi-

cation with her western German allies. Conversely, by the early occupation of Saxony, the northern issues of the mountain defiles which connect Bohemia with that kingdom, would be gained for Prussia. These she might either hold defensively, or use for the invasion of Austrian soil; whilst by the lateral railway, stretching from Cassel through Leipzig, Dresden, and Breslau, she would possess unbroken communication along her whole extent of front. Vigorous assumption of the initiative, therefore, was indispensable to the successful commencement of the great struggle which Prussia had undertaken. But in admitting the commanding weight of military considerations, it is difficult to sanction the measures by which the Prussian minister advanced towards his ends. The crooked course he thought fit to pursue, towards Hanover especially, will probably entail the censure of later historians. The ministers of that kingdom had soon recognised the dangers which loomed for it in the future. To avert these, which threatened its independence, had been their sole, and honest, object. Safety was sought in a course of absolute, rigid neutrality. Thus the Austrian troops retiring from Holstein were not permitted to remain on Hanoverian territory, valuable as their co-operation must have proved in the war which was so soon to commence. Nor was the slightest preparation made for future military action. As complications increased, the Government based its course on the sole existing legal ground—the Act of the Federal Constitution, from which Prussia released herself by seceding. When, therefore, Count Bismarck's summons—demanding from King George the virtual surrender of his own sovereign rights and of the independence of his kingdom in favour of Prussia, under penalty of incurring hostile action at the expiration of twenty-four hours in case of refusal—arrived on the 15th June, the indignation caused by a measure at once so harsh and so violent may be readily conceived. The protest which the King has since published to Europe exposes the hardship of his case, as well as the duplicity of which he was the victim. But there are moments in the history of nations where individual right, however exalted, cedes to the pressure of a higher necessity. To the separate sovereign rights of her princes, Germany truly

traced the causes of her political impotence. Against the unnatural division which so long had kept her giant strength in chains, she had loudly, and yet so uselessly, protested. The justification of the means employed must be sought in the grandeur of the cause, which each successive month may tend to realise.

However unscrupulous the conduct of the Prussian minister may be considered, there can be no question as to the ability with which his plans had been thought out. The test of this is found in the accuracy with which events were forestalled, and in rapidity of action under emergency. Count Bismarck was well aware that the summons which he despatched simultaneously to Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel, must be rejected, and his military measures were prepared accordingly.

The Prussian army, organised as we have already seen, had quietly settled down, during the first days of June, into the following positions. The headquarters of Prince Frederick Charles, who commanded the 1st army, were placed at Görlitz, in Silesia, on the extreme eastern Saxon frontier. One day's march would carry him across to Lobau, and place in his possession the line of railway leading from Dresden, through Reichenberg, to Königgratz and Pardubitz in Bohemia.

General Herwarth, commanding the Elbe army, was waiting near Strehla to seize the important junction of Riesa, where the railway lines from Leipzig in the west, and from Berlin in the north, united on their common course to Dresden.

The Crown Prince, whose army had been pushed down towards the southern extremities of Silesia, was posted with his headquarters at the little fortress of Neisse, whence, centrally situated, he could either cross into Austrian territory or unite with the 1st army, according to circumstances.

On the Hanoverian frontiers two Prussian divisions had been concentrated, prepared to march from opposite quarters upon the capital. One of these, under General Manteuffel, consisting of the regiments which had recently marched down from Schleswig, was massed at Harburg, ready to cross the

Elbe at that point. The other, belonging to the 7th army corps, commanded by General Vogel von Falkenstein, occupied Minden, on the Weser, whence two short marches across the little territory of Lippe would carry it into the immediate neighbourhood of the Hanoverian capital.

Farther to the south, on the frontiers of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, close to the Wetzlar railway junction, General Beyer was encamped with the troops which had been withdrawn from Rastadt and Mayence, augmented by a few battalions from the Rhine depots. His duty would be to seize the line of railway which connects Frankfurt and the towns south of the Maine with the north of Germany, then to march upon Cassel, the capital of the Electorate.

These several detachments, under Manteuffel, Falkenstein, and Beyer, on the 15th of June numbered altogether about 45,000 men; by a converging movement from the north, west, and south they purposed to unite, in order to frustrate any attempt on the part of the King of Hanover to concentrate his army. They were shortly to be reinforced by regiments of the second Landwehr levy, which were now being rapidly completed.

The refusal of the three States concerned to comply with Prussia's demands, was responded to by the immediate invasion of their territory during the night of the 15th and 16th of June. This their sovereigns had of course anticipated, and though their time was short, had issued their instructions accordingly. The Hanoverian forces were ordered to concentrate, from different parts, at the little town of Göttingen, situated at the southern extremity of the kingdom. The King's object evidently was, to gain a position which he might hold successfully, if supported by the Federal troops assembling on the Maine, or from which he could retire to unite with them in the neighbourhood of Frankfurt, should circumstances so compel him. The assembly of his troops was successfully and very rapidly effected, but in the extreme hurry of departure it had been found impossible to provide the army with all that was necessary to maintain its efficiency in the field. The troops present in Göttingen consisted of eighteen regiments of infantry, six weak cavalry regiments,

and fifty-six guns. The men were already much fatigued by the forced marches which their concentration had entailed; their ammunition, too, was deficient; and the difficulties of subsistence soon made themselves felt. Under these circumstances it was deemed advisable to halt for three days at Göttingen, with a view to introduce the order and organisation necessary for field purposes, as well as to obtain the necessary information regarding hostile movements, and to communicate with the southern allies. The King had left his capital on the 16th of June, and joined the army at Göttingen on the day following. Meanwhile the Prussians had entered Hanover, and soon took up the pursuit. The pressure of the advance of Generals Manteuffel and Falkenstein, now united, from the north, and the report of Beyer's march through Giessen and Marburg, from the south, upon Cassel, by which the direct retreat of the Hanoverians upon Frankfurt was intercepted, forced these at last to move. The Federals on the Maine, distant but three good marches, had not yet stirred, and the only outlet for escape led through territory belonging to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who had already declared himself the ally of Prussia. On the 21st of June, the Hanoverians commenced their march upon Gotha, by way of Mühlhausen, which last town they occupied on the 23d. The Prussians, principally intent upon the impending invasion of Bohemia, had only left a few battalions in Thuringia to maintain communication with the west, and to hold the Cassel-Leipzig-Dresden line of railway. Seven battalions of infantry, including the Saxe-Coburg regiment, a squadron of cavalry, and four guns, were, however, hastily called together, so soon as the direction of the Hanoverian march was ascertained, and posted strongly across the Coburg road in the vicinity of Gotha, prepared to dispute the further retreat of the King. This force was manifestly insufficient for the purpose, and had the King at once attacked with vigour, his object of joining the Bavarians, who were now feebly demonstrating from the south, would probably have been effected without much difficulty. Unfortunately for himself he over-estimated the Prussian numbers, and, under the influence of depression, enlisted the

services of the Duke of Coburg, with a view to negotiate with the Court at Berlin. The delay thus occasioned proved fatal to the king's interests. Falkenstein and Beyer having united at Cassel, pushed their battalions rapidly forward by rail to Eisenach, whilst Manteuffel was approaching from the north by the Mühlhausen road. Their object had been to gain sufficient time to surround the Hanoverians, who, from all accounts, were suffering severe privations, in order to force them to a speedy capitulation. There can be little doubt that at this early period of the war, when Prussia was on the point of closing with her principal adversary, great importance was attached to the surrender of the Hanoverian army. It was not only that the troops themselves were stanch and good, but their junction with the Federals at Frankfurt was regarded with some little anxiety, from the fact that Prussia had stripped her western districts, with a view to overwhelm Benedek by a great offensive effort. So soon, therefore, as the concentric manoeuvre which was to decide the fate of King George's brave little army was completed, the tone of the negotiations was altogether changed. Too late the King perceived the *ruse* of which he had been made the dupe; but, though his cause was lost, the spirit of his race is gloriously reflected in his subsequent action. Spurning to tarnish the last days of the bright history of his soldiers with disgrace, he fell back from before Gotha, and recrossed into Prussian territory at Langensalza, in order to place his army in the strong defensive position of Merxleben.

Here he was somewhat prematurely attacked by the Prussian General Flies on the 27th of June, who was consequently repulsed with very considerable loss; but on the following day Falkenstein closed in from all sides, and on the 29th of June, to save further useless effusion of blood, King George capitulated, with the whole of his army. The officers retained their arms, horses, and baggage; but the men were disarmed, and, on condition of not serving during the war against Prussia, dismissed to their homes.

The King of Hanover has since complained of the want of good faith displayed by Prussia on this occasion. It is almost useless to say that such complaints are, for the most

part, unfounded. It is not by hard fighting alone that success in war is attained. Under circumstances of emergency, wit and readiness of resource are always turned to profitable account, the advantage remaining with the more skilful antagonist. By similar means Blucher effected his retreat on the same ground, after the double catastrophe at Jena and Auerstadt. Six-and-thirty hours gained by Bagration's ready wit at Hollabrunn, in 1805, saved Kutusow's army, already gravely compromised in retreat. So stern, so terribly important, are the results of war to those concerned, that every faculty of the human mind by which the path to victory may be traced, is necessarily, and rightly, brought into action.

The loyalty and valour displayed by the Hanoverian troops during these trying days, were worthy of their old reputation. Though fighting under signal disadvantages, by which the morale of the army must certainly have been impaired, their gallant bearing in action has been warmly recognised by the adversaries they succeeded in worsting. The cavalry especially behaved with the utmost self-devotion, charging home at a terrible sacrifice of life, again and again, upon the Prussian infantry formations. How changed the duties of cavalry in the field will henceforth prove to be, how futile their attack, however determined, upon foot-soldiers armed with breech-loading rifles, was amply demonstrated at Langensalza.

The surrender of the Hanoverians was keenly felt by all adherents to the Federal cause in the south of Germany. Coupled with the events which, in the meantime, had ensued in Saxony and Bohemia, it staggered the confidence of the warmest partisans of Austria. Grief and indignation united in condemning the apparent apathy displayed by the Federal commanders. The conduct of Bavaria, especially, was already sadly incomprehensible to her own soldiers, as well as to the public at large, and the ominous cry of treachery was daily gaining strength.

We have already noticed, from his arrival at Cassel, that the mission of General Beyer had been fulfilled in the Electorate. Leaving his camp at Wetzlar on the 16th of June, with about 15,000 troops of all arms, he marched across the

Darmstadt territory at Giessen, into Hesse-Cassel, making for Marburg. He found the Maine-Weser railway broken up to impede his march, which he continued with extraordinary rapidity, by road, to Cassel. But though his division had traversed the ninety miles in three successive days, the Elector had already succeeded in despatching the few thousand soldiers who constituted his army to Hanau, on the Maine, where they rallied to the Federal standards. The Elector himself, refusing to leave the capital, was soon arrested by order from Berlin, and conveyed to Stettin, where a befitting residence was placed at his disposal.

But there were still the forces of Bavaria, and those of Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Nassau, combined with an Austrian brigade, forming the 8th Federal corps, in the field; and these had yet to be dealt with by the army of the Maine under General Vogel von Falkenstein. The former had been moving north by forced marches, but failed to reach their Hanoverian allies to avert the disaster of Langensalza. But the evil of divided commands was very apparent. Prince Charles of Bavaria was but feebly seconded by Prince Alexander of Hesse, who commanded the 8th corps; and this want of unity of action enabled the Prussian commander to take advantage of the errors of his adversaries, and, while preventing their early junction, defeat the opposing bodies in detail.

He concentrated his three divisions at Eisenach, and moved on Fulda, the 8th corps being then in movement eastward from Giessen, and the Bavarians on the march to Meiningen—their final object being, after many counter-orders, to unite at Fulda.

On the 3d July, Falkenstein drove back the Bavarians at Wiesenthal (north of Meiningen) with his left wing and centre, whereupon the 8th Corps also retreated on Frankfurt. On the 10th, Prince Charles was again defeated at Kissingen, and retreated in hot haste towards the Maine, crossing it at Schweinfurt. The Bavarians had for the time been disposed of.

Moving then towards Frankfurt, the Prussian general successfully engaged those fractions of the 8th corps which had

been pushed forward thence to the eastward, at Laufach and Aschaffenburg, on the 13th and 14th of July, and moved on the town, on which point his right division (Beyer), advancing by Gelnhausen on the right flank towards the same objective, was also concentrating.

The town was occupied on the 16th and 17th, by which date the 8th corps concentrated on the Odenwald, and opened communication with the Bavarians at Würzburg.

General von Manteuffel assumed command of the army on the appointment of Falkenstein as Governor of Bohemia, and moved on the 21st against the now united corps.

On the 24th two actions took place, and, on the 25th, a battle at Würzburg terminated again in favour of the Prussians, and the allied forces retreated across the Maine under cover of the fortress.

By this date the events in Bohemia had altered the situation of the belligerents; and the armistice concluded between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria included also a cessation of hostilities in the western theatre.

Meanwhile in Saxony, whither, as forming the principal theatre of war, all attention was directed, unexpected and very important events had occurred. Owing to the strategic advantages the possession of the little kingdom offered to either of the chief belligerents, it was generally expected that the issue of the war would, in great measure, be determined on Saxon soil. The uninitiated—those who could not estimate the numbers or the relative state of preparation of the Prussian and Austrian armies, but whose judgment was based upon topographical considerations, as well as on the well-known character of the Austrian commander, and the interests he was called upon to defend—were fully prepared for the advance of the Austrians through the Bohemian defiles into that kingdom, on the commencement of hostilities. From the knowledge which is now possessed of the positions and strength of the Prussian armies, any such operation, as will be seen later, was clearly impracticable.

In expectation of coming events, the Saxon army, well appointed, and numbering 25,000 excellent soldiers, had been posted with its flanks resting respectively upon Riesa on the

Elbe, and on Pirna and Königstein, while the centre occupied the capital, fronting towards the north-east.

It may not be out of place here to refer to the Austrian plan of the campaign, as suggested by the Memoir on the "Plan of Operations of the Army of the North," prepared by Major-General von Krismanic, who was at that time chief of the "Operation Bureau" at Vienna. Though Baron Henikstein was the chief of staff of the army commanded by Benedek, the general idea, so to speak, was drawn up at headquarters, and this has been well criticised by the Austrian staff in the official account of the war, since published, and to which detailed reference is here impossible.

Krismanic argues that the defensive attitude assumed by Austria was, though an unfortunate fact inasmuch as it resigned at once the value to be obtained from quickly taking an energetic initiative, enforced on the empire in deference to European opinion, with a view of throwing the onus of an actual declaration of war on Prussia. Concentration at Olmütz, in Moravia, was therefore first suggested, both because such a position protected the direct road from the Prussian province of Silesia, the nearest frontier, to the capital, and covered the line of retreat on the Danube; and also because when, by standing on the defensive, the temporary inferiority of the Austrian army was acknowledged, the project of basing it on a strongly-intrenched camp, well armed, is founded on true strategical principles.

A minute attention to detail characterises this Memoir. The exact disposition of each corps is referred to; and, owing to difficulties of supply, the army took up an extended strategic front of 50 to 55 miles, so that concentration on one flank would occupy 5, and on the centre, at least $2\frac{1}{2}$ days. This early disposition was based chiefly on the possibility of a Prussian invasion of Moravia; but if the initiative could be recovered owing to Prussian tardiness, the army would move to the Upper Elbe, utilising the railway for provisions and baggage, while cavalry protected the exposed flank on the Silesian frontier. If undisturbed, a union with the other forces of those States which sided with Austria in the contest might then take place.

It had been assumed that at the commencement of June the Prussians were not acquainted with the Austrian dispositions, and this has been confirmed by them in their own official account, in which they assert that on the 11th of the month they had no reliable information regarding the enemy, and imagined that the mass of Benedek's army was advancing in Bohemia.

The Prussians also affirm that at this period the Austrian effective force with the Saxons quite equalled their own, and, like everybody else, they expected to come into collision first on Saxon soil.

But the selection of Olmütz as the point of concentration of the army soon destroyed this expectation. Though the *Militär Zeitschrift* at the time pointed out that the position there was well calculated to keep the enemy in doubt and force them to divide their army, the Prussians reply, on the other hand, that, when the fact was known to them, all anxiety as to the possible direction of an offensive movement on the part of Austria, which might threaten Berlin, ceased, and every doubt as to their own plan of action at once vanished.

Exaggerated ideas of Prussia's preparations were entertained at Vienna. The Emperor feared lest his concentration might be disturbed; and considerable anxiety, and even alarm, was felt on account of the precarious character of their railway communication with the capital from which they derived their chief supplies.

Delay was advisable for other reasons. Neither Saxony nor the other allied States of the Confederation were completely ready, and thus time for the completion of the necessary preparations was all-important.

On the 10th June the Austrian army was almost entirely concentrated in Moravia, the 1st corps only (Clam-Gallas) being on the Upper Elbe; and the critics of the original plan forcibly point out that with very slightly altered dispositions it might have been all massed in Bohemia, ready for offensive action rather than defence. At this date the Prussian strategic front extended for 150 miles through a difficult country, in which the lateral communications were bad; and then, at least, their entire tendency was to rest on the defensive.

From this there is but one conclusion to be drawn, that the Prussian army was not completely ready before the Austrian, and that hence Krismanic's premises were false, and the resulting concentration at Olmütz equally open to censure.

The only means that now remained of remedying the error was, in the view of the Austrian critic, for Benedek to move at once and attack the Crown Prince. That the latter felt the possibility of this danger is evident by his obtaining permission to occupy the strong position of Neisse on the 10th of June for the protection of the province of Silesia. Here he was reinforced by the Guard; and, though he still remained on the defensive, he was now strong enough to resist attack, and give freedom of action to the other armies.

But it is certain that there was no real intention on Austria's part, for political as well as military reasons, to enter Prussia. The initiative was voluntarily abandoned at a time when taking it offered the best prospects of success.

At the same time that the Crown Prince was ordered to take post at Neisse, Frederick Charles was directed to concentrate at Görlitz, ready to enter Saxon Lusatia, or to support the Crown Prince, as circumstances might require. The marches of both armies terminated by June 18.

The Elbe army could not take part in this movement until Saxony was cleared. It was possible that the Saxons would bend off by Plauen and join the Bavarians, in which case Herwarth would have been placed in observation to protect the Prussian communications thus greatly endangered if operating offensively. It was hoped that Bavaria, lukewarm in the alliance, would be actuated by selfish motives, or not be ready. In this case nothing would be left for the Saxon army but to fight against long odds, or retire into Bohemia. It was to be expected that the Austrians would reinforce their allies in Saxony by one corps at any rate, in which case it would be essential for Herwarth to remain where he was in order to operate by either bank of the Elbe.

If this were not the case, and the Saxons retired into Bohemia, Herwarth would be available for subsequent concentration elsewhere. The reserve corps was now ordered to join him. The aspect of affairs at Frankfurt released Prussia

from further diplomatic considerations, and those of a purely military character became dominant.

From June 14 the King of Prussia decided definitely on an offensive campaign. The first steps to this end were the occupation of Hanover and Hesse, then that of Saxony.

Herwarth was informed that his forward movement would commence on the 16th June, and he made his dispositions accordingly. The Austrians claim to have been well informed as to the Prussian movements; so long as they could depend upon the presence of the mass of the Prussian forces between Torgau and Waldenburg, there was no reason why they should not move into Bohemia—in fact there was every reason for so doing. Preparations for this movement were commenced June 9, but the Prussians had begun hostilities before the army actually moved. Instructions were given to Clam to look out for the Saxons in the neighbourhood of Jung Bunzlau, and then to join the main army.

The Prussians entered Saxony on the morning of the 16th, and on the same day Horn's division (1st Army) reached Löbau from Görlitz.

When Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth crossed the eastern and northern frontiers in the early morning of the 16th June, the Saxon advanced-posts at once fell back upon the main line, destroying the bridges across the Elbe at Riesa and Meissen, and rendering impracticable the railway lines leading from both extremities to the capital. The Prussians, whose preparations for the invasion had been admirably completed, moved rapidly forward, and, whilst Herwarth marched upon Dresden, Lobau, Bautzen, Zittau, and Bischofswerda, were successively occupied by the Prince. No opposition was offered to this advance by the Saxons, who fell back in perfect order on Pirna; and, after evacuating Dresden, entered the defiles of the Erz-Gebirge and Lusatian mountains by the roads which converge by way of Töplitz and Telschen upon Leitmeritz in Bohemia. On the 18th of June, the memorable anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, Herwarth occupied Dresden—on the 19th, his troops, spreading to secure their communications, entered Leipzig and Chemnitz—on the 20th, Plauen was occupied; and thus, in four days, this classical

ground, which would have been cheaply purchased at the expense of thousands of lives, passed into Prussian possession with barely an exchange of shots. Nor did the Prussians rest long upon their bloodless laurels. With surprising activity the passes leading into Bohemia were successively seized; whilst Herwarth, replaced at Dresden by the 1st reserve corps (25,000 strong), composed exclusively of Landwehr regiments, under General von der Mülbe, moved up to the frontier in the direction of Schluckenau and Rumburg: communication with the 1st Army had been effected by cavalry patrols through Bischofswerda.

The Saxons did not, owing to some mismanagement, utilise the railway in their retreat on the afternoon of the 15th, and their junction with Clam in Bohemia was thus delayed by some days. On the 18th the headquarters reached Töplitz, and after using rail from Lobositz, reached Pardubitz by the 23d.

Meanwhile Clam concentrated the 1st corps at Jung Bunzlau to cover the safety of the Saxons; but here, again, no defence was intended, and his orders, to the effect that the first object of the scattered corps should be to regain the main army intact, so that the roads to Gitschin were to be carefully guarded, are of significant importance.

Probably the first corps might have effected this object without collision; but on the evening of the 21st a despatch arrived from headquarters ordering Clam and the Crown Prince to remain for the present at Jung Bunzlau and Mönchengratz.

The Saxons marched from Prelau by Chlunic and Limburg to Jung Bunzlau, arriving on the 24th and 25th.

On the 16th of June, the Emperor telegraphed to Benedek that events in Germany rendered the commencement of active operations desirable, but that military considerations were, however, paramount, and that it must be left to the commander in the field to decide. He answered the despatch the same day. He informed his imperial master that dispositions had been already made to concentrate at Josephstadt if the enemy remained at Görlitz and Landshut; or to collect, in four days, at Olmütz if the Prussians assembled in Upper Silesia, as his latest intelligence seemed to indicate.

The dispositions for this march were not in accord with the actual emergency. It was possible to have gained two or three important days here, and to have blocked the Silesian defiles by making use of the railway. It is evident that the information at the Austrian headquarters was very deficient. The enemy was much nearer the position aimed at if at Görlitz-Landshut than Benedek, who could not reach it without collision unless the Prussians lost valuable time. No declaration of war had as yet been presented at headquarters, but it was hourly to be expected; and on the 23d the Prussians actually notified it.

The readiness with which the Prussians now prepared to enter Bohemia, indicates that the evacuation of Saxony by the King and his army was not altogether unexpected by them. Supplied as they were with excellent information, it is probable that the causes which interfered with Benedek's action were thoroughly known to them. The character of this gallant soldier, equally with the configuration of the country which formed the theatre of his operations, was too well known to the Prussian staff to lead them into false conclusions concerning his passive, defensive attitude.

The moral effect of this first phase of the war upon the people of Germany is scarcely to be exaggerated. The vigour and harmony of action, coupled with the marvellous development of military force already displayed by Prussia, offered cause for serious reflection to those best versed in European polity. To have already detached from the Austrian league the resources of the three largest States in North Germany, represented by five millions of inhabitants, was no small result, considered solely from a military point of view. Politically, the easy triumphs of Prussia bore still more valuable fruits. The national party, which had hitherto stood aloof, recognising the true value of the hour, now eagerly espoused the Prussian cause, as tending towards the eventual unity at which they aimed. The petty States in the north, which had hitherto remained neutral, prepared to evacuate the political fabric, at Frankfurt, which was evidently soon destined to collapse. The more powerful States in the south found one more motive for irresolute action, and for doubting the ability of Austria

to stand her ground. Finally, the effect upon the people and all classes of the army in Prussia was marked and decisive. The clearly-defined object of the King and his ministers to settle once for all the question of German dualism, and the ability with which circumstances had been bent towards this end, were clearly recognised. The discontent, which certainly prevailed to a great extent, on the embodiment of the reserves and Landwehr levies, vanished, soon to be replaced by the military ardour which is the sure forerunner of victory.

Several considerations united in rendering the invasion desirable. In the first instance, it will be recollected that Prussia did not stand alone in this campaign. She was waging a joint war with Italy as an ally. Any present inaction on her part must necessarily react upon the Italian theatre, and offer to Austria the opportunity of dealing singly with her adversaries. Moreover, time was all that was required by the South German States to enable them to develop and mobilise the military resources which might be directed against the most vulnerable points of the Prussian line. The advantages of superior organisation would be lost, the moral effect of recent success be diminished as weeks rolled on, and the opportunity of closing a short and brilliant campaign by sharp decisive action would be forfeited. There appears reason to believe that in the first instance it was the intention of Prussia, after occupying Saxony, to await her adversary's attack, or to meet it in that kingdom. The position of the Crown Prince's army at Neisse, in Silesia, was calculated to answer defensive equally with offensive aims; and so soon as Benedek's concentration at Olmütz became fully ascertained, the first impression of the Prussian staff was that the invasion of Silesia must be his true object. Consequently, the army of the Crown Prince, which before operations commenced was composed solely of the 5th and 6th corps, was rapidly reinforced by the 1st corps, and subsequently by the Guard, from Berlin. Whatever other disadvantages accrued from the defensive rôle which was doubtless forced upon the Austrian general, one great object was thus attained by his concentration at Olmütz. The military forces of the enemy were necessarily divided; first, in order to occupy Saxony and

cover Berlin—and secondly, for the defence of Silesia. Considering that the force of circumstances adduced above must necessarily involve Prussia, sooner or later, in further offensive movements, the result was important, inasmuch as it would compel her to enter Bohemia from divergent bases. That is to say, the danger of invasion would be greatly increased by offering to the defensive army the possibility of opposing, from a central position, superior numbers to one or other of the lines of invasion.

There is no reason to doubt that both these circumstances were fully appreciated at Austrian headquarters, but it was hardly anticipated that the Prussian armies would so readily incur the danger alluded to, still less that they would find themselves in a position, at such short notice, to commence the execution of what must necessarily prove the decisive operation of the campaign.

On the other hand, the disadvantages and danger accompanying the use of a double line of invasion, presented themselves with much force to the Prussian leaders. It is stated on excellent authority, that "the plan of a great aggressive movement was altogether foreign to the mind of the King." It may therefore be safely concluded, that in committing his armies to the invasion of Bohemia, with the certainty of offering a great opportunity to the enemy, he was simply obeying the necessities of the military situation. The merit of the course consists in the prompt acceptance of the unavoidable danger entailed, and in the happy combination which reduced it to a minimum.

The gradual unfolding of events since June 16 had, however, peculiarly affected the relative duties of the royal commanders of the Prussian armies. In the expectation that collision would ensue in Saxony, the mass of the Prussian forces had first been directed towards that kingdom, intrusted to the leadership of the Prince who had acquired some recent experience in the Danish campaign. The rôle originally assigned to the Crown Prince, in Silesia, was of a secondary character; but from the instant Saxony was occupied without opposition, it soon became evident that the burden of responsibility resting on the Crown Prince's shoulders would be

largely increased. The reason of this is plain. The character of the country immediately east of the Giant Mountains, is not only more broken and difficult than that through which the advance of the Prussian armies from Saxony into Bohemia would be conducted, but it was correctly anticipated that the mass of the Austrian army would be in a position to act with very superior forces against the several Prussian columns issuing from the Silesian passes. On the other hand, it was well known at Prussian headquarters that the Iser would be defended by retarding forces only, very inferior to the massive divisions led by Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth von Bittenfeld. The 50,000 soldiers commanded by Clam-Gallas and the Crown Prince of Saxony, skilfully handled, might certainly impede, but never could imperil, the actual safety of these troops. Under such circumstances, the safety of the Crown Prince on Bohemian territory became the first and most pressing consideration, and this would very much depend upon the rapid action of Prince Frederick Charles. The instructions handed to this last officer were therefore conceived entirely in this sense. It was for this reason that he was ordered to cross the Lusatian frontier three days in advance of the Crown Prince, to carry the line of the Iser, to press on to Gitschin and the Upper Elbe, in order that his presence might soon make itself felt upon the flank and communications of the main Austrian army, probably concentrated in the neighbourhood of Königinhof.

To recapitulate in a few words the gist of the observations offered above: The unopposed occupation of Saxony by the Prussians, and the continued inaction of the Austrian army, entailed further offensive operations upon the former; in order to enlist every possible chance in the execution of these, the extreme value of instant action became apparent; but the relative positions of the two armies, one in Saxony, the other in Silesia, necessitated, if time were to be enlisted as an ally, the use of double lines of operation for the invasion of Bohemia; this again entailed the ordinary peril of such movements—viz., that before union could be effected in Bohemia, one or other of the separated armies might be exposed to disastrous defeat. From the ascertained position of the main

Austrian army it was the Crown Prince who, in all probability, would be called upon to sustain the unequal attack of the enemy. But little forward movement towards the common points of concentration could therefore be expected from the 2d army; it was upon the 1st army that the duty devolved of pushing aside all obstacles to progress, and of hurrying up to relieve the endangered fractions.

What, then, was Austria doing, that in the hour of emergency she should have proved so little equal to its demands? Hitherto all that was known of her military movements was that Benedek had placed his headquarters at Olmütz, where he was concerting a joint plan of operations with his Bavarian and Federal allies, who were now (in the second week in June) assembling in considerable force, the former in Beyreuth and Hof, near the sources of the Main, the latter at Frankfurt near its confluence with the Rhine. The positions, as well as all other particulars relating to the Austrian army, had been most carefully concealed from observation; but it was known that the extreme right stretched away to Cracow, where works of considerable extent had been erected—and that the left flank of the army rested upon Josephstadt and Königgratz, both fortresses on the Upper Elbe.

The selection of this position clearly indicates that offensive action could not have been intended by Austria at this period, whatever later intentions she may have entertained. It was manifestly chosen for the defence of the frontier—which in its western continuation was covered by Saxony—and of the railway line which communicated thence through Moravia with Vienna. Nor was this position changed until the Prussians entered Saxony and menaced Bohemia with invasion from the north. It is most probable that the Austrian emperor, strongly impressed with the sense of his own conservative right, underrating, too, the military power, and perhaps the resolution, of his adversary, had placed himself in a false position by hurrying on with passionate impulse the fatal vote of the Frankfurt Diet.

Certain it is that when Prussia stepped in full armour into the arena of war, her adversaries, ill prepared to meet her, receded from the iron grasp in which she threatened to enclose them.

Silesia is the only Prussian province which borders upon Austria, being surrounded at its southern and western extremities by Galicia, Austrian Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia. The loss of this province to Austria—confirmed by the issue of the Seven Years' War—was not merely one of territory. The new border-line was likely to entail grave military disadvantages upon the empire in some future war, a fact which was probably recognised by the advisers of the Empress-Queen.

From the nearest frontier point, the distance traversed by the Breslau-Vienna railway through Moravia to the Austrian capital was about 150 miles.

The powerful influence exercised by railways upon military operations is here demonstrated in a very interesting manner.

The engineers who designed the North Austrian railway system, whether from motives of economy or other causes, have carried the Bohemian traffic into the Silesian line, Moravia serving as the main channel of communication from the north and north-west with the central Danube. The only railway which connects Prague, the Bohemian capital, with Vienna, runs laterally for a distance of eighty miles from west to east, receiving the Zittau-Reichenberg-Turnau line at Pardubitz. The direction is more or less parallel to the Silesian frontier, which it nearly touches at Böhmisches-Trübau. Here the line divides, in order to unite with the Breslau-Vienna railway, at the two junction stations, Prerau and Lundenburg.

Assuming that railway communication is indispensable to support the operations of large armies in present warfare, it is evident that an Austrian force about to advance offensively upon the Prussian capital, through Saxony, from the north of Bohemia, would depend chiefly upon this line of communication with the interior of the empire for its supplies. It is equally certain that this communication, from its dangerous proximity to the Prussian frontier, would be seriously compromised by the presence of a Prussian army posted in sufficient strength on the line Glatz-Neisse-Ratibor. It follows that, once bent seriously upon aggressive warfare, it was of the highest import to Prussia to gain an excuse for the concentration of a menacing force at this point; for by so doing she

would force her adversary, whose strength and preparations she had nicely calculated, to abandon all thoughts of immediate offence, in order to guard his own vital interests. This object was gained by attributing projects to Austria, with the hardy unscrupulousness which has characterised Count Bismarck's action throughout, which that Power indignantly, and it may safely be stated, truthfully, denied. Offensive action, consequently, was only practicable for Austria in the case of her being able to take the field in sufficient force to operate at once upon double lines—to invade Silesia, covering her communications, and to enter Saxony, simultaneously, with reasonable promises of success. With her ponderous organisation, her financial difficulties, and divided forces, any such prospect must have appeared remote indeed; and the key to Benedek's early inaction is thus found without much difficulty. So soon as Baron Moltke could read that the Austrian commander had concentrated at Olmütz, without appearing in equal force at Theresienstadt, he saw his opportunity; and seldom indeed in the history of war has the golden moment been seized with more startling effect.

The disadvantage of thus early exposing her cards might possibly have been avoided by Austria, had more forethought been shown with regard to the military demands of the northern Bohemian frontier. Viewing the configuration of the Prussian borders, it certainly appears that an army assembled between the Elbe and the Iser would communicate more safely by way of Prague, Budweis, and Linz, with the Danube and Vienna. Owing probably to the financial exhaustion of the empire, the railway which has been carried along the southern bank of the Danube from the capital to Linz, has not been completed in its extension northwards from that city to Prague. Had this been the case, it is probable that the attitude assumed by Austria before hostilities commenced would have been altogether different. By hurrying on defensive preparations in Moravia for the security of Vienna—which city is not exposed as Berlin is—she might have massed the bulk of her forces in the valley of the Upper Elbe—her true position—without danger, and with perfect freedom of action.

Posted here, an Austrian army, about to assume the initiative, would find itself on the shortest road to the heart of the Prussian kingdom, and once through the mountains, in friendly Saxon territory, would seriously threaten the communications of an enemy concentrated in Southern Silesia. Or, if called upon to repel invasion, preferring defensive action, it would be centrally situated between the separated roads which a Prussian army must use in order to enter Bohemia; on the self-same ground which, skilfully turned to account, in 1788, had thwarted the best efforts of Frederick the Great for a similar object.

In this campaign, it seems more than ever desirable that the earliest concentration should have been effected in the northern angle of Bohemia, if the necessity of joint action on the part of Austria, with her two most valuable allies, Bavaria and Saxony, be taken into account. The tardiness displayed by the former Power may doubtless, in some measure, be attributed to the distant position of the Austrian forces at Olmütz. By operating from a common base—Ratisbon-Linz—on the Danube, more harmony of action might certainly have been attained, and the timely occupation of Saxony have been effected without much difficulty.

As matters actually stood, Benedek found himself chained to his post in Moravia by the presence of the 2d Prussian army at Neisse, so that the Saxon corps, quite unequal to a collision with Herwarth and Prince Frederick Charles, was withdrawn from its own territory into Bohemia, whilst the Bavarians showed no signs of life.

No sooner were the Prussians in full possession of Saxony, and of the roads which lead from that country into Bohemia, than they prepared to carry the war into that kingdom. Now, the passage of a large army, with all its material and supplies, through mountain defiles into an open country, in the face of an expectant adversary, is an operation of no little difficulty, requiring great forethought and care. In order to understand how this movement was successfully effected by the Prussians, it will first be necessary to pay some little attention to the peculiarities of the country in which it was executed.

Bohemia is a vast undulating plain, surrounded on its four

quadrangular sides by mountains varying in altitude from 2000 to 4000 feet. The Saxon, or north-western frontier, is formed by the Erz-Gebirge, the districts on either side of the hills being connected by several good roads, and by the Prague-Dresden railway, which accompanies the Elbe and the road through the principal defile. These roads were hardly likely to be selected by the Prussian armies in Saxony, inasmuch as, considering the position of the Crown Prince in Silesia, their use would have entailed dangerous separation, and would, moreover, have uncovered the capital, Berlin. The Elbe valley, with its valuable communications was, moreover, closed to them by the little fortress, Königstein, which held a Saxon garrison, and which it would have required some time and trouble to reduce.

In the north, Bohemia is bounded by the Lusatian hills, which connect the Erz-Gebirge with the Giant Mountains. These hills are pierced by excellent roads, and by the railway which leads from Lobau, in Saxony, through Zittau and Reichenberg, by way of Turnau, to Josephstadt, Königgratz, and Pardubitz. The roads are three in number: 1. From Görlitz through Seidenberg and Friedland to Reichenberg and Turnau; 2. From Zittau to Reichenberg, and again to Niemes; 3. From Neustadt by Schluckenau, Rumburg, and Niemes to Munchengrätz and Jung Bunzlau. These two last towns, with Turnau, are all on the Iser, connected by the road upon which the several passes converge. Columns, therefore, separating in Saxony, in order to enter the mountains, would reunite upon this short line in tolerably open country in Bohemia. Now every military consideration would point to the use of this system of roads by the Prussians marching from Saxony and north-western Silesia. In the first place, they were the nearest to those which the Crown Prince might use, operating with a similar object from Lower Silesia. Then, the army moving by these would, during its advance, cover its own territory and capital. Lastly, the divisions might fearlessly separate, with a prospect of speedily uniting on the common point of convergence, and thus avoid the crowding and delay which the use of a single road by a large army must inevitably entail.

The north-eastern boundary of Bohemia is formed by the Sudetian Mountains, stretching in a south-easterly direction past the sources of the Oder, through Austrian Silesia and Moravia, away to the Carpathians. The portion of these mountains with which we are concerned is divided into three distinct ranges: 1. The Giant Mountains, singularly bold and picturesque in appearance, extending from Friedland in the west, for a distance of forty miles, to Trautenau in the east; they are quite inaccessible, possess no passes whatever, and effectually bar all communication for the distance stated: 2. The Owl Mountains: and 3. The Heuscheuer Hills, which surround the little county of Glatz. Immediately to the east of the Giant Mountains we find the first of the second set of roads which were available for the march of an army about to enter Bohemia from Silesia. This leads from Schweidnitz, by way of Landshut, to Trautenau, Arnau, on the Elbe, and Gitschin. A second excellent road leads through the well-known pass of Nachod from Glatz by Skalitz and Jaromir to Josephstadt and Königgratz, sister fortresses on the Upper Elbe. Both roads communicate with each other, laterally, by a third, which, starting northwards from the western vicinity of Glatz, bends round through Braunau and Starkstadt to Trautenau. Country lanes, practicable for the march of infantry and cavalry, also connect these principal channels transversely with each other, or lead from them to Königinhof and other villages on the Elbe. So that the common point of convergence of this system of roads is the line of the Elbe marked by the three towns Arnau, Königinhof, and Jaromir. By crossing that river at the two first points, the little town of Gitschin is soon reached, whence three separate roads again lead respectively to Turnau, Münchengratz, and Jung Bunzlau, or to that line which has already been alluded to as forming the objective of invading columns marching from Saxony. Upon the intermediate space—about twenty miles, or one good day's march in extent—from Gitschin to Turnau, two armies separating on the Saxon-Silesian frontier for the invasion of Bohemia would therefore most speedily regain the communication which, during the passage through the frontier defiles, would have been altogether interrupted by the Giant Mountains.

But, in addition to the two systems of roads which have been already described, numerous and excellent channels of communication lead from Glatz, Niesse, and Ratibor southwards upon Landskron and Böhmisches-Trübau, or by Jägerndorff and Troppau upon Olmütz, and the country through which the Austrian communications with the capital were carried. By demonstrating, therefore, in this direction, great uneasiness might be occasioned to an Austrian commander standing on the defensive in Moravia; so much so, that it was very possible to impede and delay his concentration round the Elbe fortresses in sufficient strength to avail himself of the advantage of the interior action offered to him by the temporary separation of the Prussian armies. Under any circumstances, he would find himself compelled to detach for the purpose of covering his communications, so soon as the intentions of his enemy were exposed to him, and thus lose in fighting power where the final issue was to be determined.

Such, in a few words, was the Prussian plan of operations for the invasion of Bohemia:—

Division of force for purposes of movement, celerity of execution during separation, and earliest possible reunion on Bohemian soil before closing for the decisive struggle. The Zittau roads to be used by Herwarth and Prince Frederick Charles, the Glatz group by the army of the Crown Prince, both to march concentrically upon the line Gitschin-Turnau. In support of this main operation, vigorous demonstrations along the remaining line of frontier—Freiwaldau, Jägerndorff, Troppau, Oswiecin.

The rapidity with which Prussia had seized the initiative on the 16th of June prevented the development of the earlier designs attributed to the Austrian commander. The offensive plan drawn up by his staff projected the union of the Saxon, Bavarian, and Austrian forces in Bohemia; then, like the Prussians, to be divided into three distinct armies. The West Army, composed of Bavarians, Saxons, and one Austrian army corps, about 90,000 strong, operating from Leitmeritz and Theresienstadt, would enter Saxony by the valley of the Elbe and by the Altenberg road, moving for Torgau, on the Elbe, as objective point. The Chief Army,

echeloned from Olmütz to Pardubitz, numbering 140,000 soldiers, was destined to march upon Reichenberg and Görlitz in order to engage the forces of Prince Frederick Charles. The East Army, based upon Cracow, was intended for the invasion of Silesia, with a view to occupy the army of the Crown Prince, whilst the 1st and Elbe armies were defeated by superior forces in Saxony. The Bavarian reserves, and the Federal contingents, assembling at Frankfurt on the Maine, would effect an important diversion in the west, forcing Prussia to detach considerably from her chief armies, for the defence of her western provinces.

If offensive action really was contemplated by Austria, it is probable that, with some modifications, this plan would have truly represented her course of action. But its execution was rendered altogether impossible, first by the absence of the Bavarians, who never made their appearance in Bohemia at all; and secondly, by the astonishing celerity with which the Prussians, after occupying Saxony, prepared to carry the war into Austrian territory. The boldness of this conception unquestionably disconcerted the Austrian commanders. It had been the custom in Austria to despise an army which, for fifty years, had never seen a battle-field, and which, notoriously, represented a well-trained militia rather than a regular force. The thought was never entertained that the young soldiers to be found in the Prussian fighting line would prove to be a match for veterans who had bled on the banks of the Ticinus, and on the hills bathed by the Mincio. Nor could it be expected, if experience in war were really valuable, that officers, grey already in the subaltern ranks, who had never left their gloomy garrison towns, could lead recruits to victory against the warriors of Custoza, Novara, Komorn, Temesvar, Montebello, Magenta, and Solferino. If certain advantages had been obtained by the occupation of allied States, thanks to successful diplomatic trickery, honest right would soon be restored at the point of the terrible bayonet, which the married soldiers of Prussia would barely have the hardy courage or the will to face. Nor, indeed, were these and other similar reflections to be altogether condemned. The sense of superiority so strongly felt by Austrian officers,

was endorsed by the public opinion of Europe. The novel organisation, the breech-loading arms, the military spirit latent in the Prussian *Landwehrmann*, had all been shrouded from observation by the happy years of peace during which this northern people had laboured and prospered.

The task of carrying a large army across a mountain frontier into hostile territory, presents serious difficulties. The amount of danger incurred is doubtless very considerably determined by the extent of frontier. It will also be recognised that the mountain screen is of great advantage to the invading army. Under no circumstances of war, perhaps, is the value of correct intelligence so greatly enhanced for the defensive army. In the present instance, the Prussians were unquestionably favoured by surrounding circumstances. The invasion of Bohemia could have been effected along the entire extent of Saxon-Silesian frontier, thanks to the several groups of roads available for the purpose. It was manifestly impossible for the Austrian general to guard each of these avenues without detriment to his fighting means, when the decisive moment arrived. He was therefore dependent upon early intelligence of the Prussian movements, both in Saxony and Silesia, for his own dispositions. The defensive rôle which he was forced to undertake, together with the special character of his communications, had necessitated the early concentration of his army at Olmütz. His army corps were, however, so echeloned as to move by parallel roads in the direction of the Elbe and Iser so soon as his adversary's intentions were sufficiently pronounced. The intelligence of the projected forward movement of the Prussian 1st army and the army of the Elbe from the Saxon frontier, appears to have reached the Austrian headquarters at a sufficiently early date. On the 19th of June, in spite of sundry demonstrations executed by the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia along the Silesian frontier, extending as far as the vicinity of Cracow, Benedek commenced his westerly march into Bohemia. The 1st reserve cavalry division, then the 4th and 6th army corps, moved by Landskron, Geiersberg, Slatina, and Solnitz; the 10th corps by Böhmisches-Trübau and Solnitz; the 3d and 8th corps and the 3d reserve cavalry divi-

sion by Abtsdorf, Wildenschwerdt, Wamberg, and Tinist; lastly, the 2d reserve cavalry division and the reserve artillery by Policka, Hohenmauth, and Königgratz, all in the direction of Josephstadt on the Elbe. The ammunition park marched in two columns by way of Saar to Pardubitz, and the entire flank march was covered by the 2d army corps, extended along the borders of the county of Glatz. This last corps was directed, with the 2d light cavalry division, to follow the remainder of the army on the 26th of June, in such manner as to reach Neuschloss and Jasena, on the Elbe, by the 29th.

At the same time the Saxon army was withdrawn from the vicinity of Theresienstadt, and in conjunction with the 1st corps and the Kalik brigade, numbering altogether 55,000 men, was ordered to occupy the line of the Iser, from Turnau to Münchengratz.

These several columns, none of which were forwarded by rail, appear to have reached their several destinations on the 25th and 26th of June, with the exception of the detached force under the Crown Prince of Saxony, which probably took ground on the Iser a day or two earlier.

On the night of the 26th of June, the 10th army corps was at Pilnikau, the 6th at Opocno, the 4th at Jaromir and Königinhof, the 3d at Miletin, and the 8th in the vicinity of Josephstadt; whilst the 2d having fulfilled its purpose, prepared to follow the same direction from Senftenberg.

It is of importance to master the movements of the several units composing Benedek's army, in order to form a correct estimate hereafter of the use he made of them.

On the 22d of June the Prussian armies in Saxony concentrated towards the Bohemian frontier. On the same day the Crown Prince, with a view to embarrass Benedek, directed the 6th Prussian corps to cross the Austrian frontier, demonstrating from Zuchmantel in the direction of Freiwaldau. Reports were circulated that this corps represented the advanced-guard of the Silesian army, and under cover of the movement the Crown Prince withdrew the remainder of his army from the vicinity of Neisse to the entrances of the several passes really intended for use. The 1st Prussian corps moved

as early as the 19th for Landshut, the Guard followed to Braunau, and the 5th corps, starting from Neisse, advanced through Glatz upon Nachod and Reinertz. By the 26th of June these several corps had reached their respective posts, prepared to cross the frontier.

From the positions assigned to the Austrian corps on this same day, it is evident that their general did not anticipate serious irruption from this quarter. Thus the majority of the corps now concentrated about Josephstadt had already received further marching orders, directing them towards Horitz and Gitschin. The difficult passes through the Heuscheuer Hills were left entirely open, watched only by a few cavalry vedettes. The inference is, that Benedek had received false information, upon which he was acting; that the counter-march of the Prussian corps from Neisse westwards, duly reported, had been accepted as representing the movement of the Silesian army into Saxony, to follow the line selected by Prince Frederick Charles. Having successfully detected, and, we may add, disregarded the object of the various Prussian columns demonstrating towards Moravia, Benedek seems to have persisted in his theory that further movements from the same frontier would prove equally unreal. Not until the evening of the 26th of June was the presence of the enemy at Liebau and Nachod reported to him. Then he ordered Ramming with the 6th, and Gablenz with the 10th corps, to move up to the frontier, and to close with the enemy wherever he might show himself. A postscript to this order states that the "commander-in-chief is hourly expecting information as to the strength of the columns" to which his lieutenants were opposed.

The absence of this intelligence was compensated for by the loss of 40,000 soldiers, and ultimately of the campaign.

His only hopes of victory were centred in the prospect of overwhelming the Crown Prince as his columns debouched from the mountains. This 2d Prussian army necessarily formed the objective of his offensive measures, inasmuch as concentration on the Iser against Prince Frederick Charles would have exposed his communications and himself to attack from Silesia, in flank and rear. It was all-important, there-

fore, that he should quickly discern by what passes the Crown Prince intended to debouch, in order there to oppose him in superior force. The ground being perfectly well known to the Austrian staff, it was fully comprehended that the Nachod and Trautenau roads were those which would offer the Crown Prince the greatest advantages. The demands of the situation which forced themselves upon the Austrian general were therefore threefold.

First, In order to assert his superiority over the Crown Prince, it was indispensable that the march of the 1st army should be retarded whilst this object was effected; secondly, it was necessary to occupy the Trautenau and Nachod roads with a view to oppose the probable advance of the 2d army in that direction, until the necessary concentration could be effected; lastly, anxiety for his communications imperatively demanded that a sufficient force should be detained before Olmütz, to guard these until the purposes of the Crown Prince's movement should be fully declared.

In this sense the dispositions were accordingly made. The Saxon army, under command of Prince Albert, was withdrawn from the left bank of the Elbe and united with the 1st Austrian corps, commanded by Clam-Gallas, and with the Kalik brigade, which had recently returned from Holstein. These troops, forming a mass of 55,000 men, were ordered to defend the line of the Iser, upon which, as already seen, the Prussian armies marching from Saxony were about to effect their union. Gablenz with the 10th corps was directed to defend the pass leading from Liebau to Trautenau; Ramming, with the 6th corps, that conducting through Nachod to Skalitz. The 4th and 8th corps under Festitis and the Archduke Leopold, were posted in the vicinity of Josephstadt, in support of those pushed forward into the mountains. The 2d and 3d corps, under Thun and the Archduke Ernest, were echeloned along the Olmütz-Pardubitz railway, which was to carry them northwards, should their co-operation be there required.

On the 22d June, orders for the invasion of Bohemia were telegraphed from Berlin. Both the 1st and 2d armies, with the army of the Elbe, were to enter the enemy's territory,

and unite at Gitschin. The movement was based on the intelligence received of the possible movements of the Austrians, and the probability of finding their corps separated, and affording, therefore, the opportunity of beating them in detail. Still reunion was the first objective. Independent action was countenanced; freedom of movement was not cramped by unnecessary orders from Berlin, though such freedom was not to be exclusive, nor forgetful that communication with the army of the Crown Prince was one of its chiefest duties. On the other hand, the work apportioned to the 1st army was to assist the 2d.

It was necessary for Frederick Charles to wait for Herwarth, who, followed by the Landwehr division of the Guard, moved, on the 20th, by Stolken to Schluckenau and Rumburg, which he reached on the 22d and 23d; and, after marching 60 miles in six days in hot weather, with great difficulties to contend with in the way of subsistence, he arrived at Gabel on the 25th.

The 1st army concentrated on the 22d.

7th and 8th divisions, Zittau; 3d and 4th, Herrenhut and Hirschfeld; 5th, Seidenberg; 6th, Markissa. On the 23d, the army again moved, and, on the 25th, was collected at Reichenberg, the Guard Landwehr being at Rumburg.

Meanwhile, Benedek, on the 20th, wrote to Crenneville, to the effect that, having gained the position of Josephstadt, he purposed to halt for a few days and then to take the offensive, but in which direction was not known. The Crown Prince of Saxony wrote for instructions on the following day, and received a despatch in answer, on the 24th, by which he was directed, with Clam, to oppose any hostile movement from Gabel or Reichenberg, in which effort they would be either supported by the main army, or receive further instructions to retreat on it. It was evident, therefore, that Benedek was moving on the Iser, and hoped to reach it before the Crown Prince; while Clam, facing northward at Jung Bunzlau, was to stretch out a hand to the Saxons and favour their junction with the main body. He considered, therefore, that he would be fulfilling his instructions if he held the Iser line only till the Crown Prince joined him, and then fell back, if possible

without a check, to effect a concentration with the general-in-chief.

On this date, the 25th June, the Prussian 1st army was closely concentrated round Reichenberg, the Elbe army about Gabel, and the 2d army distributed from Liebau to Patschkau.

Only some insignificant cavalry skirmishes, and no serious opposition, had as yet been experienced by the Prussians, though the ground was eminently favourable for it; and the unchecked rapidity of the advance is therefore due solely to the dispositions made by the Austrian leaders.

The "interior" position now occupied by Benedek was of doubtful advantage, considering the distance he had to traverse. There was a danger now of his wedging himself in between the two hostile armies, without sufficient elbow-room. And, finally, the ignorance of the Austrian general as to the strength, movement, and purpose of the 2d Prussian army still further increased the difficulty of concentration on the Upper Elbe, which could hardly under any circumstances be effected before the 2d July.

On the 26th, the advance continued; the Elbe army from Niemes engaged the Austrian outposts at Hühnerwasser, driving them in with loss. The 1st army intended to halt, but, detaching Horn's division to reconnoitre towards Liebenau, a skirmish occurred both there and at Sichrow. Finding but a feeble resistance at those points, the Prince decided on attempting to master the passage of the Iser at Turnau. Fransecky, finding it was not held, therefore occupied it without opposition, as the Austrian cavalry under Edelsheim had left it early that morning, and, throwing a pontoon-bridge across, repaired the broken arch of the masonry bridge.

There seems to have been a want of union here between the Austrian and Saxon generals; their command was not well defined. The latter proposed to occupy Turnau on the 27th, but Clam, preferring to hold Münchengratz, declined. His dispositions were in many respects faulty, and the troops on the right bank of the Iser were badly proportioned. Thus cavalry were ordered practically to do infantry work, and the artillery was consequently driven from the field by Prussian

infantry. It is indispensable in such a country to support them with that arm, as the event proved; but, as it was, the troops retired to the left bank, leaving a few companies to guard the principal passages, and Turnau was evacuated. At 2 P.M. on this day, however, the Crown Prince of Saxony received an order to hold Münchengratz at all cost; and, in order to comply with it, made dispositions for a general attack, from the latter place, on Sichrow the following day, while the Elbe army was to be retarded by two brigades left for that purpose. The bridges were on no account to be destroyed, and those injured, including the Podol railway, were to be repaired, while Turnau was to be regained by a night attack.

But the Prussians were fully alive to the necessity of gaining these Iser passages, and after dining at 6 P.M., Horn was pushed forward to Preper. The necessity for the Austrians to maintain this point, in view of their contemplated march next day, brought on the action of Podol, which was attacked unexpectedly, and the leading troops seized and settled in a house on the left bank, out of which, however, they were soon driven, and obliged to evacuate the village. But the attack was again renewed, and the action terminated at 1 A.M. in the defeat, with heavy loss, of the Austrians. Two passages of the stream were now in Prussian hands. The importance of the point had been fully recognised by Bosé, whose personal gallantry and independent action as commander of the advanced-guard led to results that only true military knowledge aided by the exercise of a judiciously-intrusted independence would have fully recognised.

The strategic importance of the victory, small in itself, was great. Clam was obliged to abandon his projected attack, and to think of his own safety towards Gitschin. Already the purpose of the commander-in-chief had been thwarted, and the troops engaged severely dispirited. He took up a position on the Muskey Berg, between Podol and München-gratz, uncertain what to do, as no definite intimation of the general plan had arrived from headquarters; but on the 27th, the Crown Prince of Saxony received a telegram, stating that large bodies of troops were before Trautenau and Nachod,

and that the deployment of the troops at Josephstadt must be hastened on. It was left to his discretion as to the course he should pursue, and he therefore, with Clam, decided on retreating on Gitschin the following day.

On the morning of the 28th of June, Herwarth moved down towards the river, and throwing his bridge, very skilfully, under cover of a severe artillery-fire, passed his corps to the left bank. Simultaneously the Prince crossed at Podol, where, detaching the 7th division in the direction of Gitschin, he moved with the remainder of his force, parallel to the river, upon Münchengratz; his intention being, by availing himself of his very superior numbers, to outflank and destroy Clam, cutting off his line of retreat, which led through Gitschin on to Königgratz. The Austrian commander seems, very late, to have perceived his danger, and barely extricated himself, with loss and difficulty, from a position that was really untenable. Collecting his harassed troops, he fortunately succeeded in retaining possession of his communications, and calling upon the Crown Prince to unite with him, prepared to defend the excellent position and important strategic point of Gitschin. In this intention he was confirmed by a despatch from headquarters, informing him that the 3d Austrian corps would reach the place on the 29th of June, and that three others from the main army would march for the Upper Iser on the 30th.

The position of Gitschin, or Jicin, is characterised by a semicircular range of heights, about three English miles west of the town, through which the roads from Münchengratz and Turnau converge towards it; but in rear of the hills, the country is open and flat. The line occupied by the Saxon-Austrian force faced to the west, extending from Eisenstadt on the right, to the Anna Berg on the left, commanding the approaches from the Iser; and by noon on the 29th June, the defensive preparations were completed, but no attack seems to have been anticipated on that day.

The Prussians, after the action at Münchengratz, pushed forward with their 5th and 6th divisions from Turnau to Rowensko, and with the 3d and 4th from Podol to Zehrow, in the direction of Lobotka; the 7th and 8th divisions halting at Münchengratz, and henceforth forming the reserve. Her-

warth prepared to advance on the right, after detaching to Jung Bunzlau, by Unter Bautzen and Liebau. In these positions the armies remained during the night of the 28th and forenoon of the 29th of June.

The distance from Turnau to Gitschin is fifteen, and from Münchengratz to the same town, twenty English miles.

At noon on the 29th of June, the Prussians advanced against the enemy's position, which they touched towards four o'clock in the afternoon, immediately engaging on both approaches. The struggle seems to have been conducted with varying success—the Austrians being now more favoured by cover—until seven in the evening, when an order from Benedek directed the two commanders on no account to engage with superior forces, but to fall back towards Horitz, in order to effect concentration with the main army, as all further offensive action against the 1st Prussian army had been abandoned. There appears little reason to doubt that, but for this order, Clam would have maintained his position before Gitschin successfully on the 29th June; but his instructions admitted of no reply, and the difficult task remained of extricating troops so deeply engaged on ground so singularly unfavourable for the purpose. Ultimately this was effected, at a terrible sacrifice—when crossing the open ground before the town—in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and at midnight the Prussians occupied it, since it was not earnestly defended, and then halted for the night. On the following day the Prince touched the extreme right of the 2d army, towards Miletin and Arnau, with his patrols, so that on the 30th of June communication was opened between the two armies.

The uniform success which attended the operations of Prince Charles during his advance from the Saxon-Bohemian frontier, has not prevented the character of his generalship being called into question. The sense of the instructions which he was called upon to execute has been sufficiently explained. Though the force at his disposal was superior to that commanded by the Crown Prince, it did not, for strategic reasons, represent the principal line of invasion. Its purpose and object was to aid and assist the forward movement of the

2d army from Silesia. This end could only be answered by extreme rapidity of movement, and by the cordial acceptance of the secondary rôle required. Neither of these considerations would seem to have been sufficiently digested by the Prussian Prince, inasmuch as his movements are strongly coloured by independent action. The case was essentially one where six or twelve hours gained or lost might influence the results of the operation. Nevertheless, the Prince had hardly crossed the frontier before he halted for twenty-four hours, apparently with no sufficient purpose. The reason assigned for the first halt at Reichenberg, if we bear the principal objective of all concerned in view, seems simply puerile. The probable cause was, the anxiety of the Prince, that Herwarth, who had somewhat further to march, should remain on the same level with himself; a precaution, under the circumstances, which would indicate that the Prince had not correctly estimated his own position of vantage. Similarly, after the affair at Podol, another delay ensued, when a brilliant opportunity of completing the Prussian combination was missed. The delay, moreover, might easily have reacted with fatal effect upon the operations of the Silesian army. It will be recollected that Turnau was occupied by Horn, on the afternoon of the 26th of June, and that this town is fifteen miles, or one ordinary march, distant from Gitschin—the important point to be gained. The unopposed possession of Turnau was a circumstance which could never have been expected by the Prince—favourable, beyond any possible hopes, to his objective aims. A short rapid movement to his front would have severed Clam's communications with the headquarters of his army,* preventing subsequent concentration; and the reaction demanded from the western advance upon the Austrian operations towards the Silesian frontier, would, on the evening of the 27th of June, already have made itself triumphantly felt. With proper dispositions on the part of the Austrian general, the Crown Prince incurred imminent risk of decisive defeat on the 28th of June, on which day the 1st army was

* Clam, at Münchengratz, was five miles further from Gitschin than the Prussian Prince. He remained there during the entire 27th and part of the 28th of June.

fighting at Münchengratz, instead of being far on its road to the Upper Elbe. On this occasion Frederick Charles has not only exposed himself to the criticism of having formed too narrow an estimate of his peculiar duties, but his return from Turnau to fight at Podol, would indicate that he did not correctly estimate the strategic value of the former locality. From the instant Turnau was in Prussian hands, the line of the Iser was in reality no longer to be defended by Clam. The position assumed by the Austrian general, on the left bank of the river, indicates, indeed, that the Prussian objective must have been altogether misinterpreted by Clam. His purpose seems to have been to defend the approaches leading to Prague, rather than those leading to Gitschin, otherwise the defence of Podol and the neglect of Turnau, are simply inexplicable. However this may have been, it is certain that the Prussian commander failed signally to turn his adversary's mistake to his own advantage. Not only this, but he actually endorsed his adversary's error by turning eastwards to clear the line of the Iser, the key to which he already held in his hands. The destruction of Clam and the Saxons, if accomplished, which it was not, would little influence the Prussian manœuvre, were the Crown Prince meanwhile defeated by Benedek; on the other hand, disaster incurred by the Silesian army would seriously injure the Prussian prospects of a successful campaign. The fault attributable to the Prince is, that with a superiority of force at his command, which gave him unbounded advantage over his enemy, he refused to incur risks which that fact reduced to a minimum, in the general interests of the campaign.

Turning to the Austrian general, but little evidence of military skill is offered by his dispositions. His determination of defending the Iser line, instead of impeding with his command the advance of the hostile columns through the mountain defiles, may possibly have been dependent upon the tardy receipt of the order which consigned him to his post. The arrangements made for the defensive purpose are certainly open to criticism. The value of a river, as a defensive line, depends in great measure upon the character of its course. Thus in Lombardy, where numerous streams pour

from the Alps into the Po, not all are of equal military value. The Oglio, for instance, adopted as a defensive line, would entail more embarrassment upon the defending than the attacking army. So, in the present case, the task of defending the tortuous Iser against forces so much superior was hopeless from the first. Nevertheless, by proper dispositions, time might well be gained from the invader, without incurring serious loss, and this was the principal object. To attain this end it was necessary to withdraw entirely the troops adventured on the right bank, to destroy all bridges, and to devote every energy towards obstructing the passage of the enemy at other points. Probably Clam had been kept in entire ignorance of the possible advance of the Crown Prince from Silesia. That movement commenced only on the 27th of June, after the first collisions had ensued on the Iser—an additional reason, perhaps, for his misinterpretation of the Prussian designs. The abandonment of his position on the Muskey Berg, on the 28th of June, was in all probability attributable as much to the announcement from headquarters of the engagements at Nachod and Trautenau on the preceding day, as to the flanking movement executed by Fransecky. Fully as the tactical situation had been entered upon by the Austrian commander-in-chief, there is reason to believe that he had not sufficiently mastered the strategical aspects of the campaign, and that these were consequently withheld from his lieutenants. Clam extricated himself from imminent peril on the Iser only to become the victim of contradictory orders at Gitechin.

One circumstance had become sufficiently clear, during the engagements on the Iser, to all concerned. The superiority of the Prussian needle-rifle to the Austrian muzzle-loading small-arm, was such that these last henceforward had no hopes of fighting on terms approaching to equality. The general depression consequent upon this conviction spread with alarming rapidity throughout the ranks. The foundation for this assumption was, unhappily for the Austrians, but too well borne out by facts. Whereas the Prussian successes had been effected with comparatively trifling loss, the army of the Iser, after the action of the 29th of June,

was diminished in effective force by 10,000 soldiers killed, wounded, and missing.

Meanwhile the headquarters of Benedek's army had reached Böhmisoh-Trübau by noon on the 26th; and reports from all sides reached it that strong Prussian columns were closing on the frontier. It was this information that had reached the Crown Prince of Saxony.

The Austrians still consider that the imperial army was in a position to meet the half of the Prussian forces on terms of superiority; and their positions on the 27th were as follows:—

4th Corps,	Lanzow	towards	Trautenau.
10th	" Jaromir	"	Braunau.
6th	" Opocno	"	Nachod.
3d	" Königgratz	}	Neustadt and
8th	" Tynist		Jaromir.
2d	" Senftenberg	"	Neustadt.

Of these the 3d and 8th corps would be available in any direction on the 28th, and the 2d on the 29th; but it was not the purpose of the commander-in-chief to prepare for an attack from the Silesian defiles. He adhered still to his resolution of deploying on the position Jaromir-Miletin, covering the movement by pushing forward the 6th corps to Nachod, and the 10th to Trautenau.

The Prussians in their official account of the war take a different view of the line of action he should have chosen. They say that now that the circumstances are well known, every one will urge that the simplest and best course to pursue was to advance with every available man against the debouching 2d army. But the character of the march of the Crown Prince in rear of the county of Glatz was not known, and could not be known, until the columns approached the mouths of the defiles. The announcement of quarters for 100,000 men in Upper Silesia, and the affair at Zuchmantel, may have contributed to conceal the real purpose from view.

Benedek's purpose was simply to cover the deployment of his army, and the covering corps were ordered to attack the enemy wherever they came into collision. These dispositions were explained to Crenneville as a temporary cessation of

hostilities in order to get the army well in hand, and to ascertain with certainty the whereabouts of the enemy.

Nothing could confirm better the Prussian view. At this moment no certain intelligence regarding the Prussian plan had reached headquarters, and the staff had failed to read it according to the indications which had presented themselves.

Had Benedek known what the Crown Prince was about to undertake, he might have punished him.

Similarly, had Gyulai known in 1859 what the Emperor purposed, he might have done him serious injury.

Sound and speedy information is the basis of successful action, but both purposes were carefully concealed from view by every imaginable artifice. It is the invariable advantage of the offence that it can select its point of attack; and, *vice versa*, the difficult problem of the defence is, to detect or anticipate in time each and every possible design. This is especially the case behind a mountain frontier, which forms a more or less impenetrable screen; and critics should be careful in ascertaining the exact amount of information which could under favourable circumstances have reached Austrian headquarters, before they criticise either Benedek's dispositions or the Prussian plan of operations. It is evidently necessary, therefore, to do so not by the light which we possess, but by the amount of information which was at his disposal. The real question is, whether, in the absence of specific information as to the enemy's plan, the indications were such that the Austrian commanders should have read them correctly.

It must be recollected that the character of the frontier was such as to screen movement and to favour demonstration, that there was no public press to assist his judgment, and that the headquarters of the Prussian army had remained at Berlin. On the other hand, the Austrians assert that their headquarters were inundated with reports on the 26th and 27th as to the presence of the Crown Prince's army before the Silesian defiles. Nevertheless, at 10 P.M. on the 26th, Benedek does not see it in this light: both in his despatch to Crenneville, and in his dispositions, doubt as to the strength of the enemy is expressed.

Evidently his difficulties commenced with the loss of the Iser line by the evacuation of Turnau; and this was due to the tardy instructions issued to the Crown Prince and Clam as to the value of that line, from the tardiness of which the Prussians speedily reaped the fruits. Presuming the river crossed and Clam defeated, the position Miletin-Jaromir was no longer tenable.

On the other hand, with the army of the Crown Prince debouching from the defiles, an offensive march against Frederick Charles was no longer possible.

He was evidently on the horns of a dilemma from which nothing could release him but a tactical success—the decided repulse of one or other of the advancing armies.

This was barely to be expected under equal conditions of arms, considering the dispositions of both armies for the 26th and 27th. In the face of the needle-rifle matters were desperate. Clearly the position of Olmütz was false from the commencement, considering the occupation of Saxony by Prussia was inevitable before she could undertake to invade Bohemia, much less Moravia. It was essentially a half-measure, wanting in genial appreciation of the circumstances, and based upon timidity. It involved Benedek, who was not its author, at once in difficulties with which he was unable to cope. Had he been able so to do, he would probably not have accepted strategic instruction from others; and the evil of a commander-in-chief who is simply a tactician could not be better demonstrated.

To turn now to the army of the Crown Prince.

On the 19th of June, he had received orders from the King to leave one corps on the river Neisse, to direct Bonin's 1st corps westward to Landshut, and to echelon the two remaining corps in such wise towards the Bohemian frontier, that they might either act in concert with the first for purposes of invasion of the enemy's territory, or reinforce the corps left on the Neisse, should the Austrian general assume the offensive before the Prussian aggressive preparations had matured. On the 22d of June further instructions directed the Crown Prince to cross into Bohemia, making Gitschin his objective point; and on the day following, the

23d, a last despatch directed him to use all his available forces for that purpose, indicating that Benedek's westward march had already been reported to Berlin. Before, however, the 6th corps, under Mutius, proceeded to follow the remainder of the army, it executed a feint or false movement, from Neisse, in the direction of Freiwaldau, in order to embarrass, and, if possible, delay Benedek's movements towards the Upper Elbe. This demonstration was quickly abandoned by Mutius, who rapidly retraced his steps towards Glatz, whither Steinmetz had preceded him.

On the 26th of June, the dispositions of the Crown Prince were completed. Bonin prepared to march upon Trautenau; the Guard, under Prince Württemberg, from Braunau by different country roads upon Eipel and Kosteletz, on the Aupa; and Steinmetz, towards Nachod and Skalitz. On the evening of the same day, the frontier was crossed by each of these columns, which were intended in the first instance to converge towards the line of the Upper Elbe, in the direction of Königshof. These were the movements, the report of which reached Benedek at Josephstadt late on that day, and which Ramming and Gablenz were ordered up to probe. With the exception of trifling skirmishes at Pölitz, and at Kleny, near Nachod, with the Austrian cavalry outposts, no serious collision ensued on the 26th; and Steinmetz found no difficulty in establishing his advanced-guard on the important heights of Wysokow and Wenzelsberg, where he at once prepared to intrench himself.

Inasmuch as the Austrian 6th and 10th corps had received instructions to fall upon the enemy wherever he showed himself, collision was thus inevitable. Nevertheless, says the Austrian official account, it could hardly have been the intention of the commander-in-chief to use up four army corps at different points—the Saxons and Clam on the Iser, Gablenz at Trautenau, and Ramming at Nachod—for the purpose of covering the deployment of the remainder of the army against the overpowering armies of the enemy. If this was the actual result, however, it must be traced to the confused dispositions proceeding from headquarters.

According to the Prussian statements, on the evening of the

26th the two Prussian armies were only fifty miles apart, but each was well concentrated; while the Austrian corps, on the other hand, extended over a similar space of ground from Lanzau to Leitomischel.

This defile of Nachod-Altstadt-Wysokow, was the southern of the three passages which the Crown Prince desired to utilise, that of Trautenau being the northern. The road from Nachod is a steep, single mountain-road, passing along the gorge through which runs the little river Mettau, and crossing it at Altstadt. There it ascends the western face of the valley, and debouches on to some undulating land bordered on the west and north by forest-clad hills, but more open towards the south and west. The village of Wysokow is situated on the main road to Skalitz, just beyond the point where the road rises to the entrance of the defile, and bifurcating, sends one branch towards that town and Josephstadt, and the other south by Wrchowin to Neustadt. In front of the angle so formed, the plateau sinks by a gentle slope—on which are situated the houses and church of the little village of Wenzelsberg, and several isolated copses of considerable size—to the road from Wrchowin to Kleny and Skalitz, which passes through the villages of Sonow and Prowodow.

The 6th corps (Ramming) was at Opocno, with a small force of two squadrons, a weak detachment of infantry, and two guns (under Count Thun) advanced to watch the defile; but they appear not to have reported the occupation of Nachod by the Prussian troops, which was effected on the 26th.

At 1.30 A.M. on the 27th, Ramming received an order to occupy Skalitz and push an advance towards Nachod. In consequence of this, his corps, consisting of 4 brigades, received the following orders:—

1. (Hertweck) to move by Neustadt on Wrchowin and Wysokow.
2. (Jonak) Prowodow, Kleny.
3. (Rosenzweig) by Lhota Spita on Skalitz.
4. (Waldstätten, with the artillery reserve) by Jessenitz on Skalitz.

They were to move at 3 and 3.30 A.M., and numbered 28

battalions, 4 squadrons, 72 guns, and 1 company of pioneers, in addition to the 1st cavalry division, which counted 26 squadrons and 16 guns.

The 5th corps under Steinmetz was also ordered to occupy Nachod. His advance had crossed the Mettau the evening before, and occupied the town with 3 battalions. He manœuvred his infantry throughout in half-battalions—a compromise between the company and battalion column. His corps moved at 5, his vanguard at 6, A.M., and the whole body was divided into three parts—viz., advance, *gros*, and reserve, the first of which was placed under the command of Löwenfeld, general of the 9th division. It consisted of the brigade Ollech, composed of 5½ battalions of infantry, 1 of rifles, 5 squadrons, 12 guns, and 1 company of pioneers. The rest of the corps contained 15 battalions, Wnuck's brigade of 8 squadrons, and 78 guns, of which the cavalry and some reserve batteries came into action. The advance reported that it had reached the point where the road bifurcates without opposition. It was ordered to bivouac on the plateau, and to throw forward posts towards Skalitz and Neustadt, Wysokow being also occupied. The two other features of importance on the plateau were the wood between Wysokow and Wenzelsberg, and that village with its church and chapel.

At 8.30 Löwenfeld was informed of the approach of a column of all arms from Neustadt by Prowodow. It was Hertweck and Jonak. The former deployed and marched for the plateau north of Wenzelsberg, accompanied by his battery east of the village, and seven companies on the Neustadt road.

Löwenfeld ordered the vanguard to gain the plateau, and called upon the *gros* of the advanced-guard to hurry up from Altstadt while he brought his first battery into action. Wysokow was further occupied with a half-company of rifles and a half-battalion of infantry; and Colonel von Below at length gained the plateau with 4½ companies, 3 squadrons, 1 battery, at once occupying the wood north of Wenzelsberg before the Austrians gained it. The Austrians were checked by the deployed line of four companies firing volleys; and the *gros*

of the advance then coming in on the left, drove in the Austrian right. Thus this first attack was repulsed at 10 A.M.

At nine Jonak had reached Domkow, and deployed his battery and cavalry on the left. Moving by Prowodow on Wenzelsberg, he had supported Hertweck, without much result, in his attacks on the woods.

In the rear of Jonak Rosenzweig deployed. Ramming reached the ground about nine, with the leading troops of Waldstätten and Solm's cavalry; and from eleven until noon the reserve artillery and Schindlocker's cavalry were arriving.

For an hour little was done. Steinmetz was on the field, and ordered up the *gros* of the corps, particularly cavalry and artillery.

At length the general attack took place with Rosenzweig's and Jonak's brigades, and succeeded in wresting the woods from the Prussians, forcing them back to the Neustadt road, when the Prussian half-battalions formed.

Then Solm's cavalry appeared on the plateau, and Wnuck's brigade, which was the first to arrive, advanced to meet it, the charge resulting in the defeat of the Austrians. Simultaneously Ramming renewed the attack, which the Prussians repulsed with great deliberation, inflicting terrible loss.

At this moment the head of the Prussian main body made its appearance, and occupied Wysokow, the wood, and Wenzelsberg in force, whilst the Austrians retired discomfited on Kleny.

The last effort made with Waldstätten's brigade on Wyso-kow was easily defeated.

The Austrian loss amounted to 232 officers, 5487 men, 8 guns, 1 stand of colours, and 2 standards; that of the Prussians to 62 officers, 1160 men, 222 horses.

COMMENTS ON THE ACTION OF NACHOD.

The criticism hereafter applied to Bonin's dispositions at Trautenau is not applicable in the present instance. The post of Nachod was surprised, and the surprise turned to account.

Had Steinmetz neglected to secure the passage of the Mettau on the 26th, he most certainly would not have succeeded in carrying his army corps through the defile on the 27th, for Ramming would have stood with two brigades at least in position at Wysokow by 10 A.M., and by noon his reserve artillery would have been on the ground; so that Steinmetz's *débouché* from that defile would have been hopeless, unless the 2d division of the Guard from Eipel could extricate him. It is probable, indeed, that the detachment at Nachod in that case would have been reinforced, and the endeavour made to hold the post. Had this been successfully effected, considering also Gablenz's victory at Trautenau, it is evident that the position of the Guard would have been highly precarious, and the entire operation might possibly have collapsed.

Attention is drawn to the point, as illustrating how dependent the success of every offensive plan is upon surprise, and of what enormous ultimate value the turning of a few hours to account may prove, or *vice versa*.

It was assumed, no doubt, by the Prussian commander, from the fact of the Austrian detachment at Nachod vacating its stronghold, that it had no support upon which to rely. Whoever the commander of that detachment may have been, great responsibility devolved upon him. A show of resistance on his part, the preparation of his post for defence, a desperate, if even a forlorn struggle, might prove under the circumstances of infinite importance to his commander-in-chief. Had he been versed in the history of earlier operations, he would have recollected the little fort of Bard, and the incident which, in 1800, so nearly proved fatal to the passage of the Alps.

The reflection serves to indicate how utterly the Austrians had neglected the most ordinary defensive precautions on their northern frontier. Since the preceding winter, hostilities had been anticipated. Since the spring, Krismanic's plan, insisting upon the necessity of a defensive attitude for Austria, had lain before the Emperor, that necessity being based upon the superior Prussian organisation, with which the author was fully cognisant.

The practicability of the defiles was well known, for Frederick had passed through them repeatedly a century before. The general difficulty of defending such a frontier as that of Bohemia and Moravia was clearly apparent; and, in case of invasion, the value of a couple of days to the defence, procured by artificial means, must have been clear to all. Yet no attempt was made to erect hasty works which would have answered this purpose, the creed for the time in Austria being, that victory would be gained by sword and bayonet. Relying probably on the want of intention of the Austrian commander to oppose his entry into Bohemia, Steinmetz allowed his advanced-guard to precede his chief column to the extent of seven or eight miles, although he left Reinertz at 5 A.M. with the main body. Löwenfeld spent the night at Nachod, Ollech at Schlaney. Evidently the commander of the advance was anxious to secure the mouth of the defile before opposition could be seriously contemplated. He effected this successfully; but the result proved that the main body was not sufficiently near to the advanced-guard to support and secure its lodgment at the outer mouth of the defile. The official account points with pride to the fact that General Löwenfeld successfully held the plateau with 5½ battalions and 2 companies of rifles for three hours, against 21 battalions which the enemy brought up. What would have been the fate of the Prussian advance, if the weapons had been equal, and if Ramming and Hertweck had shown ordinary professional skill?

At Trautenau, as will be seen, want of forethought and enterprise is apparent. At Nachod, an opposite error, if so to be called, was committed—the safety of the advance was endangered, from the fact of the main body having been kept too far in rear. The operation would have been perfect, as to time, had Steinmetz left his quarters at 3 instead of 5 A.M., for he could not expect Löwenfeld, with the responsibility attaching to his action, to lose a single hour of the morning. Moreover, the entire advance had but two batteries attached to it, a force of artillery quite disproportioned to the character of the enterprise which should here have regulated the distribution of arms.

It will be noticed that cavalry here, as elsewhere, preceded the Prussian march; and through its agency General Löwenfeld ascertained the approach of the enemy in time to make such dispositions as his force allowed.

The first step taken by him was to occupy such localities as were of defensive value—viz., Wysokow, and the patches of wood on the plateau; the second, was to call for the assistance of his nearest support, which took the shortest unencumbered route to the field; while the corps commander was soon on the field, giving further orders for Löwenfeld to support.

Ramming's orders directed him to Skalitz with an advanced-guard pushed forward to Nachod.

He was ordered to execute this disposition for the purpose of covering the deployment of the army at Josephstadt; but this duty was not to prevent him from attacking the enemy, wherever he might show himself, with all energy.

He reached Skalitz at 8.30, and there first became acquainted with the actual circumstances of the case as reported by Prince Holstein.

Then he changed the original dispositions, purposing to take up a defensive position with one brigade at Wysokow, two brigades and reserve artillery and the cavalry division at Kleny, and one infantry brigade at Skalitz. No orders were sent to Hertweck, as he had been originally instructed to move on Wysokow.

It must, however, have been clear to Ramming that, as Hertweck was ordered on Wysokow along the Neustadt-Wrchowin road, he must come into collision with the troops which were already debouching from the defile. Either, therefore, preparations should have been made to support his action, or he should have been directed to avoid engaging.

As it was, he was left to act upon his own responsibility, and that action disturbed Ramming's otherwise prudent dispositions, inasmuch as Hertweck was repulsed in the first attack he made, and the other brigades successively drawn into action, were in turn repulsed with a loss which was for the time paralysing.

It is impossible not to see that this might have been avoided had Ramming marched with his advanced brigades instead of with Waldstätten. If collision ensued, Hertweck was certain to come first into action; and, under the existing circumstances, that was Ramming's plan. As it was, he rode to Skalitz, and, receiving Holstein's report, changed the direction of Rosenzweig without communicating with Hertweck.

The latter, on the other hand, fearing, as soon as he saw that collision must ensue, lest the enemy on the plateau should separate him from the three other brigades of his corps, himself inclined to the left, and then proceeded to take in front a position upon the flank of which he had been brought by the very character of his march.

Thus he reversed the ordinary course of things; from a flank he moved round to the front, which his adversary must inevitably defend; for had he, as the Austrian account proposes, taken up a position across the plateau fronting south, his right would have been exposed from the Skalitz road, and subject to enfilade from the Kleny heights along the entire extent of his line.

It was a grievous error of Hertweck to diverge from his original direction, indicating that he neither mastered his problem nor paid the slightest attention to the ground, excellent as the Austrian plans are.

The fighting tactics of the Austrians are only excusable on the plea that the earliest experiments with the breech-loader, excepting the Danes, in whose discomfiture they took part, were made upon them. To change their tactical formations during the campaign was quite out of the question. The result was, that after these first actions they were compelled to fall back upon the defensive, with no hope of emerging from it. Therefore it was, doubtless, that Benedek telegraphed the hopelessness of the struggle to the Emperor.

The artillery was used with little hardihood by either general. The positions assigned to it were in accordance with the then existing rules. The Austrians, however, were the first to discover and utilise its latent power, not so much through merit as necessity, exposed as they were to the extreme severity of the smaller arm. Thus Ramming massed,

the Prussians state, 80 guns against the plateau on which they stood; and Benedek at Sadowa relied on the same weapon.

It was the study of the Austrian artillery tactics by the intelligent officers of the Prussian army which led them to perceive how vastly they would increase their offensive power by developing that arm in their own forces, as the advantage secured by the breech-loader must soon disappear. In consequence, they surprised the French, in 1870, as much with their artillery as they did the Austrians with the breech-loader.

The thoroughness of the defeat at Nachod may be traced to the tactical instructions which Benedek had thought proper to issue. Considering the character of his task, and the prohibition accompanying his instructions, Ramming would have shown more prudence in not allowing himself to be entangled so deeply by continued and hopeless assaults. He must have felt that his operation was isolated in character, and that he was not contributing to the general issue of the campaign by incurring signal defeat.

The battle in the northern defile, Trautenau, had been attended with different results. On the 26th, the 1st corps (Bonin) assembled at Liebau and Schömberg, ready to cross the frontier; and in order to effect this, it was necessary to pass through the mountain-gorges, for which purpose three roads were available: one to the right by Schätzlar to Ober Altstadt; the second from Liebau by Parschnitz; and the third from Schömberg by Parschnitz, where both united, to Trautenau.

Columns making use of these last two roads would, on reaching Parschnitz, find themselves in the tolerably open valley of the Aupa, a stream which, fordable at many points at this time of year, pursues a tortuous course to the Elbe. Following the stream, the one road leads to Eipel. Up the stream a little more than a mile away is Trautenau, a town situated principally on the south bank of the river, with a suburb called Kriblitz running up a ravine formed by the adjacent heights.

From Trautenau two good roads lead,—the one away to the

right, to the sources of the Elbe and Gitschin—the other by Hohenbruck, New Rognitz, Weiberkränke, to Schurz and Jaromir on the same river. The latter leaving Trautenau cuts through the commanding Galgenberg; and another road winds up the Hopfenberg, which at the point where it unites with the Katzauer Berg leaves room for the little village of Kriblitz to nestle in its flank.

Now these three commanding hills have naturally determined the course of the river which winds round their base. They, particularly on the right, are wooded and difficult to traverse, with a few country paths only; and the northern slopes are steep, and scarp'd towards the stream.

For these reasons it is highly important for an army corps marching through the mountains, and expecting opposition, to reach Trautenau as rapidly as possible, with a view to obtain possession of the southern heights, in order to cover what would then form excellent debouching-ground.

The only information possessed by Bonin was, that his pickets had come into collision with the cavalry of the 1st light division, which he must conclude would be reported to Austrian headquarters, and lead to corresponding dispositions. Moreover, the Guard had already crossed the frontier at adjacent points.

To conform with these premises, a special *ordre de bataille* was drawn up.

The force was divided into a right column (1st division), General Grossmann.

Left column (2d division), General Clausewitz, to start at 4 A.M., and, uniting at Parschnitz, to halt whilst the advanced-guard (Pape), with the right column, occupied Trautenau.

The right column was unaccountably two hours late, so that the left column, reaching Parschnitz at the appointed time, 8 A.M., and conceiving that it must halt, according to the letter of the orders, piled arms without detaching to Trautenau.

At 10 the advance arrived, and found the bridge over the Aupa barricaded, and occupied by dismounted dragoons.

On the Austrian side, Gablenz, called into headquarters at Josephstadt on the 26th, was ordered to move up to Trautenau, at 8 A.M. on the following day, with his corps from Schurz.

Informed of the exposure of his flanks from Pölitz and Starkstadt, he reported this danger, but, to obviate it, was only allowed to communicate with the 4th corps, which detached one brigade from Lanzau to Arnau and Prausnitz. A report from Windischgratz to Gablenz at 10 P.M., 26th, was forwarded to headquarters, pointing out the increased danger for the right flank; but Benedek considered it sufficiently guarded, and ordered the 6th corps to Skalitz and Nachod. This was a grave error, considering the character of the intervening country and the direction of his communications.

Gablenz had under his command four brigades under Mondel, Grivicic, Wimpffen, and Knebel, giving a total of 28 battalions of infantry, 8 squadrons of cavalry, 72 guns, with 1 company of pioneers and a bridge train.

Mondel, on outpost duty at Prausnitz Kaile, was to start at 6.30 A.M.; Grivicic, from Jaromir, at 8.30; Wimpffen, from Schurz, at 10; Knebel, from Dubenetz, at 10.30; and the reserve artillery, from Welchow, at 11.30.

All the brigades moved by one and the same road.

The corps commandant hurried on and reached Trautenau about 11 A.M., where he found Mondel already engaged.

Windischgratz had retired before the advancing Prussians, and evacuating Trautenau, drew up his squadrons on the slopes facing the town.

Mondel arriving at 7.45 at Hohenbruck, had formed up for action in two lines. He then moved forward in that order to occupy the heights, taking St Johannis Capelle as the left of his line.

Windischgratz was on the extreme left at 10, when the cavalry of the Prussians' advance united with that of Koblinzsky, which arrived simultaneously, and debouched south of Trautenau.

Windischgratz flung his squadrons against them and drove them in, but the Prussian cavalry was immediately supported by infantry, which caused great loss to the Austrian dragoons.

The advanced-guard battery was brought into action on the right bank of the river, and Koblinzsky ranging his guns with it, pushed his infantry into action from that side.

The commanding batteries of the Austrians forced eight Prussian guns to withdraw, and the infantry made futile attempts to debouch when deprived of their assistance. Then Bonin, at 11 A.M., turned his attention to Mondel's right, and two regiments were ordered from Clausewitz's column at Parschnitz to scale the heights and operate against the Austrian flank.

Gablenz, who had arrived, perceiving this, withdrew his brigade in perfect order out of fire to the north of New Rognitz, effecting the movement by 12 noon.

The enemy had not pushed with vigour the 11 or 12 battalions on the south bank of the Aupa, and had lost tactical connection in a difficult country. Bonin was careless, and thought only one brigade was before him. At 2.30 only two batteries were further brought into action on the Galgen and Hopfen bergs, a third being in reserve below, and the remainder on the north bank.

At 3 P.M. the reserve infantry were directed to Kriblitz; but three battalions of infantry, all the cavalry, and many guns remained still on the north bank.

At 1 P.M. the Guard had arrived at Parschnitz; but its assistance was refused, and after resting two hours, it had pushed on towards Eipel.

Grivicic's artillery reached New Rognitz at 12, thus preceding him; and at 2.30 he himself arrived, and deployed for action towards Old Rognitz, which at 3 P.M. he attacked with his first line, and was repulsed; but making a second effort, and detaching to his right, he was successful, and the Prussians retired.

At 4 P.M. Wimpffen arrived, and, ordered to the front, attacked and surprised the Prussians by bringing five batteries into action.

Bonin made frantic efforts to retrieve the situation, but the Austrian artillery was too powerful, and at 4.30 all the Prussian troops were in full retreat, with the exception of Barnekow at Johannis Capelle.

Knebel arrived about 5 P.M.

The Austrian loss was 191 officers and 4596 men; that of the Prussians, 56 officers and 1282 men.

COMMENTS ON THE ACTION OF TRAUTENAU.

The first question that arises is, Should Clausewitz have occupied Trautenau? Mondel was up in all probability, and he would have been deeply engaged, before Grossmann came up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann's delay is stated to have been the hilly character of the road. Mondel, on the other hand, reaching Hohenbruck about 7.30, seems to have halted there to form. The Austrian official account states that he had occupied the heights since 9.15, and before this that he had reached Hohenbruck at 7.45. When he had formed—that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before deploying—the position must have been taken up by him between 8.30 and 9.15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondel on the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied.

Probably the latter was informed by Windischgratz that no immediate danger was impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending action. In this instance it was evidently of the highest importance that Mondel should occupy the Capellenberg, in order to fulfil his orders. His dispositions seem to have been good, for his adversary was unable to debouch in force from the town.

Then the Prussians resorted to their usual flanking attacks. Instantly impression was made; and Gablenz, acting wisely, as his supports were far behind, ceded the position, valuable as it was, rather than subject himself to defeat isolated. It is difficult to understand why Grivicic did not arrive before 2.30, or why he did not leave his headquarters earlier. On arrival, he was at once pushed into action in two lines, a direct attack

upon eight Prussian infantry battalions, well posted, supported by one battery. He was repulsed, as a matter of course ; for though the Austrians got within fifty yards of their assailants, they were literally mowed down, and, endeavouring to fire, failed, broke, and turned. The second attempt was supported by a flanking detachment of one battalion, a half-squadron of cavalry, and two guns, and was instantly effective.

In the proposed passage of a defile, the first consideration is, the constitution of the advanced-guard. When three roads converge, as in the present instance, the general advance may well be furnished by one division as disposed by Bonin. The other columns would only provide for their own security.

Now it is clearly advisable that the general advance should be strong enough to clear the further end of the defile, and to effect a covering lodgment without delaying the march of the corps.

At the same time, the distance between this advance and the main body should not be so great as to subject the former to possible defeat before it can be reinforced.

Clearly, therefore, very precise instructions should be given to the commander of the advance. All information which has reached headquarters with regard to the enemy should be placed at his disposal, and when the *débouché*, as in the present instance, is complicated by the necessary passage of a river and town, the ground should be very carefully studied, by plan, in advance.

But as all study by plan is necessarily incomplete, the excellent practice has been introduced in the Prussian staff, of examining personally, territory which is liable to become a future theatre of war.

The information which Bonin possessed was to the effect that cavalry only watched the passes leading into Bohemia, and that no preparations whatever had been made to obstruct the roads.

Further, he was distinctly ordered to occupy Trautenau, as a preliminary step to debouching with his corps from the Aupa bridge into the roads leading to the Upper Elbe, which formed his ultimate destination.

The character of the ground south of the Aupa about Trau-

tenau is sufficiently visible on an ordinary map for purposes of operation. In the Prussian staff maps it was most clearly and exactly shown.

It was thus of the last importance to secure the Capellenberg before it could be occupied in force. Assuming that the general character of the manœuvre had not been as yet penetrated by the Austrian commander, it was not probable that, in the first instance, Trautenau would be occupied by more than a standing post, such as that at Nachod.

As a matter of fact, it was not occupied either by infantry or artillery.

The effort, therefore, should have been made to surprise the post; and this would have been best effected by pushing the advanced-guard down the principal defile on the preceding evening,—a step taken by Steinmetz on the other road.

This was the more necessary, as the massing of troops at Liebau must necessarily have been observed by the Austrian vedettes on the 26th, and their reports would certainly summon reinforcements of infantry and artillery, if any such were within reach.

Considering the character of the enterprise, and the importance of the lodgment on the south bank of the Aupa, it would perhaps have been well not to have weakened the advanced-guard by detaching from it to the Altstadt valley, but rather to have added to its power by attaching a third battery. The detachment might have been furnished from the main body of the 1st division, and the greater portion of the corps artillery have been distributed well forward towards the head of the main column.

This precaution is necessary, inasmuch as, if resistance is found, it is certain that, without artillery, the necessary progress cannot be made; and if the artillery is in the rear of the infantry column in the defile, difficulty and delay will ensue in drawing it to the front.

Few of these precautions were taken by Bonin. He did not attempt to gain possession of Trautenau by surprise. He left ample time for his adversary to report his presence at headquarters, and for dispositions to be effected from Josephstadt which might seriously interfere with the success of his enter-

prise. He did not push his advanced-guard sufficiently forward even on the 27th, and dividing properly his command for the purpose of movement, he strangely miscalculated the duration of the march of the respective columns, so that the *gros* of the 2d division reached Parschnitz before the advance, entirely exposed, during its halt, on its left flank, if the Katzauer Berg had been occupied.

During the earliest phase of the action, it was exceedingly difficult for Bonin to bring either cavalry or artillery into play, owing to the command possessed by the Austrian fire on the Capellenberg. He properly, therefore, turned his attention to other means, and directed Clausewitz to cross the Aupa at Parschnitz.

The movement soon produced its effect, and the Austrians fell back.

Gablentz arrived at 11, and immediately after, the retreat, by his direction, commenced. From that moment until 3 P.M. Bonin was master of the situation.

It seems natural that, as his leading battalions pressed the Austrian rear, he should have seized the opportunity to push out his cavalry and artillery from the defiles. He did nothing of the kind ; his cavalry (21 squadrons) were not of the slightest service in furnishing information as to the retreat of the enemy, or arrival of reinforcements. Of 96 guns, 24 only were brought into action on the south bank of the Aupa.

Such generalship is entirely in accord with the refusal of Hiller's (Guard corps) assistance. It is not sufficient to take anything for granted in war. Truth must be searched for by every possible means ; and ample means were in Bonin's hands.

It is specially noted that the tactical order of the Prussian companies was lost during the advance from the Aupa.

This was owing partly to the convergence of the three roads at Trautenau, partly to Clausewitz's difficult march across the Katzauer Berg, and principally to the character of the ground on which the action was fought.

The Prussians urge that it influenced the leadership of the subsequent engagement, as may well be conceived. But during the four hours' interval there seems to have been an oppor-

tunity for correcting this to a far greater extent than occurred. The want of a guiding hand is visible in the bearing of the Prussian troops when Gablenz returned to the charge, with every advantage of ground and weapons, but inferior in artillery, and caused 15 battalions in all to vacate their ground. Their loss, compared to the Austrian casualties, was trifling; but excuse is found in the heat, marching, outpost duty, &c.

Turning to the Austrians, we see that, from his advanced position at Prausnitz, Mondel's brigade constituted the natural advance of Gablenz's corps.

Probably, as the latter was called in late to Josephstadt, his orders did not reach Mondel till early on the morning of the 27th, so that that general could not well move off earlier than he did—i.e., at 6. His object evidently was to reach Trautenau as rapidly as possible, or rather, the heights which command it.

His halt at Hohenbruck is the first point which attracts attention.

The duty of the commander of an advance is, at once without any delay, to occupy such points of ground as may possibly prove of value during an ensuing action, on coming into collision.

He reached Hohenbruck exactly as Clausewitz reached Parschnitz, and had that general's instructions entitled him to move, he would probably have succeeded in anticipating Mondel on the Capellenberg.

It is of instant importance—now more than ever—that, on such occasions, no time should be lost. The defensive power of the breech-loader is such, that it is exceedingly difficult to drive troops once in possession of a decisive tactical point from their vantage-ground. Moreover, the day for forming exact and regular order of battle is past. The order of a fighting line is determined in very great extent by the ground. Cover and concealment is the object both in attack and defence, and formations and distances must give way to the primary consideration of the destructiveness of fire.

The tendency is still, in armies which have not experienced this, to underrate it; and it is impossible not to recognise that the excessive losses incurred by the Austrians in this cam-

paign on every field were due, first, to the tactical instructions issued from headquarters, and secondly, to the want of flexibility in the formations adopted.

It was a piece of good generalship on the part of Gablenz to withdraw Mondel, and to abandon ground of such important tactical value, reckoning upon reinforcement and counter-stroke,—illustrating that in many cases the same principles pervade strategy and tactics.

The brigades as they came up were brought quickly and well into action, considering that one and all had executed a considerable march before fighting. There is no doubt that the march of these brigades might have been better conceived. Probably the time at disposal for issuing orders was short, and perhaps material wanting.

An error appears to have prevailed in Grivicic's movement from Jaromir, and, as he was to head the column, to have reacted on the other brigades. His tardy march at 10 o'clock, under the circumstances, must attract every one's attention.

Before, during, and after the engagement, Gablenz called the attention of the headquarter staff to the exposure of his right flank. The orders issued on the 26th protected his left, which was threatened by no danger. Gablenz's hardly-earned victory increased the precarious character of the position of his corps; and, on the following day, he had to pay the penalty of the blindness and obstinacy of his superiors.

The central of the three passages through the mountains had been used by the Prussian Guard corps, which, after crossing the frontier, divided,—the 1st division marching by way of Starkstadt upon Eipel, the 2d through Pölitz upon Kosteletz. A glance at the map suffices to explain the extreme value of this well-timed movement. As a matter of fact, both Hiller and Plonsky, the divisional commanders, were each in a position to co-operate either at Nachod or Trautenau on the 27th of June. Hiller's services were offered to Bonin at a period of the day when that general saw no reason to expect a reverse, and were consequently declined. Prince Württemberg, who accompanied Plonsky's division, was unable to penetrate the veil presented by the retreating Austrian cavalry; and, anxious for the safety

of his own advance, he neglected to make similar overtures to Steinmetz, or Ramming's defeat must have been still more disastrous. On the evening of the 27th of June, both divisions encamped on the banks of the Aupa, without having been anywhere engaged during that day.

On the 28th of June, at half-past seven in the morning, Ramming was relieved by the 8th corps, commanded by Archduke Leopold, and fell back towards Trebesow. Two brigades of Festiti's 4th corps were at the same time pushed forward to Dolan in rear of Ramming. The Archduke's instructions directed him to remain in position until two o'clock in the afternoon, "in case the enemy should attack," and after that hour to fall back towards Josephstadt. According to Austrian accounts, the Archduke had already commenced his retrograde movement when Steinmetz attacked him, whilst Ramming had carried his shattered corps too far to the rear to share in the action which ensued. Certain it is that the Archduke suffered a very severe defeat. Forced from his original position, he fell back upon Skalitz endeavouring to defend the town, which Steinmetz, reinforced by one brigade of the 6th corps, and a detachment of the Guard from Kosteletz, triumphantly carried by four o'clock in the afternoon.

The Austrians, utterly routed, retired upon Josephstadt with a loss of 11,000 men, killed, wounded, and missing. The loss inflicted on the Prussians—the attacking force—does not appear to have exceeded 1300 men. After his victory, Steinmetz bivouacked upon the battle-field.

Benedek had left Skalitz about noon, before the action had commenced, and was still under the impression that only small bodies of the enemy were before him. He reached Josephstadt at 1.30, and received reports from Skalitz and Miletin of the turn of events; but, being still intent upon marching on the Iser, his dispositions were issued accordingly.

But the report received at 8 P.M. on the 28th, from the 10th corps, caused doubts as to the practicability of the march on the Iser to arise at length at the Austrian headquarters.

The troops were too exhausted for the exertion required of them, and the march was abandoned, the old concentration on Miletin being reordered; so that the Crown Prince of Saxony

was finally directed by telegram to fall back, and form a junction with the main army.

On the same 28th June, Gablenz sustained a reverse, which proved as decisive as that of Leopold. On the previous evening he had left General Grivicic with 7000 men in possession of Trautenau, and proceeded himself to effect a change of front to his right in accordance with Benedek's order received during the night, to engage what Prussian troops he might find between Bonin and Steinmetz, and thus effect a diversion in favour of Archduke Leopold at Skalitz. He was to be reinforced by the Fleischhacker brigade of the 4th corps, which, marching from Königinhof, moved by mistake to Ober-Prausnitz, west of that town. The defeat of Bonin had been reported to the Crown Prince at Kosteletz on the night of the 27th. He instantly made his dispositions for falling upon Gablenz's right flank with both divisions of the Guard. At daybreak on the 28th they moved, one upon Staudenz, the other upon Prausnitz, and fell upon Gablenz, whose columns were not yet ordered, with great vigour. A series of actions ensued, along a very extended line, at Alt Rognitz, Staudenz, and Soer, in all of which the Austrians, continually out-flanked, were worsted, and ultimately driven back upon Königinhof.

On this day Gablenz lost upwards of 4000 men killed and wounded, and an equal number of prisoners,—these last principally belonging to Grivicic's brigade, the retreat of which from Trautenau was necessarily intercepted. The Prussians, on the other hand, effected this important success at the comparatively trifling cost of 25 officers and 800 privatea. That same evening, Bonin, who had taken no part in the action, was ordered up through Trautenau to Arnau, in order to gain possession of the passage of the Elbe at that important point.

The retreat of Gablenz upon Königinhof, as also that of the Archduke Leopold upon Josephstadt, was covered by the brigades detached for that purpose from the 4th Austrian corps. These were rapidly pushed aside, on the 29th June, by Steinmetz at Schweinschädel, and by the Guard at Königinhof, in both of which actions the Austrians sustained further severe loss. Late on the 29th, Steinmetz halted at

Grädlitz, the Guard at Königinhof, and Bonin at Arnau, whilst Mutius was coming up by the same road which had been used by Steinmetz. The result of the three days' fighting was, that the Crown Prince successfully carried his army from the frontier to the Elbe, in such manner that his extreme right was now within one day's march of Gitschin, his objective point. In effecting this, moreover, he had inflicted signal defeat upon four of the six army corps which his adversary could dispose of to oppose him—an important service towards the general objects of the campaign.

The Crown Prince of Prussia has been credited by competent judges with considerable military talent for the intelligence and vigour displayed in the execution of these operations. His concentration towards the frontier must have been very skilfully conducted, in order to escape the vigilance of his adversary. The various devices by which it was successfully concealed, no doubt contributed largely towards the ultimate issue of the campaign. The dispositions for the passage of his columns through the difficult mountain passes evince much judgment, being admirably adapted to the several contingencies he might be called upon to meet. Nor can it be denied that, once through the mountains, the forward movement of his entire line was pressed with great resolution, and with perfect appreciation of the value of time. In the face of the great numerical superiority he might be called upon to encounter—a probability recognised at the headquarters of the Silesian army—the value of his dispositions for the action of the 5th corps and the Guard, on the 28th June, in the general interests of the campaign, cannot be overestimated. They were simply decisive. With the exception of Bonin, he was admirably supported by his subordinates, more especially by Steinmetz, upon whom the brunt of the movement devolved. The capacity of a commander, again, is often tested by his personal conduct under circumstances of emergency. On the 27th of June, the Crown Prince was at Nachod directing the advance of his heaviest column. On the 28th, he superintended the movements of the Guard, which reversed the success achieved by Gablenz on the preceding day. On the 29th, he met Bonin at Trautenau in order to regulate the

retarded action of the 1st corps, and on the same evening established his headquarters in the centre of his reconcentrated army.

Nevertheless, it will be held that the Prince was singularly favoured by circumstances. To find the defiles, through which his long trains had to wend their way, undefended, was in itself a great alleviation of the task intrusted to him. This point gained, the configuration of the frontier—jutting up in the direction of Braunau—singularly assisted the unopposed advance of his central columns, the flanking action of these contributing most opportunely to the security of his march along the principal avenues. By this means the solitary triumph resulting to the Austrians was turned to their signal disadvantage. Above all, the confidence shown by the Prussian commander must have rested on the just appreciation of the immeasurable superiority which his infantry soldiers derived from their possession of the needle-rifle. To have marred, or equalised, the effect of this weapon, the development of superior force was indeed necessary on the part of his adversary.

The dispositions effected by Benedek to meet this movement of the Crown Prince indicate, as has been already remarked, that he was utterly unaware of its character. It has been argued that, standing on the defensive for the purpose of solving the strategical problem which presented itself, the one thing indispensable to the Austrian commander was, early and correct intelligence of his enemy's operations. To obtain this, every nerve should have been strained. This end is ordinarily effected in war by the free expenditure of money, and by the constant use of light troops led by intelligent and thoroughly trained officers. Probably neither of these agencies had in the present instance been sufficiently employed. The secrecy in which the Prussian plans were shrouded, and the rapidity with which they were executed, may have rendered the first of these sources useless. But it is impossible not to perceive that the outpost duties of the Austrian army must have been very inefficiently performed. The truth is, that the cavalry officers upon whom this trust devolved were deficient in the special scientific training which could alone qualify them

to estimate and report fully upon the circumstances which presented themselves. The reports forwarded to Josephstadt from Nachod and Braunau on the 26th of June, were evidently altogether inadequate to convince the Austrian general of his danger. As a consequence, the first dispositions of the Austrian general were faulty, admitting, as the events proved, of no subsequent remedy. The orders which despatched Ramming and Gablenz unsupported to the frontiers cannot be justified. To probe the presumed demonstration, the force diverted was unnecessarily large; to meet serious invasion, altogether inadequate, and dangerously exposed on the inward flanks. The measure would seem to indicate a conflict of opinion at Austrian headquarters—a surmise strengthened by the subsequent removal of the chief of the staff from his post. The result was proportionably disastrous. By the time the true character of the Crown Prince's movements was correctly appreciated at Austrian headquarters, both Ramming and Gablenz had sustained losses which paralysed their action for several days to come. The reports of Ramming's defeat and of Gablenz's victory on the 27th of June, do not appear to have enlightened the Austrian general, inasmuch as a despatch, which must have been subsequently written, was addressed to and received by the Crown Prince of Saxony at noon on the 29th of June, at first directing him to hold his ground at Gitschin, and promising reinforcements by the 3d corps for that day. Evidently the advance of the Prussian Guard by Pölitz and Starkstadt was still unexplained at Austrian headquarters; otherwise it was impossible to have left Gablenz exposed to the attack to which he necessarily succumbed.

It has been argued that it was still in the Austrian general's power, on the night of the 27th of June, to have assembled a force at Skalitz on the morning of the 28th, which must have sufficed to have crushed Steinmetz. A close consideration of circumstances would barely endorse this view. The engagement of the previous day had completely crippled Ramming's corps for further action on the 28th; his soldiers were not only beaten but demoralised by their very severe loss. The other troops available for that day were the 8th corps which relieved Ramming, and the 4th corps, from which at least two

brigades had been detached to support Gablenz on the Trautenau road, and to guard the passages of the Elbe. The 2d corps only reached Opocno, twelve miles from Skalitz, on the afternoon of the 28th; and the 3d corps was still held at Miletin, for the purpose which has already been mentioned. Considering the experience obtained on the 27th, together with the want of connection between his several corps, it would therefore certainly have been more prudent in the Austrian general to have withdrawn his forces at once to the south bank of the Elbe in the position of Königinhof. The difficulty of adequately supporting both Ramming and Gablenz, on lines exterior to the enemy, with the troops he held in hand, was insuperable; whilst the numerical superiority which might certainly have been enlisted against Steinmetz was insufficient to counteract the needle-rifle and the prestige of recent victory.

The difficulties of the Austrian commander must be traced, independent of tactical causes, to his entire misappreciation of the purpose of the second Prussian army, and to his general erroneous reading of the Prussian plan.

On the 30th, actual communication was effected between the armies, and the 1st army advanced beyond Gitschin; but the 2d, though disturbed by an Austrian battery on the heights beyond the Elbe, did not break up its bivouacs.

The Austrian army was falling back on both flanks, to the field on which the result of the campaign was to be decided. Strategical efforts were no longer possible—the result now depended on tactical considerations only. Clam's defeat, and consequent retreat from Gitschin, had forced Benedek to provide for his own safety; for his flank was now exposed to the attack of the 1st army, and his communications with Königgratz and Pardubitz were endangered. With great difficulty, owing to the state of the few roads at his disposal, he succeeded in effecting the change of front which would enable him to meet his new peril. Pivoting with his right upon the Elbe, between the two fortresses, he wheeled his large army, by a very skilful effort, back into line, across the Horwitz-Königgratz road, covered on his front by the river Bistritz, and with both flanks thrown back towards the Elbe. In this

31 June
position, the occupation of which was only completed late on the night of the ~~28~~ of ~~June~~, the old officer turned to bay against his hungry foes, determined to sell his existence for no mean price.

On the 1st July these movements were completed, and the 1st army made a further short advance towards the Bistritz.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PRECEDING OPERATIONS.

Startling, indeed, was the effect of the intelligence of the Prussian victories upon the neutral peoples of Europe. Popularly attributed, in the first instance, to the murderous destructiveness of the needle-rifle, it was nevertheless soon recognised that other causes must have largely contributed to these Austrian defeats. Though doubts were naturally raised as to Benedek's qualifications for his post, it soon became evident that the true reason for that general's studied inaction must be sought in the potent considerations dependent upon numerical inferiority. This same Prussia—which had overrun Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, occupied Saxony, and seized the Elbe Duchies, which was hovering about the Maine, and demonstrating from the banks of the Rhine—had actually succeeded in developing forces superior to any which could be mustered by Austria in defence of her own soil. Such reflections naturally led to the palpable conclusion that this last Power had once again invited defeat, by wilfully closing her eyes to the necessities of the situation. Why had she not at once and with good grace ceded Venetia?

There can be little doubt but that the inability of the Empire to sustain the double war was recognised by more than one of the Kaiser's advisers, and that the early cession of that province had formed the subject of long deliberation. From information which had reached the Imperial Government it seemed certain, however, that the moment when this step might have been taken with great advantage had now passed away. Retreat from Italy would no longer pacify Victor Emmanuel, who had already entered into engagements with Prussia, which precluded neutrality on his part, in case

prudential measures should find favour at Vienna. If this conclusion—confirmed as it would seem to be by subsequent events—was just, the military position offered by the possession of the Quadrilateral was certainly more favourable than any other which could be attained by the withdrawal of the Austro-Italian forces behind the mountain screens. It was not only that the frontier might, for reasons purely military, be there best defended, but the evacuation of Frioul would have opened the door to Italian enterprise in the direction of Hungary, provoking formidable, perhaps fatal, insurrection in that kingdom. The only escape from this danger must then have been sought in a renewal of that Russian alliance which had already proved so distasteful to the Austrian peoples in 1849. It is surprising, indeed, that during the two years succeeding the Danish war, in which the aggressive tendencies of Prussia were so plainly visible, Austrian statesmen should not have provided for the eventuality which had since occurred.

The logical consequence of diplomatic improvidence was found, at the crisis, in a false military situation from which it was difficult to escape. It has been seen that the configuration of the Saxon-Silesian frontier is such as to render offensive action on the part of Austria, in a war with Prussia, almost a matter of necessity. We have further argued that the successful invasion of Prussian territory could only be expected from a plan of operations which admitted the possibility of the double advance through Saxony and Silesia. For this purpose the immediate resources which Austria could command were altogether inadequate, so that her chances of ultimate victory depended entirely upon the want of enterprise, or miscalculation of his instant advantages, by her adversary. It would indeed appear that the conviction had gained ground in the Austrian councils, that the military aims of Prussia would be sufficiently attained by the occupation of those German States, the acquisition of which had so long formed the object of her foreign policy. There is evidence, as will presently be seen, to show that the invasion of her own territories by Prussian armies was not anticipated in the first instance by Austria. Possibly she calculated, too, upon early victory on the banks of the Mincio, sufficiently deci-

sive to force the Italian monarch to quit the field, and to enable the Archduke to transfer his picked battalions to the Bohemian theatre.

Such expectations could only rest upon the assumption that Prussia was not prepared to wage a war of extremity, or to risk the advantages which had been necessarily ceded to her, in a hazardous offensive campaign. Although her own weakness must have been well appreciated by Austria, it was not anticipated that the opening in her armour would so soon be penetrated by her enemy. With marked improvidence she consequently neglected those obvious measures which were best suited to facilitate the defence of her frontiers.

Embracing the entire theatre of military operations in one view, it would first seem that the very fact that Benedek was forced for the time to stand on the defensive in Bohemia should have dictated vigorous defensive action on the part of the formidable armies already assembled on the Maine. In order to carry offensive war into Bohemia, unquestionably a very severe effort was demanded from Prussia, which must have necessitated the exposure of more than one point in her line. To have struck these, whether at Leipzig or Cassel, or both simultaneously, would have at once relieved Benedek of the weight inflicted by superior numbers—adverse to his early strategy, and fatal on his final battle-field.

The most ordinary forethought, again, would appear to have demanded the artificial obstruction of certain roads which an adversary might use for the purpose of invasion. The recognised means for opposing the debouch of separated hostile columns through mountain defiles are of very old standing. They consist principally in the occupation of interior positions with concentrated force. The difficulty presented by this operation is, to bring this force to bear upon the point desired at the right moment, and is greater or less according to the distance which separates the mountain issues from each other. The time required for this purpose is gained by the use of retarding forces, more especially with a view to obstruct the advance of that portion of the enemy's columns which it is not intended seriously to defeat. In the present instance, it is clear that the Crown Prince's army should have formed

the main objective of Benedek's defensive-offensive measures. It was desirable, therefore, that the second army should be allowed to debouch into the open country in order that the opportunity of crushing it might be found. For this reason the Nachod and Trautenau passes were rightly left comparatively open. It was only requisite that the interior issues from the mountains should be sufficiently guarded to enlist the necessary time for the Austrian commander to bring up his masses. The amount of resistance offered by such detachments would therefore be dependent upon the time required for Benedek's concentration. It will be observed at once that, though theoretically easy, the successful execution of the operation in question is really reliant upon various minor circumstances, especially upon the discriminating action of the officers in command of the retarding divisions. It is seldom, indeed, that the plan of a commander-in-chief is sufficiently penetrated by his subordinate officers for the conduct of these to be entirely in concert with it. The local circumstances of action, the excitement and attractions of the battle-field to those engaged, the burning desire to conquer, the sense of humiliation experienced in retreat, where its purpose is not appreciated, are all influences which render the task of a general intrusted with this detached responsibility one of exceeding delicacy and difficulty. Though Benedek had selected his two best officers, Ramming and Gablenz, for the purpose—for both had held high rank on the Austrian staff in previous wars, and were men of tried firmness and of great experience—it is evident from the way in which the actions were fought on the 27th of June, that Benedek was in doubt as to his adversary's intentions when the Crown Prince crossed the frontier. His dispositions, consequently, on the Silesian side, were neither effected in sufficient time nor did they apparently comply with all strategical demands; while on the more distant portion of the theatre, traces of haste, and even of surprise, are not wanting.

To Clam, as already seen, was intrusted the important duty of checking the advance of the 1st and Elbe armies, whilst Benedek concentrated.

The appointment of this officer—whose shortcomings at Magenta, in 1859, are already matter of history—to command at all, had elicited much comment in Austria. To select him for the execution of a duty upon which the main operation in great part depended for success, seems wilfully to have provoked the frowns of Fortune. The line which this general actually defended was that of the Iser, where the roads at last debouch from the mountains into tolerably open country. It was here that, by the Prussian plan of operations, correctly based upon the configuration of the ground, the columns of Herwarth and Prince Frederick Charles, numbering in all 120,000 soldiers, were to deploy and to unite. The task of defending a river-line from twelve to fifteen miles in extent, with 55,000 men, in the face of forces so superior, would tax the resources of a more able man than Clam had hitherto proved himself to be. In the present instance, this difficulty seems almost self-imposed. The ground which Clam should have defended was to be found at Niemes, at Gabel and Friedland, every inch of which, with proper skill, might surely have been turned to good and valuable account. Victory was not his aim, nor the infliction of defeat his present purpose. What Benedek demanded from his firmness and intelligence was Time—a day or two, perhaps but a few hours. To gain this, Clam should have summoned to his aid the utmost resources of engineering science. It was for him to remedy, by personal exertion, the want of forethought which had left these Zittau passes open. Possessing great personal influence with the agricultural population, about to fight for the defence of soil which actually in part belonged to himself, it would seem that, whatever his earlier military deficiencies in previous campaigns, some qualifications for his present post at least existed. His knowledge of the ground should surely have enabled him to select the successive positions where a stand could be made. With unlimited command of labour, and with soldiers recruited from these same districts, purposely selected for his command with a view to enlist every incentive which might aid in stimulating their action, it seems strange indeed that the Austrian general should have failed so miserably. The only escape from the responsibility

which attaches itself to Count Clam must be sought in the possible fact that the orders which despatched him to his destination were issued too late for this to be reached in sufficient time for his purpose. This opinion was not shared by his superior, who, with pardonable severity, at once deprived him of his command. The motives which have since induced the Emperor, on the close of the inquiry instituted, honourably to recognise the services of an officer whose apparent deficiencies have twice within seven years contributed to the disasters of his armies, must nevertheless be based on some substantial ground.

It seems, indeed, improbable that the Austrian commander should have persisted in the execution of his proposed movement on Miletin, were Clam's arrival at his proper destination in the mountain-gorges a matter of physical impossibility. The damning fact that four hot summer days sufficed to carry the encumbered masses of the enemy through fifty miles of defile, capable of unlimited defence, remains to be explained away. Either Clam was unfit for his task, or the time left for its execution was insufficient for the purpose.

Again, on the Silesian frontier the actions fought at Trautenau, Soor, Nachod, and Skalitz, indicate either that the Austrian generals there in command allowed themselves to be too deeply involved in those engagements, or that obstinate resistance on their part was indispensably necessary to enable Benedek to find the time to bring up his other army corps. Ordinarily the duty of officers similarly situated is simply to make a display, as often as the ground permits, of purposed resistance. In each instance an enemy is thus compelled to halt, in order to make those dispositions for attack which invariably entail the loss of valuable time. Further delay is occasioned by breaking up the roads, destroying bridges, defending villages, woods, or field-works hastily erected for the temporary purpose. Under no circumstance can it be the purpose of a commander seriously to engage, unless he finds himself in a position of decided superiority, for the obvious reason that he invites defeat, and consequent demoralisation of those troops which will soon be required to

take their part in the impending general action. Probably it was Benedek's desire that Ramming and Gablenz should hold their ground sufficiently long to enable him to concentrate in their rear on the left bank of the Elbe. If this was his intention, he certainly appears to have again miscalculated the time which he could command. Further, he would seem to have neglected the avenues of approach which enabled the Guard marching from Braunau to bring their doubly flanking fire to bear with such decisive results at Skalitz and at Trautau. The consequence of this omission was, that both Ramming and Gablenz, with the corps brought up for their support, experienced very serious losses, entailing great disorder and demoralisation in retreat. Of the six army corps which were subsequently concentrated in rear of the Elbe, between Josephstadt and Dubernetz, four (the 10th, 6th, 8th, and 4th) were thus suffering from the baneful effects of recent defeat. During the action at Skalitz on the 28th of June, where Ramming and the Archduke Leopold were sufficiently superior to Steinmetz to justify reasonable expectation of victory, Benedek apparently attributed the contrary results to the incapacity of the Imperial Prince, who, with all consideration for his rank, was also removed from his command on the plea of illness. It was understood both in Austria and elsewhere that Benedek, fully alive to the responsibility attached to secondary command in the field, had stipulated expressly for the appointment of his own officers. How, then, can the apparent contradiction of fact, that two Archdukes and three other commanders, high in social influence, but of recognised military mediocrity, were placed at the head of his army corps, be reconciled? Rigid adherence to the system of seniority, and extreme deference to aristocratic rank, have long been recognised amongst the leading causes of Austria's disasters—causes which all Benedek's influence, supported by the voice of his army, proved powerless to remove.

Of the many circumstances connected with these interesting operations, one more remains for special consideration. It will be recollected that Clam lost his position on the Iser on the 28th of June. On that day Benedek's converging movement, completed on the 30th, had already commenced. Presuming

that the report of Clam's reverses reached him during the night of the 28th-29th, how, recollecting the simultaneous defeats of the 10th and 6th corps, must his persistence in designs which were henceforth deprived of all solid foundation be accounted for? Could reasonable dependence be placed upon the power of Clam, with shattered regiments, to defend his last position at Gitschin against forces which numbered more than twice his own? Obviously with that general's discomfiture on the Iser the Austrian plan collapsed, its object of forward concentration being no longer feasible. Instead, therefore, of advancing his columns to Josephstadt and Dubernetz, Benedek should at once have reversed their direction, placing them for the time at least in safety, under cover of the Elbe, between Königgratz and Pardubitz. By missing this opportunity the Austrian general soon found his position desperate. No sooner had the 2d Prussian army effected its latest success at Gitschin, than instant retreat under very unfavourable circumstances became urgently necessary. To carry 200,000 soldiers, with insufficient roads, safely across the Elbe, was no longer possible. That enemy, who had already shown such intimate knowledge of war, now close at hand, would assuredly attack him whilst the river divided his forces. Better far boldly to face this new and pressing danger from the west, trusting to his own brave spirit and to the God of battles for the issue.

Many writers have vehemently denounced the incapacity displayed by Benedek in the operations thus criticised. Why, they ask, was Saxony not occupied in sufficient time? Why were the frontier defiles left open to the enemy? Why, lastly, did Benedek select this fatal field of Sadowa for his last despairing effort? If these questions have not been answered in favour of the Austrian general, it is because his errors were due as much to the want of a genial appreciation of the military situation at first, as to the mistakes of his subordinate leaders.

The extraordinary vigour and ability displayed by his adversary, the startling effects of the needle-rifle, then the seeming incapacity of more than one of his generals, co-operated to defeat his ends. The fault, which must be charged

to Benedek's responsibility, consists in the obstinate pursuit of an object which these causes had early contributed to defeat. The skill and resolution with which it was sought to retrieve this last false step must nevertheless strike a sympathetic chord in every soldier's breast.

Strangely different were the circumstances under which Prussia unsheathed her sword in this aggressive war. If further evidence of her long-cherished designs against Austria were desired, this may soon be found in the study devoted to the military preparation of her Silesian province. Glancing at the map, the eye first falls upon the line of railway which stretches from Görlitz in the west, through the heart of the province, away to Cracow and the Austro-Galician borders. From this railway basis various branches to Ratibor, to Neisse, Glatz, and Landshut, are projected towards the Austrian frontier line. The three first-named fortresses form part of a system which is completed by the larger arsenals, Schweidnitz and Breslau. Altogether they constitute a group of fortifications well calculated to form the base of offensive operations directed against Austria. As already explained, the character of the Austrian railway system would seem to increase the advantages of position which a Prussian army, thus based, would possess.

Now, in addition to this superiority of position, it will be recollected that the peculiar character of her military organisation enabled Prussia to enter the field with large preponderance of numbers. By this double agency she enlisted in her favour the vast advantage of the strategic initiative. That is to say, she secured to herself the opportunity of executing her own well-matured plan, whilst her adversary was forced to stand on the defensive against aims which were carefully concealed from him. The first prize of this combination, in connection with the Bohemian theatre, was Saxony, and the possession of that kingdom facilitated the further invasion of Bohemia. The difficulty attached to this operation, so well known from earlier experience, was now diminished by two important circumstances: the offensive action of the Austrian commander, in the direction of the Zittau passes, would necessarily be paralysed, for the time being, by the attitude of the

Crown Prince; whilst the danger attending the temporary separation of the Prussian armies would be considerably reduced by the agency of the electric telegraph.

The first great object appeared to be, to carry the 1st army with great rapidity to the banks of the Iser. This effected, the further success of the operation was tolerably secure. With great celerity, the reconcentration of the Prussian divisions, which had spread throughout Saxony, was therefore effected, and then the frontier was crossed at once. It has been suggested that this Prussian operation would have been exposed to less danger, in execution, had both Prussian armies, avoiding separation, marched by the roads which lead from Dresden, Lobau, and Görlitz into Bohemia. But in order to effect this, the second Prussian army must have abandoned those valuable positions in Silesia, which had, indirectly, already rendered such important service. This movement would not only have relieved Benedek from the incubus under which he had hitherto laboured, but the intentions of his adversary would thereby have been fully exposed to him. The more, indeed, the Prussian plan is studied, the more would it seem to comply with all the requirements of military art. In it are embodied the imperishable doctrines which the genial spirit of Clausewitz bequeathed to his admiring countrymen. Military system, the preparation of the theatre of war, the advantage of the initiative, the moral influence of early success, the value of true selection of the objective, secrecy of purpose, and extreme vigour of execution in war, are all subjects which his masterly pen had more or less exhausted. Never, perhaps, in the history of nations has the value of theoretical accomplishments been so clearly illustrated as in this short but decisive Prussian campaign. It would seem, indeed, as though the actual experience of war, hitherto deemed of such intrinsic value, were now largely compensated for by careful intellectual study. Certain it is, that to the admirable training, and consequently correct appreciation of her officers, the organisation, the arms, the direction of the Prussian army may be truly traced; and further, that to the speedy appreciation of these advantages

by her educated peoples was also due that moral elation which soon insured their victory.

Taken from a tactical point of view, these operations present many objects of interest. First in order is the influence apparently to be assigned to the effects of the needle-rifle. By a singular coincidence, the same Austrian soldiers who, during the Danish war, had earned for themselves the honourable title of the "Iron Brigade," were first brought into serious collision with their *quondam* allies at Podol, on the banks of the Iser. The engagement in question was very obstinately disputed, and terminated in the entire discomfiture of Poschaker's brigade.

During the action, the Austrian battalions repeatedly endeavoured to close with their adversaries, but the Prussians stood firm, and the effect of their withering fire soon established that confidence in their own arm which was never diminished during the remainder of the campaign. Conversely, the defeat of this picked Austrian brigade was at once attributed by the sufferers to the irresistible fire which wasted their ranks. Since the Italian war, when Napoleon III. declared that "arms of precision were only dangerous at a distance," it had been the endeavour of Austria to imitate the tactics to which she attributed her own defeat. If the uniform success of the French in 1859 had established the trustworthiness of the Emperor's theory, how much more necessary must it now be to arrive at close quarters, where precision was accompanied by unusual rapidity of fire?

The more recent experiences of the American war would seem indeed to have excited but little interest in Austria. Could it really be reasonably expected that Austrian soldiers should effect what American generals had long discarded as no longer to be attained? The advocacy of the bayonet, so loudly proclaimed in Austrian circles, would surely have elicited a contemptuous smile from the veterans of the army of the Potomac. During three years of war, but 143 cases of bayonet-wounds were treated in the Northern hospitals; of these, but two-thirds were received in action, and six only proved eventually fatal. How then could it be imagined that tactics,

which had already failed against the common rifle, where infantry displayed the most ordinary firmness, should now prevail against the Prussian breech-loaders? The manner in which these naked Austrian battalions were ignorantly flung against the murderous fire of the enemy, soon produced the results which every novice in the art of war will readily anticipate. Even under cover, the dread of the Prussian weapon soon became such, that, as the enemy approached, the Austrian infantry either broke or surrendered. To this cause is chiefly attributable the otherwise unaccountable number of prisoners which fell into the hands of the Prussians. Fifteen thousand soldiers had thrown away their arms before Benedek had formed his army for his final effort. That the needle-rifle contributed largely to the demoralisation, and consequently severe defeats, of the Austrian corps in these early engagements, no one can doubt who is conversant with the circumstances of the campaign. The other disadvantages under which the Austrian chief was called upon to act, might certainly have yet been remedied, had the army succeeded in asserting its fighting superiority. When this last hope vanished in the first engagement, its cause was lost.

With strange infatuation the system to which most officers have since directed their attention—pressing as the necessity for its adoption would seem to have been—was altogether ignored. In no single instance, much as they were favoured by the ground, did the Austrian generals consider it necessary to cover their line with those breastworks which were so freely used in the American war. In a lecture, full of practical instruction, delivered by General Morris of the United States army, at the United Service Institution, the following paragraph is well worthy of the attention of every military student:—

“During the more recent campaigns, breastworks were thrown up at every general halt; these were found of such important service, that they have become a part of the general system in the management of an army. They gave such strength to positions, that no general would attack troops behind works, even though slight, if there were any way in which they could be turned. Sherman’s march to Atlanta,

and Meade's to the James river, were conducted on these principles.

"A remarkable instance of the strength given to a position by the use of the spade and axe was the battle of Franklin. Hood's determination to destroy Schofield before he could reach Nashville led to the terrible slaughter at that place. And although Hood's army threw itself upon Schofield's with a bravery and a devotion to their cause and leader which excited the highest admiration of our men, even amid the excitement and perils of that fierce struggle, yet his killed and wounded were piled up in front of the works in such vast numbers, that his army was virtually destroyed in the attempt to break lines strengthened by intrenchments."

At Münchengratz, at Gitschin, and subsequent at Königgratz, redoubts were certainly thrown up, but many of these remained unarmed, and never could answer the purpose of the successive continuous lines invariably used by experienced American generals. The use of the spade and axe by the infantry soldier is only second in importance to the use of his firearm, and demands the same careful training during periods of peace.

During the three days which followed the severe action at Gitschin, the Prussian armies were engaged in executing a forward movement which was to bring their forces into closer union.

Thus, on the 2d of July, Prince Frederick Charles had placed his headquarters at Kamenitz ; Herwarth was at Hochwesely ; whilst the Crown Prince, who had pushed Bonin across the Elbe in the direction of Miletin, remained with his own staff at Königinhof. On this same day, the King, who had left Berlin on the 30th of June, reached Gitschin, which now formed the headquarters of the united armies. In the afternoon a council of war was held, to determine the further course of operations. It seemed probable that the Austrian general had retired to the rear of the Elbe, with a view to re-form his army on the left bank of that river, under cover of the fortresses. Here he would occupy a position of formidable strength, from which it would require considerable effort to dislodge him. One favourable circumstance, however, presented itself, in the

position of the Silesian army. Striding across the Elbe, towards its source, the Crown Prince occupied ground from which a turning movement, directed against Benedek's right flank, might readily be effected. It was for this reason that he had remained stationary with the larger portion of his army, until more certain information as to the Austrian intentions had been obtained. It seemed also judicious to offer the jaded soldiers a short respite from the physical exertion which their rapid advance from either frontier had entailed. The result, therefore, of the deliberation was, that the troops should halt in their present positions for one or two days.

In the course of the evening, however, the reports of officers who had been ordered to reconnoitre the line of the Bistritz convinced Prince Frederick Charles that Benedek was now in force between this last river and the Elbe. Possibly he was only showing a bold front in order to facilitate the passage of his heavy train across the principal river. If this were not his object, the Austrian chief must either purpose attack against the 1st army, or had selected his ground for fighting a general, defensive action. In either case instant dispositions were necessary, and the measures of the Prince were taken without hesitation. Inviting the co-operation of the 2d army, distant one good march from the probable field, he reported this circumstance, as well as the advance of his own columns on Dub, to Gitschin. This intelligence reached the King at eleven o'clock on the night of the 2d of July. It is at such moments that the issue of a campaign is often determined by the ability of a commander to weigh the circumstances under which he is called upon to act. Where considerations of the gravest nature rest upon conjecture, it is of the highest importance that each alternative should at once present itself to the mind of the officer who is responsible for the conduct of a campaign. In two short hours the resolves of the Prussian generals, whose want of experience had formed the object of their adversary's satire, were finally determined. The advantage of strategic position, of superior force and arms, the moral ascendancy obtained by recent victory, the danger of delay in profiting by what to all appearance was

a false step on the enemy's part—above all, the value of further initiative, when defeat might prove ruin to the enemy,—are some of the obvious reasons which urged the Prussian King to confirm the views adopted by his nephew.

One circumstance, in particular, strengthened the conviction of the Prussian commanders in their anticipation of victory. In all their previous engagements—at Münchengratz, Trautenau, and Skalitz—the inability of the Austrian generals to oppose movements directed against a flank had been clearly demonstrated. The influence of such attacks, more especially upon the moral qualities of infantry, had formed the subject of a very interesting pamphlet, which, commenting upon the operations of 1859, was generally attributed to the pen of Prince Frederick Charles. In this instance, the armies of the Crown Prince and of Herwarth held positions from which, by proper combination, crushing force could be developed upon the most sensitive part of the enemy's line. The first object would therefore be, to detain Benedek sufficiently long in his forward position on the Bistritz to admit the possibility of the Crown Prince's arrival, which he had himself announced for two o'clock on the afternoon of the 3d. Could this be effected, the catastrophe of Waterloo might be repeated, and the war be terminated by one fatal blow.

In this sense, then, the Prussian dispositions were framed. Orders were issued at two o'clock on the morning of the 3d of July, confirming the forward movement of the 1st army towards the Bistritz, where it would concentrate to receive Benedek's attack, should such be intended, or to cross that river in order to assault the Austrian positions. Herwarth was instructed to move upon Nechanitz, the extreme left of the Austrian line, retaining communication with Prince Frederick Charles by his left. The Crown Prince received orders—carried during the night (25 miles in two hours) by a single officer—to march at once, taking the village of Horenowes for his objective point.

The attempt has been already made to penetrate the principal motive which induced Benedek to take his stand on the ground indicated. There is evidence, however, to show that the possibility of being called upon to fight at Sadowa had not

been altogether omitted from his earlier combination. Certain parts of the field had been carefully prepared for defensive action, and now other considerations prompted the Austrian General to seek here his last forlorn-hope.

With Clam and the Archduke Leopold, Baron Henikstein, Chief of the Austrian staff, had been equally removed from further responsibility after the reverse of Gitschin. It may well be credited, at a moment when he thus entirely found himself at his own resources, when his communications were interrupted—for a Prussian detachment had seized Böhmisches-Trübau on the 30th of June—when two-thirds of his army had already suffered defeat, and when the losses which he had experienced had considerably increased his numerical inferiority, that Benedek should have advised his sovereign to make preparations for concluding peace. The hopeless character of his general position would seem to have urged the Austrian general to seek a desperate remedy. Viewing the great superiority of numbers which his united adversaries would soon be able to develop, a defensive position in rear of the Elbe might not long be tenable. Turned on both flanks, and threatened in rear, this might possibly no sooner be occupied than it must again have been abandoned. To expose thus his weakness to his German allies would have been to anticipate the result of decisive defeat, without enlisting the chances of a general action. If his adversaries had succeeded in asserting their ability for strategic combination, their tactical qualities on an extended fighting line, ordered and directed by his own experienced hand, had yet to be further tested. It was quite possible, too, that the well-known eager impulse of his new adversary would prompt him to early, incautious attack, whilst the advance of the Crown Prince must certainly be greatly retarded by the state of the roads, which the Austrian movements had severely injured. The latest experience, derived from recent actions, had, moreover, illustrated the dangerous fallacy involved in his earlier tactics, and the last faint ray of hope now gleamed through the cover of a defensive battle-field.

In truth, this position of Sadowa was by nature sufficiently formidable. The little river Bistritz, to which the battle has

since given world-wide celebrity, flows for a certain portion of its course from north to south parallel to the upper Elbe, five to six miles distant from it. It varies from three to four feet in depth, with a muddy bed, and its banks throughout are of a marshy character, thus constituting a military obstacle of no inconsiderable character. On these are situated many villages, of which the principal are Cerekwitz, Sadowa, and Nechanitz, marking respectively the extremities and the centre of the line occupied by the Austrians. The elevated plateau enclosed between it and the Elbe, which formed the scene of the battle, is intersected from north-west to south-east by the highway leading from Gitschin to Königgratz. Into this many country roads run laterally from the villages on the north and south, between hills, mostly wooded, of moderate height. The more prominent of these is that of Lipa, with the village of the same name lying at its foot. From this eminence, which looks down upon Sadowa, that village and the road are commanded, and a general view of the ground right and left is obtained. Immediately to the east of Lipa is the village of Chlum, also situated on high ground which now slopes back away from the Bistritz, in the direction of the Elbe. Supposing, therefore, this semicircular range to represent the front of the Austrian position, the extremities would be marked in the east by the village of Smiritz on the Elbe, and in the south-west by Nechanitz on the Bistritz, a line about nine miles in extent, of which Lipa and Chlum, central points, would constitute the key. This front covers the approaches to Königgratz, and commands the passages across the Elbe in the direction of Böhmisches-Trübau and Olmütz, representing Benedek's line of retreat. It may at once be stated that, under certain circumstances, the danger of fighting in a position backed by a large river is considerably diminished. Presuming that sufficient means of passage have been prepared, and that an army, though defeated, is not routed, positive advantage may be derived from the presence of the obstacle. By destroying the bridges which the retreating columns have already used, pursuit is checked, and the river then serves for a fresh line of defence. In its last campaign in Italy the Austrian army had fought the battle of Solferino under similar circumstances,

without experiencing inconvenience, during retreat, from the presence of the Mincio.

The ground sketched was eminently favourable to the action of artillery, the only arm to which Benedek could now look for results, and in the use of which he had already given earlier proofs of skill. Considering the extreme urgency of the political situation, which had already been seriously damaged by the early reverses, then the vigorous and unexpected use of the initiative by his adversary, the refusal of his own Government to popularise the war in Bohemia, and the sufficiently demonstrated inferiority of his soldiers in fighting qualities—it is impossible to deny to the Austrian general the merit of his resolute endeavour to enlist the last remaining chances in his favour. On the 2d July, at noon, all general officers, commanders of cavalry divisions, and chiefs of staff, were called to headquarters. They expected to hear important revelations. But nothing of the kind occurred. Benedek alluded only to matters relating to discipline and security, expressing his intention of giving his troops several days' rest, so that the subordinate leaders left the commander-in-chief without receiving any intimation of his views, valuable as such would have been to them.

Orders had been issued the previous day to strengthen the gap between Nedelist, Chlum, and Lipa; and in the afternoon of the 2d, the heavy baggage was ordered to the left bank of the Elbe, the points of passage being specially indicated, and passage through the fortress of Königgratz prohibited.

Such steps indicated the intention of Benedek to fight where he stood; but no dispositions for battle were issued, and the leaders were thus prevented from studying the ground assigned to them, and occupying it to the best advantage.

The execution of the following dispositions for the occupation of the position was completed late on the evening of the 2d of July:—

At Nechanitz were posted the Saxons, who, with the 10th corps under Gablenz on their right, formed the extreme left of the Austrian front.

The centre, stretching from Lipa by Maslowed to Benatek, was occupied by the Archduke Ernest, whose troops, as yet,

had not been under fire, with the 3d, and by Festitits with the 4th corps.

The right, thrown back upon Horenowes and Sendrasitz, was held by Thun's 2d corps, the further interval between that general's right and the Elbe being filled by the cavalry division of Prince Taxis, which completed the first line.

In second line, the 8th corps, now commanded by Weber, was formed up at Nedelist, and in rear of the centre, massed along the highroad, in advance of Wsestar, stood the corps of Ramming and Clam-Gallas, which had suffered so much in the previous engagements. These troops, with the divisions of cavalry and the reserve artillery, formed the reserves.

On the commanding ground which formed the fronts of his position, both west and north, wherever it favoured their action, Benedek, admirably assisted by the Archduke William, posted his numerous batteries, which in most instances were artificially protected against the enemy's fire. Towards the centre especially, the artillery, massed with singular skill, was ranged terrace-like on the western slopes of the hills. On some portions of the field, more particularly towards the right front, redoubts had been thrown up, and the fringe of the woods towards the Bistritz was covered by abattis. In rear of the Elbe was Königgratz, whence the means of subsistence and ammunition necessary for a prolonged struggle would be issued for the army. Altogether, the Austrian general mustered 190,000 soldiers for the defence of his ground, and was prepared to support their action by no less than 600 pieces of artillery. His intentions were altogether of a defensive character; there is no evidence that he contemplated offensive action against the 1st army. His plan relied for success on the isolated attack of Prince Frederick Charles, with the prospect of crushing him by the weight of superior numbers, and by the force of his artillery-fire. This effected, it would not be difficult to hold the line of the Bistritz against defeated divisions, whilst he turned with the bulk of his forces to confront the Crown Prince in a second day's battle.

The detailed disposition is given at length in the Austrian official account. The general arrangements for battle were only

completed at 11 at night, and forwarded at 2 A.M. to the corps commanders. It was a period of heavy responsibility. It was clear that the plan had crossed, and his operations hitherto had altogether failed. The army was in the originally intended position, but now under very unfavourable circumstances.

Benedek's original idea of making use of this apparently valuable position to act against the entire force of the enemy or the half led by Frederick Charles had led to his losing the opportunity of attacking and beating the nearer and isolated half led by the Crown Prince.

In order to cover the purposed operation, nevertheless, several army corps had been opposed to each of the Prussian armies; and these, as the purpose of the commander-in-chief had only dimly or too late explained to them, had engaged in sanguinary conflicts and exhausted themselves in struggles with a superior enemy. Each of the three days, with one exception, had only produced sad disasters; while the enemy effected one easy triumph after the other over the single corps, and effected his difficult junction in the face of the imperial army.

Having lost nearly 35,000 men, guns, colours, and standards, all the corps were fatigued, exhausted, and depressed.

If the commander of the army had hoped to fight a battle in the position at last gained, this hope must have vanished when Clam and the Saxons, who would have had to front to the west, reached the army disorganised. The criticism of the Austrians is unfavourable to his dispositions. They consider them unsuited to the circumstances. To expose one's self to the flanking attack of a superior adversary is generally bad tactics. Well-led armies extricate themselves from similar difficulties either by breaking through the more extended front of the enemy, or by practising a rapid flanking manœuvre against one of the enemy's wings, endeavouring to roll this up, or finally by retreat until better strategic relations are found. If any such offensive manœuvres under existing circumstances were out of the question, then the army should have been conducted across the Elbe.

Behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt and Königgratz, and

the Adler and Aupa, lies a strong position; but this evidently would at once have been turned from the south or on both flanks.

The true point to select for retreat and occupation was Pardubitz. Here the army, owing to the configuration of the river, could not be turned, and the passage of the river by the enemy, which must then have taken place in the neighbourhood of Prelaues, would have offered opportunity for advantageous action. Here too were the magazines, and the army, in case of necessity, might retreat rapidly either on Olmütz or Vienna.

Benedek seems to have entertained this idea at one time, but abandoned it. His force thus remained on the dangerous footing of being exposed to the necessity of fighting a defensive action on three points. But in the official account, the conjecture is hazarded that the tactically favourable character of the ground finally used induced the commander-in-chief to accept battle here.

It is admitted that with proper dispositions for action, the army might have fought with some prospect of success.

It was evident that no success on the Bistritz front could compensate for disaster on the flanks. To these, therefore, special attention should have been given.

The line of the Trotinka from the Elbe to Racitz, then the curtain from Horenowes to Benatek, would have offered security to the north, the occupation of Nechanitz in the south.

It was his purpose to occupy the first-named line with two corps; the ground about Nechanitz also with two; the strong position about Sadowa with one corps, and a mass of guns; and to place three corps by Kuklena, Nedelist, and Maslowed in reserve.

The six cavalry divisions also posted there were too large a body to retain within this enclosed space, where there was no room for action. It would have been well, therefore, to employ three or four of them on the bank of the Bistritz to harass the enemy's right.

As it was, the army disposition omitted Nechanitz on the one flank, and Horenowes on the other, both of paramount

and equal importance, and declined the defence of any of the low-lying localities, squeezing the army together on a disproportionately small space near the main road, ordered with two fronts at right angles to each other, so that the army would be most dangerously affected by the smallest amount of success attained by the enemy on any part of the line, and in case of retreat would only gain the other bank of the Elbe with the greatest difficulty.

In a word, according to the disposition, the army had to take up a position such as might properly have applied had it been retreating worsted from battle to a last interior defensive line.

Lines, too, were named for occupation in the disposition, but not a syllable said as regards the general purpose of the action. *Contretemps* of all kinds were the consequence.

It was impossible, thus, but that localities which should have been obstinately defended to the last, were vacated without any necessity, and that others should have been attacked with an expense of force of which they were in no way deserving.

Hence untimely or unsound expenditure of resources resulted, which made itself only too keenly felt in the most important episode of battle.

In the shortcomings of this disposition, therefore, the principal cause is to be found of the disastrous incidents of the ensuing battle—so the Austrian officials think. Severe criticism indeed, and, no doubt, in the main just and true.

Had every action in Austria's military history been criticised with similar closeness and severity, it may surely be conjectured that her reverses would have been infinitely less numerous. But she had invariably thrown her shield over unfortunate generals; never had she disclosed, perhaps barely investigated, the causes of their mishaps.

Why then was she now so unusually severe? First, because it was sought to conceal the shortcomings of the Government and military authorities in failing to provide the army with equal weapons and with modern training; and secondly, because Benedek was not a member of the higher aristocracy.

What is not stated in the official account is, that the com-

mander-in-chief was from the commencement placed in a false position, and committed to the execution of a plan of operations designed for him; that his infantry was fatally inferior in weapons, in point of organisation, and in the character of its training; that in consequence he was everywhere worsted in his earliest collisions, and never found the time to take breath for further combinations. Yet, to be fair, the statement of these circumstances should have been superadded. Nevertheless the official account is valuable, for it is a masterly piece of military writing and criticism.

Judging from the dispositions made for the battle by Benedek, it is evident that he must have possessed some good reasons for concluding that the timely arrival of the Crown Prince on the purposed field was very improbable. To oppose such movement, but one army corps, with Taxis' cavalry division, was considered sufficient, the reserves being all massed in rear of the centre, and towards the left flank. Probably Benedek hoped that, as the Crown Prince hitherto had not moved from his line on the Elbe, anxiety for his communications with Glatz, threatened from Josephstadt, would further retain him in that position. In the worst case, he reckoned upon the presence of a portion only of the Silesian army, which the distance, the bad state of the roads, and 30,000 fresh soldiers would serve to hold in check. That this presumption, if entertained, was illusory, has been already pointed out, for the Prussian determination to fight was based upon the certainty of the early arrival of the Crown Prince with the whole of his army to co-operate in Benedek's defeat.

In point of fact, he started from Königinhof at four o'clock on the morning of the 3d. The distance from the nearest point occupied by his troops to the battle-field was about twelve miles, and the following dispositions for march were issued:—

Bonin, with the 1st corps, was to move in two columns from Prausnitz and Miletin, by Zabres and Gross-Trotin, upon Gross-Burglitz, where he was instructed to establish his communication with the left of the 1st army.

The Guard, marching from Königinhof, where it must cross

the Elbe, was directed by Jericek and Lhota upon Horenower and Maslowed.

The 6th corps, under Mutius, marching in two columns from Schurz and Kukus, used the roads leading to Welchow, and that running parallel to the Elbe and the railway in the direction of Königgratz. From this corps one brigade was detached to mask the fortress of Josephstadt.

Steinmetz, with the 5th corps, which had experienced heavy losses in the previous actions, formed the reserve, moving by the central road which conducts first to Choteborek, and then on to Maslowed. The baggage and all trains appertaining to the army were left behind. Prince Frederick Charles, who had been marching since midnight, reached the position of Dub, which he found unoccupied, about six o'clock on the morning of the 3d of July. He occupied it with Horn's (8th) division on the highroad leading to Sadowa.

The 7th division (Fransecky) moved off the highroad to the left, in the direction of Cerekwitz and Benatek; whilst the 2d army corps, composed of the 3d and 4th divisions, spread out on the right of the road towards the villages Dohalitz and Mokrovous, situated lower on the Bistritz.

The 3d army corps (5th and 6th divisions) was retained in reserve in the rear of Dub on the Königgratz road. Herwarth, with the 14th, 15th, and 16th divisions, had marched from Smidar during the night upon Nechanitz, which was occupied by the Saxons. He was ordered to attack the Austrian left with vigour, and to maintain his communication with Prince Frederick Charles.

The action commenced about half-past seven o'clock in the morning, which was wet and cold, with the opening of artillery-fire on both sides of the Bistritz, increasing in severity during two hours, as the batteries were successively brought into play.

The King of Prussia arrived on the ground about eight o'clock, and immediately took command.

During the cannonade the Prussian infantry advanced along the whole line towards the Bistritz, sheltered by the ground, and at ten o'clock Benatek on the Austrian right was in flames. Here the 7th Prussian division first crossed the

river, and after a sharp struggle carried the village. Then the several columns were ordered to advance upon the other points which the Austrians held along the whole line. Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Mokrovous were obstinately defended for more than an hour; but the Prussian artillery played upon the villages, which caught fire in several places, and were ultimately abandoned by the Austrian infantry for the wooded ground in rear, which formed their second line of defence.

Here, again, the 7th division, gallantly led by Fransecky, obtained the first success. With terrible loss, the wood between Benatek and Sadowa was carried in an encounter where the 27th Prussian regiment particularly distinguished itself. Shortly afterwards the wooded slopes which lie to the south of the Sadowa road were assaulted by the Prussian soldiers, who had previously carried Dohalitz and Mokrovous. At great expense of life, the obstructed skirts of the wood were at last gained; but the Austrians, covered by the trees from the dreaded effects of the needle-rifle, fought with exceeding obstinacy, and half-way up the slopes the Prussians were compelled to halt.

As his infantry retreated in order to re-form on the commanding heights of Lipa, Benedek opened a terrific fire from his batteries, which now raked the woods that the Prussians had so dearly purchased, as well as the open ground towards the Bistritz. The Prussian artillery suffered terrible loss; and the infantry, powerless to face the irresistible fire on their front, halted in the woods, which only partially sheltered them from its effects. In vain the reserves were called up, not a foot of ground was further won, though the action of the 5th and 6th divisions was soon perceptible from the increased severity of the infantry fire.

It was one o'clock, and the situation had evidently become serious. With the marshy Bistritz in rear, with all the infantry engaged, with but eight batteries of artillery and the cavalry in reserve, whilst the enemy clearly held his troops in hand, no wonder that the King and his generals looked anxiously to the right and left for the expected results from their flanking armies. But the Crown Prince as yet showed no signs of life; and Herwarth, who had taken Nechanitz

early and then continued his march upon Probus, had probably found a larger force on his front than was anticipated, for the sound of his cannon indicated that he was now certainly checked on his advance. It seemed, indeed, as though the precarious character of concentric operations was now again to be illustrated on this hard-fought field of Sadowa.

Benedek had taken his post at ten o'clock on the Lipa Hill, whence he directed the movements of his army. It had not been his intention to defend seriously the line of the Bistritz. His purpose clearly was to hold that line sufficiently long to inflict early loss upon his adversary; then, leaving open the passages across the stream, gradually to involve him in a dangerous struggle on the tangled ground which was so thoroughly searched at all points by his powerful batteries. As soon as these had made their inevitable impression upon the Prussian infantry, his reserves, massed in rear of the Lipa heights, would be called into action to complete a victory which, under the circumstances of ground, could hardly fail to prove decisive.

Until noon everything proceeded in accordance with Benedek's anticipations and wishes. Not only had his adversary attacked his stronghold, but that attack had been pushed far beyond the bounds of prudence in the eager desire to inflict defeat. Sensible loss had thus been experienced; and whilst the ardour of the Prussian infantry evidently flagged, the last reserves were now about to be engaged, not with a view to complete victory, but to gain the means of holding ground which had been so dearly won.

We may well believe that, at such a moment, the confidence in the *Kriegsglück*, which had hitherto been the proud boast of the Austrian soldier, was once more gaining ground. But the cup of victory was doomed to be rudely dashed untasted from his lips. The report that Prussian columns were gaining ground on his right, and that Gablenz on his left had expended his ammunition, now reached Benedek. Remaining sufficiently long to complete the necessary dispositions for the employment of his cavalry towards the Bistritz, he hurried away to the right in order to estimate the real danger by which he was menaced. Apparently he found no cause for

immediate alarm, for in less than an hour he returned to his old post, and then his battalions, which had already begun to press the Prussian infantry, commenced their advance.

It is difficult to understand how he failed at this time to recognise the extreme danger which menaced him from the north. Probably the foggy state of the atmosphere, with the smoke which clung heavily to the battle-field, prevented his realising the actual number of his enemies on his right front. The Crown Prince came into collision with Thun's advanced troops at a quarter before twelve, and though vigorously opposed, constantly gained ground. At half-past one the Austrian batteries, which had occupied the heights of Horenowes, flanked by the reserve artillery of the 1st Prussian army from the position which Fransecky had gained, fell back, and then the Prince advanced his infantry to assault Maslowed and Cistowes, which villages they carried in the face of the most determined resistance. At this time the Crown Prince disposed of the Guard, and of one division of the 6th corps. Baum, as well as Steinmetz, were still in rear, and the other division belonging to Mutius was penetrating the extreme rear of the Austrian line close to the Elbe. No doubt it was this movement of the 12th Prussian division which forced Thun to detach from the small force which he commanded. Nevertheless, recognising his extreme responsibility, he fought with great tenacity. Again and again he endeavoured to recover the villages which his adversary had forced from him. But his efforts against the terrible needle-rifle were vain; and as Bonin's advanced-guard appeared in the interval which separated Fransecky from the Guard, the Crown Prince resumed his onward march, bearing heavily down against the intrenched position of Chlum. "This last village," says the Prussian official account, "was carried in spite of the bravest resistance offered by the troops which held it"—strangely in contradiction to Benedek's telegram, which would seem to imply that the Prussians found the post open and slipped into it unawares. The letters attributed to General Prim assert that Chlum was lost and retaken seven times, and only finally remained in the Prussian possession after the eighth assault. The same authority states that it was owing

to the misconduct of Italian battalions, which formed a large proportion of Thun's command, that less opposition was offered to the Crown Prince's advance. It is not for the first time in Austrian military history that the unreliable action of these troops in the field has been displayed, and the wonder is that they ever should have been placed in a responsible position.

The evidence generally tends to the conviction that the loss of Chlum was the natural consequence of the Crown Prince's overpowering action. Unaccountably strange it is, that the report of his pressing danger should not have reached Benedek's ears. Probably Thun, who had detached considerably to his right, forced to make head against very superior numbers at Maslowed, ultimately retired by the road leading to Nedelist and Lochenitz, where he hoped to rally. This, in connection with the simultaneous advance of Benedek's frontal line towards the Bistritz, would certainly account, to some extent, for the absence of sufficient force at Chlum.

The fact is only interesting as illustrating the danger and disadvantage of angular positions. From the moment that it became possible for the Crown Prince to appear with four army corps on the field of battle during the afternoon of the 3d of July, Benedek's defeat was certain. The flimsy veil which had covered his right flank was rent in an instant; and had Ramming, who stood at Rosberitz in reserve, been thrown into the gap, the result of the battle might have proved still more disastrous.

It wanted five minutes to three o'clock when Benedek heard that Prussian infantry had entered Chlum. Repairing to the spot, he was greeted with a volley which wounded two officers of his personal staff; and as he rode for the reserves, a second fire from a farmhouse wounded the Archduke William. The battalions called up to retake Chlum failed in their purposes, for the enemy had already established two batteries in support of the infantry which held the village. Over the heights adjoining, the columns of the Crown Prince now poured with resistless violence; and, taken at once in front, flank, and rear, nothing remained for the Austrian soldiers but instant retreat.

The approach of the Crown Prince had been first indicated

to the Prussian generals on the Bistritz by the change in the direction of some of Benedek's guns. The intervening heights intercepted the view from the west; and the roar of battle was simply deafening.

The officer despatched by the Crown Prince before noon to announce his arrival had found it difficult to reach his destination, and only delivered his report at three o'clock. Shortly before this hour, Bonin's soldiers had touched Fransecky's left; and as the columns of the Guard streamed over the heights of Lipa, the 1st army rose again for a last effort.

The welcome intelligence that the Austrian retreat was intercepted was at once despatched to Herwarth, with the intimation that upon his further exertions from the left much of the expected results depended.

At half-past three o'clock, the King, placing himself at the head of the reserve cavalry of the 1st army, led the general advance, which now commenced along the whole Prussian line. At four, the Austrians were in full retreat, which during the first hour was conducted in good order, covered by the reserve artillery and cavalry. But as the pressure of the flanking columns became more and more perceptible, many regiments broke, and many guns were necessarily abandoned. All fled in wild disorder to the bridges which spanned the Elbe; and when these were choked with fugitives, numbers took to the water, and there found their graves. Still, some portion of the army retained its formation; the artillery continued, with noble devotion, from each commanding height, to shower its missiles on the pursuing Prussians; the cavalry charged repeatedly, as the hostile troopers rode eagerly forwards; and to the firm bearing of the Saxon infantry was principally due the salvation of the wreck of Benedek's unfortunate army.

The pursuit, executed with little vigour, owing probably to the extreme exhaustion of the Prussian soldiers, ceased with nightfall, and in presence of the Elbe, which was now occupied on the opposite bank by the Austrian rear-guard.

Benedek retreated by Königgratz, Hohenbruck, and Pardubitz upon Böhmisches-Trübau, and ultimately with the mass of his army to Olmütz, where he hoped to reorganise it. In

the battle he lost fully 12,000 soldiers killed and wounded; besides these, 20,000 prisoners, 11 standards, and 174 guns fell into the hands of the enemy. The Prussian losses are estimated altogether at 12,000 men.

Negotiations for an armistice, commenced by Benedek, who sent Gablenz to the Prussian headquarters for that purpose, were declined by the King; and the Prussian armies, spreading over Bohemia and Moravia, now marched for the Danube and the Austrian capital.

The reason why Benedek fought at Königgratz instead of retiring seems to have been that a certain amount of pressure was put upon him. This was not the only theatre of the war. Austria had vast interests in Germany. In fact, this war was entered upon for those interests. It was indispensable, if she were to retain the sympathies she courted there, to efface the memory of the first disasters by success in a general action.

The motive, therefore, was principally political; and Benedek was made the scapegoat of military failure.

If the losses and discouragement which the Austrian army corps had already encountered be considered, if the influence of the utter collapse of their tactical system upon officers and men be properly estimated, it required a huge effort to place the army so quickly in fighting position at all.

The position on the Bistritz seems to have been reported upon in the general survey of the Elbe district, but its detailed characteristics were evidently little known.

The Austrian system did not accord that independence to corps commanders which would have enabled these, co-operating with each other, to have occupied the ground in consonance with a general idea of battle, in which all would be initiated.

As a rule, the Austrian commanders were never instructed except on the very eve of action. This was due to mistaken ideas of the importance of secrecy of design, and also to the fact that there was a want of harmony in thought and mind on the part of these commanders, who were certainly not up to the Prussian level as to professional ability.

Moreover, where, as in more than one instance was the

case, the corps commander acted on his own independent judgment, he did not report this at once to his chief, for fear, no doubt, that his dispositions should be counter-ordered, but kept it to himself. The commander-in-chief was thus ignorant of many important circumstances. He ascertained here how impossible it is to overlook and to guide every phase of action on every portion of the battle-field. It was the desire to retain entire responsibility which led him into all sorts of difficulties. It is by trust and subdivision of responsibility, on a reasonable scale, that a mass of useful force is liberated which otherwise escapes without use.

Considering the changes which had taken place on his staff, and the enormous duties which devolved upon him, it was clearly impossible for Benedek to study his field of battle as closely as he should have done.

But he certainly might have issued his meagre dispositions at noon on the 2d, and have called upon the corps commanders to report upon the ground allotted to each corps, and to make suggestions for its occupation.

A further delay of twenty-four hours would doubtless have enabled him to make many corrections in his line of battle, and to have completed his plan, of which the document published is palpably merely an outline. He seems, too, to have expected another day at least before he was called upon to fight. The circumstance indicates how soundly judged the proceedings of Prince Frederick Charles were. How infinitely important it is, when an adversary shows signs of settling himself in a defensive position, to attack him without delay ! It enlists a large portion of the chapter of accidents in favour of the assailant.

The dispositions suggested by the official account are undoubtedly sound : but it must be recollected that they resulted from the most carefully prolonged study of the field, and after the faultiness of the actual arrangement had been exposed by battle.

The theory of concentration of force is not always properly realised. It is probably worse to over-concentrate than to disseminate. The masses which Benedek commanded required space to be brought fairly into play. He held them

too densely packed. It would seem, however, that his cavalry should have been pushed well up to the Elbe on the right flank rather than committed to offensive action on the extreme left. The Austrian line of retreat was in rear of the left flank, but the right was more dangerously exposed to overwhelming attack than was the left. Four divisions of cavalry with artillery would have delayed the Crown Prince.

It must be fairly stated that throughout the battle the influence of the Austrian commander-in-chief is but little apparent.

His solitary achievement was the direction of the reserves for the repossession of Chlum. He did not interfere with the action of the 4th and 2d corps; he confined himself to restricting the action of his subordinates; he declined the suggestions of the Crown Prince of Saxony and of Ramming equally; he would not listen to Edelsheim when he suggested the certainty of attack;—all these circumstances undoubtedly denote that his mind did not possess the scope necessary for chief command, and that excessive responsibility deprived him of the vigour he had displayed in the earlier wars.

The remainder of the campaign contains little of military interest to the student. The retreat was conducted in great disorder, during the night of the 3d July, towards Hohenmauth.

Sending the 10th corps, which had been so severely handled, to Vienna by train, he endeavoured to collect his scattered army behind the intrenchments of Olmütz.

The army of Prince Frederick Charles moved on Przelautsch, the Landwehr of the Guard occupied Prague, the 1st reserve Prussian corps moved from Saxony into Bohemia, and was replaced by the Landwehr of the line.

The army of the Crown Prince crossed the river at Pardubitz.

On the 9th July the line Hohenmauth (King's headquarters), Reichenberg, and Leitomischel (2d army headquarters), was reached, the extreme right being formed by the army of the Elbe, at Deutsch-Brod, on the Iglau road.

The Austrian commander-in-chief had been superseded by the Archduke Albrecht. The relics of the army defeated at Königgratz had retreated chiefly on Olmütz, and were thence transferred by rail to Vienna.

When it was known that the Austrians were moving to the south, the Crown Prince was directed towards Prerau, a junction on the Vienna-Olmütz railway, south of the latter place.

The march had been effected hitherto without opposition; but on the 10th a slight cavalry skirmish occurred near Saar, between the cavalry of the advanced-guard of the 1st army (Uhlans) and the Radetzky Hussars, in which the weight of the former told heavily against their lighter adversaries. Skirmishes with the hostile parties of cavalry also ensued on the 11th.

On the 13th the headquarters of the 1st army halted at Brunn, which was surrendered without opposition. The Elbe army had reached a point about midway between Iglau and Znaym; the Crown Prince, with headquarters at Opatowitz, continued his march towards Prerau. On the 14th July further orders were issued for the advance; and while the pontoon-trains of both armies were directed on Brunn, the 1st army was ordered to march, so as to cross the Thaya on the 17th at Muschau, on which day the army of the Elbe was to cross at Znaym.

But on the 14th news was received that strong columns had been observed by the reconnoiters of the 2d army, moving by way of Prerau towards Vienna. Dispositions were accordingly made to attack them, and on the 15th occurred the actions of Tobitschau and Rokeinitz.

On the 10th the railway line near Prerau was cut, and the Crown Prince, leaving a force to watch Olmütz, moved on Brunn, the 5th corps being, however, directed to advance through the valley of the March; it was connected with the main army by the cavalry division down the right bank. The Olmütz-Vienna line had been also cut, by direction of Prince Frederick Charles, at Lundenberg.

The advance continued by short marches on the right and centre, in order to give time for the 2d army to come up, and by the 20th they occupied the general line Stockerau-Gaunersdorf-Malaczka, and Gross Schutzen (along the Weiden Brook), the Crown Prince's army being still somewhat in rear, in the neighbourhood of Lundenberg, with his headquarters at Eisgrub.

On the 21st negotiations for an armistice were concluded, the cessation of hostilities taking place at noon on the 22d; but on the morning of that day an action was fought at Blumenau in consequence of the advance, the previous day, of the 7th and 8th divisions under Fransecky, in the direction of Presburg, in order to secure, if possible, the passage of the Danube at that point.

In the midst of the action, which up to that point had been distinctly favourable to the Prussians, Austrian flags of truce proclaimed the commencement of the armistice, and after some trouble, the "cease firing" was sounded all along the line.

So terminated the active operations of the campaign in Bohemia of 1866. On the 26th, preliminaries of peace were signed at Nikolsburg, and the Prussian armies prepared to turn their faces homeward.

The war had resulted in a complete victory, political as well as military, for the Prussian kingdom.

By the Treaty of Prague, Venetia was given to Italy; the old German Bund was dissolved; Schleswig, Lauenberg, and Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt, were annexed to Prussia. The

kingdom of Saxony, with the other German States that had been hostile to her during the war, were compelled to pay a war indemnity in various proportions. And finally, the States north of the Maine, with Saxony, were united as the North German Confederation, under the leadership of Prussia.

Summarising the most important lessons of the campaign, the following conclusions may be drawn :—

1. That Benedek, not being a strategist, and unacquainted with the theatre of war, accepted the plan of operations prepared by Krismanics ; and this document, therefore, underlaid the Austrian movements subsequently.

2. Its tendency was to insist upon the necessity for defensive action, because the military preparations of the Prussians were more advanced, and such a course was in accordance with Austria's political attitude.

3. This premiss has been demonstrated to be more or less false. Austria was, in reality, ready as soon as Prussia. The discrepancy of force at this period was inconsiderable.

4. The result of this false premiss was the abandonment of Saxony, the concentration at the wrong point of the frontier (in Moravia instead of Bohemia), thus exposing not only Saxony but Bohemia to invasion.

5. Under certain conditions, the Austrian army was to march into Bohemia, and operate offensively there. Under others, to accept battle at Olmütz, dependent upon whether the Prussians remained on the defensive, or became the aggressors.

6. Abandoning thus fully the initiative to Prussia, showed want of geniality in the conception of the Austrian plan.

7. That the Prussians were originally on the defensive. This is attributed partly to the wishes of the King, partly to the prestige of the Austrians, partly to the difficulty of the military situation in case the Austrians then assumed the offensive.

8. This attitude was abandoned altogether after the events of the 14th at Frankfurt. When hostilities became inevitable, an offensive attitude henceforth remained to Prussia.

9. It was thus indispensable to occupy Hanover and High Saxony, to secure the flank and rear, and to maintain an unbroken front.

10. Divided organisation, in order to move rapidly, and eventual concentration, were alone feasible. Peculiar advantages attached to the presence of the Crown Prince in Silesia, and of Herwarth at Torgau.

11. The false concentration of Austria was due to the paucity of communications, and want of foresight in constructing railways, the indispensable character of which for military operations was here demonstrated.

12. The arrangements for the retreat of the Saxons were faulty and incomplete, and the orders for their ultimate destination marked by uncertainty.

13. The same remark is applicable to Clam, who was left without timely instructions as to his own particular bearing, and in total ignorance of the general intention at headquarters.

14. This intention is visible only from Benedek's communication to the Emperor and Adjutant-General, which in itself is wanting in setting forth a clear view of the situation.

15. This is the more remarkable as the Austrians appear to have had excellent information upon which to base their plan of action.

16. The commencement of operations was marked by extreme vigour on the part of the Prussians, by the opposite on the Austrian part.

17. The flank march from Olmütz was wanting in the energy required by the situation.

18. No precautions were taken to block the Silesian passes. The probable reason was because offence was contemplated, under certain eventualities.

In addition to these special considerations, there are others of more general application. The imperative necessity for watching the development of firearms and fire action is evident by the losses the Austrians sustained in neglecting to glean even from the lessons of 1864 the value of the breech-loading arm. In this campaign, moreover, the decisive precedence of small arms over large is singularly striking.

A mountain frontier is the worst line of defence, unless the passes are rare, difficult, and far apart; for, to watch many, would cause a wide dissemination of troops necessary, and,

while thus weakening the sum total of the defensive forces, render concentration for decisive action difficult. The urgency of bearing strategic considerations in view, in the construction of railway lines, is clearly evidenced by the difficulty the Austrians felt in leaving the one line by which the supplies necessary for a large army can alone be readily furnished. Another line from Vienna, more directly northward than that by Olmütz, would have facilitated both the rapidity of movement and power of concentration of Benedek's forces. The necessity for harmonious action of independent commanders by initiation into the general-in-chief's plans is indispensable, as may be seen by Clam's disunited efforts to protect the Iser line and check the 1st army, as well as by the faulty arrangements which, owing to ignorance of the general idea at Königgratz, characterised the dispositions of the corps leaders.

When the enemy is obliged by geographical considerations to divide his forces, and at the same time contemplates assuming the offensive, the defender's true course is to strike at that fraction which is nearest his line of communication, and which therefore, if left unchecked, must of necessity cause strategic disaster. The duties of a containing force to render this course of action possible, were misunderstood by Benedek; for to reap the full advantages of a river-line, occupied with the view of delaying one of the enemy's fractions, space is essential, and the obstacle, if it can be readily crossed by the assailant without opposition, in the near neighbourhood of the defender, becomes but a source of additional danger.

On the Prussian side, the value of the initiative, if prosecuted with sufficient vigour, is more than ever manifest. It thwarts the settled plans of the adversary, and enlists the chapter of accidents on the side of the bolder belligerent. The campaign affords yet another illustration of the value of striking a decisive tactical blow the instant the strategic advantage is gained; and the value of flanking movements for offensive purposes is most fully evidenced.

Lastly, sufficient allowance is not made in the Austrian official account for the tactical inequality of the arms, the bad

character of the communications, and the generally false military situation they accepted.

Under such circumstances, a *sabreur* was placed at the head of the field-army in Bohemia, instead of a consummate strategist.

PART II.—CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1866 : CUSTOZZA.

While the stirring and important events related in the early part of this chapter were being enacted in Bohemia, the old fighting-grounds of Italy were also the scenes of operations of no small importance.

It is somewhat singular, that whereas the Austro-Prussian campaign has been studied and reviewed from every side, the Italian struggle on the Mincio has remained, as far as this country is concerned, in comparative obscurity. The reasons are twofold. In the first place, it is not to be denied that in her campaign in Bohemia, Prussia initiated a fresh era of warfare ; and, secondly, it is evident that this campaign in Italy, great as its military merits may be, was barren in political results, while military life and skill were equally expended there in vain. Still there are circumstances connected with it which must interest every military student. In the first place, it involves strategical problems of very great importance ; in the second, it has illustrated once more the great value of strategy as a science, as well as the extreme necessity in military operations of a precise knowledge of the ground on which these operations are conducted ; and further, the advantage of the preparation of the theatre of war for military operations. Lastly, it offers us a fine example of the services which may be expected from troops that are well disciplined and ably led, although those troops may be much inferior in numbers to the enemy with which they are engaged.

The political circumstances which attended the outbreak of this campaign obliged Austria to place two armies on the

two opposite extremes of her frontiers,—one in Bohemia in the north, the other in Italy in the south; and as her antagonist in the north was the more formidable, it was to be expected that the results of this war in which she was engaged would be determined upon that theatre; consequently, she directed the mass of her resources, the main part of her military strength, to Bohemia, leaving herself very inferior in Italy for the other and secondary war in which she was about to be engaged. But to make up for this inferiority of force, she had established during the course of years a very strong position, which is generally known and well known by the name of the Quadrilateral. So that, from the commencement of this campaign, she relied very much upon the strength of the ground she occupied in Italy to make up for the superiority of force which she naturally expected would meet her there.

The combatant forces of Austria in Italy,—and by combatant forces are meant those which are actually fit for service,—amounted to 139,000 men, as nearly as possible. There was the field-army, numbering about 78,000 fighting men and 176 guns, with which the Archduke Albrecht could take the field. It consisted of the 5th corps (Liechtenstein), the 7th (Maroicics), the 9th (Hartung), the reserve division (Rodich), the cavalry reserve (Pulz). The garrisons of the South Tyrol amounted to about 13,000 men; of Istria, to about 15,000 men; in the various fortresses, to 30,000 men, all combatant troops; and a flying brigade, which was formed for the purpose of maintaining communications through the Venetian territory, numbered a further five or six thousand men. The Austrian squadron, commanded by Tegethoff, was at Pola, prepared to take part in the naval operations.

Now the force which Italy was prepared to oppose to this, as may naturally be expected, was very much larger. Since 1860, she had introduced a system of conscription which she had organised, and which enabled her now to commence hostilities, after all deductions, with upwards of 200,000 men, combatant regular forces; that is, deducting the garrisons which she left behind her in her several fortresses, but not including a volunteer force, 35,000 strong, which was organised specially for the campaign, under the leadership of Gari-

baldi. Of these the King's army, for she divided her forces into two distinct fractions, amounted to 120,000 men; the other division, under Cialdini, to 70,000 or 80,000 men. The numbers are given so variously by different authorities, German and Italian, that there is considerable difficulty in arriving at a correct estimate of them. This force was organised in four army corps; but their subordinate fractions were infinitely larger than those which the Austrians led into the field. Three of these corps were attached to the King's army behind the Oglio, and were thus organised:—

1. Durando at Lodi, 40,000.
2. Cucchiari at Cremona, 40,000.
3. Della Rocca at Piacenza, 40,000.

Each corps consisted of four infantry divisions and a brigade of cavalry.

The 4th corps (8 divisions = 80,000 men), composed exclusively the army of Cialdini, assembled at Bologna. The King's headquarters were at Piacenza.

One division of cavalry, under Sonnaz, formed at Cremona, was to maintain communication between the two armies; the Volunteers were organising at Como, while National Guards garrisoned the fortresses.

The fleet, under Admiral Persano, was to support the land operations, as it was supposed to be superior to Austria, and mistress of the Adriatic.

With regard to the character of these several armies, Austrian and Italian, the opinion has been frequently expressed that it was not much merit for the Austrians, who had twice as many men against them, to have achieved a victory, on account of the young and raw character of the Italian army; but it must be recollected that this is not perfectly true and correct with regard to their adversary, for of late years the Italians have had considerable experience in warfare. Take, for example, the campaigns of 1848 and 1849. Even at that period, Sardinia was an enemy not to be despised in the field. There were many regiments and many battalions in that army which were quite equal in all respects to the average infantry of Europe; and in the well-

considered organisation which La Marmora introduced, when he carried out the reconstruction of the Italian forces after the campaign of 1859, he took very good care to leaven those troops which were recruited principally from the south of Italy with the more hardy and more reliable conscripts from the north. It was therefore not an army by any means to be despised as to its fighting qualities. Turning to its several branches it may be stated that the artillery was undoubtedly well served in this campaign, though insufficiently horsed, and the infantry, armed with the minié rifle, did its duty fairly. The cavalry, which may be accounted for by reasons which are tolerably patent, was not so good as that which was opposed to it; for in Italy there is a great want of the material of which good cavalry is formed,—more especially horses. But, at the same time, there are instances in past history when it has done its duty remarkably well,—as at Montebello in 1859, where nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the Italian squadrons charged the Austrian infantry; and in the campaign of 1849 in Hungary, an Italian cavalry regiment in the Austrian service, commanded by Count de Novo, fought admirably against the best troops of the enemy, the well-known Hungarian hussars. So it appears there is no want of aptitude on the part of the Italians for war. When they have had the opportunity of longer service and of more experience, they will, in all probability, exhibit very considerable military qualities, quite equal to those of their neighbours.

On the other hand, turning to the Austrian army, it has been stated that the pick of the imperial levies was placed in Italy. This fact is not at all authenticated. On the contrary, the various army corps which undertook this war were composed of troops which had principally been garrisoned in Italy ever since the campaign of 1859; they were essentially the troops that were in the country at the time, and not by any means purposely selected on account of the numerical inferiority of forces which the Archduke commanded.

It is unquestionable that the Austrian army was an older army, with a great military history of its own, with officers of considerable experience, a stern system of discipline, in

which the chief fault lay on the side of too much severity, with every branch of the service well prepared and well cultivated, and was therefore more compact than that which was opposed to it. Though its enthusiasm was not great, its contempt for the Italians was very thorough.

Turning, then, from a consideration of the numbers and the relative value of the forces, it will be necessary to consider carefully the theatre of war. It is bounded by the Alps, Isonzo, Apennines, and Adda. The frontier of Austria, as determined by the results of the campaign of 1859, may be broadly taken as striking through the centre of Lake Garda, following the course of the Mincio, although it possessed some ground on its right bank, passing the fortress of Mantua; thence to the Po, not following the lower course of the Mincio, to the fortified town of Borgoforte; then cutting across the southern bank of the Po, and following to its mouth the remainder of that river, which thus formed the southern boundary of the Austrian territory in Italy. Such were the frontiers which necessarily must be attacked by the Italians in order to effect the object of their campaign, which was the conquest of Venetia, of South Tyrol or Istria, or any other province they might attack.

The principal rivers connected with the theatre on which these operations were conducted are, in the first instance, the Po, part of which was entirely in the hands of the Austrians, owing to the division of her territory there; and the whole of the left bank of the river, from a short distance above its confluence with the Mincio, was within their frontier. Naturally this main river, the Po, would present the first obstacle to the invasion of Austrian territory from the south by the Italians. The secondary river, which we may place in the first line of importance here, as constituting the frontier, was the Mincio. The character of these two rivers varies very much. The Po possesses a vast quantity of water, and is, at the particular period of the year when these operations were conducted, subject to sudden risings, owing to the violence with which its tributaries, running down from the Alps on the one side and from the Apennines on the other pour their waters into the main river. Consequently, it would be a very dangerous matter for an army to select first,

for his principal line of operations, a line which led directly across the river, where bridges which communicated with her base would be more or less damaged by sudden floods. On the other hand, the Mincio, rising as it does in the Tyrol, passing through the mountains, finds its course more or less equalised by that basin; that is to say, the waters of the Mincio seldom vary; they are sometimes at four, sometimes at six, and sometimes at eight feet, seldom higher. In consequence, the river is very easily bridged. In addition to this, the banks of the Mincio are very different in their character: in some parts they command on the right, in others on the left; and in many parts, in a dry summer, the river is fordable. Hence, while the main river, the Po, presents a firm line of defence, the Mincio has always been considered by Austrian strategists as a line which, on the whole, cannot be depended upon, and which has generally been abandoned as a strategical one.

In addition to these two rivers, the Po and the Mincio, a third presents itself in this territory, which was one of very great importance here—that is the river Adige, which, rising in the mountains of the Alps, flows down through South Tyrol; thence, already containing a very large volume of water, it issues from the mountains, streams down past the fortress of Legnano, to find its way eventually into the Adriatic. After reaching the plains, the Adige varies in breadth from 100 to 200 yards, at a round estimate. Its waters are deep and very rapid. The average depth of the river is 14 feet. It is subject to sudden risings, and consequently it is very difficult to depend upon bridges which are not permanent, and which are thrown for military purposes across it. But it was bridged by several permanent bridges: in the Tyrol by wooden ones—at Trent, Roveredo, Ala; and farther down there were bridges of a similar nature. But at Verona there were seven permanent passages which the Austrians had provided, with others at Legnano and Boara; elsewhere it was a matter of considerable difficulty to bridge the stream.

Turning from these principal rivers, the remainder which are contained within the scope of this territory are such that it will not be necessary to allude to them individually, except

with the general remark that in case the Austrian army were driven from the line of the Adige, it would not have found any position which it could have held until it reached the Piave or Tagliamento—that is to say, had Austria been driven from her fortresses on the line of the Adige, she would have had to abandon the whole of her Venetian territory before she could find a good line of military defence.

The ground which is contained in the Quadrilateral must next be considered. A glance at the map will show that there is a strip of territory here running, or rather enclosed, between the Adige and the Po, which is very narrow, and in its general aspects very peculiar. There have been a good many opinions advanced on the subject of a manœuvre which might have been attempted across this ground, so that it is a matter of some importance to master it, to see in how far those opinions are justly and soundly based. Below the road leading from Mantua to Legnano, the country is one large swamp, in what may be called the western zone of the enclosed territory referred to. This swamp, although for many years past there have been attempts made to drain and cultivate it, is still such that it prevents any great military operations being carried on in its neighbourhood.

In the eastern zone at Rovigo, the rivers form one great delta. The water-courses increase in a tenfold degree. The communications from south and north, and transversely across this territory, are very few indeed; and those which exist eastwards of that town are very bad, and barely practicable for the march of an army, all the communications running parallel to the different water-lines which extend towards the sea.

The central zone is practicable, and it is on that line, the line from Ferrara through Rovigo to Padua, that unquestionably a military operation could have been conducted. Now, in reading many of the remarks which were made shortly after this campaign was concluded, it was generally stated that the Italian army should undoubtedly have adopted this line of operation with the view of turning the defences of the Quadrilateral. Naturally it would occur to most people that these would be of very little value indeed if they could be easily

turned, and consequently, that they must depend in a very great measure for their value upon the character of the territory which runs between the river-lines they guarded. It is a matter of some importance to investigate this ground thoroughly; and the opinions herein advanced are based upon information received from those who were on the staff of the Archduke during this campaign, and enable us to determine to a certain extent in how far the views which were so generally promoted in this country are correct or not.

Now, as has been already stated, the eastern and western zones of this ground were considered, the latter impracticable, and the former difficult—that is to say, only practicable for a small force, not for the main line of operations of an army; and the central zone undoubtedly had communications which might lead an army from one river to another. But it was connected with a mass of difficulties. In the first place, an army operating from Ferrara would have to cross the Po: in the second place, three out of five of the communications leading from south to north—from Parma, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara—converge on Rovigo; and the Austrians, after the campaign of 1859, when they had been obliged to abandon Ferrara, which fortress had been surrendered to the Italians by the treaty then concluded, naturally, as Ferrara had covered this ground previously, turned their minds to find a fresh post to effect the same object. Thus they fortified Rovigo, and made of it a very strong fortress. It possessed four permanent works, with intermediate batteries, and was armed with 96 guns. In addition to that, the whole of this territory between the Adige and the Po, had the Austrians been so minded, might have been inundated. In the course of ages the deposit brought down from the mountains has gradually filled up the water-courses in the plains, and the rivers now run along a higher level, so that it has become necessary to dam them up to prevent the inundation of the surrounding country. Nothing had to be done but to cut through these dykes which enclose the water, and inundate the land.

In addition to these main rivers, the Adige and the Po, both broad and deep, both rapid, both subject to sudden risings, there were arms of the Adige which had been “canalised”—

that is to say, they had been made navigable for the purpose of transport and communication ; and each of these was broad, deep, and dammed in the same way that the main rivers were, so that general or partial inundations might have been executed over a great portion of this tract of country, through which an army might or could have passed, had that line been adopted.

Now if, in addition to the inundations and to the difficulties of the ground mentioned, it be considered that the army invading this territory or using this line of operations would have to undertake a siege ; that the delay so caused on the ground by the difficulties which it would have had to encounter would have enabled the field-army of the Archduke to have arrived at this spot long before the operation had been carried to its termination ; and that, finally, after reducing Rovigo, or masking that fortress, the Italians would have had to concentrate their forces to cross the Adige and to have accepted battle on that river,—it seems evident that any line of operation selected as a principal one from the southern position of the Po was one that the Italians justly rejected, and on very good grounds. In addition to the other peculiarities of the territory which have been named, the character of the coast which extends all round the peninsula of Istria, and which is perhaps the easiest to defend in any portion of European territory, must be remembered. The lagunes or mud-banks which enclose this territory are, as a rule, five or six miles wide. And to coast-defences Austria has paid special attention, as at Venice, Pola, and other places.

On the other hand, the plains between the Mincio and the Adige are much more open and much less difficult, although they are very much intersected by cultivation. This part of Italy is very thickly populated, is characterised by numerous towns, and consequently, owing to the population and the frequency of the habitable centres, the communications are everywhere numerous and good. So that what difficulties might be expected for an army operating in that territory must be sought in the cultivation of the country, which was very peculiar, consisting of rice-fields and vineyards, as well as ordinary crops of every sort and kind. In addition to these natural characteristics, there were the artificial features

of the ground—the railways. In 1859 Austria had not quite completed her system in this area; but at the commencement of this campaign everything she had planned was quite completed. The two principal lines are: the upper one, conducting from Milan through Bergamo, Peschiera, Verona, and so on to Venice; and the lower one, which, coming from Turin or Alessandria, conducts by way of Milan to Piacenza, Parma, Modena, and so on to Ancona. These various lines have been connected more or less transversely at several points. A railway runs from Cremona to Treviglio; another within the Quadrilateral connected Mantua with Verona; and a third line, which had been completed shortly before the war, joined Ferrara, and more especially Rovigo, through Padua with Verona. So that within the Quadrilateral Austria possessed railway communication between Peschiera and Verona, between Mantua and Verona, and between Rovigo and Verona.

The natural base of operations of the Italians would be the line of the Po, here running from east to west, and the south side of that river. But it must be recollected that a certain portion of the stream was in the possession of the Austrians. They had at a certain point only the left bank; in other parts the entire river. Hence it could not be taken at the commencement of a campaign as a primary base.

In consequence of this consideration, Italy had prepared for herself a fortified base with the view to wage this war, which it was generally known both by Austrians and Italians must come some day to an outbreak. So, starting from Piacenza, she had prepared Piacenza, Bologna, and Ancona as principal *points d'appui* in any operations she might be called upon to undertake for the conquest of Venetia; and these principal *points d'appui* were supported by other fortified places towards the line of the Adige, &c. In addition, on the river Po she had fortified Pizzighitone, Cremona, and Casalmaggiore. So that here, in the central portion of the Po, owing to the possession of the fortresses of Piacenza, &c., she was entire mistress of that river; that is to say, she commanded it, and had a power of manœuvring on either bank,—a great advantage, and one reason which induced her to select the line of operations which she eventually did.

On the other hand, the Austrian base was the Quadrilateral. The key to the whole was the fortress of Verona, which, armed with 760 guns, and possessing 22 or 23 detached forts, formed an intrenched camp, in which the Austrian army might find refuge and shelter in case of any disaster in the field. Independently of the value which its strength gave to it, Verona is placed at a point where it commands the course of the Adige, and also the two distinct lines of communication with which Austria was connected with the interior of the empire. The one runs through Vicenza and Friume, and across the Styrian mountains; the other passes up the valley of the Adige, the valley of Eysach, and eventually down the valley of the Inn to the Danube. Verona was the key of the whole system, the key of the whole position; and beyond the great additions she had made to that fortification, Austria had increased and made Peschiera into an intrenched camp, with 311 guns, upon the Mincio, offering the double purpose of securing a passage across that river, and also of retaining to Austria a fortified harbour which she might run out of according to circumstances. Thus Verona, with the Adige and Peschiera, formed a line from which Austria might, with perfect security to herself, and with very little fear of disaster or of losing her communications in case of a reverse, undertake any operation obliquely against any advance of the Italians from the Mincio towards Venice. Further, there was the fortress of Mantua, with 228 guns, distinguished principally by the inundations which surrounded it, and which rendered any manœuvres below it excessively difficult, if not impracticable, and so curtailed the space between it and Peschiera, and shortened the line which it might otherwise be necessary to defend. But further, since the campaign of 1859, Austria had established for herself on the Po the little fort of Borgoforte, which gave her the power of offensive return, by crossing the river in case she should have worsted her adversaries within the Quadrilateral and they had retired behind it.

Further, in order to complete the system of defence, she had fortified Rovigo and Legnano. Legnano commanded the southern course of the Adige, and was of service in maintaining

communications between the different fortresses which composed the system. Rovigo was strongly fortified with detached permanent works mounting 96 guns. It is impossible to ignore the fact that any such system of grouping fortresses as this must give an army an enormous advantage.

It is worth while referring here to a theory which was advanced long ago as to the value of fortresses grouped, as against fortresses isolated and scattered over the face of a country. General Willisen of the Prussian army was the first man that called attention to this question. Nothing could illustrate his theory better than the enormous strength of this group of fortresses, and its value to an army operating in Venetia. He says, if it is a fault to break up an army into separate corps, and expose it to the risk of being defeated in detail, it must be equally considered that to scatter fortifications over the face of a country is to make each of them weak and none of them strong. To strengthen your position you must group your fortresses. They offer you these advantages: first, that of unimpeded movement; and next, that of refuge in case of disaster,—that is, provided they are so constructed that one fortress forms a large intrenched camp to contain an army, and the other enables you to cross rivers which offer you freedom of movement.

To turn to the strategy of the campaign: it is evident from the political circumstances which preceded it, that the *onus* of offensive operations fell upon Italy; that is to say, she would have to determine how she would herself undertake this war. It will not be forgotten that she was at this time in alliance with Prussia; and various plans were no doubt presented to the Italian staff. Plans reached it from Prussia; plans suggested from all sides; plans suggested by public opinion. The Italian press constantly urged upon the military authorities schemes which, when investigated, do not present much solid basis. For there is hardly any science upon which opinions are so hastily and so readily offered as upon military science; and there is none, perhaps, whose details have to be mastered more thoroughly in order to form a correct and sound opinion. For instance, it was argued that as the Italian fleet was at anchor at Ancona, and as the army was at the mouth of the

Po, that a landing might be effected upon any portion of the coast of Istria, and so this army might turn the Quadrilateral, and, entering the Styrian mountains, soon make its appearance before Vienna. But the proposers of that scheme forgot that until the Austrian naval squadron at Pola was defeated, there was no possibility of entertaining the idea; and that this consideration was a sound one was subsequently shown by the defeat of the Italian fleet by the Austrian squadron, at Lissa. Again, from the mouth of the Po to the Isonzo the coast was impracticable owing to the lagunes. That of Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia was not only difficult of approach, but landing on a large scale was impracticable, owing to the poor, uncultivated nature of the littoral districts, and the consequent difficulties of subsistence. Others, again, proposed the march of the Italian army across the Tyrol, through the different mountain passes, and then to enter Bavaria, form on the rear and flank of the Bavarian army (which was at that time in strong alliance with Austria), and, turning down the valley of the Danube, endeavour to reach Vienna by that route. It is hardly necessary to allude to this point. If an illustration of such a movement were wanted, the operations of Suwarrow in 1799 will furnish it; and there we see not only the extreme difficulty of manœuvring an army, but the almost impossibility of subsisting one in the Tyrol. But several wild projects of this kind had been brought before the Italian staff. It must be recognised at once that, great as were the numerical forces which Italy possessed, to determine a competent plan of operations was no easy matter. That had been illustrated in 1848, owing to the enormous manœuvring freedom and power which an army within this system of fortifications possessed.

But the principal question here was,—considering there were those two rivers to be passed, the Mincio and the Po, in the course of the operations, which of the two should be selected for the principal line of advance? whether there should be a division, or whether the Italian army should operate with concentrated forces? Now there can be no doubt that all these difficulties presented themselves to the officers intrusted with the conduct of the operations of the Italian

army. They were not wanting in experience. There were many of them quite equal to those of other countries. Cialdini and La Marmora were both men of experience and judgment, and quite prepared to take their share in any campaign. The difficulties of the lower course of the Po have been already pointed out, so that as a principal line of operations it was at once condemned and rejected. It was necessarily their purpose to bring their numerical superiority into play, and on this side it was impossible to do so. Much immediate tactical danger would be run for prospective strategic success. Therefore the question to be argued remained, whether the Italian army should operate by the single line across the Mincio, or establish a secondary one. The former plan offered many advantages, of which larger opportunities for development of force and safe retreat in case of defeat are not the least. But it was open to the objection that over-concentration between Mantua and Peschiera was a most difficult matter, involving perfect discipline and organisation; for the force was 200,000 strong, and to manœuvre in a concentrated form on such a *terrain* required exceptional skill and exceptional mobility. There are evidently limits to concentration under modern conditions of warfare.

Now, considering the position which the Archduke held at Verona, which was the key of the system, and considering, further, that the Austrian Government and its officers, who had so long studied this theatre, had prepared specially this line of Peschiera and Verona, as important both for offence and defence, it was evident that the Archduke could not afford to leave Verona and its neighbourhood for any very great distance. It was perfectly clear that a large army posted on the Mincio menacing Verona, perhaps pushing beyond the Mincio and entering the high ground on its opposite bank, and demonstrating there, would force the Austrian commander to give to it his almost undivided attention, and there would be no room for him to move rapidly down the Adige to oppose an enemy coming from Rovigo. Therefore it was considered that if such an army were posted on the Mincio as to claim the attention of the Archduke, it would enable another army posted on the south of the Po, comparatively unimpeded ex-

cept by difficulties of the ground and the opposition of the fortresses, to find its way across the Adige into Venetia. The instant that territory was invaded, it was expected that the difficulties of the Archduke would commence; for the force, if sufficiently large, would be enabled to place itself in the old strategical positions in Venetia, and operating again thence, hold them with a certain portion of its numbers, penetrate by the valleys into the Tyrol, and so turn Verona and seize the defensive forces in that country. However much any such plan of operations, involving a division of force—and this was the one that was eventually carried out—may be condemned, and has been condemned particularly in Austria, if ever there was an occasion where a division of forces was not only excusable but even advisable, it was, perhaps, the present.

It has been stated in Austria, generally, that the defeat which King Victor Emmanuel received at their hands in this territory between the Mincio and the Po was owing to the division of his forces. This is open to question; for if an army of 100,000 strong is not able to hold its own against one that can only bring 70,000 combatants into the field, one would despair of leading it even if it numbered 200,000 men. The sole objection to division is the fear of detailed defeat; where the numerical strength is sufficient and the communication between the fractions in modern times not difficult, separation seems both necessary and sound. The Archduke was tied to Verona so long as a superior force was on the Mincio, and there is no greater proof of this than his determination to attack the King under all circumstances. Cialdini must have been therefore left more or less unfettered, and considering the embarrassment his entry into Venetia would prepare for the Austrians, this event could be waited for and observed from the Mincio in a strong, well-selected, intrenched position, or else combat could be avoided. The final battle was lost, not for want of soldiers, but because those soldiers on the battle-field were not developed during the action. The operation required calculation and precaution, and both were wanting. So, if 120,000 or 130,000 men were not sufficient to defeat 70,000, what further advantage

would have been obtained if Cialdini's force of 70,000 men had been added to them? It would have simply added to the difficulties and increased the complications. There is no doubt that the object of a superior force is to develop itself rapidly; there is no use in having a superior force unless you can bring those men into action. However much Napoleon has proved to us that a division of forces is dangerous in the presence of an active opponent like himself, it is evident that under present conditions of warfare there must be an eventual limit to concentration. That point has been most ably dealt with by the Prussian staff, whose officers boldly declare, in justification of the manœuvre which they executed in Bohemia, that they would prefer a division of forces in breadth to a concentration of forces in depth. They say there is an equal extent of ground to be covered in order to develop your troops; and that, thanks to the lateral communications and to the facilities which present themselves, it is easier in reality to develop a force for battle which is extended in front and in breadth, than one which is massed in column after column, one behind the other, along the roads. So, again, let it be remembered, there must be a limit to concentration; and therefore little objection can be found in the original plan of the Italians to place 120,000 or 130,000 men on the Mincio, and some 70,000 or 80,000 men on the Lower Po. A division of forces in that way would be calculated to develop the superiority of numbers which Italy possessed better than if they had been held in one large mass between the Mincio and the Oglio; and the objective of Cialdini was so important towards the results of the war, in entering Venetia, in raising insurrection there, and in operating from Venetia towards South Tyrol, that, as far as the strategy of the Italians has been examined, in the original plan much calculation may be found, much forecast and forethought be discovered, and little real blame can be directed.

On the other hand, the execution was faulty from the commencement. The Archduke, posted in Venetia, with his three army corps originally lying about Verona, Vicenza, and Padua, found it necessary as soon as the Italians had proclaimed war, or as soon as there was a prospect of their doing

so, to concentrate this force which he had already assembled from different parts of Venetia, and place it on a war footing entirely. He selected for his points of concentration San Martino and Montagnana on the 16th June, Pulz being on the frontier along the Mincio, Zastasnikovic at Treviso, Scudier at Rovigo. That is to say, viewing the possibility of an attack on either the Mincio or the Po, he took up a position of observation near Verona, avoiding the inner line entirely, in order to place himself on the outer flank of the King's army, thus occupying here a central position, expectant of an attack either from the south, or the north, or the west. Naturally, at present the plans of the Italian army were concealed from him. Here he was ready to operate, if the Italians should reach him from the south, on the line of the Adige, where at Legnano great preparations had been made, and cross that river; or to carry his army across the Adige at Verona, and place it in position between that fortress and Peschiera, so as to fall on the flank of the Italian army entering the region of the Quadrilateral. If the enemy remained inactive, he was to be attacked from Peschiera.

It is remarkable to notice here that, as in the campaigns of Radetzky, the Italians appear to have had very poor intelligence regarding the movements of their opponent; while he, judging from the reports that he sent to the Emperor, was very fairly informed indeed as to the movements of his adversary. It is attributed by some Austrian writers to the open comments made by the press of the country. Although they had a very active intelligence department organised for that purpose, they had little else to do than to collect the local papers in Italy to ascertain precisely the orders issued by the generals to the troops, and the exact number of troops concentrated at different points, with their commanders, and all the details about them. The Archduke made it his first purpose to shroud the offensive operations which he contemplated with perfect secrecy. It was with that object in view that he placed himself behind the Adige, leaving almost bare the intervening territory between that river and the Mincio. In addition to completing his intelligence and everything of the kind, he, by placing himself in a central position here, was

able to complete all those communications which he might require for those offensive measures on which he had determined. In fact, his very position necessitated for him the adoption of an active system of defence. The soul of defensive operations, unquestionably, is well-judged offence. So, under the circumstances in which he was placed, it was imperative for him to adopt the latter course, for he could never expect to defend the Venetian frontier while remaining behind the Adige passively awaiting the attack of his adversaries. Hence he completed his communications with Verona; executed all the necessary preparations as to the rolling stock on the different railways, which on the 17th June were placed under the control of the military authorities; and at Venice and Verona organised special trains for the conduct of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. He placed patrols along these different lines in order to guard the rail from any attacks that might be made by the populations which were hostile to the Austrian rule; and further, to guard the telegraphic communication which was so important to him. Having taken all these precautions as regarded his communications, the next point for him was to watch and cover his front. Leaving this ground comparatively bare, he simply pushed some light troops and rifles towards the Mincio on outpost duty, and also to report the enemy's movements. These were the preparations which he made, having determined on a system of active defence.

This brings us to the execution of the plans of both armies, the offensive plan of the Italians, and of the counter-plan of the Archduke. It has been argued that the Archduke himself was compelled, for his own salvation and his own safety, to take an active initiative; and if he wished to conduct these operations to a successful conclusion—that is to say, if he wished to defend the line of the Adige and the Austrian frontier successfully, he was compelled more or less to adopt offensive measures. Presuming that to be the case—presuming that to be more or less a sound conclusion (for the operation which he conducted was signally successful), it is evident that the King's last thought, posted here on the line of the Mincio, should have been to enter the Quadrilateral without very great precautions, if he entered it at all. It seems that

his position here under these circumstances, considering that Cialdini was about to operate on the Lower Po, and that the Italians had divided their armies into two unequal forces, of which the larger force was posted on the Mincio, was such that his first step towards the execution of his plan, instead of crossing into the Quadrilateral, should have been to wait until Cialdini had crossed successfully into Venetia, for it would have been very difficult for the Archduke to move down on the Lower Po and intercept this movement. However, no such considerations appear to have prevailed at headquarters. On the contrary, the King was the first to move. Instead of waiting until Cialdini undertook that operation, and avoiding the possible blow which might be struck from this position, and which was so admirably prepared for by the Austrians, the King himself, without any precautions—without pushing his cavalry forward across the river well up to Verona, to ascertain if the ground was clear or not—proclaimed war on the 20th, giving the Austrians three days to prepare their movements. Orders for marching were at once issued to the Austrian army, directing a general advance upon Verona. The Archduke had learnt that the late rains had the usual effect upon the Po and Adige, and that the natural difficulties in Cialdini's way were thus increased. He feared that this accident might induce a general concentration, and therefore determined to act offensively towards the Mincio, and in case the King's army did not move, to cross that river in search of him. Still no movement was made till the 22d, so as not to alarm the enemy; and on the evening of the 23d the Austrian positions were as follows:—

5th corps, Chievo; 7th corps, San Massimo; 9th corps, S. Lucia; reserve, Pastrengo; Pulz, Verona; Zastasnikovic, Rovigo and Padua; heavy baggage, on the left bank of the Adige. Rodich replaced Liechtenstein in command of the 5th corps.

The corps commanders were now summoned to headquarters to have the purpose of the Archduke explained to them, and thus bring about that harmony of action on which the successful issue of his plan so much depended. There was a vast difference here between the conduct of the Archduke and that

of Benedek in Bohemia under somewhat similar conditions, and the value of such an explanation to those who, carrying out the details, must otherwise act blindly, is clearly shown in the successful issue of this campaign, as compared with the disasters that attended the more important army of this double war.

On the 22d June the King decided that the passage of the Mincio should be effected on the following morning, by which time, according to the Italian calculation, three days would have elapsed.

It has been objected by the Austrians that the King moved in reality earlier than he ought to have done, according to the notice which was given. But there is no doubt that it admitted of a double interpretation, and the King used that interpretation which was most favourable to himself. One is not bound under such circumstances to consider one's adversary's interests, but one's own; and if an adversary chooses to consider that such an interval as that will be determined according to the time that will favour himself, it is his own fault if he is mistaken. However, the King moved earlier than the Austrians expected, and the Austrian manœuvre was rather impeded in consequence, but it was not the less successful on that account. The passage was effected simultaneously at different points:—

1st division, 1st corps, Monzambano; 5th division, Valleggio; 3d division, by two military bridges at Molini di Volta and Pozzuolo; reserve of 1st corps, between Volta and Borghetta; 7th, 9th, 16th divisions of 3d corps, Goito; 8th division, over a military bridge at Ferri.

The 7th and 16th divisions formed the first line at Belvedere and Roverbella, the 8th and 9th being in second line at Pozzuolo and Villa Buona, the whole being covered by the cavalry, which, preceding the army, had crossed at Goito and moved on Villafranca, cutting the railway and telegraph between Mantua and Verona, and halting finally between Quaderni and Mozzecane. The 2d corps did not cross on the 23d.

The 6th division, and part of the 4th, watched Borgoforte (a bridge-head on the Po, below Mantua) and Castalone, the

remainder of the latter corps being detached to maintain the communication with Cialdini on the right bank of the Po.

The 10th and 19th divisions remained at Castelluchio, intending to follow the general advance next day *viâ* Goito.

No opposition was offered, and Pulz fell back on Villafrauca, beyond which, at Dossobuono, a slight skirmish ensued. This only confirmed the King in the belief that the enemy had no intention of crossing the Adige; and no patrols were therefore sent to examine the high grounds on the left of the general advance, his general idea being to occupy a central position on the heights between Verona, Mantua, and Peschiera, so as to claim the attention of the enemy from Cialdini's advance. The orders for march on the 24th were issued, but were defective in precautionary measures. The general direction of the advance was alone indicated, and the baggage was directed to accompany the different corps. The bridges over the Mincio were secured.

The Archduke, on his part, had already on the 20th issued orders for his army to quit the positions which they had occupied, and on the 22d he moved rapidly up to Verona. At Verona it was purposed by the seven bridges to throw them across to the right bank of the river. He had taken great care to watch the whole of the frontier, so that intelligence of his movement should not reach his enemy.

His force consisted of 72,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, and 168 guns, and this on the night of the 23d was preparing to break out of Verona, with an Italian army of 120,000 infantry, 7000 cavalry, and 282 guns in its front, and Cialdini with 90,000 men engaged in a difficult operation in his rear.

The following dispositions were therefore issued at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 23d:—

All troops were to march at 3 A.M. The reserve division on Castelnovo; the 5th corps on S. Giorgio in Salice and Casazze; the 9th corps from S. Lucia to Somma Campagna (which was to be attacked and carried if occupied); the 7th corps from S. Massimo followed the 9th in reserve.

After this general deployment, the reserve division was to move on Oliosi; 5th corps on S. Rocco di Palazzolo and Zerbane; 9th corps to hold Somma Campagna as a pivot;

7th corps in reserve at Sona ; Pulz's cavalry, in line with the 9th corps on the plain, to cover its left flank, and, in fact, the left of the army.

The line of retreat in case of disaster was by Pescantina (9th corps), Pastrengo (5th and 7th corps), Ponton (reserve), and S. Massimo (cavalry).

The headquarters was with the 7th corps at Sona, and during a night of heavy rain, patrols were sent in the direction of Isola della Scala.

Thus the orders so issued would carry the 5th corps on S. Giorgio, and the reserve on Castelnuovo, forming the right of his line ; and the other two moving up the line of railway, would hold Somma Campagna and the intervening ground between that place and S. Giorgio.

On the other hand, the orders to the Italian troops directed them to move obliquely from the line then held, so as to occupy this self-same territory of Castelnuovo and Sona on the left, and on the extreme right Villafranca. It was the intention of the King to get possession of this high ground which encloses the lake of Garda on the south, invite attack there as he did in 1848, endeavour to fight a defensive battle in a position of considerable advantage to himself, and thus entirely to deter the Archduke from making any serious attempts against Cialdini in the meantime penetrating into Venetia.

Now the dispositions here alluded to would necessarily bring the two armies into collision with each other. And that collision ensued in consequence. It was essentially a battle of *rencontre*. The one army, the Austrians, were hastening down these heights to engage the main army of the King in case he endeavoured to move on the Quadrilateral and to join Cialdini. In that case, the Austrians were determined to fall upon his flank ; or, in the other instance, to accept battle on the heights, in a position that would also be of advantage to them. On the other hand, should the King resolve to remain inactive on the Mincio, it was the intention of the Archduke—and he had made his dispositions so as to move according to the information he received—to pass through the fortress of Peschiera, to develop his troops there, to seek the King and attack him. If it was the intention of the Arch-

duke to seek the King and attack him at any price, it was clearly the policy of the King to accept battle in an intrenched position, or to avoid battle until Cialdini had completed his operation.

Meanwhile the Italian dispositions were such as of necessity to produce collision.

1st corps (Durando — 40,000 infantry, 1800 cavalry, 72 guns) was directed to move three divisions to occupy the heights of Sona, and observe Pastrengo and Peschiera, while one division remained on the right bank at Monzambano and Pozzolengo.

3d corps (Della Rocca) was to prolong the line of the 1st corps through Somma Campagna to Villafranca: Sonnaz to cover the right at Quaderni and Mozzecane.

2d corps (Cucchiari), leaving three brigades before Mantua and one before Borgoforte, to cross with the other two divisions at Goito, and form a reserve to the 1st and 3d corps at Marmiolo and Roverbella.

The headquarters were at Valleggio.

Turning again to the Austrian side, the reserve division had moved on Oliosi and Monte Croce, and the 5th corps on S. Rocco di Palazzolo and Monte Vento. At 7 o'clock the fire opened, by which time one brigade of the 7th corps had reached Zerbane and the two others Casazze. The 9th corps, forming the pivot for the general wheel at Somma Campagna, arrived there at the same hour.

Pulz moved towards Somma Campagna, and then inclined towards Villafranca, near which place, at 7 A.M., he attacked the advance of Prince Humbert's division and Bixio.

Though the cavalry experienced terrible losses, yet the Austrian account says that "the enemy was cowed by their daring;" and certain it is that 36 battalions and 6 batteries remained henceforth on the defensive, while the enemy's cavalry, superior as it was in numbers, remained equally inactive.

This was of the greatest importance for the security of Somma Campagna, and the consequent result of the battle.

At 8 A.M. the 1st and 3d corps were already engaged; the divisions of the 2d were at Goito only.

The Austrians viewed the heights of Somma Campagna as the key of the battle-field; for, if gained, the march of the Italian 3d corps would, unimpeded, threaten directly the Austrian communications with Verona, and only required to be used with vigour in order to render the Austrian chances of success small. This was fully recognised by the Archduke, and he determined to meet the threatened danger by taking the offensive boldly, and not waiting to fight merely a defensive action, which would enable the enemy to turn the position, owing to his great numerical superiority.

The enemy, surprised along the whole line, fought bravely, but without connection, lost one portion of the battle-field after another, and eventually abandoned it altogether.

The general course of the action may thus be briefly summarised.

The Italians succeeded in taking Monte Cricol with Cerale's division of the 1st corps; but, attacked in front and flank by the infantry reserve division and part of the 5th corps, it was eventually routed. Sirtori's division of the same corps attacking the rest of the 5th corps at Pernissa, was driven back over the Tione, a small stream which, rising near Peschiera, passes through Villafranca to the Canal Blanco, and enters the sea between the estuaries of the Po and Adige.

On the eastern portion of the field, or the Italian centre, two brigades of the 9th and one of the 7th had been severely engaged. An attack on Monte della Croce, occupied by Brignone, was repulsed by the bersaglieri and grenadiers, and the division, reinforced by Cugia, inflicted two other repulses on the Austrians. About 11 A.M. Monte Torre was held by Govone, who, on Scudier advancing as far as Custozza, which he temporarily occupied, threw him again out of the village.

On this side, therefore, the battle waged indecisively, whilst the right had been decisively checked.

On the Austrian right, the reserve division was directed to Monzambano, but only succeeded in holding Salionze; the 5th corps, however, succeeded in carrying Monte Vento and St Lucia.

The defence of the positions in the centre at Monte Torre

and Monte della Croce became now much impaired. The assault of Belvidere by the reserve division was followed by a general concentric attack of the 9th corps, Scudier, and portions of the 5th and 7th corps on Cugia and Govone at Custozza, which resulted in the retreat of the Italian centre. The right, Humbert and Bixio, now being unsupported, and in danger of a flank attack, fell back on Goito and Pozzuolo, acting as a rear-guard to cover the retreat.

The Austrian army was terribly exhausted by its exertions, and the efforts it had made for a victory which was richly deserved. They had lost 8000 men and 1500 prisoners, chiefly owing to their having to take the offensive throughout, as compared with 8000 killed and wounded and 4000 prisoners on the Italian side; but while the latter had been compelled to retire upon the Mincio, disheartened and defeated, the Austrians, occupying the outer ridge of heights from Salionze, were still in a position to fight another battle, in which the element of the brilliant success on the 24th would take a most prominent part.

The loss in prisoners may seem heavy for a victorious force in a battle like Custozza; but it is to be accounted for by the fact of the enclosed ground in which they fought—companies being cut off in the vineyards and enclosed fields, and then obliged to surrender.

On the 25th the Austrians rested, and the positions occupied by the Italians were as follows:—

1st corps at Volta and Cavriana.

2d corps at Goito, less three brigades opposite Mantua.

3d, and the cavalry, at Cerlungo.

Undoubtedly the army was surprised on the 24th, to all intents and purposes. It never expected to receive the Austrians in the Peschiera-Custozza heights—it was firmly convinced that they were still in rear of the Adige; and still less did it expect, as it was quietly moving to occupy these positions, to be so roughly grasped by its enemy. It is said that the King took his usual ride that morning, and expected nothing of the sort. Certain it is that two divisions marching along the Villafranca road were charged by the Austrian

cavalry, and the generals and their suites were driven back along it.

The result of the battle was that, after a prolonged action, the troops were forced from their different positions, and compelled to retreat. The two other divisions belonging to the corps which was blockading Mantua and Borgoforte, although they had moved up from Goito, were undeveloped during the action. It was found that the train, and all the dispositions for the baggage of the army, impeded their operations to such an extent, that it took them several hours to traverse a distance of two or three English miles. But eventually they covered the retreat of the Italian army, and in that respect did good service. But the 20,000 men at Villafranca, charged by the Austrian cavalry in the morning, remained, during the whole time the action was being decided, in the hills, without taking any share in it whatever.

It was not for want of men, therefore, that the Italians lost, for there were 20,000 in Villafranca, and the two divisions at Mozzecane and Roverbella, which could not be brought into action. It was for want of developing the forces in the field of battle.

COMMENTS.

The chief defects of the Italian operations, in their own opinion, are—firstly, that the advance of the King's army should have been delayed, in order to give Cialdini time; and next, that the front occupied in crossing the Mincio was too broad, especially with the 2d corps left in such a position that it could not support the others in case of attack. They further consider that want of unity in command, with no leading spirit to guide and regulate the action, are the causes that led to the tactical disaster on the 24th. Willisen, in his criticism of the campaign, considers that the Austrian dispositions which led to the battle of Custoza are a model for imitation from the most difficult branch of military science. It was very possible, he says, that, viewing the numerical superiority of the enemy, the stroke might fail; but it was quite right to hope, at least, for success, trusting to the

Italian division of force, and to the possibility of enlisting the agency of surprise. But he does not cede the same amount of praise to the tactical operation. That demanded that the principal blow should be directed against the strategic flank, or, at any rate, against one of the flanks. This course always entails the "refusal" of one of the assailant's flanks, thus forming an order of battle more or less oblique. In this instance the strategic flank of the Italian army was the left. It was necessary to develop force on this side, therefore, on the passage of the Mincio, "refusing" at the same time the Austrian left.

As events proved, however, the battle was too much of a frontal attack, too much of a parallel order of battle to be classed among high tactical efforts. The reason for the Archduke's dispositions was, no doubt, his anxiety for his communications with Verona, which might have been endangered had his left been too far thrown back. On the other hand, it was quite possible for the Italians to have brought up their reserve by proper dispositions, and by demanding special exertions from their troops. From Castelluchio to Villafranca is but 19 miles, and had the reserves been brought up speedily on this side, and Bixio had been thrown into the highlands, leaving Humbert and the cavalry on the plain, Somma Campagna might have been attacked by double the number of troops left to defend it.

Even without the reserve, if Bixio and Humbert had been used for the purpose, it would have been possible to have held Monte Croce, and have continued the action under favourable circumstances on the 25th.

The cause of the loss in the action may be attributed to insufficient intelligence and insufficient precautions on the part of the Italians. Had their cavalry been pushed up to Verona, and into the ground in front before they advanced, it is probable they would not have lost so many men. Further, it is clear that unity of action was wanting in the Italian army; it was evident that there was no head to the army.

The battle of Custoza closes honourably for Austria the era of what may be termed bayonet tactics. At the same time, it was a pitiable sight to see on the one theatre what they

term a model campaign, fought out against surprising odds ; while, on the other, troops were brought into action under every conceivable disadvantage. It illustrates the enormous responsibility attaching to the selection of a commander in war. At present this campaign may be considered as concluding the era of shock tactics ; and Austria, in conjunction with other Powers, has since been anxiously looking forward to the cultivation of military machinery in the place of the military instruments, which had previously been made and used by her armies.

There were four courses open to the Archduke after the defeat of the Italians at Custozza:—

1. Pursuit of the King's army.
2. To take the offensive from Mantua against the right of the King's army behind the Oglio.
3. To attack Cialdini in flank by Borgoforte in case he should march near enough to the Po to unite with the King.
4. To effect a rapid operation between the Etsch and the Po or on the Etsch, should Cialdini, despite the King's disaster, persevere in his movements.

He decided on adopting the latter course, his reasons being—his ignorance of Cialdini's doings, the insufficient means at his disposal for effecting the passage of the Po, the want of an ammunition park of reserve for the field-guns, and lastly, the inadvisability of risking his communications with Verona.

Dispositions were therefore made for march with a view to concentration at Trecenta on the Canal Blanco by the 28th, but the idea was abandoned on account of Cialdini's retreat. He had only made preliminary movements for the passage of the Po on the 29th, his purpose being to mask Rovigo with two divisions and advance on Vicenza with six. But telegrams reached him on the 25th informing him of the King's defeat, whereupon he fell back upon Modena, where his headquarters remained until the 3d July.

Meanwhile the main Italian army had retired on the 26th behind the Oglio.

The Archduke, assuming that a junction of the enemy's armies was impending, called in his detachments, fortified

Valleggio, Custozza, and Somma Campagna, and crossed the Mincio on the 1st July with a view of following up his previous victory.

But news reached him on that day of the disasters in Bohemia, the supersession of Benedek, and his own appointment to the field army which was falling back on the capital. He recrossed the same day, and withdrew into the Quadrilateral. The 5th and 9th corps were recalled from Italy to the Danube, leaving only the 7th corps and a detachment under General Kuhn in the Tyrol.

The Garibaldian volunteers operating towards the Tyrol experienced a series of minor reverses, and exercised no influence on the campaign.

Cialdini advanced on the 7th July, and masking Borgoforte, which was occupied on the 18th July after a short siege, crossed the Po and Adige, and pushed detachments to Padua and Vicenza, moving with his main body in pursuit of the Austrians, who were retreating from the Quadrilateral to the Isonzo.

An armistice was concluded on the 12th August, the line of the Indrio being fixed as the line of demarcation. Meanwhile the Italian fleet had weighed anchor on the 16th from Ancona, and proceeded to the island of Lissa, where it bombarded Comisa and San Giorgi. No landing was, however, effected; and on the 19th July Admiral Tegethoff attacked the Italian squadron and defeated it, inflicting a loss of two ironclads sunk in action, and the ram *Affondatore*, which, injured in the fight, sank in the harbour of Ancona. On the 3d October peace was concluded between Austria and Italy. By it the former recognised the kingdom of Italy and the cession of Venetia to it by the French to whom it had been intrusted. By a plebiscite the annexation of the province to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel was almost unanimously voted, and with the exception of the States of the Church, the whole of the Italian peninsula was free from foreign dominion and governed by an Italian king.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

THE OPERATIONS :—

Advantages to Austrians of holding Quadrilateral—Special advantage of Verona—Line of Adige must be held.

System of defending a river from the enemy's side illustrated by the Archduke's defence of the Adige.

Austrians utilised advantages afforded by the country.

Probable reason why the Archduke delayed concentration at Verona so long.

Plan of dividing Italian forces into two armies advocated.

First point for consideration—whether a single line or double lines of advance should have been adopted?

Difficulties attending double lines ; but not insurmountable in present case, because of numerical superiority of both Italian armies—hence double line advocated.

Second point—If double line adopted, from which side (Mincio or Po) should *principal* attack be made ?—Advantages of line from Po—Disadvantages of—Advantages of line from Mincio—Use of Verona to Austrians in either case—Too dangerous to cross close to Mantua—Defect of scattering Italian forces.

Austrians obliged to conform to enemy's movements—One objection to Archduke operating from the north.

CUSTOZZA.—Orders for Austrian advance—Lines of retreat—No signs of Cialdini.

Advance of 3d corps (Italian).—Action at Villafranca between divisions of Humbert and Bixio (Italian) and Pulz's cavalry—Pulz retires on Casetta.

Advance of 1st corps (Italian).—Detailed orders for each division—Cerales's operations—Sirtori's operations—Cerales takes and loses Mount Cricol, being attacked by infantry reserve division and Piret's brigade (of 5th Austrian corps), in front and flank—Cerales retreats—Sirtori engages Bauer and Möring (of 5th Austrian corps) at Pernissa ; is defeated, and finally retreats at three o'clock.

Italian right.—Brignone's advance—Takes post on Mount Croce—La Marmora orders up Cugia and Govone.

Austrian left.—Dispositions of 7th and 9th corps and Scudier's brigade—Brignone's position threatened.

Hartung (commanding 9th Austrian corps) attacks Brignone, and drives him back—Brignone retreats to Valeggio and Pozzuolo.

Govone's advance—Ordered to assist Brignone—Reaches Mount Torre when Brignone was in retreat—With the aid of Cugia retakes heights—Defeat of Austrians on the heights.

Cugia's advance simultaneous with Govone's—Occupies Mount Croce, &c., together with Govone.

Grand attack against Cugia and Govone made by 9th corps, Scudier, and portions of 5th and 7th corps—Italians being attacked on both sides, give way—Govone and Cugia retreat.

Humbert and Bixio, no longer able to remain at Villafranca, retreat to Goito and Pozzuolo.

Disposition of Italian army for the 25th.

CHAPTER XI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1870-1871: GRAVELOTTE.

Introduction.—The campaigns examined in the previous chapter led to some important results.

The victory at Königgratz had not only placed Prussia in the leading rank of military Powers, and overshadowed the glory that had hitherto attended the French arms, but there appears to have been also an impression left on the minds of the French leaders, by the attitude and speeches of the German diplomatists, that some actual compensation would be made to the Empire for its neutrality during the war of 1866, and its efforts to bring about a satisfactory peace.

Thus as time went on an ill-suppressed feeling of irritation grew up between the countries. France could ill brook the sudden and threatening rise of a great military Power close to her borders, of a nation that she had always been disposed to place very low in the scale of military States. Königgratz had given a rude blow to her fancied supremacy among the armies of Europe, and all the soldier spirit of the Empire was ready to rise in arms against this military *parvenu* who had presumed to contest with her the leadership in the art of war.

There had never been much cordiality between the nations. The old sore of the French invasions of the countries east of the Rhine still rankled in the breasts of both. France had always laid claim to the Rhenish provinces on the left bank of the river as her natural frontier, and still hoped, if not to gain them, to at least maintain French influence preponderating there. Prussia, so much more powerful than before the war of 1866, was little likely to lend an ear to these schemes, whatever she may have hinted at or even half promised. Her far-seeing statesmen already began to view the possibility of a united Germany, of the restoration of the ancient German Empire, and were perhaps inclined to remember that Alsace and Lorraine had once owned the sway of German sovereigns. None knew better than they the value of the weapon patience, time, and skill had laid ready to their hands; none had more thoroughly probed the weaknesses, civil and otherwise, of the great military nation which, while holding to Napoleonic traditions, had lost the Napoleonic vigour,

leadership, and skill. They viewed the future, if without certainty, assuredly without dread, and their firm assumption of superiority did not tend to allay the growing want of cordiality that was too surely springing up.

Jealousy between nations, an aggregate of individuals, is but what it is among individuals of that mass. It may, and often does, lead to bitterness and wrong-doing that brings disastrous results. Jealousy of Prussia's military renown was the first cloud that arose between the rival States. The first plain evidence of this was given by the threatening appearance of the Luxemburg question in 1867.

The fortress of Luxemburg, situated to the west of the Rhine, and capital of the province of that name, was formerly a member of the German Bund, that had been formally dissolved in 1866, and was held by a Prussian garrison. The government of the State was vested in the King of Holland as Duke of Luxemburg, who eventually offered to sell it to France, despite the diplomatic interference and protest of Prussia. This arrangement would have been extremely beneficial to the Empire. Such a rectification of her frontier would not only have been in accordance with French traditions—and the Duchy itself seemed by no means averse to French influence—but it would also have improved the natural capabilities for offence the frontier had, and have opened one more door whence France could move to cross the Rhine.

The protest of Prussia is easily understood, therefore, and war seemed imminent. But the storm was not to burst yet. Thanks to the good offices of the English Ministry, this catastrophe was averted and Luxemburg became a neutral State.

The Empire seems to have been singularly blind, moreover, as to its position with regard to the other States of Europe.

Though Bavaria and Baden were members of the same religious body, and that one to which Protestant Prussia had shown unrelenting sternness and scant mercy, they did not cease to be members of the Fatherland. Whatever soreness may have been left by the events of 1866 in Western Germany, the unity of the Teuton race was dear to them; and they, as the event proved, could sink their private differences for the common weal. Assistance from them was doubtful, to say the least, in case of a Franco-German war.

Denmark was too numerically weak to count as a factor in the problem, unless the German arms, receiving a decided check, were obliged to fall back from the frontier.

Austria was too crippled by her recent losses, too unprepared, too impoverished, to be likely to lend her aid; and while on one side of her lay Italy, who owed so much to Germany, and who was still possibly her ally, on the other lay Russia, whose ill-feeling towards Austria, well known to all Europe, would hardly permit her to win successes in the field and regain a power the loss of which Russia, of all nations, had viewed with profound, if covert, satisfaction. The attitude of Austria in 1864 afforded an instructive lesson to the Czar; and an armed neutrality, coupled with the presence of several Russian army corps on the Lemberg

frontier would have checked Austria even more effectually than her own action in the Crimean war hampered Nicholas I.

Then, again, too much dependence was placed on Italy in case of an imbroglio. True, France had gone to war for the sake of the Italian idea, and had wasted blood and treasure at Montebello, Magenta, and Solferino. But nations are proverbially ungrateful, and the Italians had seen that France's generosity was not all disinterested. She had gained for Victor Emmanuel the ancient kingdom of Lombardy, but Venetia had been still left in alien hands till Prussia freed it. She had lost Savoy and Nice in return for the Emperor's aid. The most that could be expected from her was a strict and impartial neutrality, and that, as far as France was concerned, she religiously preserved.

Such was the general political situation in the spring of 1870. When the year opened few contemplated with what disaster to France and her Imperial dynasty the year would close. But it seems at least probable, from the events which afterwards occurred, that none knew better than the German Chancellor that anything like German interference in what France deemed her affairs would be likely to bring about a struggle which—provided Baron Stoffel's reports and the accounts of the Prussian system of espionage have any basis of truth, or if akill, numbers, and complete preparation, as against weak *cadres*, maladministration, and faulty organisation, count for anything in the game of war—could have but one ending.

The cause was not long wanting. A prince of the house of Hohenzollern was nominated for the then vacant Spanish throne. Knowing the intense feudalistic feeling that exists in Germany between the scions of the noble houses and their heads, it is certainly unlikely either that it was done without the direct knowledge and consent of the head of the house of Hohenzollern, King William of Prussia, or that the latter was incapable of exercising such powerful influence on the prince as to prevent any attempt at further candidature on his part.

It must further be remembered that Spain, almost a mere peninsula of France, separated from her by a mountain-barrier only, with the same form of religion, and, from race, with French rather than German sympathies, had been essentially regarded by the French as more dependent on her than on the more distant empires of Europe. To place a German prince on the Spanish throne, especially if he succeeded in raising it to a high and powerful position, would be a menace to her southern frontier in case of the war with Germany that she felt must come sooner or later. With Spain openly hostile, or an ally of Germany's in any way, her position in case of war would be rendered dangerous in the extreme. Small wonder, then, if the demand for a withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature was followed up by a request that such candidature, viewing the power the King had over the princes of his house, should never be repeated. The feeling of bitterness was increased to the utmost; the whole tendency of the speeches of the leading orators in France, with rare exceptions, betrayed intense irritation.

Finally, when from the King of Prussia came the refusal to submit to

French dictation in the matter, the overstrained tension became too great; the usual diplomatic rupture ensued, and France, ill prepared and unready, entered with "a light heart" into a war almost *à outrance* with the greatest military Power in Europe.

In order to understand the conditions under which France and Prussia took the field, it will be necessary first to study briefly the organisation of each army since 1866; but the actual numbers given are only approximate.

The Austrian campaign had demonstrated that Prussia had, under cover of a long peace, obtained a tremendous start, which rendered her military power dangerous to France; and she began to reorganise, under Marshal Niel's able guidance. He desired to place the line regiments on a footing of 2 active battalions of 8 companies, and 1 depot battalion of 6 companies, the former only having *compagnies d'élite*. On a war footing the regiment was to be increased to 3 field battalions of 7 companies, 1 depot battalion of 6 companies—altogether, 27 companies. The two first battalions only were to have *compagnies d'élite*, but the companies were to be strengthened and brought up to that of the Prussian army, 1000 strong. But no illustration could better demonstrate the difficulties attending sudden and radical military changes than the fact, that the ministers overtaken by the Luxemburg complications in 1867, were obliged to renounce reforms which had been partially commenced and which require time to complete, and to return unwillingly to the old order of things.

In 1868 the first great step accomplished was the equal distribution of the *compagnies d'élites* throughout the army, which, however, met with much antagonism. The line regiment consisted of 3 battalions each of 8 companies. For war each battalion gave up 2 companies, the 7th and 8th, which together formed the depot battalion, and then consisted of 6 companies, 3 officers and 112 men each—or, in all, 672 rank and file. One hundred regiments of the line would thus give a total of 201,600 men belonging to the field battalions, and 67,200 belonging to the depot battalions.

20 rifle battalions,	13,500
do. depot division,	4,480

3 regiments Zouaves for field,	.	.	.	5,988
do. depot,	.	.	.	1,710
3 regiments Turcos for field,	.	.	.	7,660
do. depot,	.	.	.	1,260
Foreign regiments (3 battalions) field,	.	.	.	2,076
do. (1 do.) depot,	.	.	.	672

These numbers offer the following totals (up to 1868) on an ordinary war footing: The Imperial Guard, 15,000—field battalions of line and other regiments, 230,700,—together making 245,700; and depots, 75,500.

The troops were armed with the chassepot rifle. The cavalry was divided into heavy (cuirassiers and carbineers), line (dragoons and lancers), light (mounted rifles, hussars, and spahis). The cavalry of the Guard consisted of 1 regiment each of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons, lancers, guides, and spahis, each regiment having 4 field and 2 depot squadrons. The remaining cavalry consisted of 10 regiments of cuirassiers, 12 dragoons, 8 lancers, 12 rifles, 8 hussars, 4 African chasseurs, and 3 spahis; of these each light regiment had 4 field, 2 depot, and each heavy or medium, 4 field, and 1 depot squadron, composed of 8 officers, 164 men, and 150 horses. These 63 regiments offered a total on a war footing of 38,675 men for the field squadrons, and at the depots 15,687 sabres. From this paper calculation large deductions must be made. The breeding of horses had been neglected in France, and great efforts had been made since 1866 to promote the supply, but with little success and great expense. The remounts were therefore chiefly purchased in Hungary, Holland, and England. Thus in 1870 the French cavalry ready to take the field cannot be reckoned at more than 30,000 sabres, 12,000 horses being left in the depots, one-half of which were unfit for service.

The artillery had 2 branches, Guard and line, with 6 pieces to a battery, amounting altogether to 164 field batteries, of which 38 were horse artillery, 24 mitrailleuses, and 30 reserve.

The French field army on a war footing would thus on paper number about 285,000 infantry and cavalry, and 984 guns, with 91,000 infantry and cavalry in second line at the depots.

The peace footing represented only about two-thirds of

this number; and as the calling in of the reserves was by no means simple, it was not possible on an emergency to reckon on more than 200,000 combatants—a very small comparative force for a country of the population and wealth of France.

The law of 1st February 1868 was designed to remedy this weakness, but in reality it altered little. It divided the army into (1) the active army, (2) the reserve, (3) the mobile national guard. Every Frenchman was called upon to serve either in the regular army or the *garde mobile*; but still no new corps or even *cadres* were created, and all had to be improvised on the outbreak of war. Recruiting was effected by calling in the annual classes, by volunteers, and by re-enlistment. Substitution was allowed in the regular army, not in the mobiles. The contingent, generally assumed at 100,000, to be supplied, was determined annually by the Legislature. The period of service was 9 years, 5 in the active army and 4 in the reserve. The reserves were only to be called out by Imperial decree in case of war, according to the annual classes, with a view to keeping the regular army on a field footing. The reserve men were permitted to marry during the last two years without special permission. Taking an annual contingent of 100,000 men, its distribution would probably be as follows: Deducting 9000 for the marines and 14,416 for those who had volunteered and those exempt for social reasons, there remains for the active army, 76,584. This was divided into two portions,—the 1st to be called in for actual 5 years' service, about 63,000; 2d, to serve three months for the first year, two months for the second, but to be always liable, 13,584. Of the first about 20,000 purchased substitutes who only undertook the 5 years' active service.

Thus the conscripts of the 1st portion in 5 years offered a total of 215,000, and of the 2d portion, 68,000, without including death or casualties. The law thus mutilated in formation did in reality little for the field army; but Marshal Niel purposed and hoped to form marching regiments, say of 2 battalions, out of the depot battalions by filling these up. Only then it would be necessary to create them in the first instance, and afterwards to refill their place and duties as

sources of reinforcement and garrisons. These duties were to be undertaken, according to the law of 1st February in 1868, by the mobile guard, which was to recruit itself, 1st, from men found fit for service who had escaped the active army by lot; 2d, exempts for social reasons; 3d, those who had purchased substitutes from the regular army.

The period of service being 5 years, the mobiles were never to be called out more than 15 times a year to exercises, and never for more than 24 hours at a time. The officers were to be appointed by the Emperor, the non-commissioned officers by the military authorities of departments. The execution of this law met with much antagonism, but as long as he lived Marshal Niel insisted on its exercise. When Le Bœuf took his place the drills were discontinued, officers were appointed still, but were incapable throughout.

The French Government calculated upon a force of 550,000 men in 318 strong battalions, and 128 batteries of guns of position. At Marshal Niel's death there were already organised on paper only 112 battalions and 91 batteries; clothing for 100,000 men was ready, and about the same number had attended a few drills. After that event no further advance was made, and the state in which France undertook the war may be easily realised.

The Prussian army was on a vastly different footing.

During the war of 1866, preparations had been made by Prussia for increasing her army; and after its victorious conclusion it was comparatively easy to include the annexed provinces as well as the territories of the North German Confederation in her military system.

Infantry.—Before the treaty of Prague 1866, Prussia maintained 1 guard and 8 provincial corps, all organised on a uniform principle: each consisted of 9 infantry regiments of 3 battalions each, 1 rifle battalion, 6 cavalry regiments, 1 artillery brigade, 1 pioneer, and 1 train battalion, giving in all 30,000 infantry and cavalry, with 96 guns. In consequence of the annexations 3 new corps were formed, thus giving 11 corps without the guard; but in reality only 16 instead of 27 new regiments were raised, as the gap was to be filled by the contingents of the small states of the North German Con-

federation. When Saxony joined the Confederation, her army constituted the 12th corps.

The German infantry, thus organised, without the Landwehr, consisted of—

9 guard regiments of 3 battalions,	. . .	27
88 Prussian infantry regiments,	. . .	264
17 Confederation contingent do.,	. . .	51
2 battalions rifles of guard,	. . .	2
14 battalions provincial rifles,	. . .	14
		<hr/>
		358

The battalion was 1000 strong, and contained 4 strong companies.

Under this system, when mobilisation ensued, one relief battalion was formed for each regiment of infantry, and one relief company for each battalion of rifles.

Within two months a second relief battalion could be easily formed from the available material, so that the first was thus released for field duty.

Thus the North German army, without improvising, could place in the field at once, in first line, about 358,000, and in second, 117,000 men—giving a total of 475,000 infantry.

The dragoon regiments had been increased from 16 to 23, by the addition of Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, and Saxon regiments; the hussars from 12 to 16, with the addition of the Brunswick troops; and, lastly, the 16 lancer regiments were increased by the two newly-raised Saxon regiments,—thus in all giving a total of 74 regiments.

Each regiment had 4 field and 1 depot squadrons of 150 sabres, all completely organised in time of peace; and the last capable of expansion with the aid of the reserve and Landwehr system,—thus enabling Germany to place in the first line 44,000, and in the second, 11,000 sabres, giving a total of 55,000 men.

Artillery.—To each corps was attached an artillery brigade, consisting of 1 regiment of field and 1 of garrison artillery; but the new corps were not yet complete in the last branch. Each field regiment was organised on a war footing into 5 divisions—1 mounted, 3 foot, and 1 train. Each foot division had

4 batteries—2 of six, and 2 of four pounders, rifled breech-loaders ; and the mounted division had 3 batteries, each of 6 four-pounders. A regiment thus developed 15 batteries, or 90 guns.

In war each field regiment formed a relief division of 2 foot and 1 mounted batteries—in all, 18 guns ; giving 13 regiments of 1170 guns in first line, and 234 in second line.

The garrison artillery in war gave 176 companies, or 36,000 men ; and yielded material for garrisoning fortresses and coast defences, and supplied men for working siege guns in an offensive campaign.

Landwehr.—For the purpose of recruiting, administering, and embodying the Landwehr, the North German Confederation was divided into 12 corps districts, and each of these, again, into 9 minor districts—viz., 1 Landwehr reserve battalion district, and 8 Landwehr regimental districts ; but these last were not uniform throughout. Each district supplied the proportion of infantry, cavalry, and artillery recruits required for the constitution of the army corps.

Moreover, upon the same territorial subdivision was based the Landwehr of the garrison army of Prussia.

This consisted of 2 guard Landwehr regiments, 2 guard grenadier regiments of 3 battalions, 1 battalion in each Landwehr battalion district, 1 company for every battalion line rifles, 2 cavalry regiments, 4 squadrons for each army corps, 3 batteries for each field regiment. These troops could be organised by regiments, brigades, or divisions according to need, to act as strategic reserves, siege corps, or for guarding the country. The guard Landwehr battalions numbered 800 men, the provincial battalions 700, the rifle companies 250, the cavalry regiments 600 sabres, the battery 6-guns, besides companies of garrison artillery.

Thus the Landwehr infantry of each corps was 17 battalions of 700, or 11,900 men, and 1 company of rifles, 250 men,—giving a total of 12,000 men,—or, for the 12 army corps, 144,000 soldiers. The Landwehr cavalry, at the rate of 1200 men per corps, gave for the 12 corps 14,400 sabres. The batteries of 18 guns per corps afforded 216 guns ; the 12 battalions of the Landwehr of the guard gave 9600 men. The Land-

wehr therefore numbered in all 168,000 infantry and cavalry, and 216 guns.

The law for military service in Germany was universal liability without substitution, and all persons, with certain exemptions, had to serve from their 20th to 28th year in the regular army, and five years more in the Landwehr. In case of war, the operating army was completed from the reserves first; and the sick or convalescent men of the reserves, with the recruits, were called in to form the relief battalions; while, lastly, Landwehr men formed garrison battalions. In addition to the above forces, were those of the other German States. Hesse-Darmstadt had, in first line, 11,200 infantry and cavalry, and 36 guns; in the second line, 4800 infantry and cavalry, and 6 guns; and, in the Landwehr, 5100 infantry and cavalry, and 6 guns. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden had agreed in 1867 to accept the Prussian system as the basis of their organisation, and could dispose of the following troops:—

Bavaria: first line, 58,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, with 192 guns; second line, 20,000 infantry and cavalry, and 48 guns; and Landwehr 22,400, with garrison artillery.

Wurtemberg, first line, 21,400 and 54 guns; second line, 5200 and 12 guns; and third line, 4200 and garrison artillery.

Baden: first line, 19,800 infantry and cavalry, and 54 guns; second line, 3400 and 6 guns; third line, 7000 and 6 guns.

Thus the German field army consisted, in round numbers, of 518,000 men, 1506 guns.

France, 285,000 men, 984 guns.

The depots of Germany, 161,000 men.

The depots of France, 91,000 men.

The garrison army, Germany, 187,000 men.

The garrison army of France, *nil*.

Such were the forces at the disposal of the two nations in case of an outbreak of hostilities.

That war was actually desired by the French, with blind confidence in their military skill, and equally unwise depreciation of that of their possible adversary; is undoubted, and that it was accepted by the Germans as undeserved, and recklessly forced upon them, is equally true.

From the first, no thought crossed the minds of the mass of the French people, but that of an undisputed march at least to the Rhine. A rapid offence, grand victories on German soil, were confidently expected; while the earliest attitude of the Germans indicates that their first ideas were those of active, not passive defence.

France had this advantage, that, harbouring warlike intentions, with centralised authority, her preparations might have been matured behind the cloak of diplomacy. Grain, horses, arms, and clothing had been gradually introduced and were present in abundance.

In peace the French army was not divided, as a rule, into divisions, brigades, and corps. The commands extended over large districts, and all the troops in such districts were placed under them. The field army had to be formed for war. In 1859 it took several weeks, but in 1870 this had been worked out theoretically, and the movement of troops eastwards, and the calling in of the furlough men, commenced early in July. On the 16th of that month, the orders for the mobilisation of the Prussian army were issued. Up to that date it had been in its ordinary state. The war came upon Germany with great suddenness, and yet she was not surprised. Everything that France had to prepare during months had been prepared for years in Germany. The military organisation of the latter Power was complete and perfect, her attitude one of permanent readiness.

The bellicose expressions of the Ministers in Paris on July 15th, made war inevitable. No use whatever was made of diplomacy, for a profound conviction existed in France that she had the start, and her entire ignorance of German institutions led to a fatal confidence. War therefore was declared in Berlin on the 19th. But a certain amount of time was required even by the German organisation. The Ersatz (reserve) men had to be called in; the required number of horses had to be completed; ammunition and subsistence columns had to be formed; arms and clothing distributed; the armies concentrated. Whoever, in modern days, succeeds in effecting these preparations in the shortest space of time, will gain the initiative, and all its attendant advantages,

especially that of playing the game of war on the enemy's ground.

The system of mobilising was very different with the belligerent armies.

France threw her peace garrisons towards the frontier, there formed them into corps, divisions, brigades, and then made them mobile.

Germany mobilised in the separate districts, then marched to the frontier in order to concentrate.

A certain amount of fighting capacity is inherent even in peace organisation. Improvised transport will carry the most necessary effects, and as long as the ammunition lasts, the troops are available for action. France, therefore, was quite right to mass her garrisons at once on the frontier intending war, as by that means she might at once move into the enemy's territory. Her garrisons had always been ordered with this object in view, cavalry and artillery being cantoned along the eastern frontier. At Paris, Chalons, and Lathany entire corps were quartered, and, thanks to the power over railways held by the State, the transport of these troops by rail to their destination along the frontier was completed in a very short space of time. Though the companies were incomplete, and the artillery also, while transport had to be formed, nearly 200,000 men were assembled on the German frontier by the 20th July. Moreover, the French railways continue into Germany, and the supplies could be forwarded by them on German territory as well as on French. Under any circumstances, 60,000 men were available, and the movement to the Rhine should have been commenced with them, even if the Germans could have opposed a similar number, which they could not.

Saarlouis, Landau, and Gemersheim, the interposing fortresses, were not armed, were of old style, and had but small garrisons, while, moreover, they were not on the railway. The French might have been on the Rhine from Bingen to Lauterburg by the 26th.

This attempt was not made, but an investigation of the facts shows that it should have been.

The French might have destroyed the bridges and bridging

materials on the Rhine, and restricted the Germans to a few points of passage only; the first serious action might then have been fought at Mayence instead of Metz.

If the Germans attacked by Coblenz, the retreat of the French into Alsace was always open.

Even if the 60,000 men had not been reinforced, there was no real danger from the German attack, and great advantage would undoubtedly have been gained. The three Prussian divisions on the left bank of the Rhine would have been distributed in their organisation, and the morale of the French army elevated.

The first battles would have been fought on German ground, while the power of destroying the railways from the Rhine into France on retreat and of delaying the German operations, which was so desirable, still remained.

It is instructive to observe the carelessness with which the French commenced the war, doubtless attributable to ignorance of their enemy.

Every Frenchman believed that war would be carried into Germany. Yet the Germans were actually ready before the French.

As regards ammunition and food on the French side, the latter were prepared only for offence, and even then insufficiently. Stores and material existed in the frontier fortresses, and the food-supplies were as near as possible to the frontier.

All other precautions for defence had been and were neglected—the fortresses were incomplete and imperfectly armed, the railway system insufficiently organised.

The French were disposed for attack, upon which they were nevertheless unable to decide, and all the advantages of such a course slipped away from them, the disadvantages alone remaining.

The enemy was soon informed of the concentration of the French peace garrisons. Probably he was equally conversant with other questions which might lead to a fair estimate of the morale and state of preparation of his adversary. The disorder caused by the arrival of complements belonging to a hundred different regiments was extreme; many days were yet required to order horses and waggons; more men were

yet expected to arrive ; the railway officials were unpractised in regulating the overwhelming press of work suddenly thrown upon their hands.

But the army at length assumed a definite shape, and was now composed of 8 corps, each containing three or four infantry and one cavalry division, and a cavalry reserve, under the supreme command of the Emperor, as follows :—

Guard (Bourbaki), first Nancy then Metz ; 1st corps (Macmahon), Hagenau, Strasburg ; 2d corps (Frossard), St Avold ; 3d corps (Bazaine), Metz, then Bouzonville ; 4th corps (Ladmirault), Thionville ; 5th corps (De Faily), Bitsche ; 6th corps (Canrobert), Chalons ; 7th corps (Felix Douay), Belfort ; three cavalry divisions.

The whole force complete should have been 260,000 infantry and cavalry, but most regiments had turned out on their peace footing, awaiting completion on the frontier. At the commencement of August it could not have numbered more than 200,000 men.

The French frontier is salient in form ; one side from Sierck to Lauterburg being 90 miles—the other, Lauterburg to Hunningen, 100 miles long : while the States of Luxemburg and Belgium were neutral on the left, and Switzerland on the right. The French had occupied both sides of this strategic triangle, their principal concentration, about 90,000 men, being at Metz, with De Faily two days' march, and Canrobert six days' march away. Again, De Faily was 25 miles from Hagenau, and Macmahon 88 miles from Douay at Belfort. It is difficult to understand these French positions, but it is stated that the Emperor's plan of campaign was to mass 150,000 at Metz, 100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 at Chalons, the purpose of this double concentration being to conceal his own plans and lines of operation until prepared for entire concentration, which was to be effected near Maxau, where the Rhine was to have been crossed between Rastadt and Gemersheim. Canrobert was to move from Chalons to Metz, and cover the communications of the army, and the fleet was to perform a diversion by effecting a landing on the north coast of Germany.

If this be so, the campaign commenced before the partial

concentration had been effected, let alone the grand concentration.

As towards France the German frontier is in this case rectangular, and opposite it three armies were at once placed into the field with a view to attack, if not deprived of the initiative by the earlier preparations of France. They were composed as follows:—

First Army.—Steinmetz: 7th corps (Zastrow); 8th corps (Von Göben); 3d cavalry division (V. Gröben). Altogether, 54,800 infantry and cavalry, and 180 guns.

Second Army.—Prince Frederick Charles: guard corps (Württemberg); 3d corps (Alvensleben II.); 4th corps (Alvensleben); 10th corps (Voigts Rhetz); 12th corps (Crown Prince of Saxony); 5th, 6th, and Saxon cavalry divisions. Giving a total of 174,000 infantry and cavalry, with 534 guns.

Third Army.—Crown Prince of Prussia: 5th corps (Kirchbach); 4th corps (Bose); 1st Bavarian corps (V. Thann); 2d ditto (Hartmann); Württemberg division (Obernitz); Baden division (Beyer); 4th cavalry division and Bavarian reserve cavalry. In all, 140,800 infantry and cavalry, and 480 guns.

South Germany had given in its adhesion to Prussia, and mobilised about July 16th. The 1st corps (Manteuffel), the 2d (Franzecky), the 6th (Tümppling), and the 9th (Mannstein), remained in Germany, quite ready to reinforce the field army or act on any emergency, the latter being originally intended for coast defence. The 1st and 2d corps concentrated at Baden, and then joined the first and second armies; the 12th corps, from Saxony, uniting finally with the latter; while the 6th corps concentrated in Silesia to watch Austria, but joined the Crown Prince after Wörth.

The depot troops and the Landwehr are not included in this estimate, but altogether they numbered 150,000 to 170,000 men.

The territory of the North German Confederation was divided for the duration of the war, moreover, into five districts, in which troops were located under generals specially selected with special instructions.

The direction given to the three armies from Coblenz, Mayence, and Spire, the earliest points of concentration on the Rhine, was towards the French frontier. Steinmetz by

Saarlouis, Frederick Charles by Kaiserslautern, and the Crown Prince by Landau through the Palatinate.

The King of Prussia, in supreme command of the united armies, reached Mayence on August 2d. The district which formed the actual theatre of war is enclosed between the northern frontier of France, the Rhine between Lauterburg and Strasburg, and the area between the railways leading from Paris to Strasburg and Paris to Brussels. The Rhine itself is from 200 to 400 yards wide, and bridged at Basle, Strasburg, Mannheim, Mayence, and Coblenz. The towns of Rastadt, Gemersheim, Mayence, and Coblenz, on or near it, are fortresses.

This district is further subdivided by the Vosges Mountains into an eastern and western division.

To the east of the Vosges is the province of Alsace, watered by the streams which flow from the hills to the Rhine—viz., the Lauter, Moder, and the Sorn. To the west is Lorraine, stretching away to the Meuse, hilly, but well cultivated, and almost as fertile as Alsace. Its principal river is the Moselle, which between Frouard and Thionville is shallow, with many islands. It first becomes important at Toul, and there are seven bridges between Toul and Sierck—viz., Toul, Frouard, Pont-à-Mousson, Noveant, Ars-sur-Moselle, Metz, and Thionville, of which the first and two last are fortified. The river is itself an important line of communication, as it is navigated by steamers, and there was no railway between Coblenz and Trèves. The Saar, which in fact masked the frontier, is an affluent of the Moselle, and the Nied is one of its tributaries.

The principal passes which unite the plain of Alsace with the hills of Lorraine are Bitsche, a fortified town, with 3000 inhabitants, between Hagenau and Saargemund; Lutzelstein on the road from Hagenau to Saar-Union; Pfalzburg on that from Strasburg and Saverne to Fenestrang; Lichtenberg between Hagenau and Saargemund. There were five fortresses—viz., Strasburg; Marsal on the Seille, a place of no importance; Toul, on the railway; Metz, on the Moselle; and Thionville, a *tête de pont* on the right bank of the same river. Metz is a fortified town with 60,000 inhabitants. Until the introduction of rifled guns, it was a fortress of first rank; but even then

there were no thoughts of altering the character of the fortress, as France was not apparently in danger of invasion. But after Sadowa the case was different. It was evidently necessary to fortify it on modern principles, with detached works, like Coblenz or Cologne; and accordingly, these improvements were commenced in 1868.

Four of the forts were taken into execution at once: two, Queleu and St Julian, on the right bank; two, Plappeville and St Quentin, on the left bank of the Moselle. In the spring of 1870, the construction of a new fort at St Privat was commenced, for the protection of the several lines of railway which have one common station; and other minor forts were projected to connect and flank the larger ones. The outer circumference of detached works was about 14 miles, and all these forts were on eminences.

Turning to the railway system, we find that from Metz the eastern line enters German territory at Forbach to Mannheim and Heidelberg, with branches to Trèves and Bingen. The northern line, by Thionville and Luxemburg, to Liège, branching by Sedan to Mezières. The southern line, on the left bank of the Moselle, enters the main Paris-Strasburg line at Frouard; and this main line is connected with Mezières by two branches by Chalons and Epernay *via* Rheims. The western line was opened for a short distance in 1867, and should have been completed in 1871; it was intended to connect Metz with Chalons by St Menehould and Verdun.

Thus, if in organisation France was inferior to her adversary, she was equally so in her fortifications, preparations, and strategic communications.

There were five lines of operation available for the French:

1. By Belgium (Lille to Cologne and Wesel), but this was neutralised.
2. Trèves to Coblenz.
3. Saarbrück to Mayence and Mannheim.
4. Toul to Saverne and Strasburg.
5. Belfort and Mulhausen.

The entire length of the frontier was about 230 miles, and

the northern portion was at first but weakly defended along the line of the Saar, which was most threatened.

It was quite possible for the French to concentrate in very superior force against this line on and after the 28th July, at a time when the German concentration was only commencing. For this reason the earnest defences of the frontier line was abandoned by the Germans, who contented themselves with simply observing it. One battalion only stood in Saarbrück. Saarlouis was garrisoned, and the outposts were provided by the garrisons in the Palatinate, as well as by the Bavarian garrisons of Landau and Gemersheim ; but these fortresses were insufficient to stay an invasion. Rastadt was also occupied, and the bridge at Kehl destroyed, while preparations were made to obstruct the use of gunboats on the Rhine. The Baden division concentrated at the former place, and, on the 25th, was ready to take its share in the concentration of the 3d army, so as to secure the Rhine passages for its use, or to defend the upper passages should the French attempt them.

A Würtemberg detachment had been also sent to demonstrate along the Black Forest, and from its success in this respect led the French to believe that a corps was collected in that area.

The principle enlisted was to obtain complete concentration at secure points before the commencement of earnest operations. It was preferable to abandon territory rather than to accept action with inferior force ; and thus the Rhine, or its lower course, was taken as the line of general concentration and defence.

But the French corps were not completed sufficiently early ; artillery train and ambulances were still wanting, and the regiments were yet incomplete.

Thus July passed away without any of those definite enterprises on their part which the Germans had dreaded so much. The operations hitherto were characterised only by outpost skirmishes ; and in this even the French had shown little skill, for a viaduct on the Saargemund line was broken by a bold raid of German cavalry.

The Emperor Napoleon left St Cloud on the 28th to join the army, and arrived at Metz to find everything still in

disorder, and the town full of amateurs. As before said, his general plan was to concentrate 100,000 men at Strasburg, 150,000 at Metz, and 80,000 at Chalons, and uniting these at Maxau, cross into Baden, thus separating North from South Germany, and disturbing the German concentration. The strategic front of the French had been assumed with a view to the initiative, and the magazines were prepared accordingly; but entire ignorance existed of the Prussian plans, or their capacity for concentration.

Lastly, the French naval preparations were equally tardy—nothing was ready at Cherbourg, and the possibility of employing the fleet to create a diversion on the northern coast soon ceased to be a source of anxiety.

On the 2d August the first effort was made by the French to assume an appearance of activity, the purpose being mainly to conceal their actual want of preparation under the guise of a reconnaissance in force. The Emperor, with the Prince Imperial, was present; and the result of an unimportant action at Saarbrück, in which the 2d corps was opposed by only a few outpost troops, ended in the capture of the town.

At this time the French forces were somewhat irregularly scattered along the frontier. Macmahon had been directed to move to the northward, and was advancing by Hagenau on Fröschwiller, which is near Wörth, with Douay's division pushed forward on the right of his march to Weissemburg. The 5th corps was at Bitsche, linking this right wing with the left, which was chiefly massed near S. Avoird, opposite Saarbrück, Metz, and Thionville.

On the other hand, the three compact German armies concentrated at Trèves, near Mayence, and at Landau, were fully prepared to assume the offensive; and the left wing of this vast force, the army commanded by the Crown Prince, was first put in motion on the 4th of August to turn the left of the scattered French line, and force the defiles of the Vosges.

Thus while the 1st army was directed on the Saar, and the 2d was to advance through the Palatinate, the 3d army moved from Landau and Gemersheim against the almost independent force under Macmahon.

The order of march from the right consisted of the 2d

Bavarians, the 5th and 11th corps with Werder, the 1st Bavarians and 4th cavalry divisions being in reserve.

The French had placed the 2d division of the corps, amounting to 8 battalions, 18 guns, and some cavalry, under Abel Douay, at Weisseburg; and that general had reported the Prussian concentration to Ducrot at Wörth, who ordered him to stand and accept action, though he was himself ignorant of the enemy's strength, and not within supporting distance even, when an attack in considerable force was more than probable.

The lines of Weisseburg were in a state of decay, but south of it the position is favourable, and though the town itself is fortified in the old fashion, it still might easily have been rendered safe from assault. It was occupied with two battalions, and the rest of the division was posted on the Geissberg, with small detachments holding the passages of the Lauter.

The unequal character of the impending action requires no comment. The surprise was complete, the ground favouring to conceal the Prussian movement, and no cavalry was employed by the French to obtain information of the threatened danger.

The 2d Bavarians commenced the action by opening fire on the town, and the 5th corps crossed the Lauter at St Remy, while the 11th corps effected a passage further down the stream, and Werder moved on Lauterburg.

The French position was thus taken in front and flank, and it was fully time for Douay to retire. But his orders had been to accept battle, and the action continued till at noon Weisseburg was stormed, and an attack was then made on the Geissberg hill in rear. The first attempt to storm it was bloodily repulsed, the fire from the castle being so annihilating that the assailants were compelled to await the result of the flanking movement. Finally, the French batteries were taken under infantry fire, and destroyed. Douay was killed, and the French retreated upon Wörth, but feebly pursued by the victors, as only the divisional cavalry was present.

The Prussian loss amounted to 700 men, with 76 officers; that of the French to 2000, half of which were prisoners.

The Germans had brought 22 battalions and an overpowering force of artillery against the weak French division, and bivouacked on the ground occupied by it. When all the troops were across the Lauter, they occupied a strategic front of 17 miles.

Macmahon, informed of this disaster, determined to concentrate at Wörth, where troops had been moved by rail, on the 4th and 5th, and also ordered the 1st division of the 7th corps up from Colmar, which, reaching Hagenau without artillery at 2 A.M. on the 5th, marched on Wörth.

On the 5th the Germans advanced—the 2d Bavarians to Lembach, followed by the 1st; the 5th corps to Preuschkorf, the 11th on Sulz, and Werder on Aschbach.

Macmahon determined upon accepting action, as he was reluctant to abandon Alsace without fighting, and to commence the campaign by retreat.

His entire force only amounted to five infantry and two cavalry divisions, but the 5th corps was placed at his disposal from headquarters, and orders were sent to De Failly at Bitsche, 18 miles from Wörth, to join him as soon as possible. The railway from Bitsche to Hagenau passes 5 miles from Wörth, but De Failly only directed his 3d division to move off on the morning of the 6th, and even this was counter-ordered when within 10 miles of Wörth, for the general feared being attacked himself, and Macmahon was thus left without the anticipated support.

The position at Wörth is strong. The ground selected for defence was commanding and partly wooded, while the Sauer which runs along its front is a deep rivulet with scarped banks only passable at Görsdorf, Wörth, and Gunstet.

Macmahon was altogether in the dark with regard to the enemy. His cavalry were not employed, and the details of the Prussian march were therefore not reported. He made, however, the following dispositions of his army:—

First line.—Ducrot, 1st division, left; Raoul, 3d, centre; Lartigue, 4th, right.

Second line.—Conseil Dumesnil, right; Pellé, 2d division, centre.

Cavalry.—Behind the right and centre.

The bridges on the Sauer were left standing ; this was an error in judgment, for there was no room for offence against such odds, and these points of passage were only valuable to the Germans.

The action was not expected till the 7th, nor was it proposed by the Germans ; and indeed preparations for possible retreat were even made by the French, while the Crown Prince wished merely to draw his forces closer together on the 6th before arranging to attack, as his adversary evidently meant to stand and give battle at Wörth. But on the morning of that day the outposts skirmished, and the commander of the German advance, thinking the enemy were about to withdraw, reconnoitred his position. Firing ensued, and then the Bavarians on the right, and afterwards the 5th corps on the left, joined in. It seems probable that the latter entered into action with the deliberate purpose of helping to disengage the former ; and the manner in which the Prussian corps harmonised in action without express orders, offers a marked contrast with the want of unity and accord on the French side. For though Macmahon, considering their movement a demonstration, sent fresh orders to De Failly, which were received at 1 P.M., it was later still, and with evident reluctance, that the 3d division was ordered to march on Wörth.

The 5th corps commenced serious action at 8 A.M., and continued a vigorous cannonade until 11. A decisive attack on the village of Wörth was successful just after noon, and a French attack on Gunstet, later in the day, was repulsed.

The 5th corps then advanced on Fröschwiller, with the 11th against the French right at Elsasshausen, the general disposition of the troops being skirmishers supported by company and half-battalion columns ; and this attack, vigorously pushed, resulted in the drawing in of the French right, and the capture of the Niederwald. The frontal attacks of the 5th corps from Wörth against the village of Elsasshausen and Fröschwiller had been most difficult and costly. They were only possible as the flanking attacks succeeded, but the possession of the wood, on which the French right had rested, enabled a concentrated advance on Elsasshausen to be made, and the place was carried about 2 P.M. by the 5th and 11th

corps. Macmahon made a vigorous effort to regain this important point. Infantry was pushed forward from Fröschwiller supported by a cavalry division, but it was of no avail; the cuirassiers were almost destroyed; and, shortly afterwards, a concentric advance on Fröschwiller resulted in its capture at 3.30 P.M.

The French, now routed, retired in haste by Reichshofen into the Jagerthal and to Hagenau.

Six cavalry regiments undertook the pursuit, but this was suspended at Reichshofen, owing to the timely appearance of De Failly's division at Niederbronn where all contact between the two armies was soon lost.

The German loss was 8000 men with 400 officers; that of the French, 6000 prisoners, 6 mitrailleuses, and 35 guns, besides killed and wounded; and the victors bivouacked on the ground, having concentrated for the battle 90,000 men against 40,000 French. Macmahon was able to rally at Niederbronn, but was in no position now to defend the line of the Vosges.

Retreat was indispensable, either upon Bitsche or Saverne, and, deciding upon the latter as safer, he reached it at 7 A.M. on the 7th.

The 1st army, meanwhile, was continuing its march to Saarlouis and Saarbrück; and the 2d army was also approaching the Saar through the Palatinate, with the 3d and 4th corps in first line, covered by the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions.

The character of the manœuvre contemplated by the united armies was to effect a huge wheeling movement to the right, and thus the Crown Prince had the start; but, as it was also necessary to give him time, offence on the 6th was not contemplated with the 1st army, for it formed the pivot of the wheel, and was to be advanced to the line of the Saar, merely to secure the right of the 2d army.

The 2d French corps, with the 1st division on the left, 3d on the right, and 2d in reserve, stood on the 5th of August in position at Spicheren, which had been strengthened by artificial means. Nine miles in rear was the 3d corps, at Saargemund and St Arnold, to support the 2d corps (on the railway),

while the 4th corps was at Bouzonville, distant 16 miles, and the Guard at Courcelles.

Concentration of the left of the French army was possible, therefore, in a day.

On the morning of the 6th, the 1st German army was 9 or 10 miles north of the Saar, the 7th corps forming the right wing, the 8th corps the left, a road being assigned to each division, which was able therefore to move on a broad front. The 3d corps belonging to the 2d army had reached Neunkirchen and pushed its advance to Lutzbach, the 4th corps being on the left, and the 10th, 12th, 9th corps, and Guard one or two days' march in rear. The 7th and the 3d corps were ordered by Steinmetz to move up to the Saar, their movements being concealed from the enemy by the woods and by the screen of cavalry.

Frossard, in the night of the 5th and 6th, drew in his advanced posts from the heights overhanging Saarbrück, his 3d division camping two miles south of the Saar about Spicheren.

The news that the French were retreating was conveyed at once to the Prussians.

Rheinbaben and Kamecke (14th division) determined on crossing the Saar, and when the cavalry passed it at 11 A.M., and reached the exercising ground, they were fired at from Spicheren. At 11.30 the advance of the 14th division crossed, and, bringing its artillery into action, reported the fact to Zastrow.

Having already disposed of the 13th division upon Forbach as a reconnaissance, it was his intention to attack on the 7th, Saarbrück being held as a *débouché* for the 3d corps.

Kamecke, convinced that a rear-guard only was before him, advanced on his own responsibility on both sides of the Forbach road, but the enemy deployed in strength, and sweeping his front with artillery, soon brought the Prussian advanced-guard to a stand-still. The French, considering their position impregnable, were delighted to see the Prussians attack.

Döring's cavalry had informed him of Kamecke's action, and he instantly ordered his brigade to Saarbrück; and, in

addition, Alvensleben at Neunkirchen, at 2 P.M., despatched every available man to the field of battle by railway.

The 8th corps also pushed forward.

Thus 15 battalions, 7 squadrons, and 12 batteries were being sent as reinforcements from different sides; but they only began to arrive by slow degrees after 3 P.M., and the 14th division was until then unsupported on the field.

Kamecke's flanking attacks on the right and left of the French were repulsed. His force was too weak to effect much, and at 3 o'clock his entire division was absorbed in the action. But help was at hand, for two batteries and the 40th Regiment arrived from the 16th division.

Döring and Zastrow preceded their troops to hasten the action, and the advance of the 5th division also arrived.

Göben, coming up at 3.30, was directed by Döring against the French right, as was also the 40th Regiment.

The attack was gradually successful. The 12th Regiment arrived by rail at 4.30. On the right the 28th infantry brigade was engaged in hard fighting.

Zastrow took command at 5 P.M., and Alvensleben also appeared with fresh troops. The French retired to a second position, keeping the first under fire, and still checking the Prussians; but, taking the offensive, Frossard attacked them three times frontally, and was repulsed on each occasion.

After one more effort, feeling flanking troops on their right, the French retired towards Saargemund.

The 13th division reached Forbach about 8.30, and, by its appearance, produced a panic which drew the French off their line of retreat.

Bazaine had offered assistance, but this was declined by Frossard, and no further effort to help him was made.

Thus here, as at Wörth, the French corps were not in intimate harmony and union as were the Prussians.

This was the chief cause of the Prussian success: though there was a frequent change of command on their side during the fight, the same tactics were applied throughout.

Frossard had 31 battalions and 15 batteries, and had lost 2000 prisoners; the Prussians only 27 battalions and 16 batteries engaged, out of which they had lost 4000 killed and wounded.

Frossard reached Saargemund at 10 A.M. on the 7th, and the further retreat to Puttelange to join Bazaine was most disorderly. There was quite a panic at headquarters.

The question whether to concentrate at Chalons or Metz was anxiously discussed, and finally the latter course was decided on, the 5th corps being directed to retreat on Nancy. The 1st and 7th were to concentrate at Chalons, and to remain there under Macmahon's command. Bazaine was now placed in supreme command, and the 6th corps ordered up from Chalons. De Failly retired by Saarbourg upon Petite Pierre, which he reached at 3 P.M. on the 7th; Macmahon got to Saarbourg on the morning of the 8th; the 7th corps left Belfort; and thus was effected a general retreat of the French, who abandoned the line of the Vosges and surrendered Alsace.

On the Prussian side, the cavalry were launched forward on the morning of the 7th by the 1st and 3d armies.

The 2d army moved by Homburg on Saargemund.

On the 8th the greater portion of the German armies were on French soil. All fear of invasion of Germany was at an end. The morale of the French army had been most seriously affected. Its reorganisation was essential, and that must take place behind the line of the Moselle, the chief passage of which lay through Metz.

The right of this line was the weak point, and this had been intrusted to the 1st and 5th corps; but these, already shaken and too disorganised to be of use on the frontier, were compelled to fall back, the former by Neufchateau and Chaumont, on Chalons.

Repeated counter-orders did not tend to restore confidence. The 5th corps had been directed on Nancy, then was permitted to select the route to Langres; next was ordered to Toul, and was finally left to take the best road it could towards Chalons, and moved therefore on Chaumont.

The Prussians were in no hurry to pursue. The 3d army, which had been the longest in motion, and had been twice engaged, required a day's rest. The position of the remainder of the French forces, and the question whether they would defend the line of the Moselle, was yet a matter of doubt, and it was necessary still to continue the wheel to the right on

Saarbrück. Thus the 1st army halted on the Saar; the 2d army moved down to unite it with the left; the 3d army formed into five columns, crossed the Vosges in two days, and united with the 2d army along the Saar. The 1st corps and the 2d and 3d cavalry divisions now joined the armies.

The retreat of the main French army was conducted with much deliberation, and, except the troops beaten at Wörth, the Army of the Rhine fell back by St Avold on Metz, which it reached on the 12th, and halted on the eastern side of the city, to make extensive preparation on the 13th for the passage of the Moselle.

This was commenced on the 14th, and by the afternoon a large proportion of the troops had crossed, leaving the 3d corps (Dacaen) to cover the retreat. But after uniting on the Saar, the German armies had pushed forward, and late on the afternoon of the 14th the advanced-guard of the 7th corps of the 1st army reached Laquenay, and, with the view of delaying the proposed retreat, at once vigorously attacked. Small as the force was, it effected its object. The French march was checked; and as the 1st and remainder of the 7th German corps came up, the 4th corps (Ladmirault) had to be recalled to the right bank of the Moselle, where, with the Guard in reserve, but unemployed, it resisted successfully the enemy's advance, until night fell on a drawn battle, in which both sides claim the victory.

Bazaine seems to have committed a grave fault in allowing himself to be drawn into a general action. His fear lest the defenceless nature of the detached works on this side should render their assault possible appears needless, for it is doubtful if late in the evening the enemy would have recognised their comparative helplessness, or risked a danger the extent of which could not be foreseen. Metz, under the circumstances, would have been a sufficient protection, and the retreat would have been unmolested for one day at least. If the defence of the Moselle line were intended, the entire army should have been used for the purpose; if retreat was Bazaine's object, he should have gone at once.

On the 15th the retreat was continued by the southern of the two roads which, leading from Metz to Verdun, pass, the

one by Gravelotte, Rézonville, Mars-la-Tour, the other by St Privat and Briey. But the delay occasioned by the battle of the preceding day was already felt. By night the 2d and 6th corps were near Rézonville, and the Guard in rear at Gravelotte, while the 3d and 4th corps were making for the northern road; but at 4 A.M. on the 16th, when it was intended to continue the movement, the latter corps was not yet in line. Thus the retrograde movement was deferred till noon, but long before that hour had struck, the Prussian cavalry and horse artillery had come into action on the plateau south of the Gravelotte road, and thus brought on the battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour.

The position of the three German armies on the preceding night were as follows:—

1st Army,	. . .	Steinmetz, . . .	} Metz and Courcelles.
1st corps,	. . .	Manteuffel, . . .	
7th "	. . .	Zastrow, . . .	
8th "	. . .	Von Göben, . . .	
2d Army,	. . .	5th cavalry division,	Thiaucourt.
10th corps,	. . .	Voigts Rhetz, . . .	Pont-à-Mousson.
3d "	. . .	Alvensleben, . . .	Cheminot.
9th "	. . .	Mannstein, just arrived,	Buchy.
12th "	. . .	Prince Saxony, . . .	Solgne.
2d "	. . .	Franzecky, just arrived,	Han-sur-Nied.
Guard,	. . .	Württemberg, . . .	Dieulouard.
4th corps,	. . .	Alvensleben, . . .	Marbache.
3d Army, Crown Prince.			
1st Bavarians,	} Nancy.
2d Bavarians,	
5th corps, Kirchbach,	
11th corps, Bose,	
Württembergers,	} Luneville.
Badeners,	

The commander of the 2d army issued the following directions for the 16th: Rheinbaben was to push on to the Verdun road to Thiaucourt, supported by the 10th corps.

Later the 3d corps was to cross and march on Mars-la-Tour by Gorze, and the 12th corps was directed to Pont-à-Mousson—the Prince's object being, by a strong reconnaissance, to ascertain whether Bazaine was retreating or not.

The 3d corps and 6th cavalry division were moved on Mars-la-Tour and Vionville.

The 10th corps and 5th cavalry division on St Hilaire, and the 9th corps on Silligny, covered the passage. The latter corps was released by the 7th and 8th taking position between the Seille and Moselle, and was ordered to follow the 3d in support. The 12th to Pont-à-Mousson on the road to St Hilaire; thus forming a reserve to the 10th, as the 9th did to the 3d corps.

Behind these was the Guard. The 2d corps, which was furthest behind, was ordered to move on the 16th to Buchy; and on the 17th to Pont-à-Mousson, where they were to cross the river, the 4th corps moving towards Toul.

Battle was not expected by the Prussians on the 16th. It was 20 miles to the Verdun road, but the zeal of the Germans overcame these difficulties, thus placing them in some danger, and many thank Bazaine's tardiness for their success.

The 3d corps crossed the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, Noveant, Champey. Reports were received at 8 A.M. that the French were retiring by Vionville towards the north and west.

Buddenbroch was then directed to Mars-la-Tour to intercept them with the 6th cavalry division, and on arriving at Fromont was ordered to wheel to the right and carry the heights of Flavigny and Vionville, which was effected by 10.

Stülpnagel at this hour debouched from Gorze upon Anconville on the right, and was engaged here at St Arnould.

In this position the left, under Buddenbroch, the centre composed of the cavalry, and the right (under Stülpnagel) were repeatedly attacked by the French; but, supported by the cavalry, they held the ground.

Rheinbaben (5th cavalry division) had bivouacked at Xanville, and in the early morning moved off on Mars-la-Tour, where he touched the head of the French columns.

He intimated to Alvensleben that he would support his attack on Vionville, and informed the 10th corps of what was going on. He had two horse batteries attached, belonging to the reserve of the latter corps.

This force was marching its 1st division from Thiaucourt on St Hilaire, the brigade Lehmann moving on Chambly to support Rheinbaben; its other division was left at Pont-à-Mousson at half-past 4 o'clock.

Lehmann hearing firing at Tronville, shaped his course there, and arrived at 11.30. The 19th division first received orders to march to the battle-field at noon, when near St Hilaire. Schwarzkoppen arrived in the vicinity about 3 P.M. with the dragoons of the Guard.

Kraatz Koschlaw reached Tronville at 4, and the first reinforcements of infantry were received by the 3d corps at 3.30 ; but later on, portions of the 8th and 9th corps arrived.

Barnekow of the 8th corps marching from Frontigny, which he reached at 1 P.M., heard the firing, marched again for Noveant, crossed the Moselle and reached Gorze at 3.30. The 9th corps followed, and reached the same point at 5.30 to cover the right of the Prussian line.

The first French troops engaged were Canrobert's and Frossard's, the Guard being in reserve at St Marcel.

Lebceuf now commanding the 3d corps, and Ladmirault, on the other road, had halted about 2.30, their columns directed towards Bruville, and were confronted by the 10th German corps on the road between Vionville and Mars-la-Tour. The Prussians suffered severely from the French batteries, which were therefore charged successfully by Bredow's cavalry brigade ; this almost succeeded in checking the fire, but at the cost of terrible loss.

The Prussians left in disorder at Bruville were also brilliantly covered by Rheinbaben's cavalry.

Barnekow (8th corps) arrived in the nick of time to support Stülpnagel, whose right was being turned, and was opposed by the French Guard.

Still further on the right the Hesse-Darmstadt brigade of Mannstein (9th corps) arrived, and entirely relieved Stülpnagel. Darkness now ended the battle.

The southern road was finally in possession of the Prussians, with a loss of 17,000, including 650 officers, while the French suffered a loss of 23,000 men, 80,000 on each side having been engaged.

From his own words Bazaine shows that he was aware that at least 30,000 Prussians with cavalry were on his flank on the 15th, and had warned Frossard, Canrobert, and Fenton of the fact.

It is a question whether his own dispositions for the 16th, under these circumstances, were the best which could have been made with the intention of gaining Verdun.

These dispositions are known, as well as the reasons he adduces to justify them.

Certain it is that the Prussians did not expect to find the French army on the southern route, but only a covering corps. They conceived that the principal columns would march by the two northern roads.

Bazaine was doubtless influenced by the report of hostile movements on the left bank of the Moselle, below Metz, possibly due to the attempted *coup de main* upon Thionville; but it is quite certain that no sufficient steps were taken to obtain certain information on the subject. The passage of the Moselle by 20,000 cavalry could scarcely be effected without detailed information being sent into Metz; and what the difficulties of ground about Briey were, where the passage of troops alone was concerned, it is difficult to imagine. On the whole, both assertions seem insufficient to justify the rejection of this line. On the other hand, there is much force in the motive given of keeping both columns together when the enemy was known to be so near, and, as he could not yet be in great force, of punishing him if he had the temerity to attack.

Again, the delay on the 15th and 16th was the unavoidable consequence of the battle of Borny. Ought that battle to have been allowed to assume the dimensions which it attained? Ought not the French rather to have fallen back under cover of the forts, than to have awaited reinforcements from troops which were already far advanced in retreat?

Bazaine's justification for fighting here is, that Metz was not safe, and that it was feared the Prussians might make a serious attempt upon it. He is supported in this by Coiffière's high authority.

But he retired altogether during the ensuing night, so that on the following day the fortress was in precisely the same danger; and finally the question was whether, retreat for the army being once decided upon, the preservation of the fortress was a consideration of superior weight to a safe retrograde

movement. Probably it will be decided that Bazaine was wrong in fighting at Borny, under the circumstances; that retreat was his definite objective; and that the very problematic danger to which the fortress was exposed, should not have been made a matter of paramount importance.

But it must be remembered that Bazaine had only taken over supreme command thirty-six hours before; that he had taken no part in the earlier strategic operations; that he had every reason to continue the measures hitherto initiated; that he was fettered, on taking command, to a line of action to which he, with many others, was opposed; and that the Emperor was as ignorant as was Bazaine of the forward state of the turning movement of the Prussians. Whilst Bazaine was fighting at Borny, at least one division of the Prussian second army was already on the left bank of the Moselle, at Pont-à-Mousson.

The delay of the 15th, and the postponement of the 16th, were the direct results of the battle of Borny. The 3d and 4th corps could not take up their positions according to the dispositions of the 13th, before the forenoon of the 16th, and Bazaine proposed to continue his retreat at 2 P.M. that day.

Every hour of the intervening delay is fully to be accounted for.

Le Bœuf and Ladmirault had to be victualled and re-supplied with ammunition on their passage through the fortress, which was in itself necessarily slow, and the positions assigned to them were eight to ten miles to the west of it. Owing to the proximity of the city, the number of absentees after the battle was considerable, and difficulty was found in rallying them.

The question, however, presents itself, whether, considering that he had accepted action on the 14th, and in the face of the intelligence which poured into headquarters on the 15th, the earlier dispositions should not have been altered, for which there was ample time, and the further movement of the Guard and 6th corps have been made to conform to that of the 3d and 4th, which had been retarded by the battle. The march might then have been covered and masked by proper

use of the powerful cavalry of the French, supported by sufficient artillery.

That Bazaine failed to reconnoitre in force to the south, and to occupy the defile of Gorze, seems to indicate that he was still in earnest as to retreat on the early morning of the 16th, and that he hardly yet realised the extent to which the action at Borny had really compromised that operation.

But although he might be reluctant to part with any considerable force of infantry, the position of his cavalry divisions was certainly faulty to a degree, though determined to a certain extent by the appearance of Prussian cavalry on the actual line of retreat.

On the whole it seems safe to conclude that Bazaine was wavering at this period between the duty of obeying the precise orders which had been handed to him, and distaste for the operation dictated. Whether on account of the moral effect on the soldiers, whether on account of the danger entailed upon the army, or whether from anxiety to be relieved from further fetters, and to take his own line, is for later history to determine. Probably he was influenced more or less by all of them.

What is quite certain is that, when he found himself attacked as he had anticipated, on the 16th at 9 A.M.—when he saw that his retreat to Verdun, with the given dispositions, could only be effected after a more or less decisive victory, and that, failing in this, if he let go his hold on Metz his army would be exposed to destruction—he preferred certain retreat and refuge in Metz to the uncertainty attaching to the other operation; and unless it can be proved that he fought the battle of Borny for the express purpose of impeding the operation proposed, it is difficult to find fault with his resolution when he affirms that it was not until the following day he was informed how bare of subsisting means that great fortress was—a fact which will remain unintelligible to all.

Perhaps it will be just to conclude that Bazaine did not regret that the incidents of the 16th furnished an excuse for delaying the execution of a retreat for which he had always been disinclined.

This seems to be borne out by his conduct of the action of Rezonville.

After the battle of the 16th the only line of retreat for Bazaine was evidently the line Longuion-Sedan. He might possibly have supplied his army with ammunition, which is one of the reasons he gives for his delay, during the march by the two roads which he would cover.

There may be yet another reason. Niel's tactics had been based on the value of the defensive with so good an arm as the Chassepôt and the over-rated importance attached to the mitrailleuse. The position of Amanvilliers, on which these tactics could be tried hopefully, was close at hand; there was ample time to intrench it; and while there was a possibility of victory, the strategic purpose of being able in that case to separate the German armies from their base was at the same time answered.

Bazaine, however, assigns as reasons for the step he took his want of provision and ammunition, and that Metz was not able to hold out for more than fifteen days without the army: but the Germans seem to doubt his intention of retreating at all; and so perfectly was some part of the position intrenched, that this could hardly have been completed on the 17th after the retreat from Rezonville.

Whatever be the real reason, the French, bivouacking on the field on the night of the 16th, fell back early the next morning to the heights overlooking the Mance rivulet, facing west; their right, the 5th corps, resting on St Privat; the centre, the 4th and 3d corps, at Amanvilliers and the farm of La Folie; and the left, the 2d corps, at Point du Jour; the Guard being held in reserve in rear of this flank at St Martin.

Bazaine's purpose was purely defensive, his object the repulse of the enemy and a possible opportunity for seriously endangering his retreat; but even for this his dispositions, with a strong left, a weak right, and a badly-posted reserve, were far from faultless. The position itself, too, had one grave element of weakness. There were thick woods and steep slopes immediately in rear of it, and thus the difficulty of manœuvring, in order to reinforce any threatened point of his

line, was enormously increased ; while, in case of defeat, one line of retreat was alone feasible, that on Metz itself.

Meanwhile the Germans had determined on concentrating the greater part of the 1st and 2d armies on the battle-field of the 16th. Only the 1st corps and 3d cavalry division were left on the right bank of the Moselle. The 4th corps was at Toul, the 12th advanced to Pont-à-Mousson, and the whole of the remainder were hurried across the river, and, by 4 P.M. on the 17th, had bivouacked by corps on the Rezonville plateau, in the following order, from the left: Guard, 12th, 3d, 9th, 8th, and 7th,—the 10th being in second line. Finally, the French position was, as far as possible, reconnoitred, and then the Count von Moltke, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Duke of Württemberg formed their plan of attack for the next day.

It was decided to move northward, in direct echelon from the left. In first line, 12th, Guard, 9th, 8th, and 7th corps ; in second line, the 10th on the left, and 2d corps on the right, —each moving in masses of army divisions.

The advance commenced at 6 A.M., and when the first stage of the movement, that of reaching the Conflans road, was completed, the exact position of the French was no longer doubtful, and a wheel of the entire army to the right was ordered.

The French right was expected to be at Amanvilliers ; and at 10.30 the King's orders were issued for a general attack, coupled with a turning movement by the 13th corps ; but it was soon found that the enemy's right extended even further, and the flanking movement required, therefore, more time. From this it is apparent that the German intention from the beginning was to shut the French into Metz, rather than endeavour to cut them from the fortress. The 2d corps, acting as a reserve to the Prussian right, was one entire march behind.

The 9th corps began the battle with its artillery, about noon, at Montigny. At 2 o'clock the Guard came into action on its left against St Marie aux Chênes, and soon after 12 the 8th corps, moving by Rezonville on Gravelotte, joined in the combat, on the right of the 9th corps, it being in turn supported on its right by the 7th corps. Thus, at 2 P.M., 250

guns were in action against the French position ; and by 4 o'clock its influence had been felt on St Privat and Amanvilliers, St Marie aux Chênes had been stormed, and the Saxon artillery soon opened fire against Roncourt and St Privat.

But up to 5 o'clock the position of affairs was not unfavourable to the French. They had successfully held their ground under heavy artillery-fire ; and when the Guard corps, advancing from St Marie, attempted to storm St Privat over the open ground lying between the villages, it was repulsed with terrible loss.

But the extraordinary influence of the outflanking movement and the concentrated artillery-fire against the French right was beginning to be felt. When the 12th corps of Saxons reached Roncourt, north of St Privat, at 6.30, their attack, seconded by the Guard, resulted in the capture of the village and the throwing back of the French right in disorder upon Metz.

A little later, the 2d corps arrived upon the field and supported the action of the 7th and 8th corps ; but on the French left the troops bivouacked that night upon the field. The Germans, with 211,000 men and 820 guns, had lost 19,038 men ; and the French, with 112,000 men and 542 guns, 11,705 : thus the percentage of loss on the former side was about 1-8th, and on the latter, about 1-7th.

The battle had been chiefly an artillery and infantry combat, in which cavalry took very little part. It was the first in which the King had commanded in person, and the first which was fought designedly and according to plan. The conditions in the morning were uncertain, and alterations in the conduct of the battle had to be foreseen and prepared for, so that the character of the march, bearing in mind that changes in minor disposition occurred as information arrived, was most difficult ; and that it was completed and executed in most perfect order is due to the Prussian staff alone.

The King had remained on the right flank of the attack throughout the day, leaving the left wing to Prince Frederick Charles, and special reserves had been told off to the right centre and left.

Bazaine had remained throughout the day on his own

extreme left, where he could not overlook what was going on on the other flank ; and the position of his reserve, posted with him, seems to indicate that he was more anxious concerning his communications with Metz than with Chalons. Owing to its faulty position, when it did move it arrived too late to be of use.

There are some special points of interest, from a tactical point of view, regarding the battle.

The German infantry was often moved under artillery-fire in columns of battalions, sometimes with the regulated intervals, without excessive loss, owing to the indifferent character of the French artillery.

Columns present great advantages in great battles such as these, for they are well under command and easy of direction. The Germans stood artillery - fire, too, far better than the French.

In a close country, company columns and skirmishing lines were formed at considerable distance wherever it was intended to engage. Sometimes this was done too far off, and the subsequent direction of the troops was more difficult accordingly.

Ordinarily, in advancing to attack, the first line of a brigade consisted almost always of company columns contiguous to each other ; very rarely with two companies in advance, followed by the other half-battalions.

The French formed very dense skirmishing lines with two or four companies in support, and opened fire at 1000-1400 paces.

The effect of this fire was at times severe and surprising, but never sufficient to check the advance.

The skirmishing division of the Prussians, on arriving at 500 paces from the enemy's line, proved insufficient.

Advance was here checked, and, as a rule, the division was reinforced by a second, both seeking cover in lying flat down. All engaged recognised the necessity of this step : 1st, to reply to the enemy's fire with a chance of success ; 2d, to prevent the excessive exposure of the supports. The distance of supports was as far in rear as possible with a view to their co-operation.

It was impossible to place closed bodies at 150 paces' distance

without cover, or even lying down. The choice lay between either increasing the distance or extending, and of these the last step was the most frequent, as reinforcements were soon necessary, and gaps had to be filled up.

The management of those supports was most difficult; often in advancing they extended without order, lost the control of their officers, and entered of their own accord the fighting line.

The din of action at quarters so close was such that the officer's voice was not audible, and his example only perceptible.

It often occurred that entire regiments were dissolved into the firing line, and that the supports were formed by the second line of battle.

The skirmishing fire commenced at from 500 to 150 paces, and the irregular skirmishing line waving at points backwards and forwards, rendered its direction or control most difficult; but these tactics were unavoidable. It was indispensable to exhaust the offensive force of the breech-loader before assault could be undertaken.

Wherever an attempt was made to charge before this had been effected, it invariably failed.

Still greater was the absence of leadership on the part of the French noticeable. Their discipline was loose, and they were not accustomed to rely sufficiently upon their officers, though the necessity for this is *now* greater than ever in order to retain command over men in action.

Neither Germans nor French ever succeeded in bringing closed bodies into the line of fire, or in advancing either by battalions or companies in line for the purpose of delivering volleys.

Every officer recognised the impossibility of this peace manoeuvre at once, and abandoned the idea on the offensive. On the defensive it proved almost equally impracticable.

Both sides altered their tactics. If the French found themselves compelled to abandon the idea of firing with deployed lines, so did the Prussians in deployed companies or half-companies.

The occasions on which volleys were fired were very rare, and then only where a surprise had been effected.

In reinforcing the fighting line the battalions were used, extended, and doubled into it, so that in course of time men of entirely different battalions, regiments, &c., found themselves fighting side by side, and thus all tactical order was soon lost.

This was not so much the case on an open plain like Mars-la-Tour as in intersected country like Wörth. The decisive effect was usually attained by the result of flanking movements, and hence the value of numbers in future is apparent. The intensity of fire in front was perceived to diminish, and this enabled the frontal line to gain ground at once.

When this was not feasible, more troops were pushed to the front, but as closed bodies they never were of direct effect. Over and over again in advancing they too extended, and the extended mass rushed indiscriminately, without order or command, forwards.

The French, softened by prolonged and telling fire, seldom withstood this rush, where it was properly timed.

In the open field it never came to close quarters; now and then, very rarely, in woods and villages.

Once undertaken, these rushes were executed with great resolution. Little additional impetus is required when the movement is once initiated. The difficulty is to get the men out of cover to commence the attack. Once out, movement is absolutely indispensable.

The effect of breech-loading fire on troops is difficult to appreciate by those who have not witnessed it, and the effect of flanking fire is greater than ever, so that troops surprised by fire will inevitably give way.

When the French were totally routed, as at Wörth, the demoralisation was excessive. In no actions in 1866 were arms thrown away to the same extent.

Cavalry attacks were almost invariably repulsed by skirmishers drawing somewhat more closely together, as at Wörth and, later, at Sedan; and even guns and mitrailleuses were occasionally carried by the Prussian infantry, by means of skirmishers, who crept forwards to within 600 or 700 paces of the batteries, and killed the horses. They, however, only

succeeded in making themselves masters of the pieces when infantry was not at hand to support the artillery.

The artillery of a beaten army always has to go back eventually.

If this retreat is not effected betimes, it is lost so soon as the enemy's infantry can get at it from a distance of 500 or 600 yards, and there is no power of reply.

Even with canister and grape this would be ineffectual against the present breech-loader.

The greater the disaster, the greater naturally the loss in guns. At Wörth it was considerable, but at Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte only seven were lost.

The defensive attitude of the Prussians showed a marked difference to that of the French in the firing tactics.

The French fired at long distances, inflicting loss, but not decisive loss. As the German skirmishers ran forward, the men in their excitement forgot to alter the back sight, and fired over their heads; they fired hastily, and expended too much ammunition.

The Germans on the defensive allowed the enemy to approach to within 400 or 500 paces. It was often difficult to endure without firing; but being under cover, the loss inflicted was not excessive, and the effect of the close fire, when once let loose, never failed.

Throughout all the operations conducted by Bazaine up to Gravelotte, there was an amount of deliberation and tardiness which seems unaccountable, bearing in mind that he was supposed to be anxious to reach Chalons.

His retreat had been covered by a successful rear-guard action, in which the enemy had suffered severely; but the movement westward was still delayed. Why were the French so slow in vacating the line of the Moselle, knowing, as they must have done, that the flanking movement of the Crown Prince was already so fully developed? Why, having once commenced retreat, did they halt at the imminent risk of losing their communications, and of being separated from their depots and base of supply?

It will be observed that the disadvantage accruing to the invaders operating against an exterior flank towards his

adversary's communications is, first, that the opportunity of counter-stroke by the necessarily shorter line is open to the defensive army; and secondly, if this course be not deemed advisable, the defender will find the time to recognise and to avoid the consequences of the purposed blow. The Austrian military press of the time, criticising the operations, condemns Von Moltke's strategy. It says that Radetzky would have punished it, as he did the similar error of the Sardinians in 1849.

Colonel Hamley, too, draws the logical conclusion that where two armies are operating each against the communications of the other, that army must first abandon the initiative which *first* feels the weight upon its communications.

In the present instance, the Austrian criticism would be just, were the opposed armies in equal force. The numerical superiority of the Prussians justifies at once the strategy brought into play, and prohibits the offensive returns with which it should be met.

The inevitable conclusion is, that the advantage accruing to that army which can place a telling superiority of numbers on the theatre of war is enormous; and the doctrine of Clausewitz, that the first effort of strategy should be to develop the full resources of the belligerents at the earliest moment, is fully substantiated.

The French, then, though entirely surprised, and with two corps heavily defeated, were allowed to recover from this; whilst the Prussians, pivoting on their right at Saarbrück, swung round their centre from Saarguemines to Pont-à-Mousson, and their left from Saverne to Nancy.

It is not to be supposed that critics in this country should know the *terrain* better than the French staff, but every one competent to form an opinion could see but one course for the French to adopt—retreat to the Meuse and the Marne.

There are indications, however, which may justify the surmise that Bazaine never earnestly purposed this retreat. His late movement and his halt are not indicative of excessive anxiety for his communications.

The early lessons of the war should have brought the French to their senses, and no one can doubt the general soundness

of their military views, or the readiness with which they, as a rule, have recognised and adapted themselves to circumstances in war.

It may be that Bazaine, considering his retreat already too far compromised to continue it with safety, deliberately halted in order to form front to a flank, obeying the dictates of his adversary.

But then the question again arises, Why, with ample time at his disposal, did he not commence his movement earlier, in order to avoid this necessity?

The difficulty of giving a correct reply to this query, perhaps justifies the surmise that considerations prevailed which induced Bazaine to depart from ordinary rules.

The enormous numerical superiority of the invader had been realised at headquarters simultaneously with home deficiencies.

Between the frontier and Paris but one fortress of sufficient importance presents itself for the purpose of artificial aid to remedy this, that is Metz.

As an arsenal and intrenched camp, probably containing much larger supplies than have been generally attributed to it, for a principal subject of base of operations, it was well calculated to serve the requirements of an army in all respects for a time.

The great value attached to the aid of fortresses in defensive warfare is that they admit of the offensive-defensive element, particularly when posted, as they generally are, on a difficult river.

But nothing is clearer even in this war than the enormous superiority which the defence has acquired over offence in military operations : the startling victories gained by rapid movement and attack will hardly be found so frequently in future history.

It was necessary then for Bazaine, first, to comply with the enemy's movement; secondly, to be attacked; thirdly, to select ground favourable for defence; and fourthly, when eventually driven in, as was to be expected from the relative proportion of force, to find the anchorage which would save him from absolute disaster.

The one thing necessary to such a course was the certainty of finding enough food for a sufficient time in Metz.

It will be recollected that the French purpose was to gain time by neutralising the first superiority of force in order to develop their resources.

The only hope of France was apparently in continuing the struggle.

Now the ground where Bazaine fought was singularly well chosen for such a purpose, and the evidence tends to show that he throughout fought strictly on the defensive, leaving the onus of attack on his adversaries.

The Prussian losses were terrible; and the recklessness with which their troops were used seems to point to the conviction of the Prussian leaders that a prolonged war would be fatal to German interests.

But even driven into Metz, provided he could live, Bazaine would, from his view at the time, fulfil his purposes; for the investment of Metz with a garrison of 100,000 men would ordinarily entail the employment of a very much larger force.

If the fortress were badly provisioned, from inability to obtain further supply, the defender would soon have to capitulate. If well supplied with food and ammunition, he could, on the other hand, endure blockade for a long period; and the longer he could hold out, the greater his chance of release from external co-operation, which might lead to the raising of the siege.

The effective investment of such a fortress as Metz with detached works on a broad river is excessively difficult. The larger the circumference, of course the more troops are required, and, divided by the river, concentration is rendered difficult; while, on the other hand, the defence holds every element of success, afforded by easy movement, power of surprise, and security from eventual harm.

The two things necessary are food and morale.

Should the season be wet, the advantages accruing to the defender would be increased.

Such were probably the views which led Bazaine to be indifferent as to reaching Chalons.

Notwithstanding the brilliant success of the 18th, the

German army did not pause in its activity. There was yet the army under Macmahon to be met and defeated, and at the same time that of Bazaine had to be checkmated; and for the former purpose there was at the time but one army, definitely constituted, available for this purpose—viz., the 3d army—which had almost reached the Meuse near Toul. On the 19th, therefore, this was ordered to cross the river, with cavalry on its left, and advance to the westward. At the same time another army was formed of the Guard, 4th, and 12th corps, and, as the "Army of the Meuse," under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, was to operate with the 3d army in the western theatre. The remainder, consisting of the 1st army, and what was left of the 2d, was to form the investing force of Metz, and 170,000 strong, was about on a par with the "Army of the Rhine."

Macmahon had, in retreating, bent off towards Tourville to stretch a hand to the 7th corps from Belfort, and had been followed by De Failly, so that at Chalons the new army was composed of the 1st corps, impaired in morale; the 5th corps, discontented with its commander; the 7th corps, which had not been engaged; and the newly-formed 12th corps (Lebrun), which had but little cohesion; in all, about 120,000 men: but in addition were some 12,000 of the cavalry reserve and one division of Canrobert's corps, which, despatched after the remainder had been sent to Bazaine, was stopped at Frouard, and finally returned to Chalons. Thus by the 25th August this new army mustered about 490 guns and 120,000 men.

Three courses were open to Macmahon. First, to stay where he was and accept battle; this would be dangerous with such a force as he commanded. Secondly, to retreat on Paris; but in this he was opposed by the War Ministry there. Thirdly, to make a flank march to the north and east, and uniting with Bazaine, raise the investment of Metz. This last was finally determined on; and on the 21st, after burning his superfluous stores at Chalons, he moved on Rheims. On the 22d he was ordered to march on Montmedy, so as to reach Suippes on the 23d; but by the following day he had only reached the high ground on the Aisne, between Re-thel and Vouziers, having taken two days to traverse 60 kilo-

metres. Still, proceeding at the same rate he might have reached Metz in four days more, but henceforth the march was less satisfactory. Bonnemain's corps was moved to the left of the army, and the corps became separated; while on the 25th the grave fault of halting for supplies was committed, Marguerite being ordered to Le Chêne. The right of the army was thus completely uncovered; and Douay, 7th corps, consequently ordered his own cavalry to Grand Pré, where on the 26th the approach of the enemy was reported, and Douay took up a position to fight. On the following day Macmahon ordered a retreat to the Oise; but on the 28th, in consequence of stringent orders from Paris, the march to the eastward was resumed on Buzancy. On the 29th the French commander-in-chief, anticipated by the Prussians at Stenay, made for Mouzon; while the 5th corps, attacked by the Saxons at Nouart, fell back in some disorder on Beaumont. The 7th corps had halted at Ochles instead of La Besace.

On the 30th the three corps on the left bank of the Meuse were ordered to cross the river at any price; but the 7th corps, commanded at a distance, harassed by the enemy's cavalry, and impeded by a convoy of 1500 carriages, only reached Stonne at noon, and though hearing firing in the direction of Beaumont, was unable to reach that place owing to the nature of the ground. After all, its rear division was attacked by the Bavarians near there, and defeated. Finally, it obliqued to Remilly by Roncourt.

The 5th corps reached Beaumont after a night march on the 30th; but aware, as he must have been, that the enemy was in the neighbourhood, and though he had even demanded support, De Failly yet threw out no outposts. But the error was heavily punished. The bivouac, taken up as though in time of peace, was thoroughly surprised, and suffered severely from the sudden artillery-fire that was brought to bear on the defenceless camp. The corps retreated in utter disorder, abandoning camp and baggage, toward Mouzon, crossing the Meuse at Villers, covered by a portion of the 2d corps from Mouzon. At Remilly on this night disorder reigned supreme. The bridges were imperfect, the troops already demoralised,

the orders conflicting, while close upon them the enemy still pressed on.

Thus on the night of the 30th-31st, the French corps were thus posted: 1st, Carignan; 12th, Mouzon; 5th, Villers; 7th, Remilly and Bazeilles, for Douay had already directed one division on Sedan by the left bank of the Meuse.

The general disorder, the demoralisation attendant on the constant arrival of fugitives from the 5th and 7th corps, again induced the Emperor and Macmahon to abandon the march on Montmedy in order to fall back on Sedan, though it would probably have been better to have concentrated and fought at Mouzon; and once more the troops marched, but now with ever-increasing disorder, until the shelter of the fortress was gained. The 5th corps reached there by 3 A.M. on the 31st August; the 1st corps by 11 P.M.; the 12th by 11 A.M.; the 7th, marching by various roads, halted on the meadows to the north-east of Sedan by about noon, and at 3 P.M. occupied Floing and La Chapelle. But the French staff had proved singularly incapable. They had not thought even of using the railway at Bazeilles as a point of passage of the Meuse, and the bridges between Sedan and Mézières were neither observed nor destroyed. During the day some hard fighting occurred opposite Bazeilles, resulting in the final possession of the bridge by the Germans—the French engineer being unable to destroy it for want of powder.

Even then Macmahon did not seem to have fully realised his position. He had no idea that the enemy was so close in such force. He purposed to retreat on Mézières, which the newly-formed 13th corps had reached. He had sought protection at Sedan and had failed to find it, and on the night of the 31st was thus posted: 5th corps, Floing and St Menges; 12th, Bazeilles; 1st, Dagny and Francheval; 7th, on the heights behind Sedan.

Turning to the Germans, the difference in the decision and rapidity of their movements, as compared with those of their adversary, is most striking. The 3d army had reached the Meuse near Ornain on the 20th, and had then halted to await the arrival of the "Army of the Meuse;" but on the 22d it had come up into line, and the united forces now extended

from Etain to Gondrecourt—the cavalry of the left wing (the 3d army) having advanced to the valley of the Marne.

On the 24th, the lines Verdun-St Dizier, and on the 25th, Dombasle-Vitry, were respectively reached, the cavalry of the 4th army having been pushed forward to St Menehould; and thus already the fact that the nature of Macmahon's march was understood may be recognised in the slight alteration of the advance, which had been hitherto due westerly.

But on the night of the 25th more definite intelligence was received, and on the 26th the actual wheel of the two armies to the north commenced, the 4th army moving at once towards Varennes, and the 3d closing to its right. On this day the King's headquarters were at Clermont. The cavalry, pushed on to Vouziers and Buzancy, had already skirmished with the 5th corps, and ascertained that the 5th and 7th corps were still at the former place, with the 12th at Le Chêne, and the 1st on the right bank of the Meuse. On the 27th, the Meuse army reached the Meuse at Stenay and Mouzon with its advance, the Saxons halting at Dun, the 3d army being near Clermont and St Menehould; while on the 28th the movement was continued, the former force moving along the left bank of the Meuse, the latter up the valley of the Aisne.

On the 29th, the Saxons advancing from Dun on Nouart attacked the French, who retreated. Von Moltke had now reason to imagine that Macmahon, finding his march on Metz intercepted, would endeavour to gain neutral ground in Belgium, and therefore determined to press him hard in order to prevent this. The positions of the German armies on this evening were as follows:—

Fourth Army.—12th corps, Nouart; 4th, Landres; Guard, Dun (in second line).

Third Army.—Von der Tann, at Sommerance and St Juvin; Hartmann, Fléville (in rear of the last); 5th corps, Briquenay and Authes; Württembergers, Boulton aux Bois; 11th corps, at Vouziers; 6th (which had just arrived), towards Vouziers from St Menehould and Suippes; 4th cavalry division, on the extreme left towards the Aisne.

The following dispositions were made for the 30th: the 12th corps at Villemontry, the 4th at Beaumont, the Guard

(in reserve) along the Meuse, the 1st and 2d Bavarians at Beaumont, the 5th corps at Pierremont and Oches, the Württembergers and 11th corps at Le Chêne, the 6th at Vouziers, to be cantoned towards Rheims and Chalons, two cavalry divisions in rear of the centre, two on the extreme left, and the headquarters at Varennes.

The Germans were thus pushed far to the west, probably to be in position to arrest Macmahon should he endeavour to retrace his steps; and the 6th corps had been placed in observation, in order to meet any dangers from Paris, where the 13th corps had been organised under Vinoy, and ordered by the Emperor to Rheims. The 1st Bavarian corps surprised De Failly in his bivouac, and he retreated in disorder to Yoncq, pursued by Von der Tann; but the 4th Prussian corps, joining the right of the Bavarians, so threatened both De Failly's flanks that he was unable to retire direct upon Mouzon, and made for Villers. Lebrun supported and covered De Failly's retreat from Mouzon with cavalry and artillery, so that he eventually gained the right bank of the Meuse. The Prussian dispositions for the 31st were that the Crown Prince of Saxony was to intercept the French in any attempt to move off eastwards between the Meuse and Belgium; while the Crown Prince of Prussia was to continue his march northwards, to attack whatever he found, and to operate so as to hem in the French between the Meuse and the frontier. By the evening the forces had reached the following positions:—

Fourth Army.—Guard at Carignan, on the right bank of the Chiers, the 12th corps at Douzy, the 4th at Mouzon. The cavalry were active along the Chiers, harassing the French rear.

Third Army.—1st Bavarian corps at Remilly, 2d at Raucourt.

They mastered the railway bridge opposite Bazeilles; but though they prevented the French from blowing it up, they were unable to debouch, and withdrew in order to co-operate with the 3d army as it advanced on the right bank. Two bridges were thrown across the Meuse at Remilly where Von der Tann bivouacked, securing his right by barricading the bridge at Bazeilles. Hartmann bivouacked at Raucourt, and the 5th

North German corps at Chéhery, on the road from Le Chêne to Donchery and Sedan; the 11th corps towards Donchery at Villers aux Bois; the Württembergers at Dom le Mesnil; the 6th corps at Attigny and Semuy on the Aisne.

For the 1st September the following dispositions were made: The 1st Bavarian corps to cross the Meuse at Remilly and assault Bazeilles; 2d Bavarian corps to post itself at Fresnois and Wadelincourt, to support the 1st corps and observe Torcy; the 11th corps, followed by the 5th, to cross at Donchery, follow the line of the Meuse, and then advance towards St Menges; the Württembergers were to halt at Donchery, as a reserve, and to ward off any sortie from Mezières. The 11th corps threw two bridges on the 31st at Donchery, and at daybreak on the 31st stood entire on the right bank.

The Germans had reason to believe that Macmahon would endeavour to escape; and the King therefore ordered the 3d division to be ready to operate offensively towards the road from Sedan to Mezières. The Crown Prince of Saxony formed his army at 5 A.M. The Guard and 12th corps were to be in position at Pourou aux Bois and Pourou St Reiny and Douzy; the 4th corps, recalled from Mouzon, was to place one division in reserve at Mairy, the other to support the 1st Bavarians at Bazeilles. The French, with 120,000 men, occupied a front extending from Givonne to Moncelles, opposed by 180,000 Germans.

It is unnecessary to examine in detail the battle of the 1st September, but it will be well to summarise briefly the events of the day. The first advance of the Germans was against Bazeilles, which, assailed by the 1st Bavarian corps, was gained possession of by 10 o'clock. To the right of this the 12th corps came into action against La Moncelle, supported finally on its right, again, by the Guard corps, which completed the wheel round towards Illy and Fleigneux. The 11th corps at Donchery, and the 5th at Chéhery, had both crossed the Meuse at the former place, and, moving without opposition on Vrigne aux Bois, finally came into action, the former against Floing, and the latter on its left at St Menges, thus uniting at about 2 o'clock with the right of the Guard corps.

The 2d Bavarian corps from Raucourt had sent one division to assist the 1st corps at Bazeilles, the other being in reserve at Wadelincourt.

The left flank of this advance was protected by the 2d cavalry division,

which had advanced across the Meuse towards the west of Vrine, and by the Würtemberg division at Donchery and Nouvions.

Shortly after mid-day the combined attack of the Guard and 5th corps on Illy was successful ; and, despite a desperate attempt to check the advance by cavalry charges, the 1st French corps was driven back upon the fortress, drawing with it the left of the 7th.

The German artillery now commanded the entire field. The Bavarian guns at Wadelincourt to the west, the artillery of the fifth corps at Illy, the numerous batteries that had accompanied the advance of the remainder of the army, shut in the army of Macmahon by a circle of fire.

Shortly after 3 o'clock, negotiations were opened for surrender ; but it was not until the next day that the Capitulation of Sedan was signed.

COMMENTS ON THE MARCH TO SEDAN.

The Emperor states that Macmahon informed the War Minister that the operation would probably be most imprudent, and pointed out the dangers of such a movement, dwelling on the known fact that the troops were most indifferent, and to execute such a flank march under the circumstances was most dangerous. The "Officer of the Army of the Rhine" declares it amounted to an act of insanity. Rüstow calculates that Macmahon, marching by way of Rethel and Stenay, might have concentrated at Montmedy on the 26th ; and on the 29th, or at the latest on the 30th, could, in conjunction with Bazaine, have fought Prince Frederick Charles, then considerably inferior in numbers to the combined armies.

On the 26th, the Crown Prince's right was at Varennes, and on the 27th at Dun from Clermont, the Guard being in support, and the 4th corps coming up ; while on the 27th an action at Buzancy was fought.

As information of Macmahon's movement was first ascertained on the 25th, Rüstow argues that Macmahon had four days' clear start from Chalons. In point of fact, the Germans confessedly never anticipated the possibility of any such movement. It contained, therefore, the first element of success, surprise. It remains to be considered what Macmahon's ultimate objective should have been, and what was the prospect of a tactical success.

United with Bazaine, 250,000 men could have been brought against a portion of the 1st and 2d armies only ; for if these had concentrated, the investment would have been raised, and Bazaine freed. To what extent was support to be expected from the Crown Prince of Saxony, viewing the original direction given to his march ?

Could Bazaine's forces, if released and united with Macmahon's, serve the general purpose of the war better than in Metz, where he was employing 200,000 enemies ?

Moreover, from the character of the march to be conducted, it is essential to weigh the amount and duration of the danger to be incurred. The replies seem to be these :—

The plan generally savoured of the audacity often necessary in war to retrieve a desperate situation. Owing to the proximity of the Belgian frontier on the left of the line of march, the march itself was dangerous, provided the enemy were in sufficient force to oppose it. But because a march is dangerous, there is no reason why it should not be undertaken. The general who always aims at absolute safety will effect little in war. It is necessary to recognise the danger of the undertaking, and provide for it. But how ?

Having determined upon the plan, it was absolutely imperative to proceed straightway to its execution with all vigour.

Aiming at surprise, concealment was indispensable ; and this could be effected by a good cavalry screen, and by demonstration followed by rapid marches. Moreover, the movement should have been covered by flanking corps, as in the campaign of 1859. But owing to the necessity for rapid marches, and considering the privations inseparable from such exertions, discipline and perfection of the fighting force was more than ever indispensable. No rapidity is possible in war, without cohesion and discipline ; and to undertake a dangerous operation with a blunt instrument is really madness.

The operation is then to be condemned on account of the character of the army called upon to execute it—and this is the Emperor's own criticism ; but for no other reason of military danger.

A flank march is only dangerous if recognised in sufficient

time to be efficiently opposed; and with four days' start, Macmahon, as Rüstow argues, should have had it all his own way.

The Belgian frontier was only to be feared in case of heavy defeat; and a dangerous strategic situation is only really a matter of military calculation, when the probability of being caught *in flagrante delicto* is imminent. The danger incurred, therefore, is justified by the remote probability of engagement and defeat whilst in danger. Willeesen says, when victory is secure, strategy may be thrown to the dogs; and by parity of reasoning, where engagement, still more defeat, is improbable, momentary strategic peril may be boldly faced to attain a distinct and valuable object.

What was this object? Nominally to release Bazaine. That apparently is sufficient motive. The true objective here was to inflict signal defeat on Frederick Charles and Steinmetz, and by a happy manœuvre to regain a temporary superiority in order to inflict defeat. If this was to be expected, if this was recognised, the manœuvre in question is certainly justifiable and praiseworthy.

It was well known that Bazaine must soon succumb in Metz, on account of want of provisions; and it was equally understood that with Bazaine the military power of France vanished. To free and to utilise him, therefore, was surely a better objective than to leave him to his fate, with the remote prospect of defending the capital. But the defeat of the Prussians before Metz was indispensable, otherwise the situation would not generally be improved.

The Prussians were obliged to invest Metz, because they could not leave 200,000 men on their communications. Simply to remove Bazaine from the fortress would be to release, further, 200,000 Prussians for active operations—that is to say, to restore the original disproportion of force, which would enable them again to march comparatively unopposed upon Paris. But, under existing circumstances, the course pursued by Macmahon was bad, for, against his own convictions, he undertook an operation of which he justly disapproved. His true course was rather to resign, recognising that under such circumstances the execution must necessarily be faulty.

The Emperor rightly descants upon the danger of allowing political considerations to influence military movements. The State should be careful in its selections for command; but once intrusted, absolute liberty of action is advisable.

The "Officer of the Army of the Rhine" blames Macmahon for obeying; but it was difficult for him not to obey without having tendered his resignation; and he was, moreover, hampered by the presence of the Emperor, to whom he owed everything. The execution of the movement was execrable. Hesitation on the part of commanders reigned everywhere; orders and counter-orders followed unaccountably; the direction of the march was too often changed; care for supplies was unattended to; and the movement itself was not definitely marked. The first two marches were excessive, the others puny, and throughout the exposed flank was not covered; while, owing to the ignorance of topography displayed, the order of march was not maintained; and lastly, outpost duty was utterly neglected. Such faults in the execution were soon apparent to the rank and file, particularly so to the French; and the natural result of want of confidence in the leader became general, especially under the circumstances of successive previous defeat. It is in such cases that real strategic danger incurred by an army whose tactical virtue has been expended, becomes fatal, and must necessarily terminate in a great catastrophe, either destruction or surrender. We may therefore conclude that Macmahon was right in condemning the movement, but on the sole ground of the untrustworthiness of the instrument for the operation.

With the capitulation of Sedan the last field army of regular troops disappeared. Bazaine, in Metz, can be left out of the question. Only the 13th corps, the garrison returning from Rome, and the battalions in course of formation at the different depots, were left to carry on the war, though behind them lay the undisciplined masses of the mobiles, franc-tireurs, and National Guard.

So the German hosts determined on continuing the march on Paris; and at noon on the 2d September, the orders for that purpose were issued, the advance beginning on the 4th. Leaving the 1st Bavarians and 11th corps as prisoners' guard,

the 6th corps moved on Rheims; the 3d army with its right on Rethel, Rheims, and Dorman; that of the Meuse with its right on Laon. Thus, on the 15th September, the 4th, Guard, and 12th corps were at Villers Cotterets, La Ferté Milon, and Monthiers, covered by the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions at Nanteuil and Senlis; and of the Meuse Army, the 6th, 5th, and 2d Bavarians were at Meaux, Faremoutiers, and Rozoy, covered by the 2d and 4th cavalry divisions at Tournan and Provins. The 1st Bavarians and 11th corps had by this date reached Epernay and Rheims respectively. Meanwhile the Parisians had been active, and Trochu had made good use of his time. The forts were armed, the works completed, a system of barricades instituted. The means of subsistence had been increased by the use of steam transport; the neighbourhood had been exhausted; the bridges on the communications with the capital had been broken up; and the private establishments had been set to work on *matériel* of war. The *personnel* was numerous, if of no great value. There were 70,000 line troops, 100,000 mobiles, 10,000 franc-tireurs, 18,000 marines, and the National Guard, giving a total of 400,000 men.

The orders for the investment of Paris were promulgated on the 15th. The Meuse Army was to take up ground on the right bank of the Marne and Seine, and complete the operation by the 19th. The 3d army was to march by its left, gradually stretching its left flank, covered by cavalry, towards the west and towards the Loire. In each case the investing corps were to establish themselves on ground beyond effective artillery-range, commence fortifying, reconnoitre the dispositions of the enemy in front, and establish the freest possible communication between the corps. The force thus consisted of 6 corps, the Würtemberg division, and three cavalry divisions, though, as their effective state was much reduced, this did not amount to more than 122,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 622 guns; and seeing that the *enceinte* of Paris was 18 miles long, and the line of the outer forts extended over 31 miles, they had to watch a line 50 miles in length; so that, considering the strength of the Paris garrison, the risk of the enterprise is at once apparent; though even this danger was deemed less hazardous than an immediate assault.

An attack might succeed ; but investment, though slow, was sure.

All the efforts made by the French to interrupt the operation were fruitless ; and by the 19th it was practically completed. Von der Tann reached Monthery on the 22d September, and remained in reserve to the 3d army. The 11th corps arrived at Boissy St Leger on the same date, and took over that part of the investment extending from Choisy-le-Roi to Ormesson. The 17th division, ordered up from Rheims, reached Paris on the 7th October. On the 29th September, the Landwehr of the Guard were freed by the fall of Strasburg, and arrived by rail, reaching Nanteuil between the 9th and 19th of October.

Thus on the 21st the total strength of the German armies with these reinforcements amounted to 202,000 infantry, 34,000 cavalry, and 898 guns ; and from this moment commenced the erection on a grand scale of the works to complete and strengthen the investing line, which was carried on successfully despite ineffective sorties on the 30th September, and on the 13th, 21st, and 28th of October.

The whole question of the conduct of the war now resolved itself into three operations. First, the siege of Paris, involving the protection of the investing force from the assaults of the French armies that were to be formed in the provinces ; secondly, the blockade of Metz ; and thirdly, the reduction of Strasburg, Belfort, and the small fortresses that lay across the German lines of communication with the Rhine.

There were two great sources of danger to the security of the German armies before Paris. In the north an army under Faidherbe was being organised, and this might operate either directly towards Paris, or by Soissons on Rheims threaten the German communications through that city. Thus on this side the line of the Seine with Rouen, and that of the Somme with Amiens, Peronne, and St Quentin, became of great importance to the German leaders. But even a greater danger menaced them from the south, where there were more abundant means for the formation of armies that would at least be numerically strong ; and hence the Huisne with Nogent le Rotrou and Le Mans, the Loir with Châteaudun and Vendôme, and the Loire with Tours, Blois, and Orleans, were lines of defence to these levies which required constant watching, in order that, by early information of the approach of the hostile columns, the danger might be met and averted. Here first D'Aurelle de Paladines, and then Chanzy, commanded the "Armies of the Loire."

Away eastward from these river-lines, the course of the Loire, the mountains of the Côte d'Or, where Dijon formed a strong *point d'appui*

for the scattered bands that were formed here under Garibaldian leadership, and finally the southern spurs of the Vosges at Belfort, continued the natural screen behind which the raw levies of the Republic might gain cohesion and strength.

Thus the German leaders had not merely to ward off the blows directed at the army investing the capital, but protect their long attenuated communications from the ever-threatening danger of hostile irruption.

They had constantly in view the establishment of fresh railway communication, even after the line Nancy-Chalons-Nanteuil had been opened. Thus they first endeavoured to possess the lines Chalons-Rheims-Soissons-Crépy and Chalons-Rheims-Laon-La Fère-Compiègne; then they aimed at that leading through Rheims, Mézières, Thionville, Metz, and Saarbrück to the Rhine. But the safety of these railways depended on the possession of the fortresses which commanded them; and to the reduction of these, as well as to the greater sieges, was their attention carefully directed. "One week's occupation of these roads would have choked the army before Paris."

Of all these points Metz was the most important, not merely as dominating the line of the Moselle, but as enclosing the yet undestroyed Army of the Rhine.

OPERATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF METZ.

The German force there consisted of the 1st, 7th, and 8th corps of the 1st army, on the left bank of the Moselle; and the 2d, 3d, 9th, and 10th, with the 3d reserve division of the 2d army, on the right bank,—in all, some 200,000 men, as against a French field army of 140,000 men and 20,000 garrison troops. There was a corps in general reserve to each army, and bridges were built above and below the fortress.

The line of investment was traced by General Moltke, and divided into as many fractions as there were army corps, each of which was thus intrusted with the occupation and settlement of a certain *rayon* which was left entirely to the corps commanders. The outposts were pushed forward from this line towards the fortress within range of the heavier guns, the reserves only being entirely withdrawn. It was important to draw the investing line as close as practicable, and two objects had to be kept in view by the German armies. First, to close

the line of investment to such an extent as to prevent communication of any kind ; and secondly, to post the troops in such a manner that sorties could be repulsed with certainty. The pickets supporting the outposts bivouacked or were sheltered in buildings or barns ; the grand guards or supports were also in bivouacs or huts ; and entire divisions were bivouacked for a time.

Without the aid of field fortification, the investment was entirely impracticable. The line was not everywhere equidistant, but was dependent on the features of the ground ; for when heights presented themselves, these were included in it, even though nearer to the fortress.

The principle of throwing entire responsibility for their commands on corps and division leaders was apparent in both investments, and this in spite of the fact that the task of finding at every point of the line fitting position for defence was most difficult. The construction of fortifications was not undertaken at first with much zeal. The troops were, as usual, reluctant to throw sufficient energy into it. Only after the first experiences was the absolute necessity recognised by the men, but then the work commenced in earnest, and a first, second, and even third line of defence soon sprang up. Of all the ingenious devices for strengthening and securing the position of infantry in the field, nothing equals the ordinary shelter-trench if properly constructed. It is rapidly made, and offers the best cover against rifle or shell fire ; its thin line can hardly be struck by artillery projectiles ; but it should be narrow and deep enough for men to stand in, for shells, if striking an inch behind the trench, hurt no one, and to take effect in front must strike the centre of the raised earth. The defensive power of such a trench is now enormous, but a difference of 10 or 20 yards in tracing it may greatly affect its value. If the trench be carried along heights, it should admit of no dead angle towards the front, in order to keep the enemy, as he ascends the hill, under constant severe fire. When obstacles offer cover to an enemy's approach, these should be flanked by the trench, which is thus broken, not straight ; and of course care must be taken that it is nowhere looked into from commanding ground. It

is necessary to dwell on these details, now as much tactical as engineering. So closely are both sciences connected, that the necessity is recognised in Prussia for the interchange of studies in each corps. Every infantry officer should understand the practical construction of a shelter-trench.

In connection with this line was the preparation for defence of every village and villa or farmhouse within it, by the presence of which it was supported and strengthened. The entrance to the villages was barricaded and protected by a regular earthwork, and the larger houses in the interior prepared and occupied ; where woods presented themselves, free use was made of them. The precise value of such defences is clearly brought out in these investments. So *abattis* proved of very great value, and in some instances was absolutely impregnable, especially if sufficiently broad and high in front of the actual line of defence, but not forming the line itself. Before Paris this mistake was often made, and it was then found that the line of fire should be considerably in rear of, and should flank the obstacle. Placed too closely in rear, men are hindered in their own fire—and concealed only, not protected from that of the enemy. Lines of walls were frequently turned to account with the best effect ; when within woods, they were simply impregnable, if the ground were slightly cleared in front ; but when exposed to artillery-fire, they were of diminished value. Rifle-pits, wire entanglements, and blockhouses, were employed along the entire frontal line ; and precise instructions were issued to the garrisons to hold and defend the latter if the first line were forced. They were mostly sunk into the earth, with only two feet visible above ground, were covered in, and shell-proof, and thus they offered cover to the pickets on outpost duty.

The value of a regular fieldwork as compared with a shelter-trench may be contested, but it is clear that the latter offer large objects for artillery, and afford less development of fire.

Lastly, observatories were erected to enable complete unity of action to be effected, by having early intelligence of the enemy's movements ; and these were connected by telegraph with the headquarters of divisions and corps.

On the French side the preparations were far less complete. Provisions which should have been in Metz, had in the previous operations fallen into the enemy's hands. The fortress, provided with five months' food only for the ordinary garrison and inhabitants, had received not merely the relics of the Army of the Rhine, but some 30,000 peasants who had taken refuge within its walls. Bazaine, on taking over the command, had made every effort at collecting stores of food, but still the confusion that reigned in Metz was indescribable, and it speaks well for the general that in spite of all disadvantages he was prepared for a renewal of operations on the 26th August.

On this day the 4th, 6th, and Guard corps crossed to the right bank of the Moselle with the object of breaking through the investing cordon; but the rain fell in such torrents that the idea was abandoned, the army withdrawn, and was then formed into four great camps, two on either bank of the dividing stream, which was bridged with numerous bridges within the *rayon* of the forts.

In consequence of Macmahon's march, the 2d and 3d Prussian corps were detached to Dun and Stenay on the 27th, and this intelligence reaching the French commander, gave him the opportunity of attacking the investing force when only slightly superior to his own. But in order to do this with full advantage, it was necessary that these corps should have gone beyond supporting distance from the fortress, and therefore, that two days should at least elapse, after the 27th, before the attempt should be made; for, though it was impossible for the Prussians to assemble an equal force on either bank of the Moselle, their defensive positions would always enable them to hold their ground for one day at least.

The 29th, therefore, would have been the earliest advisable day, but Bazaine having received a message from the Emperor on the 30th, appointed the 31st for the battle; and on that day the army was concentrated under Forts Queleu and St Julien, with the plateau of St Barbe given as their objective, the idea being to gain Thionville by Bethainville and Rédange. This bank offered the advantage of having no

river to cross, and in taking St Barbe as an objective, the enemy would be perplexed as to the real intentions of his adversary. The operations were partly successful on the 31st; but during the night Servigny was retaken by the Prussians, and the indecisive action of the 1st terminated in a withdrawal to the shelter of the fortress.

The report sent to the Emperor and Minister for War was to the following effect: "After an action of two days' duration about St Barbe, the army has returned again to the intrenched camp at Metz, with but a small amount of ammunition for our field-guns, and without meat or biscuit for the men," &c., &c.

Bazaine has been accused of never having been in earnest in these attempts, but it is important to endeavour to realise the circumstances of his case. He had to carry an army of 140,000 men away from Metz, a totally different enterprise from passing a small body of infantry and cavalry through. Such an operation implies the necessity of delivering a regular battle on a broad front, and, if the passage be forced, of preparing for further action when pursued. This again implies an ample supply of reserve ammunition for infantry and cavalry, independent of their ordinary train. This train again could not head the army. It must be passed through it, either during or after a successful action—a very difficult matter, considering, that on a double line it would have a length of four or five miles. It was therefore further necessary to enlist several roads for the purpose, and to this end it was imperative to inflict severe defeat upon the enemy. To defeat the Prussians before Metz in a pitched battle, therefore, constituted Bazaine's object, not merely to cut his way out. This was the problem on the first day in any case, and further operations would only have been feasible on the second. But on the other hand, if he had succeeded in beating Frederick Charles there would have been no necessity for his leaving Metz. It would have been possibly even an error to do so except for further offence, for he would abandon then his strong position on the most sensitive portion of the enemy's line. It would have been impossible for the Prussians to continue their operations in the interior until Bazaine was

once more shut up in the fortress, and success on his part would have recalled the other armies at once.

But even if his victory were not complete, temporary success would have enabled him to revictual his army to some extent.

It is essential, therefore, to bear in mind that Bazaine's position was desperate unless he could beat the Prussians. It was quite possible to carry a small body of picked troops through this or that part of the line ; but to cut his way out with his army without supplies, was, militarily speaking, an impossible undertaking, before he had totally defeated his adversary.

Bazaine selected the right bank for his enterprise, because there was more room for forming on a wide front, and the villages on this side had not materially suffered. The march commenced at daybreak, the right on Fort Queleu, the left on Fort St Julien ; but the front was not formed till mid-day, and the attack did not commence till later, involving the loss of several hours. The artillery opened fire at 2 P.M., and at 4 was made an infantry attack against the 1st Prussian corps and 3d reserve division, which, though at first repulsed, had by 10.30 gained possession of Noisseville and Montoy, where the main defensive line was breached ; but the two detached army corps had received counter-orders on the 29th and had rejoined the increasing army, so that during the evening and night ample forces could be thrown across the Moselle in support. But before these troops arrived, Manteuffel, sure of assistance, rallied his men, and in a night attack carried the named villages, driving the French back to their early positions. Bazaine finding his situation hopeless, on the 1st of September returned to Metz, having with 130,000 French been checked by 40,000 Prussians. The Prussian authors state that the bearing of the French throughout denoted demoralisation, the result of their earlier defeats ; but it must be borne in mind that the fighting was entirely of a direct character involving the terrible disadvantage of exposure of the attack against the concealment and cover of the defence. An investing line has no flanks, and herein lies its strength. The theory that an interior position possesses its former decisive value is greatly impaired.

There are many conditions necessary to give it the importance claimed for it, and an army invested hardly possesses it at all. The difficulty of developing force sufficiently rapidly, and the impossibility of direct attack against vigilant troops with sufficient artillery in intrenched positions, render it imperative for a commander to do his utmost to prevent investment. It is when the invader separates to effect this that the opportunity is presented, and, once effected, the chance will hardly return again.

At Noisseville the faults of the troops, the character of the attack, the want of energy in securing success, are everywhere apparent; apathy on the part of the private soldier, and want of confidence on all sides, characterised the sortie—clearly demonstrating that the shock of war is now so rude that where the fullest confidence did not exist from top to bottom, victory cannot be expected.

The month of September and the first days of October passed comparatively quietly away. Various operations of minor importance occurred at Lauvallier, Vany, Chieuilles, Mercy St Peltre, Lessy, Ladonchamps, Bellevue, and St Remy, but no results had followed from them save that as foraging expeditions they were successful. Hunger was doing its work within the fortress; and sickness, owing to exposure, was rife, and was increased by defective sanitary measures and inferior food, for the troops were now mainly dependent on horse-flesh and the smallest ration of bread.

The duties of investment were most severe, too, on the other side. It was in the interest of the garrison constantly to alarm and disturb the repose of the investing forces, and, where feasible, to erect and arm works in order to push back and stretch the investing lines, so as to increase their duties and diminish their strength. The constant firing of the defence was excessively distressing and wearing. It is a mistake to suppose that the French wasted ammunition either here or at Paris in so doing, even if the actual effect were but small, for the Germans admit that it caused them great inconvenience, and even that might be a gain. These measures were better initiated at the capital than at Metz, for the simple reason that the former was better supplied with soldiers and ammunition, and had in addition more resources. In Metz

the physical and moral power of the garrison was constantly declining, from the first hour of investment.

The 7th October saw the beginning of the end. A council of war was called, and arrived at the following decisions: 1st, To remain in Metz as long as possible; 2d, Not to commit the army to any further operations outside the fortress; 3d, To enter into negotiations with the enemy; 4th, In case the enemy should wish to impose conditions incompatible with military honour, to force a passage sword in hand.

General Boyer was intrusted with the first negotiations on the 12th, but, returning unsuccessful, was sent back again, with a similar result. On the 24th all hopes of a political solution as concerning the future of the Army of the Rhine were at an end. And on the 26th, after a fruitless errand of Changarnier's, Jarras was sent to arrange the terms of capitulation, which was signed on the evening of the next day at Frescaty.

The Prussians state that after Noisseville the fate of the French army was never for one instant doubtful. Want of ardour, determination, and military spirit, were apparent in every battalion.

It may be confidently predicted that in future, armies will demoralise under the influence of defeat more rapidly than has hitherto been the case.

After its losses at Borny, Rezonville, and Gravelotte, the French army was not really available for severe offensive action. It was this knowledge, coupled with his recent experience of the enormous difficulties attending direct attack, which cramped Bazaine's action at Metz.

He was therefore from the commencement on the horns of a dilemma. He was unable to count upon victory in a general engagement, owing, first, to the fact that he must inevitably assume the *rôle* of the assailant; secondly, that the communications and ground round Metz were by no means favourable to the rapid development of the temporary superiority accorded to him by his interior position; thirdly, the Prussians within the first fortnight, in correct appreciation of their defensive *rôle*, had completed a double and triple line of works, which increased their ordinary power of resistance; and lastly, the

moral power necessary to rise superior to these difficulties was altogether wanting in the army.

It has been shown already that in order to carry his army off, it was absolutely necessary for Bazaine to gain a pitched battle, and that in that case it was impossible for him to be more favourably placed than he was, in the general interests of the war. Any such calculation must therefore soon have been dismissed from Bazaine's mind. On the other hand, if active success were impossible, his capitulation was certain with the consumption of the last rations.

Recognising the contingency as inevitable without relief, the situation still possessed inherent military advantages.

It must never be forgotten that the enormous field army carried into France by the Prussians was entirely absorbed by the investment of two fortresses and the siege of a third. The reduction of Strasburg could be narrowly calculated, for it was a fortress of older fashion. That of Metz and Paris was entirely dependent on the subsisting means within. No effort was made to reduce Metz by artillery power, and at Paris it was but feebly attempted.

The number and calibre of the guns, their transport, and that of the necessary ammunition, presented difficulties that were almost insuperable.

It is clear, therefore, that the purpose of French strategy should, from the first, have been to prolong the defence of these places to the utmost.

If an army is surprised in its concentration, as was here the case, time is necessary to recover from the shock, and this is precisely afforded by similar fortifications, and their value once for all established. Inactive as the garrison of Metz was, it was for the time rendering admirable service.

It nailed 200,000 active adversaries to the spot, barring all further operation. The object of Bazaine should therefore have been, not to attempt romantic but impossible enterprise, but, after due logical deliberation, to endeavour by every means and resource in his power to prolong the duties of Prince Frederick Charles.

Those who advocate sorties, sword in hand, forget that such attempts must inevitably have been made early in the siege,

to the certain detriment of the real demands of the military situation. The loss of 20,000 Frenchmen in action would to some have been a gratifying sacrifice at the shrine of military glory; but it would have served no practical end. The loss of the same number of men from sickness and starvation, terrible as it would have been, might, and probably would, under different circumstances, have necessitated the raising of the investment of Paris.

If Bazaine is guilty of military neglect or incapacity, his crime must be found in another direction. The charge framed against him should be composed of the following clauses: 1st, Whether every care had been taken from the commencement to provide subsisting means when the imprisonment of the army was inevitable or probable? 2dly, Whether, after imprisonment, sufficient administrative capacity was evinced in apportioning the provisions in store in the fortress? 3dly, Whether every opportunity was seized of adding to the stock, by external enterprise? 4thly, Whether the enduring power of the garrison was sufficiently tested?

If the Marshal can clear himself in these respects, no sensible soldier can charge him with military misdemeanour as regards Metz.

We know that Bazaine was in no direct manner responsible for the discipline and organisation of the French army and its relative position of inferiority. He had every right to assume that he was not the author of the strategic dispositions which invited and entailed the first tactical defeats. It is a matter of history that he simply inherited the responsibility for the consequences of these defects, at a moment of indescribable confusion and difficulty.

He had originally determined upon retreat. Why?

Because he was rightly dissatisfied with the fortress of Metz, as it stood, and with the strength of the line of the Moselle. It had been amply proved that Metz did not supply all the conditions demanded from a similar *place d'armes*. It was not supported by any adjacent work, and it had not been prepared for the rapid passage of troops from one bank to the other. Had the line of the Moselle been properly fortified, enlisting the Meurthe and the Seille in its system, it

would not have been correct to state that retreat was indispensable after Forbach and Wörth. That retreat was indispensable owing to the faulty condition of the line of the Moselle with reference to the German frontier.

Again, Bazaine did not attack at Borny. He was slipping away from the Nied when he was attacked, on the sole responsibility of the brigadier commanding the Prussian advance, who observed his purpose.

He responded to the action because he had more or less grounded fears, on the authority of Coffinières, for the safety of Metz, which eventually might become the only harbour of refuge open to his inferior force.

Nevertheless, it is probable that his acceptance of action at Borny was an error. His adversaries could hardly know what he did; and in the worst case, the loss of Metz might be preferable to the loss of the army.

The slowness of the retreat through the fortress was due to the enormous train and the deficient communications, and for neither of these was Bazaine responsible. His action at Rezonville was feeble. Had he known the exact state of affairs, it would have been different, doubtless. But he had not had time to look round personally. It was difficult for him to appreciate that one army corps only was on his flank at first. His retreat on Gravelotte evinces resource, if not first-rate ability. That his troops in that action were not sufficiently supplied with ammunition was, again, not his fault, but that of the general administration of the army, and the confusion under which he assumed command. On the whole, the verdict will be that Bazaine did his duty fairly, if not perfectly; and the impartial student will not hold him responsible for defeat which, under the circumstances, was inevitable.

One interesting feature of the investing lines is the extent to which ground may now be occupied with field fortification adapted to sufficiently pronounced features.

It was argued in the earlier operations that Bazaine had done well, after inflicting terrible losses upon his adversary, in retiring into Metz instead of hazarding a march the issue of which was more than doubtful. But one grave considera-

tion presented itself at once to Bazaine. The fortress was only provisioned for a few months, for the ordinary garrison and its inhabitants. The principal French magazines had been accumulated on the frontier, and had assisted the invasion of French territory. Clearly, then, the advantages offered by the shelter of the fortress were of a temporary character, determined by the amount of subsisting means it contained. From the moment supplies commenced to run short, the shelter it had sought became a source of positive danger to the army, and the presence of the army ultimately dangerous to the fortress. Two courses presented themselves, therefore: 1. To break through the Prussian lines before provisions began to fail, with a view to escape altogether; 2. By a course of successful operations to reprovise the fortress, and thus to continue its occupation. In either case, the decisive defeat of a portion of the enemy's forces was indispensable. For, presuming that the purpose was to carry off the army from Metz through the investing lines, this could only be effected in conjunction with a train of reserve ammunition, which would have to be escorted, during the night following victorious battle, through the breach made in the investing line. The time thus required would enable the enemy to successfully mass his troops, and render the completion of the operation exceedingly precarious. Moreover, it has been well argued, that in case Bazaine succeeded in making himself master of either bank of the Moselle, he would have done wrong to leave the fortress. His efforts should have been directed towards reproviseing the fortress to an extent which would have enabled him to prevent a force so very much superior to his own from taking part in other operations for an indefinite period through the winter.

Such supplies could have been procured at Thionville.

Bazaine tells us that on the 26th August he purposed forcing the lines in the direction of that fortress, but was stopped by the weather.

An engineer officer, reporting on these operations, says that the Crown Prince was marching in a much more difficult country at the same moment. It must be recollected, however, that he was marching on roads, not manœuvring with

the three arms, in low ground saturated with rain. Deligny, however, says that the troops crossed by a single bridge; that eight hours had already been consumed in crossing when the counter-order came; and that the entire ensuing night was employed in regaining the old positions. He adds that the army knew at once that the purpose had not been earnest, for that no preparation had been made to complete the necessary train. According to him, the reason given was that General Coffinières asserted that the fortress was not safe for fifteen days if the army evacuated it. But one thing is certain, that the strategic value of any such fortress as Metz is at once impaired, if not altogether sacrificed, unless the river upon which it is constructed is bridged at every possible point. To use the fortress and the river for successful offence, the river must cease altogether to be an obstacle within the *rayon* of the fortress, a principle which appears to have been lost sight of altogether by Bazaine from commencement to end.

Success could only be expected from surprise, and surprise be only realised by sudden and overwhelming concentration.

Bazaine renewed the attempt on the 31st, he implies, on receipt of communication from the Emperor. This may be. A better reason existed in the fact that two army corps had been detached from the investing force on the 27th to Dun and Stenay to reinforce the Crown Prince of Saxony, and oppose Macmahon.

Clearly, from this circumstance, danger was anticipated by Moltke from Macmahon's movement, for he reduced the investing force for the time being to little more than Bazaine's own strength; so that, in order to meet one peril, he exposed himself to another.

But the dilatoriness of Macmahon's march soon relieved him from anxiety; and on the 29th the Crown Prince of Prussia was in a position to support the 4th army, and the two corps returned by forced marches to Metz on that day. Bazaine's sortie was well timed; it was also well planned, with the exception of his concentration. Two bridges were used this time, not the permanent ones. The French concentration was not effected until 3 P.M., though commenced at

daylight. Why not the night before, by a dozen bridges instead of two?

His objective was the strong position of St Barbe, commanding the country between the Nied and Moselle, and the roads leading from Metz to Boulay, Bouzonville, and Thionville—Canrobert being directed on Malroy, to destroy the passage, or impede it, which he succeeded in doing. The left of the army was covered by the Moselle, the rear by St Julien and Belle Croix, and the right by Fort Queleu and a division of the Guard.

Bazaine states that his intention was to gain Thionville by Bethainville, and Rédange, with the 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, and try Malroy with the Guard and 2d corps.

If so, he counted upon finding in Thionville everything that he should have taken with him from Metz. But one thing he could not find there, which was the protection against superior numbers afforded by Metz in case Macmahon should not arrive. It could not be for him to search for Macmahon, or to imperil his army by so doing. It was his interest and duty to employ, and, if possible, to defeat the forces before Metz, to facilitate Macmahon's arrival. He could not be better placed than in the fortress, whether to co-operate with Macmahon in defeating Frederick Charles, or in effecting this purpose independently should the Prince detach, as he did. The object on the 31st should have been signally to defeat the Prussian forces on the right of the Moselle, a problem quite within his means, considering that 70,000 Prussians at most were spread over the ground extending from Malroy to Mercy. Then by every means in his power he should have re-provisioned the fortress whilst master of that bank of the river.

The direction was well chosen, as offering the broadest space for developing his front, remembering also that the villages in a northerly direction had not yet been drained of provisions. Moreover, Thionville was full of supplies. But the battle should have commenced at daybreak, not at 4 P.M.

Late as the attack was, it was successful to a certain extent. The French carried Servigny and Montoy by 10 P.M., breaking here completely through the investing lines.

But they made no effort to maintain their ground. The

troops which had carried these villages were not supported; they did not intrench themselves, and were easily thrown out by a cleverly organised night attack.

The battle was languidly renewed in the morning, but terminated at 10 A.M. in general but orderly retreat. Of this operation, the Prussians say that the French fighting was spiritless, evincing a low state of *morale*. The French, that no one knew what he was to do; the Marshal had not communicated his purpose to the generals of division; his presence was not felt on the battle-field; from beginning to end there was little or no direction; that the troops fought well, and that the retreat commenced, no one knew why, and was completed in the most perfect order.

General Deligny says that the Marshal could not have been in earnest; it was necessary for him to do something, but he did as little as possible, for he did not wish to incur defeat or loss.

A Prussian general says Bazaine did all he could. He selected his time and planned his operation well; his troops and officers executed it badly. But Bazaine himself reported (immediately after the action) that the *morale* of the troops was excellent, in spite of the great losses and numerous engagements.

It is denied by Deligny that the spirit of the troops was impaired, that their conduct was insubordinate or mutinous. He asserts that it would compare most favourably with that of any other army in a similar position of suffering and hardship. Probably it will be judged at a later period that the aims of Bazaine were not clearly formed in his own mind, and that hence arose the uncertainty and indecision which characterised his action, and imparted itself to his subordinates. The month of September spent in inactivity demonstrates, if further evidence were required, how any system of simply passive defence must inevitably lead to ruin. Even the Prussian who has undertaken Bazaine's defence condemns him now. He shows conclusively that, were more important action impracticable, he might have done great service to his country by effecting the escape of 10,000 picked men to form the *cadres* of the armies organising elsewhere. Probably there

is truth in the surmise, that after Sedan Bazaine considered peace was inevitable, and wished to preserve his army intact, as far as possible, for future purposes. But as time wore on, he was, in order to subsist, compelled to mutilate it, and was thus debarred from further effort. An example to men similarly placed in future, never to swerve from the straight line of military duty for political ends.

Meanwhile the fortresses small and large, that were of value or importance to the Germans, were falling one by one into their hands.

Strasbourg, invested after Wörth by Von Werder, capitulated on the 27th, and Toul on the 23d September; Schlestadt on the 22d, and Soissons on the 16th of October; Neu Breisach and Fort Mortier on the 6th November; Pfalzburg and Montmedy on the 14th December; Thionville on the 24th, La Fere on the 26th, and Verdun on the 8th of November; Longwy on the 25th, Mézières on the 2d, Rocroy on the 5th, and Peronne on the 9th of January 1871. Belfort and Bitsche were alone unconquered until the last, and the latter never capitulated; but the investment of the former was intimately connected with the effort of Bourbaki to raise the siege, and will be referred to in considering that general's operations.

The capitulation of Metz had at length freed Prince Frederick Charles, and at a time, moreover, when his aid was sorely needed, for the pressure of the new French levies was being felt, and this notably along the line of the Loire.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ARMIES OF THE LOIRE.

As we have seen, the 4th cavalry division had been pushed forward towards the Loire, reaching Pithiviers on the 25th September, where, as well as at Artenay on the 26th, skirmishes with hostile bands ensued; and on the 5th October as the increased activity of the enemy was apparent, the division fell back on Angerville. The same occurred with the 6th cavalry division at Chartres, and as the intention of the enemy to form an army of relief on this side, under General d'Aurelle de Paladines, was well known, it was evident that some progress had been made, and the necessity for forming a covering army was quickly recognised. Von der Tann was placed in command, therefore, of the 1st Bavarians, 22d infantry division, and the 2d, 4th, and 6th

cavalry divisions on the 6th October, and ordered to take up a position at Arpajon, with one cavalry division on either flank, and one pushed out in front.

The general, finding the enemy did not move, advanced on the 8th to Angerville, where he received information that 40,000 men occupied Orleans, 10,000 Pithiviers, and 10,000 Châteaudun. He therefore moved on Orleans, and after a skirmish at Artenay, gained possession of the town on the 11th, the enemy retreating to Bourges. Prudently declining to pursue him further, he remained in observation at Orleans, while the 22d division returned with the 4th cavalry division to Paris, clearing the line Châteaudun (18th), Chartres, and Dreux *en route*. Thus by the end of October the Germans were securely settled in the broad tract of country included between the Loire, the Eure, and the Oise.

On the 27th October Metz capitulated. The 1st army (1st, 7th, 8th corps, 3d reserve division, and 3d cavalry division) was thereupon directed to occupy the city, besiege Montmedy and Thionville, and watch the prisoners; while the 2d army (2d, 3d, 9th, 10th corps, and 1st cavalry division) was to move by forced marches on Troyes and the Loire.

On the 10th November, when it occupied the line Troyes-Chaumont (where a brigade was left to watch Langres), the anticipated advance of the French was announced, and news was received on the 13th that Von der Tann had had to evacuate Orleans, having fought a severe action at Coulmiers on the 9th.

The Duke of Mecklenburg was placed in command of the 1st Bavarians, 22d corps, 17th division, and 2d, 4th, and 6th cavalry divisions, and ordered to concentrate at Angerville-Toury on the 12th November. Rumours of the approach of strong bodies from the westward resulted in some counter-marching by this force to ward off the threatened blow on that side; and on the 15th November orders were issued to the Duke to confine his attention to the roads leading to the west and towards Châteaudun, leaving to Prince Frederick Charles the guardianship of the road from Orleans. Skirmishes in various directions led to the belief that the bulk of the French

forces were concentrating near the latter; and on the 22d, therefore, orders were sent to the Duke of Mecklenburg to pursue the enemy towards Le Mans with cavalry and weak detachments only, while with the rest of his force he moved south to co-operate with the Prince by Beaugency. On the 25th the two commands were placed under the orders of the latter; but the Duke's force in its march southward was still disturbed by the presence of hostile bands from the Loir, and had to move again towards that river to check them. It halted near Châteaudun, &c., on the 28th.

The 2d army meanwhile remained facing the forest of Orleans, north of the Loire, until the 28th, when it was decided to move it a little further to the left, to counteract a possible French advance along the Loing towards Paris; and this necessitated the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg giving up the original idea of passing his force across the river at Beaugency, and so to arrange his march from the Loir as to unite with the 2d army at Toury.

But on the same day the French assumed the offensive. The 10th German corps, on the left, was vigorously attacked at Beaune la Rolande by the 20th and part of the 18th French corps, and the 15th, 16th, and 17th corps were also believed to form the army commanded by D'Aurelle de Paladines. On the 30th of November the Grand Duke effected his junction with the 2d army, and on the 1st December reconnaissances were ordered to be pushed along the entire line to discover the enemy's exact position. It was then found that the French right was being withdrawn; but on the same day the 1st Bavarians were attacked in force near Loigny, and the battle was continued by the Germans on the 2d.

On the 3d a combined advance upon Orleans was made. The 2d army sent the 9th corps on Artenay, 3d on Chilleurs aux Bois, the 10th corps on Villereau and Chilleurs aux Bois, 1st cavalry division between the Esonne and Loing, the 6th cavalry division on Châtillon le Roi; the 2d cavalry division to call in its outposts at daybreak. The Grand Duke was directed to make a corresponding attack to the west of the Orleans-Artenay road. The 20th infantry division was formed at Poupry with the 2d cavalry division, the 1st Bavarians at

Lumeau, the 17th division at Auneux, the 4th cavalry division on the Chartres-Orleans road.

During the whole of the 3d and 4th severe fighting occurred along the line; but on the evening of the second day the Germans had penetrated to the suburbs of Orleans, and the place was thereupon surrendered, the French retreating in three bodies—their right by Gien on Nevers and Bourges, the centre by Orleans and Vierzon, the left by the right bank on Beaugency. On the 5th a strong detachment of the 9th corps crossed the river, and pushing cavalry detachments towards Gien, Vierzon, and Tours, brought back many prisoners to add to the 12,000 already captured during the previous battles.

COMMENTS ON THE FIRST LOIRE CAMPAIGN.

Thus the first attempt to relieve Paris from the Loire failed; but though the rapidity of the organisation of the large army commanded by D'Aurelle is remarkable, the fighting of these raw levies was most defective.

According to the 'Staats Anzeiger,' Von der Tann had barely 20,000 men in Orleans, and it was only on his representation of the largely increasing size of the French army opposed to him that General Wittich, with the 22d division, was ordered to join him from Chartres. Before this junction was effected collision ensued; and the Prussian statement is that Von der Tann, knowing that he was to be reinforced from Chartres and Evreux, avoided action, falling back upon Toury—this the more as it was already known that Frederick Charles's army was approaching by forced marches. This is barely candid. The action was undoubtedly severe and the losses sensible; and had he wished to avoid action, why did he turn off towards Coulmiers and Châteaudun, leaving troops in Orleans, instead of retiring at once upon Toury?

The truth is, the Army of the Loire was still underrated as to quality, numbers, and equipment; and a little more judgment and decision on D'Aurelle's part would have involved Von der Tann in a signal disaster, and perhaps have seriously affected the German investment.

This may be realised by reference to the dispositions in the east of France. Metz had fallen on the 27th October, and 300,000 Prussians were thus liberated. Of these a portion remained in Metz as garrison; 50,000 under Manteuffel were despatched against the French Army of the North; one corps was sent to Paris, to reinforce the besiegers; and 75,000 under Prince Frederick Charles moved to the south and east, that is to the Upper Loire, and to co-operate with Werder engaged in reducing the fortresses of Lower Alsace.

Thus no force was in the first instance directed from Metz towards Orleans, and now or never was the French opportunity.

The purpose, therefore, of involving and destroying the Bavarians was sound, the means taken doubtful, as the numerical proportions were known to D'Aurelle, if not to Von der Tann.

A direct demonstration against Orleans from the south, whilst massing the remainder of their forces at Marchenoir, would have placed the French in a position of greater vantage on the day of battle.

Von der Tann extricated himself by a night march after losing 4000 men and 2 guns, falling back to meet the divisions which were hurrying to his assistance. Besides the 17th and 22d divisions which had been ordered up, the 13th corps, under the Duke of Mecklenburg, was at once moved off to his support; and these troops, with the punished Bavarian corps, represented the entire forces of which the Prussians at this moment could dispose as a covering army. But Keratry had now begun to give symptoms of life from his camp near Le Mans, and the Hessian and Schleswig-Holstein divisions were turned against him, successfully engaging him at Dreux and Châteauneuf on the 17th and 18th November.

The troops, therefore, which really interposed between the Loire Army and the investing lines from the 10th to the 20th November were the Bavarians—who had been very roughly handled, and whose soldiers were somewhat suffering in *morale*—and the 13th Prussian corps, all under the Duke of Mecklenburg. Prince Frederick Charles could not well put in an appearance before the 20th, at the termination of a very severe march.

Now, although the 'Staats Anzeiger' asserts that after

Coulmiers D'Aurelle detached considerably to Keratry, purposing the union of that general with the Army of the North, this is not apparent from after events; and if he did, he acted in contradiction to every true principle.

To abandon a position of successful supremacy already attained for a distant speculative object, is simply an act of suicide which can hardly be credited.

Certain it is, that for some reason or other the French general did not attempt to follow up his success. Whether Trochu was not prepared to co-operate, or whether the supplies he should have introduced, in case of success, into Paris were not at hand—whether his ammunition or his nerve failed him—remains to be seen when the true history of the campaign is written.

As a matter of fact, renouncing further pursuit, he fell back on Artenay and Orleans, where he commenced to intrench himself with vigour, making free use of the forest for the purpose.

Moltke meanwhile, appreciating the danger of the French success, had made preparations for raising the investment, and telegraphed to Prince Frederick Charles to force his march towards the Upper Yonne to the utmost.

The question therefore arises here, assuming that Moltke had, owing to the enemy's advance upon Etampes, raised the investment of the city on the left bank of the Seine, in how far would such a step have improved the general position of the French? The probability is that, masking his movement, he would have been far on his way to meet D'Aurelle before Trochu was alive to his absence, and that he would have wielded a sufficient force to have inflicted decisive defeat on the former before his action could have been interfered with by Trochu. On the other hand, the Prussian subsisting depots would have fallen in great measure into the hands of the Parisian army, though probably not in sufficient quantity to form a result of any importance.

That Trochu was prepared to take and keep the field under such circumstances, is in the highest degree improbable; had he issued from, he must soon have returned to, Paris—where, in point of fact, he was now doing the same negative service which Bazaine had rendered at Metz. It may safely be

stated, that unless Trochu at this period was in a position, by uniting with the relieving force on its advance, to hope to inflict decisive defeat on the Prussian corps on the left bank of the Seine, then D'Aurelle did right in falling back upon Orleans; for, by advancing to Paris, he only jeopardised the existence of a hopeful young army, in spite of the severe criticism which his apparent want of dash has invoked.

If Moltke had raised the investment, it would not have been for the purpose of retreat, but for the purpose of crushing the Army of the Loire, while the remaining forces before Paris protected his rear, for which purpose they were quite sufficient until Prince Frederick Charles arrived.

That this last general could arrive, was due solely to the early fall of Metz.

D'Aurelle then retreated to Orleans, and there constructed a series of intrenchments on a large scale. The value of the position is, as a glance at the map shows, due to the presence of the forest and river, both capable of being turned to skilful account—the drawback being, that in case of reverse the principal avenue of retreat lay through a large and populous town, on the north bank of the Loire.

Thanks to the energy of Gambetta, and the patriotism of the inhabitants, D'Aurelle's force was completed in another fortnight to 200,000 men, with 500 guns.

The mass of these troops constituted the centre of his line at Orleans, his left stretching to Marchenoir, and his right to Gien, threatening thus a number of communications towards the capital.

Prince Frederick Charles reached Pithiviers with his advanced-guard on the 19th, and there touched Van der Tann, who was posted at Toury and Angerville. But the Duke of Mecklenburg had started with the 17th and 22d divisions towards Le Mans, to push his success against Keratry's Army of the West. As late as the middle of the last week in November he was still between Nogent and Chartres without direct communication with the Bavarians.

The 'Staats Anzeiger' would imply that this was meant to form part of a great turning movement, by which the army of D'Aurelle was to be eventually surrounded. But it is evi-

dent that, if the writer of the article received his inspirations from the Prussian staff, they at this period were ignorant both of the strength, the organisation, and the positions of the French—unless, indeed, the purpose was to conceal arrangements which history may eventually pronounce defective.

Thanks to their dispositions, and to the screen afforded by the forest, the French might concentrate against any portion of their adversary's line, flanks or centre, before they could be opposed in anything like equal force, provided they were prepared to take the offensive. It is estimated that at this period (25th Nov.) the army which Prince Frederick Charles was about to command, did not exceed 100,000 men.

Turning to the latter part of the operations conducted by D'Aurelle, he seems to have been unable to handle the masses of troops which had so rapidly accumulated in the forest of Orleans. It is not easy to conceive a more difficult problem than that of tempering these newly-raised levies to a sufficient extent, in so short a space of time, to obtain from them the power of movement essential for successful operations in the field. The wisdom of the step recently introduced by the Prussians, of dividing such masses into separate armies, under competent commanders, seems sufficiently apparent. The commander-in-chief instructs, but the execution of his instructions is left entirely to the independent judgment of the subordinate commanders. Moreover, the system enlists the advantage that, during operations on a large scale such as these in France, it is always feasible to increase or diminish the strength of this or that army unit, according to the demands of the case, and without the knowledge or timely penetration of the adversary.

If this is necessary with army corps so thoroughly combined and trained as those which composed the Prussian army, it would seem still more indispensable with such troops as the French here possessed. Similar organisation might have assisted D'Aurelle materially in his contemplated movements from the camp before Orleans. Throughout these last operations, the want of harmony and combination in the French plan is apparent. A portion only of the forces are employed, first here, then there; whereas, to make superiority

of force tell, it must be entirely and simultaneously developed. Evidently the reason of this is that the commander-in-chief wishing to direct the execution of his own plan, reluctant to delegate authority, when he alone was held responsible, could not, on an extended line such as that occupied by the French, be present at every point. Consequently the plan was originally defective, and of insufficient grasp.

Now the direction given to the point of attack has been criticised by an excellent pen, which has summarised these operations.

It has been assumed that the strong point was selected, not the weak one ; that he struck against the Prussian left, instead of against the Prussian right and right centre.

The immediate theory advanced is incontestable ; and if the operation had been isolated in its character, if no other considerations prevailed beyond immediate encounter with the army of Prince Frederick Charles, the writer might probably be correct in his conclusions. But it must be remembered that the operations of the Army of the Loire were in direct connection with the interests and movements of the Army of Paris, and that the efforts of that army were properly directed towards the east and south-east of the investing line, because the ground more favoured their deployment in force in that quarter, and the communications of the Prussians would be more directly assailed there than elsewhere. It will be remembered, too, that the strategic advantage which accrues to the defender of his own territory is that, by exercising forethought, he is everywhere at home. With the communications at their disposal, the French might constantly shift the depots from which their supplies might be drawn, whereas the Prussians were constrained to one rigid line, which was indispensable to their existence.

Lyons constituted a base, which was not nearly so distant as that upon which the Prussians depended, with communications of ample kind, and perfectly free ; so that in this case the operating armies would be striking at the enemy's communications whilst perfectly secure as to their own ; ever a most important consideration in strategy, inasmuch as it enhances or diminishes the relative value of defeat or victory.

Moreover, although the Prussians certainly were stronger on their left than on their right, the power of concentration and the numerical superiority he held, enabled D'Aurelle by proper dispositions to appear in sufficient superiority against this point of their line. But all the elements of successful attack were wanting. The attempt was made without preceding demonstrations at other points of the line; it was made in insufficient force; it was not supported by simultaneous action elsewhere; and there is reason to believe that no care was taken to secure that early and marked preponderance of artillery fire which is now indispensable to offensive operations.

The severe repulse sustained by the French right placed that fraction of the French army *hors de combat* for some time after, which sufficiently accounts for the general inaction during the next two days. But on the 1st December a fresh tentative effort was made. The wisdom of this step is more than doubtful. The forces available could no longer establish any great superiority; and in quality they were very inferior. Apparently it would have been better to have remained on the defensive within intrenchments until the entire force had recovered its elasticity. The only excuse for it is, that matters were rapidly culminating in Paris.

With regard to the Prussian operations, the conclusion arrived at seems pointedly correct, that the French owed their defeat rather to superior strategy than to other causes.

On the 28th November, Trochu made his sortie in the direction of L'Hay, Chevilly, and Choisy-le-Roi; and on the 30th, Ducrot sallied out in front of Vincennes. Suffice to say, that Trochu declined to make an independent effort, and retired when he heard of the repulse of the Army of the Loire.

It was stated that the French retired in different directions after the actions before Orleans. In the sequel the advantage to be derived from excentric retreat on defensive territory will be apparent, if favoured by other military features.

The Prussians laboured, as the best commanders (Napoleon included) often must labour, under the uncertainty as to which was the true line of retreat; and, as their adversaries separated,

were themselves compelled to separate in order to watch and pursue the different fractions.

After the occupation of Orleans, the pursuit was immediately taken up, the 3d corps moving by Gien and Jargeau; the 9th by Orleans down the left bank of the river on Beaugency, to support the principal column on the right bank; the 6th cavalry division to Vierzon; while the 10th corps remained at Orleans; and the 1st Bavarians, with the 17th and 22d divisions, remained on the right bank, ready to move on Beaugency if the enemy had retreated to Tours.

On the side of the French, Chanzy, with the 16th and 17th corps, was cut off from Orleans, and rallied at Mer, where he was joined by the 21st corps, sent to him from Tours, and assumed the chief command of this the "Second Army of the Loire." As early as the 7th these troops had been pushed forward to Beaugency; and on that day, as the Duke of Mecklenburg, who was again temporarily acting independently, moved out of Meung, on the Beaugency road, he was unexpectedly met by a very severe fire. Both armies received reinforcements during the day, and the action was undecided; but on the 8th it was again resumed, the French taking the offensive, about Messas and Cravant, and the battle still remained, to the disagreeable surprise of the Germans, without result. Slight successes were gained during the night by the latter at Vernon; and on the 9th they again gained ground, taking Villorceau, but this was soon accounted for by the evident fact that Chanzy was concentrating against their right at the forest of Marchenoir.

The Duke was therefore reinforced by the 10th corps from Orleans, and the 3d corps was ordered to Beaugency. On the 10th the French renewed the attack at Cernay and Cravant, but without success; and at the close of the day their front was contracted between Villermain and Josnes. On the 11th the two armies were inactive, and on the following day the French mysteriously disappeared; but the Germans, soon finding that Chanzy had retired upon Fréteval, and had crossed the Loir, where he had taken up a position, with his front covered by the river, on the high ground between the forests of Marchenoir and Fréteval, advanced

against him, and on the 14th carried the village, but failed to hold it.

The position of the Germans on the 15th was peculiar. Chanzy's army was now in reality nearer to Paris than they were, and no covering force lay between the French and the capital; while the French commander, now in communication with the Army of the West (Keratry), was, if sufficiently reinforced, in a position to move on Paris by Châteaudun.

The position at Fréteval was, moreover, too strong to be carried by a front attack; but it will be remembered that the 9th corps had moved down the left bank of the Loire, and had reached Blois on the 12th, but was unable to cross until a detachment from the 10th corps, from the right bank, had lent it a hand. Then these troops moved on Vendôme, beat out the French by their superiority in artillery, and, crossing the Loire, turned the French position at Fréteval. The Germans entered Vendôme on the 16th, after two days' fighting.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's advance was by Cloyes-Morée-Vendôme-Blois; and a rear-guard affair occurred at Epuisay on the 17th, the enemy withdrawing to Le Mans by the 21st, on which date the German 10th corps skirmished at Monnaie, and appeared before Tours. The remainder of the French army that had been engaged at Orleans had rallied at Bourges under Bourbaki.

The nature of the country in which the final operations of this portion of the campaign occurred requires a brief description. The greater river, the Loire, was Chanzy's original base of operations; the lesser one, the Loir, with Vendôme, Châteaudun, La Flèche, and Angers, the line to be defended. In this area the intermediate streams of the Sarthe, with Alençon and Le Mans—the Huisne, with Nogent, Le Theil, and La Ferté Bernard—affluents of the greater rivers, were also important obstacles to movement, and, moreover, further lines of defence.

The country between the Loir, Aisne, and Sarthe may be divided into different defensive lines, such as those of the Azay, the Braye, Grand Luce-St Calais-Vibraye, Parigné-Ardenay-Pt. de Gesnes, and Le Mans; and of these the latter was the most important strategic point in the west of France, for five rail-

way lines met here, and the nature of the country, wooded, fenced, and abounding in villages and farms, afforded excellent opportunities for effective action. The town Le Mans was commanded by the neighbouring heights, and was not, therefore, a good military position in itself. It was necessary to defend it from a distance without at the same time scattering the troops too much. Thus, the plateau of Auvours was of prominent value; and Sargé, north of Le Mans, was defended by intrenchments. The roads crossing the plateau were three in number: that to Tours was defended by the position of La Tuilerie; that to Changé by Teste Rouge; and the third led to Parigné l'Evêque.

During the first three days of the new year, the Prussian troops, which had been quartered along the Loire, concentrated towards Vendôme. The Duke of Mecklenburg was about Chartres with 60,000 men; the 10th corps on the Loir; Von der Tann and the 9th corps at Orleans; the 3d corps at Gien.

The purpose of this concentration was to attack and crush Chanzy on Bourbaki's departure, the general plan being to advance from the line Morée-La Chartre, with the 9th, 3d, and 10th corps, while the Duke moved from Chartres for the Huisne, and, following that river, united with the other force before Le Mans.

On the 5th January, Prince Frederick Charles's headquarters were at Oucques, the Duke's at Illiers; and on the 6th, the former, crossing the Loir, not without opposition, reached Azay and Villiers, the latter gaining Brou and La Loupe. On the 7th, Savigny and Sargé, on the line of the Braye, were reached, the Grand Duke being at Beaumont, Authon, and Nogent. On the 8th the Prince reached St Calais; and the 10th corps, which had been engaged on the left, advanced from La Chartre, while Mecklenburg reached La Ferté Bernard, on the Huisne. The 4th cavalry division marched down the river to Bellême, the 2d kept up communication between the Grand Duke and the Prince, the 5th covered the former's right, and the 6th the latter's left. On the 9th, Frederick Charles reached Bouloire, though the roads were hard frozen and slippery, and the cavalry were useless;

but on this date the Germans had reached to within striking distance of Le Mans.

On the 10th the troops were ordered to move as follows: The 3d corps was to clear the road to the town as far as the river, and advancing accordingly upon Changé and Champigné, defeated the French at Chelles, Parigné, and Changé; the 9th corps was to close up to Bouloire and act as a reserve; the 10th corps was to continue its advance on the Grand Lucé road; the 13th corps was to move on Le Mans, sending detachments across the Huisne to the right bank; while the 4th cavalry division was to advance by the Bonnetable road towards the same objective.

On the 11th the French had drawn back to the strong position on the heights around Le Mans, which had been carefully occupied. The 21st corps was stationed between the Sarthe and Huisne, with headquarters at Sargé; the 17th corps was in reserve on the Laval road; the 16th corps was to cover the approaches from the Loir, had its left at Juré, and its right on the Sarthe; the cavalry was pushed out to the front.

Chanzy congratulated himself upon having brought his army to the position it occupied, but he recognised the necessity of concealing its condition from the enemy. He had reason to be satisfied with his retreat from Beaugency; and while commenting on the fatigued state of the enemy, he pointed out to Gambetta at this time the opportunity which circumstances had afforded to Bourbaki to move in concert with him. But the latter was moving eastward; and Chanzy, hoping to be able to march on Paris by the 12th or 16th at the latest, had yet to defeat the army that had driven him hitherto so far westward.

On the 11th, then, the French were drawn up in the strong position of Le Mans, the left only, the 1st corps, being on the right bank of the Huisne as far as Montfort. Prince Frederick Charles did not intend to act decisively on that day, as the Duke of Mecklenburg was not yet up; but directed the 13th corps to move further to the right on the Savigny-Le Mans road, the 3d corps to hold the centre, the 9th to move on the Bouloire road to St Hubert, and the 10th to pass from

the Grand Lucé road to that from Château du Loir, leaving only a brigade of cavalry and some guns on the former. Fighting occurred during these operations, and the plateau D'Auvours was carried; while the passage of the Huisne at Champigné, with that at Connerré, was gained; and during the night the important height of Les Tuileries was occupied by the Germans.

On the 12th, the attack commenced at mid-day, the 13th corps on Corneille and La Croix, covered on its right by the 4th cavalry division; the 9th corps, placing its guns on the plateau of Auvours, gained the passage of the stream at Parance; the 3d corps continued the offensive towards Le Mans; and lastly, the 10th corps, pushing on Pontlieue from Les Tuileries, gained possession of the city, to which the Prince's headquarters were transferred on the 13th.

The French retreated in haste on Alençon and Laval. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was pushed towards the former place with the 13th corps; detachments from the 10th corps went forward in the direction of Conlie and Laval; while the 3d and 9th corps were concentrated in and about Le Mans.

Prince Frederick Charles reported on the 14th the successful result of his operations, which had resulted in the capture of 18,000 prisoners, 20 guns and mitrailleuses, 2 standards, and much warlike stores, and, last of all, in the dispersion of the 2d Army of the Loire.

COMMENTS ON THE SECOND LOIRE CAMPAIGN.

This campaign of Chanzy on the Huisne and Sarthe was only part of a gigantic military enterprise adopted and put into execution by Gambetta. The French possessed at this time four armies, under Chanzy, Faidherbe, Bourbaki, and Garibaldi respectively; and all of them were to act simultaneously against the Prussians—viz., Chanzy against Prince Frederick Charles, Faidherbe against Manteuffel, Bourbaki against Werder, while Garibaldi co-operated with him; simultaneously the garrison of Paris was to make its effort. The directions given both to the Army of the North and to

Bourbaki was against the Prussian communications ; and the troops employed, including the Army of Paris, may have amounted to 500,000 men.

Against this huge concentric movement the Prussians, occupying the centre of an enormous circle, in inferior numbers, but with infinitely better troops, at once assumed the course of action which was best calculated to reply to it. Each French army was confronted by a Prussian force which, with the single exception of Werder, always took the offensive ; the result being that Frederick Charles beat Chanzy—Von Göben, as will be seen, beat Faidherbe at St Quentin—Werder repulsed Bourbaki, and Manteuffel destroyed him. Werder was left on the defensive to hold Bourbaki and find time for Manteuffel to come up.

The French losses were enormous. In prisoners only, Roye had lost at Rouen 10,000, Chanzy 22,000, Faidherbe 10,000 ; later on, Bourbaki had lost 25,000, and interned in Switzerland 80,000 ; giving a total of 147,000 men, besides 40,000 killed and wounded. The Prussians claim, including those taken at Paris, to have captured 800 guns besides. Their own losses are estimated at barely 15,000 men.

There are two inevitable conclusions to be drawn from these facts : first, that levies *en masse* are henceforth useless, if even greatly superior in numbers, against well disciplined and organised troops ; and secondly, that where such levies are brought into action, the simpler the operations committed to their execution the better.

A concentric plan of attack was adopted by the French ; and in each instance it failed from want of cohesion in the troops employed. The Prussians, on the other hand, adopting the same strategy, were thoroughly successful, as at Le Mans.

Hence we may conclude that such operations are very telling where the instrument is reliable and the enemy inferior in quality, but in the opposite case are totally impracticable.

The ground around Le Mans itself affords the same theatre as that in which the wars of La Vendée, where the troops of the Republic were so long held in check by raw levies, took place. The whole territory is hilly and well wooded, with fields cultivated and fenced in, in English fashion. With massive

farmhouses, and a fair sprinkling of villages, it is admirably suited to favour local defence; but the excessive severity of the weather, and the frozen and slippery state of the roads, made transport exceedingly difficult; still, though movement was thus impeded, it was not, as the event proved, impossible. The very nature of this ground, however, led to disaster in the present case. It is only really useful to practised troops, skilled in such fighting; to half-disciplined levies it offers grave disadvantages in modern times; and the vast number of prisoners captured was not merely a source of discouragement to the army, but proves that they lacked skill and experience in the method of avoiding such losses. The Germans state that the hardships encountered by them were extraordinary, and that Chanzy had a great chance, by disseminating the troops he commanded, instead of holding them closely together, of marring the operation.

The character of the German movement was concentric, and applicable precisely to the circumstances of the case. It was to be anticipated, considering the character of the troops, the severity of the weather, and the incomplete organisation of the French, that if the Prussians found the movement difficult, the French would find it still more so. Now in this, as in every other case, the danger of concentric attack consists alone in a system of active defence on the part of the defender. Clearly he must mass against one or other of the advances, and strike hard, trusting to success at one point for subsequent results. The point to be selected as presenting most advantages would be the centre, inasmuch as, if beaten, the other fractions would be widely separated. Thus the Prussians' central column was strong, consisting of the 3d and 9th corps. To have been successful, Chanzy must have defeated this advance by sheer hard fighting and superior force. Was he in a position to do so? Presumably not. It would have been difficult for him to manœuvre for the purpose with the troops he commanded in any season, and in the heart of a severe winter it was next to impossible; for, as a rule, the greater the hardships to be encountered in war, the severer must be the discipline to enable a commander to fully trust to his soldiers; and we only infer that, as the severity of the

war-shock has become infinitely more severe, so has the necessity for unrelenting severity of discipline increased. Nothing can be clearer to the military student than, provided his mind be impartial, that troops taking the field without having been subjected throughout to a system of permanent discipline, must be beaten by those which have ; and to assume that any voluntary system of organisation can prove successful when the shock comes, is simply to live in a fool's paradise.

Another feature worthy of notice is, from the extent of the prepared positions about Le Mans, that throughout the war the French evidently attributed too great importance to the advantages gained by the new arms for the defence.

Doubtless it were unwise to underrate these ; but it must be remembered that such positions are merely calculated to enable the defence to inflict loss, not to secure victory, unless the adversary be kind enough to run his head against a wall. Every position, again, is liable to be turned—if turned, is worthless ; and such cases are numerous here. The only severe loss was incurred by the Prussians, if advancing against the front of a position ; and this they knowingly encountered, in order to give the flanking movements time to bear their fruits. If, then, it be admitted that a system of active defence is alone calculated to procure results in the long-run, it will be conceded that the French chance throughout these operations was indeed a bad one, for they were unable to pursue it.

OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

When the 3d army moved westward from Wörth, the Baden division was left to observe Strasburg ; and when this was reinforced, the small army was placed under the command of Von Werder, and directed to besiege the fortress. After its reduction on the 2d September, that general, with the new 14th corps, formed from the Baden division and some additional infantry and cavalry, and subsequently reinforced by the 1st and 4th reserve divisions, pushed southwards, besieging the fortresses of Southern Alsace ; and eventually, by

the middle of December, occupying the line Dijon-Gray-Vesoul-Montbéliard, and investing, with Treskow's division, Belfort.

At Auxerre Zastrow stood with the 13th division and the corps artillery of the 7th corps to fill up the gap between Werder and the 2d army, and to guard the railway communications.

At first the French had only such troops as were commanded by Garibaldi and Cremer at Autun, Beaune, and Dôle, to oppose to Werder; but by the middle of December further force was collected at Besançon by Bessolles, which forced Werder to abandon Dijon and retire from Langres in order to concentrate at Vesoul, and there more effectually cover the siege of Belfort. Werder commanded about 54,000 infantry and cavalry with 150 guns.

But there were other forces collecting in the theatre. It will be remembered that after the second battle of Orleans the army under D'Aurelle was cut in two, one part under Chanzy retreating fighting on Le Mans, the other retiring by Gien to Nevers and Bourges, pursued for a short time only by the 3d German corps. The latter portion of the 1st Loire Army, when rallied and reinforced, was placed under the command of General Bourbaki, with the object of operating towards Belfort to raise the siege of that fortress, and threaten the German communications. Though reconnaissances were made from Orleans by the 6th cavalry division, the nature of Bourbaki's movement was not fully grasped until the end of December, by which time the new "Army of the East," consisting of the 15th, 18th, and 20th corps, and reinforced by the 24th corps from Lyons, had, by the extensive use of railroads, nearly completed its concentration at Besançon.

Bourbaki's first proposed plan of operations was to cross the Loire above Nevers, making for Montargis and Fontainebleau, while Garibaldi and Cremer demonstrated on Dijon and Gray. This was indeed the original plan for D'Aurelle when in possession of Orleans, but matters were now greatly changed. Instead of 200,000 men, scarcely 100,000 were available, and Orleans was no longer in the possession of the French as a base. There was now no prospect of joining

Ducrot victoriously emerging from Paris. What chance would Bourbaki have with Frederick Charles? Let Chanzy's fate answer. He would inevitably be defeated at Montargis. Bourges and Nevers would be uncovered, and these important arsenals placed at the enemy's mercy. The operation directing Garibaldi on Dijon, Gray, and Belfort, is equally objectionable. There would be but 40,000 raw troops exposed to Werder's 60,000 veterans in a most inclement season, and the forces therefore thus divided would offer each fraction inferior to the enemy.

The counter-project involved the other principle. Instead of dispersion and inferiority, union and superiority were to be sought. It was proposed to renounce marching on Paris, and to throw the 18th and 20th corps rapidly by rail on Beaune, and uniting with Cremer and Garibaldi to obtain possession of Dijon, while the other detachments were to be concentrated at Besançon under Bessolles, and then the entire force was to march upon Belfort, raise the siege, and eventually bear upon the German communications. The 15th corps, intrenched at Vierzon, was to cover Bourges and Nevers, and conceal the operation, until, relieved by the 25th corps, it was to reinforce Bourbaki in the east.

But the plan was incomplete. It left too much to the discretion of commanders according to the circumstances encountered. Still, proposed to the general officers at Bourges, it was unanimously accepted, and was put into operation after the 20th of December. It was not without merit, but faulty in its objective: the raising of the siege of Belfort was made the principal point; and this, from a high strategic point of view, is erroneous. The real object of the operation should have been to defeat Werder, who was in observation at Dijon, and afterwards to push on northwards and destroy the detachments which guarded the Prussian lines; the siege of Belfort must then have been raised as a necessary consequence, and very possibly the investment of Paris too. For the success of the operation, as usual, secrecy and rapidity of execution were indispensable. The first element was observed, for the march was screened by the 15th corps, and false reports were circulated; but the second was neglected owing to mis-

understandings, and the difficulties connected with railway transport. Whether this was the result of bad dispositions of the French staff, or supineness of the railway officials, certain it is that the embarkation and disembarkation of troops proceeded very slowly, and much time was lost. The lines were not left open for supplies while the army was dependent for its food on it, the movement was over-hurried before the companies had time to disengage and prepare their rolling stock; and, in a word, the transport of troops on a large scale had not been studied either by the staff of the army or by the railway officials themselves.

On the 27th of December French troops commenced putting in an appearance at Chagny and Chalons, and Cremer occupied Dijon and Gray; but Garibaldi remaining by mistake at Autun, forced Cremer to return to Dijon on Zastrow's approach to Montbeliard. He only quitted Dijon January 8th. Meanwhile Bourbaki effected his concentration very slowly at Dôle, Dampierre, and Besançon; but it was completed on the 5th January, fifteen days after quitting Bourges. His army was composed of the 15th, 18th, 20th, and 24th corps, Cremer's division 15,000, and the reserve 9000 men—together, about 140,000 men, with 400 guns. Garibaldi, 13,000 to 14,000 strong, with 36 guns, was to co-operate by occupying Dijon and protecting the line of communication by rail.

Reports soon reached Versailles that Bourbaki had moved his four corps by rail to Chalons-sur-Saône, and accordingly Zastrow marched for Montbard from Auxerre, and Dannenberg, with an extra brigade, from Chaumont and Metz. A few days later, however, he returned to Auxerre, a victim to French demonstrations; and the 2d army corps, withdrawn from the investment of Paris, was sent to Montargis, while Frederick Charles attacked Chanzy on the Loire. In the first days of January, Werder, remarking the railway activity, reported to Versailles that troops belonging to the 18th and 20th corps were before him, and that Bourbaki was in Dijon with 60,000 men and 80 guns; and soon after, every particular regarding this army was forwarded by agents, so that it became necessary to place considerable force in this theatre. The 2d corps marched from Montargis to Nuits, the 13th division, &c., to

Châtillon-sur-Seine, and the 14th from Mezières and Rocroy—the movement being so calculated as to bring these reinforcements into line at Châtillon-Nuits by the 12th of January.

The three army corps, the 2d, 7th, and 14th, were placed under Manteuffel, and called the Army of the South; Werder being ordered meanwhile to operate independently and report direct to headquarters. He retreated from Vesoul on the 8th, as soon as he found the enemy was not moving on Epinal; and, fighting at Villersexel on the 9th of January, he discovered the entire character of Bourbaki's movement. Abandoning Vesoul, he marched through a winter's night to Belfort, reaching that fortress on the 11th January, and placed himself, covering the investment, in the prepared position of Hericourt. Manteuffel fully recognised the precarious position of Werder, and prepared to push on vigorously to his aid. The first objective would properly be Dijon, but the menaced position of Werder outweighed all ordinary considerations; and Bourbaki, not Dijon, became his chief anxiety. Notwithstanding the bad communications in the Côte d'Or, the necessity for a change in the line of supplies, the tired state of the 2d, and incompleteness of the 7th corps, he moved on Vesoul, prepared, if too late to intercept the French leader, to follow at his heels. Aggressive action was recommended in order to deceive the enemy. On the 12th the two corps were assembled in the neighbourhood of Châtillon, more than 100 miles from Belfort; and on the 14th the 2d corps, which was to observe Dijon, moved by Montbard, Chanceaux, and Selongey—the 7th watched Langres, sending the 13th division by Châtillon and Prauthoy, and the 14th on Longeau, the advanced-guards being pushed far ahead to clear the way; Kettler, with the 8th brigade, was left at Montbard to secure the communications and cover Nuits-Blesme.

The character of the Côte d'Or and the plateau of Langres renders military operations somewhat difficult. Though the main roads are good, there is little lateral communication, and the villages are small and poor. In summer, passage through the country is easy by these roads; but in the winter the frost and snow render them so slippery that the passage of artillery and cavalry is slow and tedious. A thaw on the 17th did not

help to mend matters; but on this date both corps emerged from the Côte d'Or with trifling loss. The opposition had been trifling: the Garibaldian operations were disconnected and purposeless.

But meanwhile there had been hard fighting before Belfort. On the 16th, 17th, and 18th, telegrams were received from Werder of the French attacks; and Manteuffel, after occupying Gray and the line of the Saône, announced that his further movements would be determined by Werder's next despatch.

There are two points of interest to notice here: first, the comparative facility of combined operations in modern times; second, the fact that every Prussian army corps, besides reporting to its commander-in-chief, communicates also with its next neighbours.

The 7th corps was directed to occupy Dampierre, reconnoitring beyond the Saône towards Vesoul; Langres was still to be observed, and Kettler was drawn on towards Dijon. Communications were opened by Epinal; and on Werder confirming the report of the enemy's retreat, Manteuffel answered, "I stand on the 20th at Gray, and forwards: ready to take the enemy in flank, or to intercept him: Werder requested to assume offensive." Von Moltke answered in the same sense.

Werder remained at Belfort on the 11th. The little town itself, with a population of 6000 inhabitants, is situated 10 miles from the Swiss frontier, and nearly 30 from Baden. Both town and citadel are built on a rock, in the space between the Jura and Vosges, where the communications are carried from south-east France to south-west Germany. Fortified by Vauban, it has been modernised by the addition of five detached forts commanding all the approaches.

The strategic value of the place has been denied by some writers, who point to Metz as an example of the worthlessness of similar fortified positions; but much caution must be exercised in accepting such theories. Metz, if adapted to the demands of modern warfare, might have proved of decisive importance in the campaign; but the use of such fortresses must be thoroughly understood. It has been said that Belfort was too far off the main lines of invasion to exercise much influence; but how can an army safely invade France with its

communications directly menaced from Belfort, while those of the defensive army are perfectly covered? Evidently it could only do so if it had sufficient force to check Belfort and continue the invasion.

The river Lisaine runs from north to south five or six miles west of Belfort, and at Montbéliard it unites with the Savoureuse and Allaine, coming from Belfort, afterwards entering the Doubs.

In the early part of its course it traverses open country, and then, entering a deep, narrow gorge with precipitous slopes, it cuts the roads from Vesoul, Besançon, and Montbéliard to Belfort respectively. Werder had elected to place himself in position here, barring the road to Bourbaki, marching directly on Belfort. His task was with 47,000 to check 120,000, and to cover the siege of a fortress containing a garrison of 15,000 men.

His dispositions were as follows: On his right the Baden division held the plain between Frahier, Chagey, and Hericourt; in the centre, the 4th division of reserve occupied the left heights of the Lisaine to Montbéliard; on the left the division Debschitz, fronting south-west, stretched from Montbéliard towards the Swiss frontier; Treskow's division invested the fortress, his reserves being so placed as to repulse sorties, and serve at the same time as a support to Werder. The road by Montbéliard, through the Savoureuse valley, is the easiest line of advance; but the neighbourhood of the Swiss frontier, the line of the Doubs and canal, rendered attack from this side difficult. Montbéliard, however, was fortified, and the castle prepared for defence. The headquarters and reserves were placed in a central position, between the two rivulets, at Brévillers.

The entire position was carefully intrenched, and the woods cut down; batteries were constructed, and heavy guns placed in position; the villages and farmhouses were barricaded and loopholed, especially at Montbéliard. The general extent of front was nine miles; but this distance was diminished by the shortened lateral communication that existed in rear. Bourbaki had determined to march upon Vesoul so as to intercept Werder from Belfort, and purposed moving with his

three corps together, leaving one in reserve in addition, and calling in Cremer. The object of the plan was good, but tardy in its execution, while the difficulties of movement were apparent.

The 18th and 20th corps left Dampierre and Auxonne to cross the Ognon at Pesmes, where they effected a difficult passage, the 24th corps remaining on the left bank. Villersexel and Esprels were then menaced, and on the 9th a battle occurred at the former place, in which the French were partially successful; but owing to the difficulty of provisionment, and the disorganisation of the troops, the advance on Belfort was not pursued until the 11th. A skirmish occurred at Arcy on the 13th, and on the 14th Bourbaki arrived before Hericourt, twenty-five days after his first departure from Bourges. Cremer had only left Dijon on the 8th, but he reached Lure, near Belfort, on the 14th.

The French general determined on attacking Hericourt and Montbeliard directly—the former with the 20th and 24th, the latter with the 15th corps—while a flank movement was to be made by the 18th corps, assisted by Cremer's division, which moved off the highroad, and Bourrai, with the 24th Regiment and the franc-tireurs, was to move by Audincourt. The right of the enemy was assumed to be at Chenebier.

But the results were far from satisfactory. The cold was intense, the men and horses were without food, the troops raw and dispirited; so that the badly-directed attacks failed, and the fighting of the French was too dependent on Bourbaki's personal presence. There was no room for the development of both corps at Chagey, the columns clashed, and, owing to the want of efficient staff, great delay ensued; so that, finally, Werder remained in possession of Frahier and the highroad to Belfort.

The roads at Chenebier were exceedingly bad for the French columns; and to the fact that their true character had not been ascertained, may be attributed the failure of the flanking movement. Cremer was cut in two by the 18th corps, and delayed three hours, only coming into action at 3.20 P.M.

On the 16th the battle was renewed. Three successive attacks were made on Hericourt, and by the evening Chenebier

was gained ; but the slight success was not clenched, and Werder, recognising his danger, sent General Keller to surprise it by night, in which attempt he was successful. The sufferings of the French troops were dreadful ; the cold was intense ; the supplies meagre, and, in some cases, absolutely deficient.

On the 17th Bourbaki attacked along the entire front, but was repulsed everywhere, and the failure of this final effort decided him on retreating, so that on the evening of the 18th he fell back, pursued by the victorious Germans.

It will be well to compare the situation of the two belligerents.

The massive French army had been repulsed with terrible losses by a weak foe ; while on the 19th, Rougemont at Clerval, and Garibaldi at Dijon, were both inactive. Werder was on the Lisaine triumphant, with a small corps pushing back the enemy. Manteuffel was at Gray with two army corps. The Germans were well supplied, victorious, and had thorough confidence in their military system : the French were demoralised, without magazines, in a poor territory, and exposed to fearful weather, while they had but little discipline, and bad officers. Their condition was as bad, if not worse than in 1812.

It was a moment for a good commander to turn such a state of affairs to account, and this the German did. For Manteuffel to unite with Werder was blindly to forfeit the advantage of his situation. If he could intercept the French, though he possessed but 40,000 men, a third vast catastrophe as great as Metz or Sedan must inevitably accrue to them.

Bourbaki was right to retreat under the circumstances, and the direction given to his march was well chosen. Still Gambetta interfered. He could not understand the situation, and detailed orders from Bordeaux. But it was of no importance. The French army was too disorganised to be able to effect satisfactorily any combined movement.

Leaving Kettler to attack Dijon, and if he could not gain it, at least observe it, the German army wheeled to the right on the 19th January, and on the 21st the 2d corps had occupied Dôle, with the 7th at Dampierre on the Doubs south of the fortress of Besançon. On the 25th the Lyons-Besançon road was completely barred, while the 14th corps (Werder) was

approaching the latter place; and Bourbaki, surrendering his command to General Clinchaut, attempted to commit suicide as the French army retreating on Pontarlier passed into Switzerland. The remaining half of the Army of the Loire had been destroyed or paralysed.

COMMENTS ON BOURBAKI'S OPERATIONS.

Fault has been found by many writers with the strategic conception of Bourbaki's movement, but it will be observed at once that CONCEPTION and EXECUTION are very different terms. In the present instance it is with the former only that we are concerned, unless, indeed, it can be proved that its execution was purely impossible, in which case the entire plan might justly be characterised as ridiculous.

It may be broadly stated that at this period of the war—December 1870—the purpose of every operation undertaken by the French was the relief of Paris, now invested by the German armies. After the loss of her regular armies, France had undertaken to raise, arm, and organise, sufficient forces from her ample population to effect this project. From the very nature of the military situation, it was necessary to complete these preparations at points sufficiently distant from the zone of Prussian occupation. And, as these fresh resources showed symptoms of life and vigour, it became equally necessary for the invaders to establish covering armies towards the points selected by the French for concentration. The French, then, were clearly committed to offensive operations, the Prussians to a system of active defence.

Now there were two possibilities by which the relief of Paris might be effected:—

The first of these was, to take the bull by the horns, to march resolutely against one or more of the covering armies, abiding by the result of the collisions for the success or defeat of the enterprise.

The other would take into account the established fact that it is not necessary to defeat large armies in order to compel them to evacuate the territory upon which they have long been standing. In the present instance, if this could be

effected by other means, it would seem folly to challenge the issue of a combat in which the adversary's superior skill had been demonstrated to conviction. But all his skill in arms would serve him little unless his soldiers were regularly and amply fed. The moment had arrived in this as in earlier campaigns, where the invader had reached the limit of his offensive power. His resources were strained to the utmost for the secure occupation of the territory he had already gained. In that territory he had already exhausted such produce as could be provided by requisition. He was dependent, therefore, absolutely upon the provision of his supplies from countries lying east of the Rhine. If we consider that the Prussians had placed over 500,000 combatant soldiers on French soil; that these forces were supplemented by a vast host of non-combatants, requiring an equal amount of subsistence; that the French inhabitants of the invaded districts could not be allowed to starve; and that from Nancy to Blesme one channel of transport only was available,—it will be readily understood that if there was a weak point in the Prussian armour it was here to be found, as, indeed, the experience of every preceding war had amply demonstrated.

Bearing in mind, then, the peculiar responsibility attaching to the preservation of their line of supplies, it would seem as though this should have been amply and specially protected by the Prussians. *Etappen* troops, it is true, were established upon the line throughout its entire length, but these served principally for local security; they could not be suddenly called away from the posts occupied, for general concentration against a hostile irruption, or the lines would have been severed in twenty different points at once, and the object of the operation, temporarily at any rate, attained. As a matter of fact, there was no portion of the territory held by the Prussians in France so weakly occupied at this period, as that precisely through which they drew their supplies. The cause of this is not far to seek. Moltke had withdrawn the 2d army (after the fall of Metz) in order to meet more pressing dangers elsewhere; and as the French had hitherto evinced little activity in their south-eastern districts—Garibaldi was here their principal champion—little danger was apprehended from

this quarter. If, then, the French could succeed in transporting, unobserved, from a different theatre, sufficient forces to enable them to assert temporary superiority in the Côte d'Or, the end and aim of all strategy would surely here be found. It is precisely in such circumstances that the defender, with the means now at his disposal, should find the solitary advantage which accrues to him. If he should neglect, or be ignorant of such advantage, his case is desperate indeed. It is in freedom of movement, and irresponsibility as to supply, as compared with the invader, that he should excel. The resources of the entire country are his own, and his base is everywhere. Herein lies his strength, and in this respect alone is his enemy inferior to him.

From Dijon, therefore, Bourbaki should have prepared to operate through Langres and Chaumont, upon the line Blesme-Frouard, putting Werder off his guard by demonstrating in force with Cremer by Gray upon Vesoul, and with Bessolles from Besançon towards Villersexel and Belfort.* Garibaldi should have been reinforced and directed to mask the movement by occupying the defiles in the Côte d'Or, on the left flank, pointing towards Montbard and Nuits.

The means of transport to support this operation should have been supplied from Lyons—the resources of which district had not yet been tapped—and collected at Chagny, during the ten days occupied in the passage of the troops from Bourges to Dijon; and the effort then immediately have been made to fill Langres with ammunition and subsisting means.

Marching with ordinary diligence, Bourbaki would reach that fortress on the 3d,† Chaumont on the 5th, and Blesme on the 10th or 11th of January.‡ The weight of his hand would have made itself already keenly felt at Chaumont, from

* Cremer, with Bessolles and the garrison of Besançon, would muster considerably over 40,000 men. Their instructions should have explained to them the alternatives open to Werder, and the action expected from them in each case.

† Langres about 85 English miles from Dijon.

Chaumont „ 19 „ „ „ Langres.

Blesme „ 40 „ „ „ Chaumont.

‡ The above dates are calculated on the assumption that Bourbaki should have been able to move with the heads of his columns from Dijon on the 1st of January.

which junction the tributary lines of railway diverge through the valleys of the Seine and the Yonne to Paris.

At this date (January 5) the 14th Prussian division was at Rocroi, the 13th with the corps commander at Auxerre. Franzecky, with the 2d army corps,* was marching from the investing lines upon Montargis, which town he reached on the 6th of January. There was literally nothing beyond the *elappen* troops, scattered along the railway lines, to oppose the march, the influence of which could hardly be exaggerated. Strangely favourable, moreover, to the plan was the fact that Werder's instructions made it his first duty to cover the siege of Belfort.

If these and similar arguments are met with the sweeping objection of the *difficulty* attending such enterprises, it would have been better for France to have sheathed her sword at once. No doubt they are difficult, and precisely in proportion to the difficulty inherent in them is their actual value, inasmuch as the enemy is more likely to be surprised by their execution. It is the victory over similar difficulties which has established the reputation of the few great captains of which the world can boast. But conception necessarily precedes execution, and it is no small matter to have pointed the rapier correctly before it is thrust home.

It has occurred to more than one as somewhat surprising that no one, not even the French, have traced a certain resemblance between this operation and a conception of their great Emperor.

In the last year of the eighteenth century, the French, after a series of reverses, still clung to the ground Buonaparte had won for them in Italy in 1796-97. But the generals of the Directory had been beaten in the Riviera by Mélas, and Massena had sought refuge in Genoa, where he was closely besieged; Suchet, meanwhile, had fallen back to the frontier line of the Var.

The First Consul was called upon to redeem this state of things.

In utmost secrecy he collected all that could aspire to the

* These were the troops subsequently employed by the Prussians under General Manteuffel.

name of soldier—little superior to Bourbaki's levies—at this very town of Dijon. Now the ordinary, some would term it the preferable course, was to carry these troops to reinforce Suchet on the Var, and thus to attempt, directly, the relief of Massena in Genoa.

Buonaparte judged otherwise. He determined to take this force into Switzerland, and then across the Alps into Italy. The difficulties of such an enterprise appear to us, even now, enormous. What then could have supplied the motive which induced the great Commander to incur so many chances of failure *en route*, to the simple, straightforward movement, which must first have suggested itself? The answer is, that he correctly estimated the value of secrecy and surprise in war, and that in debouching from the Val d'Aosta, he knew that a few marches would place him upon the communications of his adversary.

In truth, when he had entered the principality of Piedmont, it never occurred to Buonaparte to march to the relief of Genoa, much as he was reproached for not doing so. He marched for his enemy's communications, occupied the strong points on his rear, rolled up his detachments, and lived upon his supplies. Genoa was left to its fate and fell, but reverted, as it necessarily must, in a few days to the victor of Marengo.

When Bourbaki had arrived at Dijon, to all intents and purposes upon the communications of his enemy, where was the inspiring address to remind Frenchmen of the deeds of their fathers and the genius of their Emperor? Why, instead of marching for the decisive point, did he direct his columns first on Besançon, and then languidly upon Belfort?

Clearly he had not comprehended the width or bearing of his problem; and though it may be truly and forcibly urged that the operation was undertaken without the preparation and forethought which were indispensable to its success, it is equally certain that the enterprise collapsed from the incapacity of the officer to whom it was intrusted.

The conception, generally, was genial and sound, its execution poor and pitiable.

The rigour of the season and the paucity of the roads had

much to do with this. The infantry, armed with old muskets and heavily encumbered, were outmarched by the Germans, whose discipline and effective staff offered a complete contrast to those of their adversary. In no instance is this more noticeable than in the accord between Werder and Manteuffel as compared with the want of it in the case of Bourbaki and Garibaldi.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

The campaign in the north of France, where an army, under General Faidherbe, was endeavouring to assist in the relief of Paris by threatening the German communications, exercised comparatively little influence. As in the south, the possession of the river-lines, offering rare points of passage and therefore limiting the path by which a hostile advance could be effected, became a matter of grave importance to the covering armies, and to the gaining of these the operations were mainly conducted.

Of these rivers the Seine, with Rouen, and the Thérain, with Beauvais, as strategic points on the main roads to the capital, ran in a north-westerly direction; and the Oise, with Compiègne and La Fère, and the Somme from Amiens, ran somewhat parallel to the line of German communications with the frontier. On the latter stream are situated Amiens, Peronne, and St Quentin, through which ran two main roads from the north; while in front of Peronne lies the small town of Bapaume, a point of junction of the roads leading from the north to Peronne, Ham, and Compiègne, and from the east to Amiens. To meet the threatened danger from this quarter, an "Army of the North," under Manteuffel, was formed, after the capitulation of Metz, of the 1st and 8th corps (the former weakened by detachments), and the 3d cavalry division.

On the 7th November the German general began his march, occupying Ham on the 21st; and, on the 27th, a battle was fought before Amiens, which was occupied on the 28th. Leaving troops to watch this point, Rouen was occupied on

the 6th December, and Dieppe, at the mouth of the B  thune, north of Rouen, was seized by a detachment from the main body.

Faidherbe resumed the offensive on the 3d December, recaptured Ham on the 10th, and appeared before Amiens, occupying the line of the Hallue, east of the town, on the 20th. This advance was coupled with a sortie from Paris on the 21st. On the 23d, Manteuffel, who had moved his whole force less the detached parties left to guard Rouen and Dieppe, advanced against the French army on the 23d, and fought an indecisive action. Like the previous battle before Amiens, the French were not routed, and bivouacked on the field; but, owing to their defective transport, they were again obliged to withdraw, and fell back, the afternoon of the next day, on Arras. Pursuit was conducted on a small scale to Bapaume and Albert, the main body remaining at Amiens, whence, on the 27th, a force was sent to Peronne to carry out the investment of that fortress; and flying columns, despatched in various directions during the latter part of the month, successfully dispersed numerous small parties of the enemy's troops.

In January 1871, General Manteuffel was, as already seen, despatched to the south to assist General Werder in his attack on the army under Bourbaki. General Von G  ben thereupon assumed the command of the Army of the North.

On the 1st of the month Faidherbe again advanced, with the object of relieving Peronne and attacking the covering force at Bapaume, consisting mainly of General von Kummer's division, but was unable to defeat it; and though the Germans had decided on evacuating the position, the French fell back on the 4th January to Arras.

On the 10th Peronne fell, and Faidherbe, spreading a false report of his intention to march on Amiens, moved against St Quentin with about 40,000 men and 70 guns. The German forces were at this time much scattered owing to the number of points that had to be watched; but Von G  ben, divining his intention, had moved all his available troops by rail towards the menaced town on the 18th January. A severe engagement was fought on the 19th, which resulted in the total defeat of the French, who retreated in some disorder on Cambrai and Guise.

Thus the last army that had been organised for the relief of the capital was finally defeated. The chief reason for its failure was its want of mobility, owing to its defective train, which, even when partly successful, rendered abortive all attempts to push those successes far enough to reap the full fruits of victory. As in other parts of the theatre, the French seem to have frittered away their strength in detachments which would have been perhaps of material value on the more decisive fields of battle; and their want of cavalry was fully felt in the retreat from the last battle fought by the Army of the North.

The siege of Paris presents in itself but few points of special value. The chief interest centres in the operations conducted by the armies that, organised in the provinces, were successively advanced to its relief. The "Army of Paris," under the supreme command of General Trochu, was divided into three subordinate armies—the first under Tamisier, and afterwards Thomas, the second under Ducrot, and the third under the especial direction of the Commander-in-Chief.

After the attempts to disturb the completion of the line of investment, early in September, no further efforts of importance were made until the 30th, when Vinoy made an extensive sortie from the south-west front against the 6th corps, under cover of demonstrations against the 5th and 11th corps, but was repulsed with heavy loss. The 13th of October was fixed upon for the next great attempt, and the same general, advancing from the south front against the heights of Clamart, occupied by the 2d Bavarian corps, was again defeated; while during the action, the fire from Fort Valerien, designed to support the sortie, destroyed the chateau of St Cloud. Under cover of the guns of the same work, another effort was made on the 21st October to the south-west, against the 5th corps; but, aided by the artillery-fire of the 4th corps, on the other bank of the Seine, it successfully resisted the attack.

The village of Le Bourget, to the north-east of Paris, was the scene of a fierce struggle on the 28th and 30th of the month, being taken by surprise by the French, but recaptured by the Germans on the latter date. This, though in itself insignificant and of no real importance, attracted considerable attention, both from the necessity of checking the results of even such a slight German reverse on the French armies, and also from its position on the investing line. Its possession was necessary as preventing an undue extension outwards of the chain of investment, and also because the small height on which it stood afforded a commanding point of observation over the plain between the suburb of St Denis and the city. It was captured after a most sanguinary struggle, in which the Guard corps suffered heavily.

Several attempts were made meanwhile to negotiate terms of peace, but these all failed; and after the fall of Metz, on the 27th October, it became apparent that resistance to the last was the only course for Paris.

And so November opened with no signs of decided movement in the beleaguered fortress ; but events had been occurring on the Loire which seemed to offer an opportunity for effective action with the army advancing to the relief of the capital from the direction of Orleans. This town had been occupied on the 9th November, but it was not until the 28th of the month that D'Aurelle had endeavoured to push forward ; and on the following day a sortie on an important scale was made from the south-east front against the 6th corps, under cover of demonstrations at Nanterre, near Fort Valerien and St Denis. A French flotilla on the Seine also aided in the battle, and the plateau of Mont Avron, east of the most advanced fort (Rosny) on this side, was occupied by artillery to cover the passage of the Marne.

The French crossed that river, and fought a severe action towards Brie and Champigny, which were occupied and fortified on the 1st December, though no further advance was made ; but on the 2d, the Germans, in their turn, assumed the offensive, and so far checked the French, that, on the 3d, under cover of a false attack, Trochu withdrew his troops across the Marne.

No further activity was displayed by the besieged until the 21st, when sorties were made by Admiral Roncière towards the north from St Denis against Dugny and Le Bourget, assisted on his right by Ducrot, who attacked Drancy, while other demonstrations were made at various points. The plateau of Avron, which had been of much assistance to the French in the last great sortie, was bombarded and finally occupied on the 29th December, and on the 5th January the bombardment of the city was definitely entered upon. Little was done in the early part of this month ; but on the 19th the last desperate effort to break the investing lines was made towards the south-west, under cover of the guns of Mont Valerien ; but it failed, as all the others had failed, and with it perished the last hope of breaking out from the French capital. The defeats of the armies, moreover, that had been in vain endeavouring to relieve Paris, and the rapid reduction of the food-supply in the beleaguered city, all tended to show that the case was hopeless. Thus, on the 28th January, Paris capitulated ; and with its surrender came the armistice which, while putting an end to the operations of the external armies, opened the way to peace.

GENERAL COMMENTS.

The purpose of the first Prussian offensive is presumed to be massing on the weak exposed flank of the French with the object of rolling it up, and eventually of co-operating, possibly, with a general attack on the French centre on a common battle-field.

It is a perfectly groundless idea that the early actions were the result of accident. The left flank was selected inasmuch

as concentration in that direction was favoured by political circumstances, by the direction of the communications, by the screen afforded by the Rhine, and by the character of the country through which the advance was proposed. The first consideration was probably the attainment of early tactical success, which would be well calculated to effect the desired impression upon the French, whether army or nation; and next, to clear the left flank of the Prussian advance.

Before the blow was struck, the intention of advancing the left army under the Crown Prince is apparent by the direction given to the now famous reconnoitring party under Count Zeppelin which penetrated as far as Niederbronn in the last days of July; and in the interruption of the lateral communication between the centre and right within the French frontier by a cavalry patrol on the 24th.

Had the French been found in force on their right, no doubt the earliest concentration would have been effected against the STRATEGIC flank; but for the very reason that the French left covered the French communications with the capital, it was probable that their precautions against attack would be principally directed in that quarter, a fact confirmed probably by Count Zeppelin's report.

The Prussian operation, then, is in conformity with the doctrines of their military writers, enforcing the value of rapid and direct concentration where tactical success is most to be expected, and thus demonstrating that the rule of operating against the communications of the enemy is, though admirable in principle, still susceptible of great modification.

There is a general similarity between the leading characteristics of the Prussian movements in this campaign and that of 1866. The importance was apparently recognised of subdividing forces of such magnitude as are now placed in the field into large, more or less independent, bodies, with the wholesome restriction and understanding that such independence is to be asserted or sacrificed as occasion may require. In this instance it was a matter easy of arrangement, for two of the armies were led by princes of the royal house under the king as supreme commander, and this is perhaps the only advantage of the presence of the sovereign in military operations.

It has formed a matter of surprise that the early Prussian

successes were not more rapidly followed up. It will be well to bear in mind that in 1866 the Prussian armies, separating for movement and unexpected attack, made it their first consideration to reunite on the enemy's territory. No doubt this principle has been laid down by the greatest master of strategy, but whether it should always be followed as a rigid rule after success may be open to question, considering the altered conditions of armies in the field, and the facility of communicating by means of the telegraph. Benedek was allowed the breathing-time to place his army in a formidable position, whereas he himself states that if the enemy had followed up his success nothing could have saved him from destruction. With a superiority of arms less pronounced, the result of the battle of Sadowa might have been different.

Similarly, it must strike the close observer that the Prussian objective was only partially attained by these first victories. Possibly it may have been desired by the leader of the Prussian armies that the resistance of the French at Saarbrück should have been of a character so prolonged as to admit of the co-operating approach of the Crown Prince from a direction which must have proved decisive: possibly it was considered that the distance to be traversed by his force was too great for further instant action, and the secondary advantages attained might be prudently accepted as a first instalment: possibly political calculations had been brought into play, for the unstable position of the Emperor cannot have escaped so shrewd an observer as Bismarck, and the abdication or deposition of Napoleon III. might have placed him in a position to negotiate peace at once, and so conclude the war.

One or all of these considerations may have guided the movements of the armies, and certainly the early delays might have greatly served the French cause. One circumstance at least must have been clear to the Prussian commander, that, for the moment at least, the leadership of the French army was in incompetent hands. To allow time for the change, and such change always requires time, seems as great a fault as not to pursue a defeated enemy, and apparently the one quality in which Von Moltke seems deficient is that of reaping the full and instantaneous fruits of victory. The time

that was permitted to elapse after the first struggle lost to the Germans the opportunity of bringing the war to a brilliant and rapid conclusion, and enabled the French to realise their position with more calmness, and to provide for it accordingly ; while the military qualities and knowledge which the French army indubitably possessed might, through the delay afforded them, have had a better chance of development.

The sole advantages gained after the introductory skirmishes were, occupation of the enemy's territory while their own was maintained inviolate, and the destruction of the *morale* of the French army and people.

The French displayed the same recklessness in tactics that had been evinced in their strategic dispositions. There is no doubt that the latest antecedents of an army will always influence its present bearing on the field of battle. It would be difficult, indeed, for the French army, entering the field as it did, to adopt the system of defensive fighting which characterised our old Peninsular army. Yet present circumstances more than ever seem to indicate the wisdom of that course. On many a battle-field the French repeatedly left their defensive ground in order to become the assailants, inferior as they were in force to the attacking armies. In every instance their efforts were unavailing, as such efforts always must prove to be, for they invite loss which, in case of failure, simply leads to demoralisation.*

A correct view of their position, unsupported as they must have known it to have been, should have led the French generals to have inflicted the greatest possible loss on their adversaries, and to have withdrawn in order from their position so soon as the enemy's flank attacks were sufficiently devel-

* This was notoriously the case in the battles along the Hallue in the northern campaign against Faidherbe. The Prussians failed to advance against the position attacked further than the belt of cover afforded by the trees and villages lining the streamlet at its foot. Every attempt to directly storm the naked height in rear failed. Equally so did the counter-attacks by the French, ~~OVER THE SAME GROUND~~, for similar reasons. What rendered the offensive attack impossible equally made the counter-stroke unavailing. Granted that counter-attack is the soul of a good defence, such blow cannot be delivered over an open *terrain* against assailants which, even if checked or repulsed, are still sufficiently undemoralised to avail themselves of effective cover.—ED.

oped. Many writers even argued at the time the continued advisability of bayonet attacks, from the success that, in some cases, was attained by the Prussians. Such arguments may be disposed of by the simple assertion, which must be patent to all, that had the several actions been contested on equal conditions of numbers and artillery, the final advantage would have undoubtedly accrued to the defenders.

The Prussians brought on each occasion an overpowering force of artillery to bear against the defensive position, and they no doubt threw their troops against the front of the position, until their flank attacks were developed; but where bodily collision took place, as at Wörth, this occurred from the imprudent tenacity which induced both the French officers and soldiers to cling desperately to a position turned, and therefore no longer tenable.

In all these frontal attacks the loss was considerable, but their success depended more upon that of the turning movements than even the desperate courage displayed by the assailants, of which the Spicheren Berg and the Geisberg offer notorious examples. The attack of the latter has been compared by journalists of the time to our own assault of the heights of Alma; but though this is no compliment to the Prussian generals, does any one suppose that our attack there would have succeeded against Prussian troops armed with the breech-loader? If not, why should a Prussian attack against the French similarly armed? The natural inference is, that such attempts are only feasible in connection with outflanking manœuvres as these are brought into close play, for the fire of the defenders is then rendered uncertain, their abandonment of the position itself certain. Macmahon, the only credible witness, describes these attacks as not by any means delivered "with the same steadiness as in a parade movement," but rather as the advance of a cloud of skirmishers, who brought an overpowering infantry-fire, coupled with an equally overwhelming artillery-fire, against the defenders, with the object of crushing them before the final assault was delivered. If superior numbers were present, flank movements were always tried.

No doubt brave troops will always move even against this

fire, but that does not alter the answer to the question, "Is such good generalship?" The Prussians in their early efforts had to make excessive sacrifices, which eventually led to the practical alteration of their system of attack to one involving looser order and smaller columns.

The change was perfectly natural. It must be borne in mind that if the transition in the power of the weapons is great, the change in the fighting formations must be proportionate, however startling. When the destroying power is so marvellous on both sides, and as destruction is the principal agent of victory, the first problem is to develop this—the second, to secure yourself against it.

Only loose order can answer both these requirements; and the counterpoise to the danger of such irregular fighting can only be sought in, first, the commander-in-chief's having the absolute direction of an intact powerful reserve; and, secondly, in the improvised efforts of the commanders of the fighting line to prepare formations calculated to check an overpowering forward movement of the enemy from the chance material at hand, quite irrespective of the corps to which they belong.

The strength of such reserve would not be disproportionate if it were even one-third or one-fourth of the fighting force; and its first purpose would be defence. The increased value of fresh troops in battle is unquestionable; and the sole chance of retaining control over the conduct of the action lies in the possession of a powerful body of unbroken battalions, while the order of the actual fighting line would always be dependent absolutely upon ground, the sole condition being that it should be ready for immediate engagement.

Turning to the three arms considered independently, it is at once obvious that the lessons of 1866 had not been thrown away upon the German leaders. The artillery in that campaign had failed to fulfil the necessary conditions. Weak in material, it was badly distributed. The advanced-guards at most brought one, and very rarely two batteries into action, the remainder following in rear of the division, with the reserve artillery in rear of the entire corps. This was speedily altered. In 1870, though the proportion of artillery—84 guns for 26,000 men, or at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ guns per 1000—was not

increased, it was all rifled, and moved near the head of the division; so that now it became possible, even if that alone came into action, to develop 10 batteries giving possibly an initial superiority. The Austrian artillery in the 1866 campaign, though better than that of their opponents, was still not satisfactory; for, owing to the dissemination of the batteries through the brigades, superiority of this class of fire was, at the commencement of the battle, not brought to bear. When large artillery reserves were brought into action, as at Königgratz, they were totally unprotected with infantry, and they were hence silenced by the Prussian infantry in detail. These lessons were not thrown away; and the massing of guns securely was a feature of the war on the German side.

The technical superiority of the Chassepôt had been fully recognised in administrative circles in Prussia before the outbreak of hostilities, but due caution was exercised to prevent the soldiers from knowing their inferiority; and it had been definitely decided to change the weapon when the threatening aspect of affairs rendered postponement of this plan necessary. The combination of infantry and artillery fire was therefore more carefully studied, to restore the balance of inferiority. The artillery officers were on their mettle; slower, more accurate firing, at shorter ranges than heretofore, was directed; they were intrusted with the carrying out of the initiatory stage of the battle, leaving it to the infantry to "pluck the fruit ripened by artillery."

The French were by no means weak in this arm. 30 guns per division of 8000 gave $3\frac{1}{2}$ guns per 1000, but of these only 18 were attached to the division, the remaining 12, treated mostly as guns of position, belonging to the corps reserve, and these were rarely brought into play. Among these 30 guns, moreover, were 6 mitrailleuses, thus reducing the proportion to 3 guns per 1000, for this weapon does not replace the field-piece in the field, however useful it may be for defile fighting or fortress warfare. The special army artillery reserve of 96 guns was most rarely used.

The cavalry was seldom usefully employed on the battlefield save at Rezonville, and this was due to the long range and character of the enemy's artillery projectiles, the rapid

firing of infantry, and lastly, the diminution of the possibility of surprise. This latter is a more necessary condition of success than ever, for the greater ranges of weapons compel the cavalry to keep at greater distances, thus giving more ground to ride over, and affording more time to make preparations to resist the charge.

In 1866 the Austrian had 2 light and 3 reserve cavalry divisions, each consisting of 2 brigades and 2 batteries, the light being somewhat stronger than the heavy, so as to undertake scouting duties on the flanks and front; and the Prussians in 1870 were organised on precisely similar principles, though, as they acted offensively in this campaign, and the Austrians never did in the previous one, there was considerable difference in their employment. The development of cavalry certainly seems excessive, for the proportion of cavalry to infantry was 1 horseman to 8 infantry soldiers.

During the six months' campaign the Germans took 26 fortresses. Many of these were mere "shell-traps," and only those were of real importance to the Germans which barred the communications. The real fortresses were only four in number—viz., Paris and Metz of the first, and Belfort and Strasburg of the second class—and the remainder were unprepared for a siege, and occupied generally by a town; so that, bearing in mind the calamities a bombardment entails under such circumstances, it would have been advisable to abandon those of useless and obsolete type, developing only those which were of real value.

In the field the engineers had an important part to play, because of the importance of the investments which formed the essence of the war. There has been too great a tendency to ignore the value of this branch of the service in field operations. Sudden, perhaps un hoped-for successes may be rendered secure by quickly throwing up field-works behind the attacking force, or a retreat may be stopped by affording the shelter of intrenchment. In 1866 the services of the engineer were little appreciated, and with results detrimental to the operations conducted. Over the Bistritz no attempt was made to increase the number of passages by bridging, and the crowded state of the bridge of Sadowa points out how grave a disaster

might have befallen the Prussians had they been compelled to retreat. The same thing occurred at Nechanitz, where the 16th division took four and a half hours to deploy ; and throughout that campaign, and still to some extent in that under review, there was a tendency to ignore the co-operation of the "fourth arm" of the service, which must disappear in future wars. The next campaign will see it acting in rivalry with the others. But the tactician and soldier should not be subordinate to the architect and constructor. The engineer is a soldier, not an artisan ; and if a good soldier, though an indifferent architect, he will be always serviceable, though his constructions may, in a measure, fail from an artistic point of view. Indifferent construction in the right place is better than artistic work in the wrong one. The commanding engineer's importance is only to be appreciated when seen at the side of the commander-in-chief superintending the entire strategic and tactical position, in order to seize the opportunity when his own branch of the service can advantageously and actively operate in battle.

With regard to the staff, Rüstow denies that any great difference of education exists between the staff officers of the French and Prussian armies, and is of opinion that it is the division of labour and methodical inner organisation of the German bureau which renders its superiority so evident. Doubtless this may be true, and it is quite possible that a mass of intelligence may be latent in an army without coming to the surface ; but it is still evident that it must be fully developed in some such form as a properly divided staff institution, so as to gain from it that order and smoothness of working which at all times characterised the labours of this branch throughout the campaign.

INDEX.

- ABENSBERG**, battle of, 157.
Abtsdorf, 408.
Acqui, 10, 62.
Acre bombarded, 228.
Adda R., 52, 481.
Adige R., 231 *et seq.*, 482 *et seq.*
Adler R., 461.
Aichach, 89 *et seq.*
Aisne, operations on the, 196 *et seq.*—commented on, 199.
Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 285.
Ala, bridge at, 482.
Albrecht, Archduke, 498, 504.
Alessandria, convention of, 69 — its strategical importance, 27, 251 *et seq.*, 302 *et seq.*
Alexander, Emperor of Russia, 103 — misled by the Court party, 104.
Alliance, the Holy, 349.
Allied armies in 1813, strength of, 160 — their advance after Dresden, 168 — their movements on the Seine, 188.
Allies, the skill of the, in Magenta campaign, 329 — movements of the, 330 — loss of, 337.
Alpine routes, 28, 481.
Alpe, Napoleon's passage of, 41 *et seq.*
Alsace, province of, 523.
Alsen, capture of, 342.
Altmühl, 82 *et seq.*
Altona, occupation of, 342.
Altstadt, 418 — valley of, 431.
Alvinzi, 14.
Amiens, 609 — peace of, 80.
Ancona, battle at, 341 — Italian fleet sails from, 505.
Anna Berg, the, 409.
Apolda, Prussians routed at, 129.
Appel, General, 239, 247, 248, 257, 264, 265.
Arçy, skirmish at, 602.
Argenteau, General, 3, 4, 7, 9.
Arnan, 399 *et seq.*
Artillery, indifferent character of French, 544 — superiority of Prussian, 616.
Aspern, battle of, 157.
Aspromonte, Garibaldi wounded at, 342.
Aube, operations on the, 197.
Auerstadt, campaign of, 120 — battle of, 129.
Angereau, General, 9, 14, 140 *et seq.*
Augsburg, 87.
Augustenberg, Duke of, 342.
Aulic Council, the, its unfavourable influence on Austrian operations, 75 — Austrian generals impeded by, 80 — strengthens Buonaparte's army by its precipitate action, 83 — its influence, rejected by Kutusow, 101 — abolished, 167.
Aupa, the, 417 *et seq.*
Aurelle de Paladines, General, 562, 578, 581, 583 — his position considered, 585.
Austerlitz, campaign of, 99 *et seq.* — battle of, 105, 116.
Austria, her army in Italy in 1796, 3 *et seq.* — its position after actions at Dego, 10 — retires behind the Po, 12 — behind the Mincio, 13 — defeat at Lonato and Castiglione, and retreat into Tyrol, *ib.* — successes on the Brenta, 14 — defeat at Rivoli, *ib.* — defects of Austria's military position, 20, 24 — its strength in northern Italy, 32 — its position before Marengo, 58 — its strength, 59 — defeated, 68 — army on the Danube, 81, 84 — position about Ulm, 90 — its movements, 93 — shut in by Buonaparte, 95 — defeated and capitulates, 96 — losses, 98 — campaign in Italy, 1849, 229 *et seq.* — her forces estimated, 239 — position of army after Novara, 254 — her losses, 266 — strengthens her army in Italy, 280, 287 *et seq.* — her relations with Germany, 292 — her forces at Königgratz, 329 *et seq.* — her relations with the Prince Regent, 351 — her army compared with the Prussian, 370 — her allies in Germany, 374 — sense of superiority possessed by, 401 — loss of, at Nachod, 420 — neglect of precautions there, 421 — loss of, at Trautenau, 428 — dispositions of troops, 497, 498.

- Baden division, the, its movements in Alsace, 595.
- Bagratiou, General, 108 *et seq.*
- Barclay de Tolly, General, 162—declines to use cavalry at Dresden, 165—commands reserve of Allies at Basle, 172.
- Bard, Fort, arrests passage of French army, 43—capitulates, 53.
- Basle, treaty of, 347.
- Baum, 467.
- Bautzen, battle of, 161.
- Bavaria, invaded by the Austrians, 81—her position among the Allies, 374.
- Bayreuth, 394.
- Bazaine, Marshal, 533—his conduct at Borny considered, 539 *et seq.*—his tardiness and deliberation censured, 547—his object in falling back on Metz, 550—his position in Metz, 567—excuses for his conduct, 571—his military advantages, *ib.*—the proper charge against him, 572—his conduct of the defence examined, 573 *et seq.*
- Bazeilles railway bridge seized by the Germans, 556.
- Beauharnais, Eugene, Viceroy of Naples, 100.
- Beaulieu, General, 37—his position after Dego, 10—retreats into the Tyrol, 13—superseded, *ib.*
- Beaune la Rolande, action at, 580.
- Belfort, fighting at, 600—its strategic value, *ib.*—operations about, 597.
- Belgiojoso, action at, 54.
- Belgium, French invasion of, 1.
- Belvidere, the, assault of, 501.
- Benedek, General, enters Mortara, 249—commander of a Hungarian regiment, 249—earns the Cross of Maria Theresa, 251—crosses the Po, 311—at Olmutz (1866), 397—marches into Bohemia, 402—acts upon false information, 404—his critical position, 407—his westward march reported to Berlin, 417—at Sadowa, 425—leaves Skalitz, 435—his dispositions at Königgratz criticised, 438—his retreat to Olmutz, 469—losses at Königgratz, 470—superseded, 505.
- Beningsen, General, 136—assumes offensive position at Pultusk, 138—his plan of operations, 142—falls to surprise Bernadotte, 143.
- Bergères, 183 *et seq.*
- Beregardo, headquarters of Gyulai, 381.
- Berlin entered by the French, 130.
- Bernadotte, General, in command of a corps of Rhine Army, 80—his force at Austerlitz, 110 *et seq.*—his movement on Mayence a feint, 81—routs Prussians at Apolda, 129—ordered to the Vistula, 138—Friedland campaign, 140 *et seq.*—made king of Sweden, 158—joins the Allies, 161—advances on France, 172.
- Bersaglieri, 500.
- Berthier, General, 36—negotiates with Mélas, 69.
- Bes, General, occupies Cerano and Cassel-Nuovo, 244—reports the passage of the enemy at Pavia, 245—takes up his position at La Sforzesca, 247—attacked by an Austrian brigade at La Sforzesca, 248—his position at Novara, 260—his movements before Novara, 264, 265.
- Bessières, commandant of Imperial Guard, 80.
- Béthencourt, General, crosses the Simplon, 45.
- Beyer, General, position of, 379—his march through Giessen and Marburg, 380—his arrival at Cassel, 382.
- Dischowsperda, 389.
- Bismarck, Prince, at the Court of St Petersburg, 352—minister to the Diet at Frankfurt, *ib.*—at the Court of Paris, *ib.*—his rise, *ib.*
- Bistritz, the, line of, reconnoitred, 454—described, 457.
- Bixio, 499, 501.
- Black Forest, 81 *et seq.*
- Blanco Canal, the, 500.
- Blucher, Marshal, 160 *et seq.*—crosses the Rhine, 172—his military character, 173—battle of La Rothière, 179—the battle of Brienne, 181—marches for Paris, 182—failure of the Prussian plan, 184—awaits attack at Bergères, 185—exposed by Schwarzenberg's retreat, 191—his objectives incompatible, 193—defeated at Ligny, 214—retires on Namur and Liège, 216.
- Boara, 482.
- Bochetta, the, 28, 30, 32.
- Bohemia, effect of events in, in 1866, 384—description of, 398, 399—Prussian plans for invasion of, 400—campaign in, 341-477.
- Böhmisch-Trübau seized, 456.
- Bonin, General, marches upon Trautenau, 417—ordered to Arnau, 436—his movements, 463.
- Borgo St Siro, Sardinian advance driven in at, 248.
- Borgoforte blockaded, 502.
- Bormida R., 56 *et seq.*
- Bosé, General, gallantry of, 406.
- Bosonitz, 106 *et seq.*
- Boulogne, French Army of, 80.
- Bourbaki, General, 589—endeavours to raise siege of Belfort, 596—his plan of operations, *ib.*—its defects, 597—his movements discovered by General von Werder, 599—sufferings of his troops from cold, 603—attempts to commit suicide, 604—comments on his operations, *ib. et seq.*—his position compared to that of Napoleon, 608.
- Boyer, General, 570.
- Brandenburg, Elector of, 843.
- Brescia, disturbances at, 267.
- Breslau, 449.
- Breslau-Vienna railway, 394 *et seq.*
- Brienne, 177, 181.
- Brignone, General, 500.

- Brünn, 102 *et seq.*, 478.
 Brunow, Baron, Russian ambassador in London, 284.
 Brunswick, Duke of, generalissimo of Allied armies, 1—in command of Prussian army, 124 *et seq.*—delayed by Hohenlohe, 127.
 Buol, Count, 299.
 Buonaparte, Jerome, 133 *et seq.*, 156.
 Buxhöwden, General, at Austerlitz, 107 *et seq.*—his position on the Vistula, 133—retires from command, 139.
 Cadibona, Col di, 28, 30.
 Calatafimi, battle of, 341.
 Caldiero, action at, 100.
 Camon, General, movements of, 335.
 Canrobert, Marshal, 304—his advance at Magenta, 326, 327.
 Capellenberg, 429, 432.
 Carcare, 8, 10.
 Carpathians, 399.
 Casale, 27, 29.
 Cassalmaggiore, fortification of, 436.
 Cassel, 379, 380.
 Castel Ceriolo, 60 *et seq.*
 Castelfidardo, battle at, 341.
 Castelnovo, 498.
 Cavalry operations in Franco-Prussian war, 619.
 Cavour, Count, foreign minister of Sardinia, 271 *et seq.*—his memorandum, 282—his death, 341.
 Cenis, Mont, 28, 38 *et seq.*
 Ceraie, division of, 500.
 Ceva, 6, 7, 51.
 Chabran crosses Great St Bernard, 45.
 Champaubert, 183 *et seq.*
 Changanier, General, fails to make terms with Prussia, 570.
 Chanzy, General, 562—assumes command of second army of the Loire, 588—his strong position at Le Mans, 591.
 Charles V., power of, 344.
 Charles VI., decease of, 345.
 Charles Albert concludes armistice with Austria, 233—at La Bicocca, 265—abdicates, 266.
 Charles, Archduke, of Austria, 81—takes command of army in Italy, 14—warns Austrian Court against Buonaparte, 17—his retreat, 100—recalled from Italy, 102.
 Charles, Prince, of Bavaria, 375, 410, 412.
 Chassepot rifle, its superiority, 618.
 Chivasso, 47, 50, 51.
 Chlum, the village of, 457 *et seq.*—lost by the Austrians, 468—repossession gained, 472.
 Choteborek, 464.
 Christian IX., King of Denmark, 342.
 Chrzanowsky, General, raised to command of the Sardinians, 234—effective force at his disposal, *ib.*—prepares for action at Novara, 269—forms his line of battle, 280—his situation at Novara, *ib.*—his blunder, 263—takes up his position at Borgo-Manero, 266—his character, 268.
 Cialdini, General, 479, 490—his movements on the lower Po, 495—his advance, 497.
 Cistowes captured, 467.
 Civoli, battle of, 14.
 Clam-Gallas, General, 331 *et seq.*, 388—commands the 1st Austrian corps, 405—criticism on, 445 *et seq.*
 Clausewitz, General, 426 *et seq.*
 Cleve territories, acquisition of, 344.
 Coalition, war of first, 2 *et seq.*—of second, 15, 16—sanguine views of its leaders, 17—its plan considered, 23—the third, the war of, 80—the fourth, 121.
 Coburg, the Duke of, 381.
 Colli, General, commands Sardinian and Austrian contingent, 3, 4—his plan rejected, 7—attempt to relieve Provence, 9—repulses Buonaparte, 11—falls back on Mondovi, 11—routed at Viro, 12.
 Comisa, bombarded, 505.
 Communications, importance of preserving, illustrated by result of Marengo, 70.
 Concordat introduced, 293.
 Confederation, the German, its history, 343 *et seq.*—its constitution, 357.
 Confederation, the army of the, 375.
 Confederation, the North German, 474.
 Congress, proposed, in 1859, 284.
 Constantine, Grand Duke, of Russia, 108.
 Convention with regard to the Principalities, 272.
 Copenhagen bombarded, 80, 156.
 Cossaria, 8, 9.
 Cote d'Or, operations in the, 599.
 Coulmiers, action at, 579.
 Cowley, Lord, English ambassador in Paris, 282 *et seq.*
 Craoow, 394 *et seq.*
 Cremer, General, occupies Dijon, 598.
 Cremona, 53, 233, 486.
 Crenneville, letter from Benedek to, 406.
 Crimean war, 271.
 Crown Prince of Prussia, the, 373—occupies Neisse, 387—responsibility resting on him, 390—his military demonstrations, 402—instructed to cross into Bohemia, 416—completes his dispositions, 417—carries his army to the Elbe, 437—his military talent, 437, 438—encounters Thun, 467—his advance, 469—commands Prussian left wing, 526—gains battle of Wörth, 529.
 Cucchiari, General, at Cremona, 479.
 Cugia, General, 500.
 Custozza, Charles Albert defeated at, 233—campaign of, 477 *et seq.*—comments on the campaign of, 502, 503.
 Dalmatia, lagune of, 489.
 Dantzic besieged, 141.
 Danube, the railway along the, 396.

- D'Aspre, General, 239—occupies Grave-lone Island, 240—marches to Gariasco, 247—approaches Mortara, 248—at-tacks Durando, 249—reaches Garbag-na, 257—his operations at Novara, 261 *et seq.*—his character, 262.
- Davoust, Marshal, in command of a corps of Rhine army, 80—his force at Austerlitz, 110 *et seq.*—defeats Duke of Brunswick at Auerstadt, 129—Friedland campaign on the Vistula, 138 *et seq.*—campaign, 140 *et seq.*
- De Faily, General, his division at Wörth, 529—surprised at Beaumont, 552.
- Dego carried by Buonaparte, 9.
- De Hübner, Baron, Austrian ambassador in Paris, 272.
- Deligny, General, his opinion of Ba-zaine's strategy, 577.
- Della Rocca at Piacenza, 479.
- Denmark, king of, dies, 354.
- Denmark, war declared against, 342—severance of the Elbe Duchies from, 354.
- De Novo, Count, 480.
- Desaix, General, joins Buonaparte in Italy, 57—present at Marengo, 63 *et seq.*—his arrival at San Giuliano, 65—his death, 66.
- Deutsch-Brod, 472.
- Diet, the reconstruction of, demanded, 350—restored, 351.
- Directory, the French, its Italian policy, 6.
- Doctorow, General, 107 *et seq.*
- Dohalitz, village on the Bistritz, 464 *et seq.*
- Donauwerth, 83 *et seq.*—its strategic importance, 86—occupied by Mack, 89.
- Dossobuona, skirmish at, 497.
- Douay, General, killed, 527.
- Dresden, campaign of, 156—its defences, 163—theatre of war, *ib.*—battle, 164—comments on, 165—evacuated, 388.
- Dubenetz, 427.
- Duhesme, General, 52 *et seq.*
- Duppel, battle of, 228.
- Durando, General, position of, 244—covers Mortara, 247—his position at Novara, 260—his movements before the battle, 264 *et seq.*—at Lodi, 479.
- Duroc, General, his mission to Berlin, 82.
- Durrenstein, action at, 100.
- Dybböl, capture of, 342.
- Ebersburg, fight at, 157.
- Echelon movements, Jomini's opinion of, 76.
- Eckmühl, battle of, 157.
- Edelsheim, General, Austrian cavalry under, 407.
- Egypt, French occupation of, 16.
- Eipel, 417, 425, 434—the Austrian Guard makes for, 428.
- Eisenach, concentration of forces at, 383.
- Eisenstadt, 409.
- Elbe, army of the, 387.
- Elsnitz, General, defeated by Suchet, 51—at Marengo, 61 *et seq.*
- England, threatened invasion of, by Bu-onaparte, 80—designs against, 279.
- Erfurt, council of war at, 125—Parlia-ment at, 350.
- Ernest, Archduke of Austria, 405, 458.
- Erz-Gebirge, the Saxon frontier of Bo-hemia, 398.
- Espinasse, General, movements of, 335.
- Eysach, the valley of, 487.
- Faidherbe, General, organises an army in the north, 562—defeated at St Quentin, 593—defeated by Von Gö-ben, 610.
- Falkenstein, General, his advance, 380—appointed governor of Bohemia, 384.
- Fanti, General, his movements, 267.
- Ferdinand, Archduke, of Austria, 81, 88—abandons Mack at Ulm, 95—de-feated and compelled to capitulate, 96—organises army in Hungary, 102.
- Ferrara, 483, 484.
- Festitte, General, posted near Joseph-stadt, 405.
- Fleischhacker brigade, 436.
- Flies, the Prussian General, repulse of, 381.
- Florence, democracy established at, 233.
- Fontanone R., near Marengo, 60 *et seq.*—line of the, its tactical importance, 74.
- France, invasion of, from Liguria, 28—invaded by the Allies, 171—forces available for its defence, 176—her alliance with Russia, 273—her pre-parations, 280, 288—her jealousy of Prussia's military position, 508—declares war on Prussia, 511—or-ganisation of her armies, *ib.*—con-fidence of success, 518—carelessness in commencing the war, 520—lines of operation available for her army, 524—tardiness of naval preparations, 526—disappearance of her field armies, 560.
- Francis II. takes the crown of Austria, 348.
- Francis Joseph, 351—his project with respect to the Diet, 354.
- Franco-Prussian war, its outbreak, 518—theatre of, described, 523—opera-tions in the East, 595—its operations commented on, 612—contrasted with campaign of 1866, 613.
- Frankfurt, Diet of, condemns the treaty with Denmark, 342—assembly of con-stitutional deputies in, 350—engage-ments near, 384—occupied, *ib.*—as-pect of affairs at, 388.
- Fransecky, General, occupies the pas-sage of the Isérat-Turnau, 407—his flanking movement, 418—moves to-wards Cerekwitz and Benatek, 464.
- Frasne, action at, 209.
- Frederick I. of Prussia crowned, 345.
- Frederick II. invades Silesia, 345—or-ganises a league of German princes, 346—espouses cause of the Elector Charles, *ib.*

- Frederick William III., 349.
 Frederick William IV. resigns the government, 351.
 Frederick VII. of Denmark, death of, 342.
 Frederick Charles, Prince, commands the Prussian Guard, &c., 373—at Görlitz, 378—ordered to concentrate at Görlitz, 387—his successes, 388—pamphlet attributed to him, 455—reaches Dub, 464—moves on Pzelausch, 472—in command of second German Army corps, 522—moves on Le Mans, 591—disperses second Army of the Loire, 592.
 Freiwaldau, 400 *et seq.*
 French army, its condition after Leipzig, 172—the organisation of field-force in Franco-Prussian war, 521—its losses in Franco-Prussian war, 593—its recklessness in tactics, 615.
 French Republic invades Belgium, 1—declares war against kings, 2.
 Friedland, campaign of, 139—position of the French, 140—Napoleon's objects, 141—battle of, 152—commentson, 153.
 Frioul, the evacuation of, 442.
 Friume, 487.
 Frossard, General, defeated at Spichern, 532.
 Fulda, 383.
 Gabel, arrival of Prussian forces at, 406.
 Gablenz, General, commands the 10th corps, 404—at Trautenu, 417—sent to inquire into the enemy's movements, 417—ordered to move up to Trautenu, 426—his report from Windischgratz, 427—withdraws his brigade, 428—his good generalship, 434—his retreat upon Königinhof, 436—he sustains a reverse, *ib.*
 Galgenberg, 428.
 Gambetta, M., raises men for Loire army, 584—his plan of operations against the Prussians, 593.
 Garibaldi, General, 291, 315— aids the Sicilian insurrection, 341—volunteer force organised under him, 478—his command in the Franco-Prussian war, 596 *et seq.*—his operations in eastern France, 597.
 Garnier, General, guards Col di Cerise, 3.
 Gastein, convention of, 342, 355.
 Geiersberg, 402.
 Genevre, Mont, route, 28.
 Genoa, its defence by Massena, 27, 34 *et seq.*—its importance, 29, 33—invested by Ott, 48—capitulates, 51.
 Genoa, the Duke of, 244—his position at Novara, 261.
 George, King of Saxony, struggles of, 380—his capitulation, 381.
 German army, its intention to shut up the French in Metz, 542—precautions to prevent M^r Mahon's escape, 556.
 Germany, its struggle for independence, 348—result of French revolution to, 349—military headship of, 350.
 Gitschin, roads to, guarded, 389, 399—Austrian troops directed towards, 404—proposed union of troops at, 405—preparations for the defence of, 409—its distance from Munchengrätz and Turnau, 410—engagement at, *ib.*
 Glatz, 399 *et seq.*
 Gneisenau, General, assumes command of Prussians after Ligny, 211.
 Goito, 499 *et seq.*—repulse of Radetsky at, 283.
 Goldbach, R., 105 *et seq.*
 Golymin, action at, 138.
 Görlitz, 390 *et seq.*
 Gotha, march towards, of the Hanoverians, 380—King George falls back from, 381.
 Göttingen, 379, 380.
 Grand Army, the, its strength, 193—goes into winter quarters, 189—its strength in Poland and Prussia, 142—its strength after retreat from Moscow, 161.
 Gravelone Island, 236, 240.
 Gravelotte, campaign of, 508 *et seq.*
 Gravenstein, 228.
 Greece, revolution in, 342.
 Grivicic, 427 *et seq.*—his movement from Jaromir, 343—left by Gablenz in possession of Trautenu, 436.
 Gross-Burglitz, 463.
 Grossmann, General, 426.
 Gros-Trotin, 463.
 Grouchy fights battle of Ligny, 214—delays in joining Wellington, 222—his operations criticised, 225—his action in the pursuit, 226.
 Guignes, Napoleon's rapid march upon, 190.
 Gyulai, Count, 300 *et seq.*—reaches Magenta, 336.
 Hadick, General, 59 *et seq.*
 Hamley, Colonel, his 'Operations of War' referred to, 87, 181—on cutting off communications, 99—on operations on communications, 548.
 Hanover, king of, 381.
 Hanover entered by the Prussians, 380.
 Hanoverians, bravery of, 382.
 Hapsburg, house of, its influence, 343—its decline, 344.
 Hartung, 478.
 Haslach, action at, 92.
 Haynau, General, at Brescia, 267.
 Henikstein, Baron, chief of the staff to Benedek, 385, 456.
 Herrenhut, troops posted at, 406.
 Hertweg, General, 419 *et seq.*
 Herwarth, General, 373 *et seq.*—at Strehla, 378—marches upon Dresden, 388—enters Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Plauen, *ib.*—moves up to the frontier, 389—at Hochweesly, 453—instructed to move upon Nechanitz, 455—marches from Smidar upon Nechanitz, 464.
 Hess, General, 331.
 Hesse, Prince Alexander of, 375.

- Heuscheuer hills, the, a range of the Sudetan Alps, 399, 404.
 Hill, General, his corps in Waterloo campaign, 204.
 Hillsberg, actions at, 142, 151.
 Hirschfeld, Prussian forces posted at, 406.
 Hohenbruck, 426 *et seq.*
 Hohenlinden, battle of, 79.
 Hohenlohe, Prince, 124 *et seq.*—his retreat demoralises the Prussian camp, 127—unable to fathom Napoleon's movements, 129.
 Hohenmauth, 403, 472.
 Hohenzollern, General, detached to force the Bochetta, 84.
 Hohenzollern, Prince, nominated for Spanish crown, 510.
 Hohenzollern dynasty, rise of, 342, 344—its inferiority to Hapsburg, 343.
 Holstein, Prince of, 428 *et seq.*
 Holstein, negotiations for the surrender of, 355.
 Hopfenberg, the, 426.
 Horenowes, the village of, 455 *et seq.*
 Horitz, troops directed towards, 404—retreats upon, 410.
 Hongomont, attack on, 222.
 Hühnerwasser, engagement at, 407.
 Humbert, Prince, 499, 501.
 Hungary, war of independence in, 237—insurrection in, suppressed, 350.
 Ibrahim Pasha abandons Syria, 228.
 Iglau, 472, 473.
 Iller, R., 81 *et seq.*
 Ilm, R., 122 *et seq.*
 Indian Mutiny, its effect on England, 276.
 Indrio, the, a line of demarcation, 505.
Inhabers in Austrian army, 361.
 Inn, R., 82 *et seq.*—the valley of, 487.
 Ionian Islands, cession of, 342.
 "Iron Brigade," the, 451.
 Isar, R., 82 *et seq.*
 Isar, R., 393 *et seq.*, 450.
 Isernia, battle at, 341.
 Isonzo, 481 *et seq.*, 505.
 Istria, garrisons of, 478—peninsula of, 485—its coast, 489.
 Itages, night attack at, 186.
 Italians, positions occupied by, in Custozza campaign, 501.
 Italy, campaign in, of 1796, 1 *et seq.*—position of belligerents, 4—invasion of, from France, 28.
 Italy, French army of, 3—its position in the Riviera, 4—its tactics, 8—preliminary actions, 7—victories at Dego, 11—its success, 12—critical position on Adige, 14—the situation on the Po, 22—its organisation in Liguria, 29—its strength at Marengo, 59—the Austrian defeat, 67.
 Italy, forces of, in campaign of 1866, 478.
 Jägerndorff, 400.
 Jaromir, 399, 426 *et seq.*
 Jarvis, Admiral, 7.
 Jasena, 403.
 Jemappes, battle of, 2.
 Jena and Auerstadt, the campaign of, 120—the strength of the Grand Army, 122—inferiority of the Prussians, 124—Napoleon's dispositions, 125—uncertain operations of the Prussians, *ib.*—Napoleon utilises their mistake, 128—Hohenlohe unable to fathom his movements, 129—battle, *ib.*
 Jericek, 464.
 John, Archduke, of Austria, 81.
 Jomini, Baron, his opinion of Buonaparte's conduct of Marengo campaign, 75 *et seq.*—his view of echelon movements, 76.
 Jonak, General, 419—reaches Domkow, 420.
 Josephstadt, 394 *et seq.*, 460.
 Joubert, General, in the Tyrol, 14—killed at Novi, 15.
 Jourdain, General, commands Sambre-and-Meuse army, 2.
 Jung Bunzlau, 1st corps concentrated on, 389—Clam and Crown Prince at, 389—Herwarth detached to, 410.
 Kaim, General, commanding under M6las, 32, 34—left to complete battle of Marengo, 64—routed, 68.
 Kalik brigade, the, 408.
 Kamenitz, headquarters of Prince Frederick Charles, 453.
 Karageorgiwitch, Prince Alexander, deposed, 273.
 Katzauer Berg, the, 426, 432.
 Kaufheuren, General, 84.
 Keimayer, General, 84, 88—at Ansterlitz, 107.
 Keith, Admiral Lord, 30, 51.
 Kellerman, General, commands army of Alps, 2—his successful charge at Marengo, 66, 77.
 Kempton, General, 84.
 Keratry, General, his operations on the Loire, 582.
 Kleist, General, 162 *et seq.*
 Klenau, General, 162.
 Kleny, skirmishes at, 417—retreat of the Austrians on, 420.
 Knebel, 427 *et seq.*
 Kobelnitz, 105 *et seq.*
 Kollowrat, General, 84.
 Königgratz, campaign of, 341 *et seq.*—its lessons, 474 *et seq.*
 Königshof, 393 *et seq.*—Prussian Guard marches from, 463.
 Königberg, 137.
 Königstein, 398.
 Kostaletz, 417, 434 *et seq.*
 Kray, General, opposes Moreau, 16—his position in the Black Forest, 20—defects in his position, *ib.*—his attitude necessarily defensive, 22—exposes his left flank, 24—defeated by Moreau, 35—disgraced and superseded, 79.

- Kriblitz, suburb of Trautenau, 425 *et seq.*
 Kriamanic, General, his plans, 385, 421.
 Kuhn, General, in the Tyrol, 505.
 Kukulna, 461.
 Kukus, 464.
 Kutusow, General, his advance on the Inn, 100—rejects influence of Aulic Council, 101—against joining battle at Austerlitz, 104—his unwillingness to carry out Weirotter's plan, 113—withdraws behind the Littawa, 114.
 La Cava, situation of, 242—the Lombard division ordered to take post at, 243.
 La Harpe, General, commands division of army of Italy, 3—joined by Cervoni, 7—repulses Argentineau, *ib.*—sent against Colli, 9—covers Massena's movements, 11.
 Lahn, valley of, 373.
 La Marmora, General, position of his forces, 236—sent to Mortara, 248—defeated by Benedek at Mortara, 250—suppresses the republican movement in Genoa, 267—his organisation, 480—his experience and judgment, 490.
 Landshut, 399—1st Prussian corps moves for, 403.
 Landskron, 400, 402.
 Landsturm, the Prussian, 366.
 Landwehr system, the, abolished in Austria, 363—accepted in Prussia, 366, 367—its organisation, 516—its military spirit, 402.
 Landwehr of the Guard occupies Prague, 472.
 Langensalza, disaster of, 383.
 Langres, the plateau of, 599.
 Lannes, General, commands corps of Army of Reserve, 41—disperses Austrian outposts, 42—seizes Pavia, 50—moves on Piacenza, 53—fights battle of Montebello, 55—at Marengo, 62 *et seq.*—commands a corps of Rhine army, 80—his force at Austerlitz, 110 *et seq.*—defeats Prince Louis of Prussia, 127—campaign on the Vistula, 133 *et seq.*—defeats Russians at Pultusk, 138—Friedland, 140 *et seq.*
 Lansau, 418, 427.
 La Rothière, battle of, 178.
 Lauenberg sold to Prussia, 342.
 Le Boeuf, General, succeeds Marshal Niel, 514.
 Leck, R., 81 *et seq.*
 Legnago, 87, 482 *et seq.*—fortified, 487—preparations at, 493.
 Leidenberg, 398.
 Leipzig, battle of, 169—entered by Herwarth's troops, 388.
 Leitmeritz, 388 *et seq.*
 Leitomischel, 2d army headquarters, 472.
 Le Mans, battle of, 592—its tactics considered, 593.
 Leopold II., his death, 1.
 Leopold, Archduke, of Austria, in command near Josephstadt, 405—attacked by Steinmetz, 435—falls back upon Skalititz, *ib.*—commands the 8th corps, *ib.*—retreat of, upon Josephstadt, 436.
 L'Estocq, General, 133 *et seq.*
 Levies *en masse*, their uselessness against disciplined troops, 598.
 Liebau, 404 *et seq.*—the 2d army distributed from, to Patschkau, 407—the massing of troops at, 431.
 Liebenau, skirmish at, 407.
 Liebstadt, action at, 143.
 Liechtenstein, General, 107 *et seq.*—473, 495.
 Ligny, battle of, 214—comments on, 215.
 Liguria, French army in, 29.
 Linz, the railway to, 396.
 Lipa, 457 *et seq.*, 465.
 Li Poggi, near Marengo, 62 *et seq.*
 Lissa, defeat of the Italian fleet at, 505.
 Littawa, R., 106 *et seq.*
 Loano, battle of, 2.
 Lobau reached by Horne's division, 388 *et seq.*, 398.
 Lobositz, 389.
 Lobotka, 409.
 Lochenitz, 468.
 Lodi, 52—bridge of, forced, 13.
 Loftus, Lord, English ambassador at Vienna, 285.
 Loire, Army of, operations against, 578—operations commented on, 581—its connection with Army of Paris, 536—theatre of operations, 589—the second army dispersed, 592—second campaign commented on, 592.
 Loison, General, 52 *et seq.*
 Lombardy, routes for invasion of, 28—the war in, 280.
 Lomellina, 314, 322.
 Lorenz rifle, 365.
 Louis XVI. declares war on Germany, 1—his death, 2.
 Löwenfeld, general of the 9th division, 419—his movements, *ib.*
 Lundenburg, 395.
 Luneville, peace of, 79.
 Lusatian Mountains entered by the Saxons, 388.
 Luxemburg question, the, 509.
 Lyons, the Army of, 281.
 Macdonald, Marshal, his division at Montmirail, 183 *et seq.*—his retreat on Nogent, 191—joins Napoleon at Lyons, 202.
 Mack, General, 81—reaches Ulm, 83—deceived by French strategy, 86—courses of action open to him, 87—concentrates at Ulm, 88—his change of front, 88—resolves to retreat on Ulm, 91—determines to await the French, 92—closed in by the French, 94—his obstinacy, 95—defeated, 96—capitulates, 98.

- Macmahon, Marshal, 326—movements of, 335—assaults Cascina Nuova, 337—concentrates on Würth, 528—compelled to retreat, 530—his position at Chalons, 551—resolves to raise investment of Metz, *ib.*—falls back on Sedan, 553—shut in at Sedan, 556—his objective at Sedan considered, 558—his strategy condemned, 559.
- Macquord, General, guards Col di Tenda, 3.
- Magenta, reception of Charles Albert at, 245.
- Magenta campaign, 271 *et seq.*
- Maida, action of, 120.
- Maine, the army of the, 84.
- Maine, the Grand Army on the, 122—Federal troops assembling on the, 379—retreat of the Allies across the, 384.
- Maizières, engagement at, 177.
- Malmebury, Lord, English Minister of Foreign Affairs, 284.
- Malmö, armistice concluded at, 228.
- Manteuffel, General, in the Bohemian campaign, 373—at Harburg, 378—assumes command, 384—placed in command of Army of the South in Franco-Prussian war, 599—pushes to the aid of Von Werder, *ib.*—takes command of Army of North, 609.
- Mantua, besieged, 13—capitulates, 14—the fortress of, 451 *et seq.*—over-concentration at, 490—blockaded, 502.
- Marengo, 13, 56—eve of the battle of, 58—strength of the combatants, 59—description of the field, 60—commencement of the action, 61—the Austrian advantage, 64—arrival of Desaix, 65—the Austrian retreat, 67—loss in the battle, 68—battle commented on, 70.
- Marescot explores the Alpine passes, 37—his report, 38.
- Maria Theresa, her husband opposed by Frederick II., 346.
- Markissa, part of Prussian troops posted at, 406.
- Marmon, Marshal, 65—in command of a corps of Rhine Army, 80—arrives at Dresden, 164—ordered to meet York, 177—his division in Montnirail campaign, 183 *et seq.*—driven behind the Aisne, 195.
- Marne, the campaign on the, 186.
- Maroicica, 478.
- Marshals, Napoleon's, point of interest in their operations, 198.
- Maslowed, 458 *et seq.*—captured, 466.
- Massena, Marshal, his command in Italy, 3—advances up the Altare, 8—sends La Harpe in repulsing Austrians, *ib.*—defeated, 10—operates against Colli, 11—crosses Adige, 14—enters Switzerland, 16—opposed by General Mélas, 17—replaces Championnet as chief of Army of Italy, 18—difficulty of his task, 22—reorganises his command, 30—his gloomy prospects in Liguria, *ib.*—outmanœuvred by Mélas, 34—his exemplary conduct at Genoa, 49.
- Maurice, Prince, of Dessau, 365.
- Mayence, Bernadotte's movement on, a feint, 81—regiments withdrawn from, 373.
- Mecklenburg, Duke of, his command on the Loire, 579 *et seq.*
- Meiningen, 125 *et seq.*, 383.
- Meissen, 388.
- Mélas, General, assumes command of Austrians in Italy, 19—defects in his position, 21—his plans, 31—concentrates his forces, 32—reinforces Kaim in Piedmont, 47—his dispositions for opposing Buonaparte, 48—his retreat from the Riviera, 51—concentrates at Alessandria, 55—his plans at Marengo, 60—his mistake at Marengo, 62—leaves Zach and Kaim to complete the battle, 64—concludes Convention of Alessandria, 69—his strategy reviewed, 72 *et seq.*—his inaction condemned, 74—reputation sacrificed, 75—disgraced and superseded, 79.
- Mellinet, General, at San Martino, 335.
- Memmingen invested by Soult, 93—surrenders, 94.
- Merneck, General, 84.
- Merxleben, position of King George at, 381.
- Mery, Russians defeated at, 191.
- Mettau, R., the, 418 *et seq.*
- Metternich, Prince, his policy in Austria, 349.
- Metz, principal concentration of French army at, 521—its strength, 523—its importance as a protection for the capital, 549—the possibility of holding it, 550—the investing force, 563—thorough measures for investment, 564—supplies cut off by the Germans, 566—attempt to break through the cordon, *ib.*—French driven back into the town, 568—foraging expeditions, 569—council of war, 570—capitulation signed, *ib.*
- Milan surrenders, 13—Charles Albert retreats upon, 233—defeat of Charles Albert at, 228.
- Miletin, 403 *et seq.*—concentration on, reordered, 435.
- Millesimo, 8, 9.
- Mincio, R., 231 *et seq.*, 458—the struggle on the, 477—the country of the, described, 482, 485 *et seq.*
- Modena, 484—the Archduke falls back upon, 504.
- Mohrungen, action at, 143.
- Mokrovous, village on the Bistritz, 464, 465.
- Moldavia and Wallachia, organisation of, discussed, 272—their union, 281.
- Mölldorf, General, 124.
- Moltke, Count von, Chief of the Prussian Staff, 373, 542—Austrian con-

- demnation of his strategy, 548—determines to press Macmahon hard, 554—traces line of investment at Metz, 563—recommends the forcing of the Yonne, 583—his principal defect as a strategist, 614.
- Moligno, 8.
- Moncey, General, crosses St Gothard, 40, 45.
- Mondel, General, arrives at Hohenbruck, 427, 433.
- Monnier, his division at Marengo, 63 *et seq.*
- Montagnana, a point of concentration, 498.
- Montebello, battles of, 55, 315, 317.
- Monte Bruno Pass, 28, 30.
- Monte Cricol, taken by the Italians, 500.
- Monte della Croce, 500 *et seq.*
- Montenegro taken under the protection of France, 273.
- Montenotte, engagement at, 8.
- Montreau, action at, 182, 189.
- Monte Torre held by Govone, 500.
- Monte Vento carried, 500.
- Montmirail, campaign of, 171 *et seq.*, 194 *et seq.*
- Monzambano, Austrian reserve directed to, 500.
- Moravia, Austrian army concentrated in, 386—defensive preparations, 396.
- Moreau, General, appointed to Rhine Army, 15—confronted by Kray, 16—Helvetian army added to his command, 18—his position on the Rhine, 20—defeats Kray, 35—his campaign on the Rhine, 79—evacuates Soissons, 192.
- Morris, General, lecture by, 452.
- Mortara, fighting at, 249 *et seq.*—lessons drawn from the battle of, 253.
- Mortier, General, his division in Montmirail campaign, 183.
- Moscow campaign, 158 *et seq.*
- Mühlhausen occupied, 380.
- Münchengratz, 398 *et seq.*—held by Clam, 407—movement of troops to, 409—7th and 8th divisions halt at, *ib.*—action at, *ib.*—redoubts at, 453.
- Murat, General, commands corps of Army of Reserve, 42—occupies Piacenza, 55—commands reserve cavalry of the Rhine, 80—sent to reconnoitre Bavaria, 88—object of his movement on Leck, 89—occupies Vienna, 101—captures the pontoon-train of Hohenlohe's army, 126—campaign of Pultusk, 138—enters Warsaw, 134—charges the Austrians at Dresden, 165—defeated at Tolentino, 202.
- Muskey Berg, position taken up on, 408—abandoned, 413.
- Mutius, General, commands the 6th Prussian corps, 417 *et seq.*
- Nachod, Pass of, 399—the 5th Prussian corps advances upon, 403—occupation of, by the Prussians, 418—comments on the action of, *ib.*
- Nachod-Alstadt-Wysokow, the defile of, 418.
- Naples captured by the French, 15—evacuation of, by Francis II., 341—advance of Garibaldi on, *ib.*
- Napoleon I., Emperor, appointed to Army of Italy, 2—his instructions, 6—his advance, 8—decides to attack Dego, 9—operations against Colli, 11—repulsed, *ib.*—crisis in his scheme, *ib.*—separates Sardinian contingent from Austrians, 12—critical position on the Adige, 14—First Consul, 17—organises military resources, 18—determines to cross the Alps, 24—receives news of Mélas's advance, 36—orders Moreau to cross the Rhine, 37—conceals real object of army of reserve, 38—leaves for Switzerland, *ib.*—fixes on Great St Bernard route, 40—passage of the Alps, 42 *et seq.*—his position in Italy, 49—his plans for defeating Mélas, 56—his dispositions before Marengo, 58—comes on the field, 63—his stake in the battle, 65—the Convention of Alessandria, 69—his strategy in the Marengo campaign considered, 70 *et seq.*—his delay at Stradella a mistake, 72—Jomini's opinion of his strategy, 75—the value of his victory at Marengo, 79—returns to Paris, 79—crowned emperor, 80—threatened invasion of England, *ib.*—transfers army of Boulogne to Germany, *ib.*—his plans, 81 *et seq.*—invests Ulm, 94—his position at Brunn, 103—at Austerlitz, 106 *et seq.*—Jena campaign, 120 *et seq.*—enters Berlin, 131—alliance with Turkey, 132—campaign on the Vistula, 135—success of his plans, 139—Friedland campaign, 140 *et seq.*—discovers enemy's plan, 143—his strategy commented on, 153—Moscow campaign, 159—concentrates at Dresden, 162—Leipzig campaign, 168—his ascendancy in the field, 180—campaign of Montmirail, 182 *et seq.*—generalship exaggerated, 186—crosses the Marne, 193—Paris capitulates, 193—abdicates, 201—partition of his acquisitions, *ib.*—Waterloo campaign, 202 *et seq.*—his motives at Waterloo analysed, 216—his reasons for delaying the attack, 223—his tactical errors, 224—deported to St Helena, 227—individuality of his military genius, 347.
- Napoleon III., Emperor, favours Piedmont, 275—improves the French navy, 279—his opinions on the state of Italy, 281—how regarded in Germany, 293—attempts a European conference, 342—arrives at Metz, 525—his plan of campaign, 521, 526—falls back upon Sedan, 553—capitulates to the Germans, 557.


- Napoleon, Prince, lands at Villafranca, 280—marries Princess Clothilde, 280—relieved from his office, 283.
- National Guards, the, 479.
- Navarino, 228.
- Nechanitz, a village on the Bistritz, 457 *et seq.*, 461.
- Nedelst, 458, 459, 461.
- Needle-rifle, superiority of, 413.
- Nelase, troops removed from, 403—march of Prussian corps from, 404—corps left on, 416.
- Neuburg, 83 *et seq.*
- Neustadt, 398, 418 *et seq.*
- New Rognitz, 426 *et seq.*
- Ney, Marshal, commands a corps of Rhine army, 80—his movement on Ludwigsburg a feint, 85—his special orders at Giengen, 90—forces the Danube at Elchingen, defeating Reisch, 94—pushes into the Tyrol against Archduke John, 100—turns flank of Prussians, 126—captures Magdeburg, 130—ordered to the Vistula, 133—Friedland campaign, 140 *et seq.*—his unadvised attack on Königsberg, 141—recalled by Napoleon, 142—takes command of Army of the North, 168—uncertainty about his orders, 212—his attack at Waterloo, 222.
- Niel, Marshal, his army reforms, 511.
- Niemes, 398, 407.
- Nimptsch, General, at Marengo, 62 *et seq.*
- Noisseville, action at, 568, 577.
- Nordlingen, 87.
- "North, the armed neutrality of the," 79.
- Novara campaign, 229 *et seq.*—scene of operations described, 246—its position and history, 255—Sardinian concentration at, 256—position of armies after the battle, 254—remarks on the campaign of, 270.
- Ober Altstadt, 425.
- Oberanowitch, Michael, 273.
- Ober-Prausnitz, 436.
- Odenwald, the, 8th Prussian corps concentrated on, 384.
- Offensive operations, requisites for their success, 81.
- "Officer of the Army of the Rhine," his opinions of the movement on Sedan, 557, 560.
- Oglio, 479, 492, 504.
- Old Rognitz, 428.
- Ollech, the brigade, 419.
- Olmütz, 101 *et seq.*—concentration suggested on, 385—retreat of the army to, 472—Vienna line cut at, 473.
- Oltshan occupied by the Russians, 104.
- Opatowitz, 473.
- Opocno, 403, 418.
- Orange, Prince of, his corps in Waterloo campaign, 204.
- O'Reilly, Austrian General, 52, 54 *et seq.*—commands right column at Marengo, 61 *et seq.*
- Orsini, conspiracy of, 275.
- Osterode, 140 *et seq.*
- Oswiecin, 400.
- Ott, General, his position in Liguria, 33—invests Genoa, 48—reduces it, 51—defeated at Montebello, 55—his division at Marengo, 62 *et seq.*—carries Castel Ceriolo, 68.
- Oudinot, Marshal, his division at Austerlitz, 112.
- Owl Mountains, the, a range of the Sudetian Alps, 399.
- Padua, 483—detachments pushed to, 505.
- Papal States, occupation of, 341.
- Pardubitz, 389 *et seq.*, 403, 469 *et seq.*
- Paretto, 8.
- Paris capitulates to the Allies, 198—entered by the Allies, 226—revolution in, 230—treaty of, 273—the Germans march upon, 560—orders for the investment of, 561—siege of, 611—capitulates, 612.
- Parschnitz, 425 *et seq.*
- Pavia, 27, 52.
- Peninsula, commencement of war in, 186.
- Pernissa, attack at, 500.
- Peronne, its position, 244, 260—captured by the Prussians, 610.
- Perponcher, General, occupies Quatre Bras, 209.
- Persano, Admiral, commander of the Italian fleet, 479.
- Peschiera an intrenched camp, 487—over-concentration at, 490.
- Piacenza, 27, 52—occupied by Murat, 55, 69—Victor Emmanuel's headquarters at, 479.
- Piave or Tagliamento, 483.
- Piedmont, routes of invasion, 28—its eastern frontier, 240—invaded by the Austrian forces, 244—its position towards Austria, 275—its preparations, 291.
- Pilati, General, 61, 66.
- Pirna, Saxons fall back upon, 388.
- Pizighitona fortified, 486.
- Plonaky, 434.
- Po, the valley of the, French position in, 22—its importance as a theatre of war, 25—natural features, 26.
- Po, R., 232 *et seq.*, 303, 481 *et seq.*
- Podol, action of, 408.
- Pola, coast defences at, 485—Austrian naval squadron at, 489.
- Poland, overtures made by Napoleon for restoration of, 132.
- Pölitz, skirmishes at, 417.
- Pope, the present, elevation of the, 230—his flight, 233.
- Poschaker's brigade, 451.
- Posen, 136 *et seq.*
- Posoritzer Post-house, the, 105.
- Pragmatic Sanction, the, 845.
- Prague, the Treaty of, 73.
- Prausnitz, position of Mondel's brigade at, 433.


- Pratzen, 106 *et seq.*
 Prelaues, 461.
 Preper, Horn moves forward to, 408.
 Presburg, Peace of, 118.
 Prim, General, letters attributed to, 467.
 Probus, march of Herwarth upon, 466.
 Provera, General, his position at Cosarsia, 8—surrenders, 9—defeated at Mantua, 14.
 Prowodow, 418-420.
 Prussia joins Austria against France, 101—her annexation of Hanover, 121—her position after Jena, 131—the Court at Königsberg, 133—its army before Pultusk, 137—her enmity against France, 172—her attitude in 1859, 296, 297—prepares for war, 342—her alliance with Italy, *ib.*, 358 *et seq.*—provinces of, 368—her forces in the Königgratz campaign, 364 *et seq.*—the monarchy of, before Königgratz, 375—concludes armistice with Austria, 384—declines negotiations, 470—annexations to, 473—her position after Königgratz, 508—her army organisation, 514—strength of her field army, 516—war declared with France, 518—composition of its army on French frontier, 522—France invaded, 538.
 Prussian Chambers, conflict with, 351.
 Prussian army, its inexperience in 1806, 124—of 1806, its entire rout, 180—compared with Austrians, 370—superiority of its artillery in Franco-Prussian war, 616.
 Prybyszewski, General, 107 *et seq.*
 Pultusk, campaign of, 131 *et seq.*
 Puls, 478 *et seq.*
 Puntowitz, 106 *et seq.*
 Quadrilateral, the Italian, 232 *et seq.*
 Quatre Bras, battle of, 214.
 Racitz, 461.
 Radetsky, Marshal, his mistake at Novara, 75—his career, 231—moves from Milan to San Angelo, 240—his operations at Novara, 264, 265—concludes armistice with Victor Emmanuel, 266.
 Railways, influence of, upon military operations, 395—in Italy, 486—Franco-Prussian system, 524.
 Rain, 89 *et seq.*
 Ramming, General, commands the 6th Austrian corps, 404—his directions, 405—ordered up to probe the Prussian movements, 417—ordered to occupy Skalitx, 418—his attack at Nachod, 420—his defeat, 435—relieved by the 8th corps, *ib.*
 Ramorino, General, commands a brigade under Chrzanowski, 236—his personal history, 242 *et seq.*—his operations, 243.
 Rastadt, regiments withdrawn from, 373.
 Ratibor, 400, 449.
 Reggio, 484.
 Reich, early history of the, 343.
 Reichenberg, 398 *et seq.*—the Prussian army concentrated at, 406.
 Reinertz, 403, 422.
 Renault, the division of, 281.
 Rendsberg abandoned by the Danes, 342.
 Republic, the French, declares war against Russia, 15—its restoration in France, 349.
 Rezonville, battle of, 542—point of tactical interest in, 544.
 Rhine, the Army of the, 80 *et seq.*
 Rhine, the Confederation of, 120—dissolved, 170.
 Riesa, 388.
 Riviera, the French in the, 3.
 Rivoli, battle of, 14.
 Rocavino, commandant at Dego, 9.
 Rodich, General, 478.
 Rome, democracy established at, 233.
 Rosenzweig, brigade of, 420.
 Roveredo, bridge at, 482.
 Rovigo, 483 *et seq.*
 Rowensako, 409.
 Rüchel, General, 124 *et seq.*
 Rumburg, 389, 398—Herwarth arrives at, 406.
 Russia, expedition against France, 16—withdraws from the war, 17—makes war on Turkey, 1807, 131—sends ultimatum to Napoleon, 157—invades Finland, 157.
 Russian army, its movements in Germany, 102—its condition, 136—withdraws behind the Pregel, 139—its strength at Bialla, 142—defeated at Mery, 191.
 Rüstow, Von, his opinion of the French and Prussian staffs, 620.
 Saale, R., 122 *et seq.*
 Saar, 403—cavalry skirmish near, 472.
 Saarbrück, action at, 528.
 Sadowa, 456, 461, 465.
 Salionze held by the reserve division, 600.
 Salzburg, treaty concluded at, 355.
 San Giorgi bombarded, 505.
 San Giuliano, 60 *et seq.*—Dessaix's position at, 65.
 San Martino a point of concentration, 493.
 Sardinia, its contingent with the Austrians, 3—detached by Buonaparte, 12, 270—at the Treaty of Paris, 274.
 Sardinian campaign, 229.
 Sardinian army, its position after Novara, 254.
 Sassello, 3.
 Savona, 6, 28, 51, 69—centre of Massena's line, 33.
 Savoy, the Duke of, commands the reserve, 244—joins Durando at Mortara,

- 247—retreats from Mortara, 249—position of, at Novara, 261—proclaimed king, 266.
- Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Duke of, 380.
- Saxon army, its numbers and position, 384, 385—its march from Prelau to Bunzlau, 389.
- Saxony, the Crown Prince of, 393—ordered to hold Münchengratz, 408—directed to fall back, 435.
- Saxony converted into a kingdom, 132 *et seq.*
- Saxony, proposed seizure of, 376, 474—entered by the Prussians, 388—compelled to pay a war indemnity, 474.
- Scharnhorst, General, system devised by, 365.
- Schätzlar, 425.
- Schlaney, 422.
- Schlappanitz, 105 *et seq.*
- Schleswig-Holstein proclaims independence, 228—hostilities renewed with it, 271.
- Schluckenau, 389, 398, 406.
- Sohömberg, 1st corps assembles at, 425.
- Schurz, 426, 427.
- Schwarza, R., 106 *et seq.*
- Schwarzenberg, General, 84, 162 *et seq.*—begins attack at Dresden, 164—crosses the French frontier, 171—his military character, 173—his indecision, 190—his reasons for advancing on Paris, 200—Prince Felix, victory of, 351.
- Schweidnitz, 399, 449.
- Scudier at Rovigo, 493.
- Sebottendorf, 3, 7.
- Sedan, capitulation of, 557.
- Segur, Comte de, 96.
- Seidenberg, part of Prussian troops posted at, 406.
- Sendrasitz, 459.
- Senftenberg, 403.
- Sens taken by Prince Würtemberg, 188.
- Serrurier on the Tanaro, 3.
- Servia, 273.
- Servigny retaken by the Prussians, 567.
- Sesia, 321, 326, 327, 339.
- Sezanne, action at, 198.
- "Shell Trap" fortresses, 619.
- Sichrow, skirmish at, 407, 408.
- Sicily, abandonment of, by the Neapolitan troops, 341.
- Sigismund, Elector, 344.
- Silesia invaded by Frederick the Great, 345—boundaries of, 395.
- Simplon route, 28, 38.
- Sirtori, division of, 500.
- Skalitz, 399, 405, 417, 418, 419, 423, 427.
- Slatina, 402.
- Smiritz, the village of, on the Elbe, 457.
- Smith, Admiral Sir Sydney, 120.
- Soissons surrendered by Moreau, 192—failure of attack on, 194.
- Sokolnitz, 105 *et seq.*
- Solaroli, 236 *et seq.*
- Solferino, defeat of the Austrians at, 340 *et seq.*
- Solm's cavalry, 420.
- Solnitz, 402.
- Somma Campagna, 498 *et seq.*—fortified, 505.
- Somma Riviera, battle of, 228.
- Sona, 498.
- Sonnaz, General, at Cremona, 479.
- Sonow, 418.
- Soor, 436, 446.
- Soult, Marshal, commands right wing of Massena's army, 30, 33—commands a corps of Rhine army, 80—takes Memmingen, 94—his orders at Austerlitz, 109—holds village of Pratzer, 114—ordered to the Vistula, 133—Friedland campaign, 140 *et seq.*—beaten at Toulouse, 201.
- Spichern, action at, 531.
- Spigno, 8, 10.
- 'Staats Anzeiger,' the, its criticisms on Loire campaign, 581, 582, 584.
- St Barbe, action at, 569.
- St Bernard route, the Great, 28, 39—the Little, *ib.*, 39.
- St Cyr, Carra, 64 *et seq.*—holds Dresden, 168.
- St Dizier, 177.
- St Gothard route, 28, 38, 40.
- St Jean, Mont, 220.
- St Johann's Capelle, 427, 428.
- St Lucia carried, 500.
- St Priest, General, killed, 195.
- Starkstadt, 399 *et seq.*
- States, conference of the, at Berlin, 350.
- Staudenz, 436.
- Steinmetz, General, at Nachod, 417 *et seq.*—his operations at Schweinschädel, 436—his command in Franco-Prussian war, 535 *et seq.*
- Stettin, headquarters of the 2d Prussian corps, 373.
- Stolken, 406.
- Stradella, the defile of, 29, 52.
- Stralsund blockaded by Mortier, 141.
- Strasburg capitulates, 678.
- Stuart, Sir Charles, proposes to land troops in France, 22.
- Styrian Mountains, the, 487, 489.
- Suchet commands Massena's left wing, 29, 33—retreats behind the Var, 35—defeats Elsnitz, 51.
- Sudetian Mountains, divisions of the, 399.
- Suez, Isthmus of, 278, 279.
- Suwarow, Marshal, enters Switzerland, 16.
- Sweden, king of, takes the field against Napoleon, 101.
- Tactics, superiority of Prussian, illustrated, 529, 532.
- Tanaro, operations in valley of, 6, 8.
- Tann, General von der, his action at Coulmiers, 579.
- Täpflitz, 388.
- Taunsein, General, 125 *et seq.*
- Taxis, Prince, repulsed by the French, 54, 459.

- Tegethoff, Admiral, defeats the Italians, 505.
 Tellnitz, 106, 112.
 Teleschen, 388.
 Tenda, Col di, 28, 30.
 Theresienstadt, 396, 400, 403.
 Thielmann, General, attacks Grouchy, 225.
 Thiers, M., his opinion of Buonaparte's conduct at Marengo, 76 *et seq.*—his unjust reflections on Marshal Ney, 219.
 Thorn, 134 *et seq.*
 Thun, 405, 418, 459.
 Thuringia, the forest of, 122.
 Thurn, General, Austrian commander in Italy, 239—marches for St Giorgio, 247—and Torre di Robbio, 257—ordered to Confienza, 258—his movements before Novara, 264, 265.
 Thurreaud, General, crosses Mont Cenis, 41—carries Susa, 45.
 Ticinus, the principal passages of, 236—crossed by the Austrians, 229 *et seq.*, 280, 303.
 Tilait, Peace of, 156.
 Tione, the, 500.
 Torgan, 388 *et seq.*
 Trauteman, 399 *et seq.*—battle at, 425—comments on the action of, 429.
 Trebesow, 435.
 Trent, the bridge at, 482.
 Trieste, the lagune of, 489.
 Trochu, General, his measures for defence of Paris, 583 *et seq.*
 Troppan, 400.
 Trotinka, 461.
 Turbigo, 330.
 Turin, resumption of hostilities at, 233.
 Turnau, 398 *et seq.*—passage of the Iser at, 407.
 Tyrol, South, garrisons of the, 473.
 Tyrol, march of Italian army across the, 489.
 Uhlans, 473.
 Ukra, passage of the, forced, 138.
 Ulm, campaign of, introduction, 79—the theatre of operations, 82—Mack reaches Ulm, 83—position of, 24th September, *ib.*—courses open to Mack, 87—position of, 8th October, 89—Ney's special instructions, 90—French forces close around, 92—Mack's obstinacy, 95—battle, 96—capitulation of Austrian army, *ib.*—Austrian loss, 98—reflections on campaign, *ib.*
 Union, suspension of the German, demanded, 350.
 Unter Bautzen, 410.
 Urban, General, ordered to Piacenza, 312—retreat of, 316.
 Valenza, 27, 29.
 Valleggio, headquarters at, 499, 505.
 Valmy, 1.
 Vandamme, General, his operations on the Sambre, 208 *et seq.*
 Var, the, 28, 33.
 Vauchamps retaken by the French, 185.
 Vendée, insurrection in the, 19.
 Vendôme, fighting at, 539.
 Venetia, occupation of, 341—cession of, 505.
 Venice besieged by the Austrians, 233—capitulation of, 271.
 Venice, the coast defences on, 485.
 Vercelli, 309.
 Verona, passages at, 482—position of, 487—communications with, 494.
 Vicenza, 487—detachments pushed to, 505.
 Victor, Marshal, commands corps of Army of Reserve, 41—at Marengo, 62 *et seq.*—fights battle of Montebello, 55—arrives at Dresden, 164.
 Victor Emmanuel, 266—interview with Radetsky, *ib.*—concludes armistice with Radetsky, *ib.*—sends a contingent to the Crimea, 274—opens the Piedmontese Chambers, 280—opposes Garibaldi, 341—defeat of, 491—his operations, 495, 496.
 Vienna, campaign of, 101—peace of, 157—again occupied, *ib.*—Congress of, 201—peace of, 342—communication with, 394.
 Villafranca, treaty of, 340—Pulz falls back upon, 497.
 Vionville, battle of, 535.
 Vistula, campaign on, 133 *et seq.*—surrender of fortresses on, 141.
 Vivo, action at, 12.
 Vogel von Falkenstein occupies Minden, 379.
 Voltri, action at, 7.
 Volturno, battle at, 341.
 Von der Mülbe commands a reserve corps, 373.
 Von Roon, General, Prussian Minister of War, 373.
 Walcheren expedition, 157.
 Waldenburg, 388.
 Waldstätten, brigade of, 420.
 Walewski, Count, 282.
 Wamberg, 403.
 War, Seven Years', the, 346.
 War of Liberation, the, 365.
 War, Thirty Years', beginning of, 344.
 Warsaw entered by Murat, 134.
 Waterloo, campaign of, 202 *et seq.*—courses open to Napoleon, 204—strength and organisation of the armies, *ib.*—theatre of war described, 208—French advance on Charleroi commented on, 210—Wellington's inactivity, 212—balance of strategical success in favour of Napoleon, *ib.*—movement of 16th June, 213—Ligny, 214—Quatre Bras, *ib.*—operations of 17th June, 217—the strength of the forces, 220—chief events of the action, 222—comments on the battle, 223—losses, 224.
 Weiberkränke, 426.
 Weidenfeld, General, 59, 66 *et seq.*

- Weimar, Duke of, 124.
 Weirotter, General, his plan for attacking the French, 105—his plan discussed, 116.
 Weissenburg, battle of, 527.
 Welchow, 427, 454.
 Wellington, Duke of, defeats Soult at Toulouse, 201—his position in Belgium, 204—his inactivity at Brussels criticised, 212—meets Blucher at Bry, 214—his position at Quatre Bras, 217—retreat on Waterloo, 218—his subdivision of force criticised, 224.
 Wenzelsberg, 418, 419.
 Werder, General von, in observation at Dijon, 597—his night march on Belfort, 599—his dispositions at Belfort, 601.
 Wernick, General, his retreat, 97.
 Werniz, 82 *et seq.*
 Werther, Baron, Russian ambassador at Vienna, 282.
 Weser, the, 379.
 Westphalia, peace of, 344.
 Wetzlar, regiments left at, 373.
 Wildenschwerdt, 403.
 William, Archduke, 459.
 William I., King of Prussia, reaches Gitschin, 453—takes command of army, 464—leads the advance, 469—reaches Mayence, 523—commands in person at Rezonville, 543.
 Willisen, General, theory of, 488.
 Wimpffen, General, commander of the Austrian detachments, 266, 427, 428.
 Windischgratz, 427, 429.
 Winzingerode, General, allows Napoleon to occupy Craonne, 194.
 Wittgenstein, General, 162 *et seq.*
 Woher, General, Austrian commander in Italy, 239—his operations, 244—remains with the headquarters at Gropello, 248—his movements before Novara, 264.
 Wörth, battle of, 528 *et seq.*
 Wratislaw, General, Austrian commander in Italy, 239—occupies Zerboło, 244—engaged at Gambolo, 248—moves to Civaiegna, 256—ordered to Vercelli, 253—his movements before Novara, 264, 265.
 Wrchowin, 418.
 Wrede, General von, his creditable disobedience of orders, 181.
 Wukassowich, General, detached to reinforce Argenteau, 8—ordered to strengthen Dego, 9—retreats to Aogui, 10—to Mantua, 52—Zurich, battle of, 17—his policy, 21.
 Wurmsr, General, succeeds Beaulieu in Austrian command, 13.
 Württemberg, Prince of, commands the Prussian Guard, 417—accompanies Plonsky, 484.
 Württemberg, Duke of, 124.
 Würzburg, battle at, 384.
 Wysokow, situation of, 418.
 Yéres, the French position upon, 188.
 York, Prussian general, 171 *et seq.*
 Zabres, 463.
 Zach, General, chief of the Austrian staff, his plan of the Ligurian campaign, 34—left to complete battle of Marengo, 64—routed, and surrenders, 66—sent by the First Consul to negotiate with Mélas, 69.
 Zastanikovic, General, at Treviso, 493.
 Zastrow, General, 596—his operations against Bourbaki, 598.
 Zehrow, 409.
 Zeppelin, Count, his reconnoitring party, 613.
 Zittau, 398 *et seq.*—troops posted at, 406—passes of, 449.
 Znaym, 473.
 Zuchmantel, 403—the affair at, 414.





**This book should be returned to
the Library on or before the last date
stamped below.**

**A fine of five cents a day is incurred
by retaining it beyond the specified
time.**

Please return promptly.

~~MAR 11 1907~~

Widener Library

001796531



3 2044 087 956 355